By Milan F. Satcher, Steven Belenko, Anthony Coetzer-Liversage, Khirsten J. Wilson, Michael R. McCart, Tess K. Drazdowski, Amanda Fallin-Bennett, Nickolas Zaller, Alysse M. Schultheis, Aaron Hogue, Noel Vest, Ashli J. Sheidow, Brandon del Pozo, Dennis P. Watson, Patrick F. Hibbard, Randy Stevens & L. A. R. Stein 

At the intersection of drug policy, the opioid crisis, and fragmented care systems, persons with opioid use disorder (OUD) in the United States are significantly vulnerable to contact with the criminal legal system (CLS). In CLS settings, provision of evidence-based treatment for OUD is variable and often secondary to punitive approaches. Linkage facilitation at every touch point along the CLS Sequential Intercept Model has potential to redirect persons with OUD into recovery-oriented systems of care, increase evidence-based OUD treatment connections, and therefore reduce CLS re-exposure risk. Research in this area is still nascent. Thus, this narrative review explores the state of the science on linkage facilitation across the varied CLS contexts, including general barriers, facilitators, and opportunities for using linkage facilitation for OUD treatment and related services. Following the CLS Sequential Intercept Model, the specific CLS contexts examined include community services, police encounters, the courts (pre- and post-disposition), incarceration (pre-trial detention, jail, and prison), reentry (from jails, prisons, and unified systems), and community supervision (probation and parole). Examples of innovative linkage facilitation interventions are drawn from the Justice Community Opioid Innovation Network (JCOIN). Areas for future research and policy change are highlighted to advance the science of linkage facilitation for OUD services in the CLS.

l. Health & Justice (2024) 12:36

By Marie Nougier, Adrià Cots Fernández & Dania Putri

April 2021 marks the five-year anniversary of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs. This report aims to take stock of progress made on the implementation of the operational recommendations included in the UNGASS Outcome Document. Using desk-based research, and drawing on data and analysis from UN reports, academia, civil society and the community, the report focuses on six critical areas: public health, development, human rights, civil society engagement, UN agency collaboration and cooperation, and drug policy evaluation. While some progress has been undeniably made, the research gathered in this report shows that in the last five years the gap between policy commitments on paper and meaningful change on the ground has continued to widen.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2021. 115p.

By David Restrepo

On August 25th, 2020, a group of Colombian legislators challenged one of the last drug policy taboos left standing since the start of the current prohibition era: they proposed the legal regulation of both coca and cocaine.

The bill, Proyecto de Ley No. 236, unexpectedly passed the first round of committee-level congressional debate in 2021, but was archived by Colombia’s conservative-dominated legislature. Its opponents claimed that legalisation would unleash drug use and a crime wave, kicking the country back to its Pablo Escobarera international pariah status (Colombian Congress, 2021).

Despite its shelving, the bill’s relative success in Congress reflects a growing understanding that, no matter what governments do, drugs are here to stay. If a drug-free world is not an option, societies are better served by making peace with drugs via regulations that help us contain their harms and maximise their benefits.

Sensible drug policy today means leaving behind disproven measures like eradication, crop substitution, drug seizures and incarceration, which do little to prevent “drug addictions”, henceforth referred to as substance use disorders or SUDs. Like child abuse, punitive drug policy achieves the opposite of education. It unleashes highly profitable, powerful underground markets where drug use is promoted and glamourised, and violence and corruption become the business model (Durán-Martínez, 2018). Punitive drug policy channels public and private resources towards attacking rather than helping marginalised populations whose livelihoods depend on the least lucrative and most unsafe rungs of the illicit drug supply chain.

In Colombia, the Amazon basin, and South East Asia, conflicts and economies made possible by cocaine or opioid prohibition do not just victimise people: they are also speeding the demise of mega-biodiverse ecosystems, tugging the world towards the cliff of runaway climate change (McSweeney, 2015). In Mexico and Central America, homicidal drug wars are destabilising democracies and sending out waves of refugees, vulnerable to exploitation and xenophobia even as they attempt to rebuild their lives (Junger & Quested, 2020; Agren, 2020). In Central Asia, illicit opium helped fund the Taliban’s reconquest of Afghanistan, after trillions of dollars spent on the US war on terror (Felbab-Brown, 2021). In the Global North, punitive drug laws reinforce ethnic and racial profiling, turn low-income neighbourhoods into ganglands, and promote the mass incarceration of people of colour (Davis, 2003).

