By Kathleen J. Frydl

According to a joint study conducted by Stanford University and the medical journal The Lancet, the opioid crisis is on track to claim 1.2 million U.S. lives in this decade. To better respond to this first-order public health crisis, this white paper proposes an alternative approach to international supply-side counternarcotics policy designed to reduce fentanyl-related overdose deaths. A new target for counternarcotics policy As Thomas R. Dye argues, policy models should “identify what is significant.”  This is the most crucial of all stages, Dye explains, given that “deciding what will be the problems is even more important than deciding what will be the solutions.” This white paper nominates the regulatory and other failures of governance that facilitate the traffic in illegally manufactured fentanyl as the appropriate target for U.S. supply-side counternarcotics policy. Most crucially, countries without established and enforced drug-production rules that fail to govern chemically similar “analogues,” and without established and enforced “know-your-customer” provisions for the transport of drugs or their precursors, tolerate deficits in governance which render them susceptible to large-scale traffic in illegally manufactured fentanyl. The international counternarcotics treaties currently relied upon as a basis for drug policy either do not address, or do not adequately respond to, these failures of governance. .A counternarcotics policy directed at governments differs markedly from the current approach to international supply-side policy, which assigns responsibility to Mexican criminal organizations and relies on law enforcement as the appropriate response. Notably, as several impartial reviews conducted by the Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service observe, counternarcotics policy premised on enforcement against criminal targets has gone without an evaluation “measuring impact, not output.” Equally significant, empirical analyses of drug enforcement suggest that drug traffickers respond to these interventions with competitive adaptation, leaving their networks more resilient and, in some cases, more autonomous. The counternarcotics framework offered here also differs from proposals put forward by drug policy reformers who identify demand for illicit drugs as most significant and, in response, propose a variety of interventions to diminish or more safely satisfy that demand, measuring the effects of these interventions on the reduction of overdose deaths. These crucial interventions notwithstanding, drug supply remains an urgent question for counternarcotics policy. Contrary to a standard narrative, illegally manufactured fentanyl did not appear in U.S. markets in response to demand among opioid users. Although Chinese and Mexican officials remonstrate their American counterparts by insisting that the demand for drugs lies at the heart of the opioid epidemic, research demonstrates that the market for fentanyl specifically is “supply-led”:  that is, users would prefer an opioid other than fentanyl.   Fentanyl is an efficiency gain for traffickers and a highly unreliable and dangerous product for its users. Additionally, the harm-reduction efforts supported by many drug reformers do little to reduce drug exposure, another key driver of overdose deaths. The model set forward here adopts elements of both current counternarcotics policy and the agenda of drug reformers:Supply matters, and so too does the crucial outcome of reducing overdose deaths.       

At the Niskanen Center, we believe policy should be informed by strong causal evidence. Sometimes, though, we encounter promising ideas that are so big or novel that no government has yet tried them, and so scant evidence of their effectiveness exists. Such is the case with the use of trade policy to limit deaths from fentanyl and its analogs in the United States. To begin to fill in the blank spaces around this issue, we asked the political historian Kathleen Frydl to explore the history and potential of trade policy as a shield against an unprecedented public health crisis. 

Trade policy once formed the basis for U.S. counternarcotics efforts, a time when Treasury Department officials threatened and used drastic sanctions like embargoes, along with subtler tools such as slower customs inspections. Over the past year, the President has threatened and implemented tariffs against our most prolific suppliers of illegally manufactured fentanyl. A tariff is a broad-stroke intervention, a direct tax on imports meant to protect a domestic industry. It punishes both domestic firms and foreign exporters, and it generates collateral damage, including supply chain disruptions and retaliation, without punishing specific bad actors. For these reasons, tariffs serve better as threats at the negotiating table than as tools of policy. To achieve a targeted outcome, a more targeted approach may deliver more–while disrupting less. 

A less-known alternative, border adjustments, might accomplish many of the same goals as tariffs – compelling other countries to pick up the tab for negative externalities they generate – but can be deployed within the existing framework of international trade agreements, making them an attractive option to address specific threats to public health and national security. A border adjustment levels the trade playing field, imposing costs on imports from other countries to account for costs borne by Americans. To quote from this paper, border adjustments “balance rather than bias trade.” 

That fentanyl has blown apart the old drug enforcement paradigm is widely noted among drug policy analysts. Produced in laboratories, often from legal and regulated substances, the drug is difficult to snuff out at its point of origin, and its potency and physical innocuousness make it hard to detect at customs checkpoints. In fact, most fentanyl seems to enter the country not on the backs of undocumented migrants, but nestled within freight or the luggage of seemingly legitimate commercial travelers. Meanwhile, evidence-based interventions meant to reduce demand work best to mitigate the harms of chronic opioid abuse but do little to reduce the danger of exposure to fentanyl, including unintentional consumption.