Colombia’s bill does not endorse cocaine use. Neither does it overlook the risk of turning coca and cocaine into for-profit industries like alcohol and tobacco. It is unwise to hand private corporations unchecked control of the plants and molecules that can inebriate and damage our mental health, but also, in the right circumstances, connect us with others, spark our creativity, and even allow us to experience altered states of mind that facilitate personal and community growth (Griffiths et al., 2019). Rather, managing the power, risk and benefits of psychoactive substances demands careful regulatory design that harnesses democratic accountability and knowhow from as diverse an array of human experience as possible.

Colombia’s bill captures the evidence-based perspective that regulations can help contain the self-serving excesses of legal markets. They can delay the age of drug initiation, promote moderation and encourage pro-social norms. They do this whilst enabling the emergence of legal industries that pay taxes, provide legal employment and generate medical and social benefits. If done via controls that prevent publicity and reduce profit motives, regulation can minimise drug-related harms even if drug use were to rise, which is not a foregone conclusion. Overall, welldesigned regulatory regimes for psychoactive substances offer the possibility of a better cost-benefit balance for society than prohibition appears to do.

Colombia’s proposal laid the groundwork for a regulatory architecture that has social justice at its core. It recognised the authority of Indigenous and local government institutions to shape the low-potency, whole coca leaf market, thereby providing an alternative to corporate takeover. This would honour the collective property rights to coca that generations of Indigenous people have fought for, whilst benefitting small coca farmers and integrating beneficial coca leaf uses into society.

Following these equity and inclusion principles could transform coca and cocaine markets from a source of devastation to a potential driver of regenerative, intercultural development, not to mention a form of long-overdue reparations for ethnic and small farmer communities.

The proponents of Colombia’s coca and cocaine regulation bill knew it would likely fail on its first try, but challenging this longstanding taboo could nudge people to conceive another world (Marulanda, 2020). By unlocking the imagination, new strategies might emerge, and this might ultimately change the political balance of power that blocks legal regulation.

This essay seeks to build on that approach. It comments on the bill’s comprehensive proposals: the result of a group of legislators, NGOs, and local communities coming together to condense decades of lessons from Colombia’s drug war trenches. It also imagines what the legal regime would look like from farming to consumption, assessing the outcomes in terms of the potential benefits and costs. The essay closes by exploring insights for overcoming the forces that doomed the bill: a stagnant political economy that sustains the war on coca and cocaine as one of the deadliest and most environmentally destructive of all the drug wars.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2022. 34p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Colombia’s counternarcotics policy choices have profound impact on consolidating peace in the wake of the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and on the building of an effective state. Strategies of forced or voluntary eradication of coca crops have proven ineffective. As evidence from around the world shows, a long-term comprehensive effort to promote alternative livelihoods for coca growers — integrated into rural development and supported by well-designed interdiction efforts, with eradication delayed until these alternative livelihoods are generating sustainable income — has the best prospects for producing peace and a capable state and for reducing drug production.

To achieve sustainable and robust reduction of illicit crop cultivation, Colombia must thus expand its timeline of drug policy and state-building intervention well beyond 15 years. To achieve any viable transformative effects, it will also have to concentrate resources to selected zones of strategic intervention and gradually connect them and expand them to encompass larger areas in state intervention efforts.

The alternative livelihoods approach requires a concerted effort to build international support, particularly with the United States. It also requires countering the objections of Colombia’s political right. Arguments can be framed around the ineffective and counterproductive outcomes of forced eradication, the demonstrated benefits of comprehensive alternatives livelihood combined with well-designed interdiction to reduce the power of criminal groups, and other counternarcotics priorities in the United States.

A zero-coca conceptualization that insists on eradication first and conditions development aid on prior eradication of coca jeopardizes peace-building and statebuilding. In Colombia and elsewhere in the world, it has consistently failed to produce a sustainable reduction of coca cultivation. Forced eradication undermines the peace deal with the FARC and the broader legitimacy and presence of the state by jeopardizing the state’s ability to establish meaningful presence in areas formerly dominated by nonstate armed groups and radicalizing communities and cocalero (coca cultivator) movements. Aerial spraying will only compound these problems; drones will not redress the negative political effects, even if somewhat increasing the precision of spraying.

Washington, DC: Brookings Foreign Policy , 2020. 30p.

By Harm Reduction International

This report follows development aid being spent on narcotics control around the world. It calls on governments and donors to divest from punitive and prohibitionist drug control regimes which undermine their other health and human rights commitments, and invest in programmes which prioritise community, health and justice.

Mass incarceration and overpopulated prisons. Death sentences. Civilians killed during counter-narcotics operations by specialised police units. Poor farmers’ livelihoods destroyed by aerial spraying and other ‘forced eradication’ of crops they keep. Rights violated by forced treatment programmes, discrimination, and barriers to health care. These are among the consequences of the global war on drugs that has particularly impacted poor, marginalised, and racialised communities around the world.

The evidence base for such negative impacts is now vast and widely recognised internationally, including by United Nations (UN) agencies and in reports published by the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Also well-documented internationally are the benefits of alternative approaches to drug policy – including harm reduction initiatives that advance, rather than undermine, public health and human rights – and the lack of evidence that punitive and prohibitionist approaches to drugs have actually curbed drug use. Despite this, vast amounts of international funding continue to flow to punitive drug control activities, while harm reduction remains vastly underfunded.

There is a long history of drug policy being used by world powers to strengthen and enforce their control over other populations, and to target specific communities. Racist and colonial dynamics continue to this day, with wealthier governments, led by the US, spending billions of taxpayer dollars around the world to bolster or expand punitive drug control regimes and related law enforcement. These funding flows are out of pace with existing evidence, as well as international development, health, and human rights commitments, including the goal to end AIDS by 2030. They rely on and reinforce systems that disproportionately harm Black, Brown and Indigenous people worldwide.

In order to decolonise drug policy and advance health- and human rights-based approaches, the material and financial bases of punitive drug control must be revealed and redirected. This report contributes to these goals by synthesising existing research on international financial flows for punitive drug control, and adding new analysis of data on official development assistance (ODA) spent by aid donors and institutions on “narcotics control”. These specific, public budgets are supposed to support international development, including health goals and global poverty reduction. This spending is more commonly associated with initiatives to vaccinate and educate children, for instance – but project-level data included in this report shows that some of it has also gone to supporting things like undercover policing, “intelligence-led profiling”, and efforts to increase arrests and prosecutions for drug-related offences.

LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

Each year, aid donors report their spending to the OECD which maintains what is called its Creditor Reporting System (CRS). According to the most recent update of the data in this system (from mid-December 2022, covering spending through the end of 2021), more than USD 930 million of aid money was spent on “narcotics control” projects in countries around the world in the ten years from 2012-2021. This includes spending by dozens of donors – led by the US, EU, Japan, and the UK. Tens of millions of dollars of this total (at least USD 68 million over the period studied) were spent in countries that have the death penalty for drug-related offences. This raises particularly serious concerns about whether and how aid budgets have bolstered regimes that execute people, building upon previous HRI research in this area. While some donors, such as the UK, have spent less aid this way in recent years, others have increased it – most notably the US, where such spending rose significantly in 2021, in the first year of President Joe Biden’s administration.

Though data availability and transparency vary across projects and donors, this analysis reveals how aid money has supported approaches that undermine global development goals and “do no harm” principles. Put simply: aid funding is supposed to help poor and marginalised communities, while punitive drug control regimes have been shown to disproportionately negatively affect them. This makes such regimes a poor fit for such important yet limited development budgets. This research also shows how these donors have numerous opportunities – as well as obligations – to change how they invest in global drug policy by funding under-resourced, evidence-based, and health- and human rights-centred harm reduction efforts instead, worldwide.

London: HRI, 2023. 38p.