Border adjustments target the failures of governments that allow criminal activities to flourish. Placing governments in the target frame seems a logical way to incentivize the large-scale reforms needed to stem the flow of fentanyl. Criminals shift tactics and their organizations evolve; U.S. counternarcotics policy should be pegged to meaningful outcomes that will reduce overdose deaths, regardless of the current face of drug traffic. And, if governments refuse to implement needed reforms, at least border adjustments generate revenue to offset the high costs of harm reduction and drug treatment now borne by US taxpayers, insurers, and philanthropies.

We do not believe there is any one answer to the overdose epidemic. Synthetic opioid analogs are moving targets, changing almost daily in chemical composition and psychological effect. The drug trafficking organizations that distribute them and the chemical producers who supply their ingredients are sophisticated, often complex conglomerates. Threats of tariffs may satisfy an understandable urge to punch back at a foreign menace, but their effects on the human misery opioids cause is essentially untestable. This paper explores a more measured approach that may better serve the objectives of supply-side counternarcotics.

Washington, DC: Niskanen Center, 2025. 46p.

By The Drug Enforcement Administration

Mexican cartels’ production, trafficking, and distribution of powerful illicit synthetic drugs, chiefly fentanyla and methamphetamine, represent a dire threat to public health, the rule of law, and national security in the United States. The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels (CJNG), together with their procurement, distribution, and financial support networks stretching across Latin America, China, and other key global nodes, remain the dominant threats for the trafficking of these and other drugs into the United States. In the 12-month period ending in October 2024, 84,076 Americans died from a drug overdose, according to the most recent available provisional statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), underscoring the devastating effect these cartels have on our country. Although these numbers show a 25 percent decline since the same 12-month period last year – when the country lost 112,910 people to drug poisonings – demonstrating positive momentum in the fight against these drugs and the organizations trafficking them, the threat remains grave. The trend is hopeful, however. October 2024 was the eleventh consecutive month in which CDC reported a reduction, and the current statistics represent the largest 12-month reduction in drug overdose deaths ever recorded. Fentanyl and other synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine, are the primary drivers of fatal drug overdose deaths nationwide, while other illicit drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, and diverted prescription opioids still contribute meaningfully to the drug threat landscape in the United States. However, overdose and poisoning deaths involving fentanyl and other synthetic opioids caused more deaths than all other categories of drugs. This exceptionally deadly drug – often pressed into pills resembling legitimate medications and presented as authentic to customers or mixed into other drugs – creates a heightened risk of fatal overdose for unsuspecting or otherwise opioid-naïve users. The production and trafficking of drugs by Mexican cartels has fundamentally altered the drug and criminal landscapes in North America. The cartels capitalize on the relative ease of synthetic drug production compared to the physical and environmental limitations of traditional plant-based drug production to generate immense revenues. The cartels maintain steady supply chains for obtaining the precursor chemicals, primarily from China and India, necessary to produce these synthetic drugs. The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels, in particular, control clandestine production sites in Mexico, smuggling routes into the United States, and distribution hubs in key U.S. cities. The cartels work with U.S. drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and violent gangs to distribute drugs throughout the country, all exploiting social media and messaging applications to extend their reach to a larger and younger customer base. The cartels’ extensive, complex, and adaptable networks present formidable challenges across the U.S. law enforcement, national security, regulatory, financial, and health and wellness sectors.  

Washington, DC: DEA, 2025. 80p.

By Andrew Scheibe, Shaun Shelly, M. J. Stowe

The illicit drug trade generates billions of dollars and sustains transnational criminal organisations. Drug markets can destabilise governance and undermine development. Data indicate increasing drug use in South Africa. However, information on the size and value of the drug market is limited. This is the first study to estimate the market value of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine in South Africa. People who use drugs were meaningfully involved in all aspects of implementation. We used focus group discussions, ethnographic mapping, brief interviews, and the Delphi method to estimate the number of users, volumes consumed, and price for each drug in South Africa in 2020. Nationally, we estimated there to be: 400,000 people who use heroin (probability range (PR) 215,000–425,000) consuming 146.00 tonnes (PR 78.48–155.13) with a value of US$1,898.00 million (PR US$1,020.18–US$2,016.63); 350,000 people who use cocaine (PR 250,000–475,000) consuming 18.77 tonnes (PR 13.41–25.47) with a market value of US$1,219.86 million (PR 871.33–1,655.52) and 290,000 people who use methamphetamine (PR 225,000–365,000) consuming 60.19 tonnes (PR 6.58–10.68) and a market value of US$782.51 million (PR 607.12–984.88). The combined value was calculated at US$3.5 billion. Findings can be used to stimulate engagement to reform drug policy and approaches to mitigate the impact of the illicit drug trade. Additional studies that include people who use drugs in research design and implementation are needed to improve our understanding of drug markets.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5(3): pp. 1–17