By Miriam Cavazos Hernandez and Balasurya Sivakumar

We examine the effect of natural resource shocks on violence by drug cartels at the municipality level in rural Mexico from 2003 to 2017. For this, we use an Instrumental Variable setup by instrumenting our main explanatory variable vegetation density with rainfall. Vegetation density is an indicator for natural resource shocks and reflects the “greenness” in a particular area which is considered as an indicator of land productivity. Our main finding is that negative shocks in vegetation density increase homicides. This negative shock could imply crop failures resulting in bad economic outcomes for people in rural areas thereby pushing people to engage with violent drug cartels. Additionally, in order to confirm the main results we explore possible effects that natural resource shocks have on drug cartel presence, seizure of illegal drugs and other drug-related criminal activities. These results further confirm the negative relationship between natural resource shocks and violence by drug cartels. Our findings highlight the dynamics in the operation of the drug cartels and are relevant for understanding the determinants of conflict in rural Mexico.   

Lund, Sweden: Lund University, 2022. 48p.

By Jeffrey A. Singer and Sophia Heimow 

  Every state except Alaska has laws that criminalize the possession and/or sale of paraphernalia for the consumption of illicit drugs. State-level drug paraphernalia laws prevent people who use those drugs from accessing the means to reduce the risk of infection or overdose. This makes nonmedical drug use even more dangerous because the laws often prevent access to clean needles and syringes along with products to test drugs for deadly contaminants. These laws are meant to discourage illicit drug use. Instead, they produce avoidable disease and death. Drug prohibition puts peaceful, voluntary drug users at risk of losing their liberty and often their lives. Paraphernalia laws similarly increase the risk that users will lose their lives. Some states have amended their laws to permit harmreduction programs and tools. For example, many states allow syringe services programs (also called SSPs or “needle exchange programs”) to operate within narrowly defined parameters. The goal of drug paraphernalia policy should be to save lives by reducing the risks of overdose and disease. This means removing government barriers to obtaining and distributing clean syringes and drug testing equipment. Because Alaska leaves residents free to purchase syringes and other paraphernalia in any quantity, anyone can operate an SSP and implement other harm-reduction measures. States should follow Alaska’s lead by repealing their drug paraphernalia laws so that programs aimed at reducing overdoses and disease can proliferate and succeed.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2022. 24p.

By Jeffrey A. Singer

Dr. Rahul Gupta, the White House director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, stated the Biden administration would be “prioritizing harm-reduction practices because these are proven, cost-effective and evidence-based methods that work to save lives.”1 Overdose prevention centers (OPCs) are a successful harm-reduction strategy that has been saving lives in 16 developed countries—including the United States, where such facilities operate in defiance of the law. OPCs, also known as safe consumption sites or drug consumption rooms, began in Europe in the mid-1980s.2 Governments and harm-reduction organizations now operate OPCs in much of Europe, Canada, Mexico, and Australia. Unfortunately, a federal law that prosecutors and harm reduction opponents call the “crack house” statute (21 U.S.C. Section 856) makes them illegal in the United States.3 Some OPCs in the United States operate in the shadows. Underground OPCs have been providing services since at least 2014. More recently, state and local officials have been approving OPCs in defiance of federal law. This policy brief reviews how OPCs are an effective, mainstream harm-reduction strategy. Congress should stop standing in the way of local harm-reduction organizations that seek to reduce overdose deaths by establishing OPCs.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2023. 12p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The versatility of synthetic drugs and flexibility of their manufacture is driving a constant evolution of the illicit synthetic drug market. The dynamic nature of the market continues to present a significant challenge globally, requiring a multifaceted, comprehensive approach to address the problem. In November 2021, UNODC launched the Synthetic Drug Strategy as a framework to support countries in developing evidence and science-based responses to address this ongoing challenge. The strategy includes four spheres of action, namely, multilateralism and international cooperation, early warning on emerging synthetic drug threats, promoting science-informed health responses, and strengthening counter-narcotic interventions. East and Southeast Asia, which is home to one of the largest methamphetamine markets in the world, is a key region for implementation of the strategy. Amidst the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and other recent developments, organised crime groups in the region have shown their adaptability and ingenuity to capitalise on the situation and expand their operations.

Vienna: UNODC, Global SMART Programme , 2022. 36p.

By The Global Commission on Drug Policy

The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world. Fifty years after the initiation of the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and 40 years after President Nixon launched the US government’s war on drugs, fundamental reforms in national and global drug control policies are urgently needed. Vast expenditures on criminalization and repressive measures directed at producers, traffickers and consumers of illegal drugs have clearly failed to effectively curtail supply or consumption. Apparent victories in eliminating one source or trafficking organization are negated almost instantly by the emergence of other sources and traffickers. Repressive efforts directed at consumers impede public health measures to reduce HIV/AIDS, overdose fatalities and other harmful consequences of drug use. Government expenditures on futile supply reduction strategies and incarceration displace more cost-effective and evidence-based investments in demand and harm reduction.

Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011. 24p.

Edited by Julia Buxton Mary Chinery-Hesse Khalid Tinasti

The 12th volume of International Development Policy explores the relationship between international drug policy and development goals, both current and within a historical per-spective. Contributions address the drugs and development nexus from a range of critical viewpoints, highlighting gaps and contradictions, as well as exploring strategies and opportunities for enhanced linkages between drug control and development programming. Crim-inalisation and coercive law enforcement-based responses in international and national level drug control are shown to undermine peace, security and development objectives. Readership: Academic scholars and researchers, policymakers and development practitioners interested in international development policy, drug policies and their effects on development, global economic and political trends, and local development issues.

Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020. 335p.

By Thomas Friis Søgaard Marie Højlund Bræmer Michael Mulbjerg Pedersen

This report provides an analysis of current drug supply models and the related violence and exploitation of vulnerable groups in Denmark. Recent years have seen a growth in criminals’ exploitation of vulnerable groups for drug-related crimes. This development appears to be driven by several structural factors, including increased drug market competition and a proliferation of more labour-intensive supply models. Based on the findings of this study, we identify some priorities for future research to understand the impact of digital developments in retail-level drug distribution on vulnerable individuals and to inform responses to reduce criminal exploitation.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2021. 55p.

By Simone Haysom

The heroin route that crosses South Africa has created a regional heroin economy, with severe social and political repercussions. Heroin use has developed in both major cities and small towns – an important shift in local drug markets that is taking a toll on thousands of people. This policy brief sheds light on the domestic heroin economy, analyses its implications and proposes responses to its drivers and consequences. An effective response will need to consider political factors and must be regionally coordinated. Market dynamics and harm-reduction approaches should also be included. The most sustainable strategies address root causes, disrupt markets and tackle corruption.

ENACT (Africa) 2019. 12p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Carol Graham, Keith Humphreys, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Bryce Pardo, Peter Reuter, Bradley D. Stein, and Paul H. Wise

This Brookings opioid project, “The Opioid Crisis in America: Domestic and International Dimensions,” has analyzed policy options for reducing demand, providing treatment, designing regulatory frameworks, and implementing domestic law enforcement and international supply control measures. It has explored local impacts on communities as well as state and federal level responses and international actions. It has paid special attention to vulnerable communities, such as politically and economically disenfranchised Americans, women and children, and military veterans.

Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2020. 15p.

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh and Casey Anderson

More people died from opioid-related deaths in 2015 than in any previous year. This record number quadrupled the level of such deaths in 1999. Unlike the heroin and crack crises of the past, the current opioid emergency has disproportionately affected white Americans—poor and rural, but also middle class or affluent and suburban. This association has boosted support for preventative and treatment-based policy solutions. But the pace of the response has been slow, critical components of the solution—such as health insurance coverage expansion and improved access to medication assisted treatment—face resistance, and there are growing efforts to revamp the failed and costly War on Drugs.

This report examines the sources of the opioid crisis, surveys health and justice policy responses at the federal and state levels, and draws on lessons from past drug crises to provide guidance on how to proceed.

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2017. 35p.

By John Walsh

More than half a century after the advent of a global drug prohibition regime and the launch of the U.S. “war on drugs,” the results have been disastrous for Latin America and the Caribbean, and for the United States itself. Even worse, prohibition’s consequences are exacerbating other grave problems—corruption and organized crime, violence perpetrated with impunity, forest loss and climate change, and displacement and migration—making solutions to these challenges even more difficult to achieve. The Biden administration’s historic embrace of harm reduction represents an enormous, lifesaving advance for U.S. drug policy. But even with harm reduction services, moves to decriminalize drug possession, and shifts underway to legally regulate recreational cannabis, the brunt of drug prohibition remains intact and the drug war rages on in the Americas. The principal victims of government repression in the name of drug control and of the predations of organized crime have always been and continue to be the most impoverished and marginalized communities…. Regulatory models must prioritize the interests and inclusion of those communities most harmed by the punitive enforcement of drug prohibition. Such regulatory frameworks will be far better suited than prohibition to protecting human rights and promoting health, gender and racial equality, security and environmental sustainability.

Washington, DC: WOLA, 2022. 28p.

By Stephen Rolles

Global drug policy is rooted in a laudable urge to address the very real harms that non-medical psychoactive drugs can create. Such concerns have driven a prohibitionist global agenda: an agenda that gives clear and direct moral authority to those who support it, while casting those who are against it as ethically and politically irresponsible. However, such binary thinking can be problematic. By defining the most stringent prohibition as the most moral position, it makes nuanced consideration of the impacts of prohibition difficult. In particular, it makes it very difficult to look at and learn from the impacts and achievements of prohibition. Historic attempts to do so have foundered on a sense that analysing prohibition means questioning prohibition, and that questioning prohibition is in itself an immoral act—one that allies the questioner with the well known infamies of the world’s illegal drug trade. Ironically, supporting the status quo perpetuates that trade, and the harms that it creates.

It is not the purpose of this report to revisit these various findings; they are freely and easily available elsewhere. Rather, we seek to reconsider the management of illicit drugs in the light of the experience that they represent and embody. Using that experience, we will set out a blueprint for non-medical drug management policies that will minimise the harms that such drug use creates, both on a personal and on a societal level. In short, our goal is to define a set of practical and effective risk and harm management and reduction policies. Such policies will represent a clear and positive step towards the positive outcomes that prohibition has tried, and failed, to achieve. A strictly prohibitionist stance would understand them to be immoral, because they call for the legally regulated production and availability of many currently proscribed drugs. Transform’s position is, in fact, driven by an ethics of effectiveness, and as such represent an attempt to re-frame the global harm management debate in exclusively practical terms

London: Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2009. 232p.

By Marie Claire Van Hout and Tim Bingham

This research aimed to assemble an evidence base around perceived anti-social behaviour associated with the provision of drug treatment in Dublin’s city centre, upon which to build a strategic response incorporating short/medium/long term goals and actions within the area. It will be used to guide discussions on how to reduce visibility of drug related public nuisance, improve public perceptions of safety in the area and provide comprehensive, safe, effective and appropriate treatment services within a series of short, medium and long-term strategies.

Dublin:Strategic Response Group, 2012. 187p.

By Tim McSweeney, Paul J. Turnbull, and Mike Hough

This summary sets out the main findings from a review of the recent literature on strategies to tackle illicit drug markets and distribution networks in the UK. The report was commissioned by the UK Drug Policy Commission and has been prepared by the Institute for Criminal Policy Research, School of Law, King’s College London. The main literature searches for this review were conducted during late September 2007 using a number of search terms and bibliographic data sources. In drawing together the evidence for this review we aimed to answer four broad questions: • What is the nature and extent of the problem? • What are current UK responses? • What are effective strategies for dealing with these issues? • Where are the gaps in our knowledge and understanding? This review restricted itself to domestic measures for tackling the drugs trade. As well as production control (e.g. assisting the Afghan government to implement its National Drug Control Strategy), there are a range of measures as part of the current drug strategy that are aimed at tackling drug markets and distribution networks within the UK’s borders.

London: The UK Drug policy Commission, 2008. 90p.

By The UK Drug Policy Commission

Over the past ten years, UK drug strategies have increasingly focused on providing treatment and support services for drug-dependent offenders – who commit a disproportionate number of acquisitive crimes (e.g. shoplifting and burglary) – as a way of reducing overall crime levels. This criminal justice focus has been reinforced in the recent 2008 UK drug strategy (new Welsh and Scottish drug strategies are also being developed). The UK Drug Policy Commission (UKDPC) has analysed the evidence for the effectiveness of these initiatives for reducing drug use and reoffending and of the wider impact of this more prominent criminal justice approach. To inform our analysis we commissioned an independent review of the published evidence from leading researchers at the Institute for Criminal Policy Research (ICPR), King’s College London. We also listened to policy experts, local commissioners, drug workers and current and ex-drug users.

London: The UK Drug Policy Commission (UKDPC), 2008. 80p.