By The Research and Trend Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

Now entering its second year of enforcement, the ban continues to hold. In 2024, the area under cultivation was estimated at 12,800 ha, or 19% more than in 2023 (10,800 ha) . Despite the increase, opium poppy cultivation is still far below the priorban levels. In 2022 an estimated 232,000 ha were cultivated. The increase in cultivation came with a geographical shift. The South-western provinces of the country were long the center of cultivation up to and including 2023. In 2024, this changed and now 59% of all cultivation took place in the North-east, particularly in Badakhshan. The rapid and currently sustained decline in poppy cultivation and opium production has important and wide-ranging implications for the country and opiate markets long supplied by product from Afghanistan. Questions remain as to how the country will cope with the continued reduction in opiate income and how opiate markets downstream will react. Farmers that lack sustainable alternatives face a more precarious financial and economic situation and need alternative economic opportunities to become resilient against picking up poppy cultivation in the future. Distributors and dealers closer to destination markets, as well as consumers, are likely to experience supply constraints in the coming years, should the ban remain in place. Following a major hike in 2022 and 2023, dry opium prices stabilized slightly in the first half of 2024 to around US$730. These prices are several times higher than the long-running pre-ban average of US$100 per kilogram. Extremely high farmgate prices and questions about dwindling opium stocks may encourage a resumption in poppy cultivation, especially in places outside of traditional cultivation centers, including neighboring countries. 

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 20p.

By Max Daly ̵ Patrick Shortis

There has been a groundbreaking shift in the global drug trade, pioneered in Russia and now spreading globally. Unlike traditional drug trafficking models, this system leverages darknet markets and cryptocurrency for anonymous transactions, allowing buyers to retrieve drugs from hidden physical locations, or “dead drops,” rather than direct exchanges. Driven by large platforms such as Kraken, Mega, and Blacksprut, Russian darknet markets control 93% of the global share, generating approximately $1.5 billion in revenue in 2023 alone. This dominance marks a new era for organized crime, with Russia’s digital drug economy vastly surpassing traditional Western darknet markets in scope and influence.

The rise of Russia’s dead drop drug trade stems from several unique national factors: restrictive anti-drug policies, strained Western trade relations, and a strong technological foundation. Enabled by these conditions, the dead drop model has reshaped how drugs are distributed in Russia. Drug transactions now involve no face-to-face interactions; instead, orders are placed online, paid for with cryptocurrency, and retrieved from secret locations across cities within hours. This system, offering convenience and anonymity, has seen synthetic drugs—especially synthetic cathinones like mephedrone—overtake traditional imported substances like cocaine and heroin in Russia. As the report highlights, these potent synthetic drugs are cheap, easy to manufacture, and readily distributed through Russia’s vast delivery networks.

The report further underscores the severe social impacts of this model on Russian society, particularly among young people. Youth are drawn into this high-tech drug economy, often working as couriers or “kladmen” for online shops—a job that comes with high risks, including violence, criminal charges, and addiction. Violence has become endemic in the system, with enforcers, known as “sportsmen,” meting out harsh punishments for couriers suspected of theft or negligence. This pervasive violence, combined with the easy availability of highly addictive synthetic drugs, is fueling a public health crisis and contributing to rising incarceration rates among young Russians.

Beyond Russia, the report warns that this drug trade model is now expanding across borders, posing public health and security risks. It’s affecting Russian youth heavily, leading to violence, criminalization, and increased synthetic drug dependence. Understanding Russia’s darknet markets offers insight into the future of drug trafficking worldwide. Authorities and international bodies must adapt to address the growing influence of this high-tech, anonymous, and highly organized trade system.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 53p.

By Anna Sergi

Abstract In large commercial seaports policing and security efforts to counter the drug trade, especially cocaine, do not appear to be effective beyond a mere displacement effect. In the port of Piraeus, Greece, (perceived) rising quantities of cocaine have led to calls for further securitisation of the port to curb illicit trafficking. This article will present the current trends of countering and disrupting cocaine at the port of Piraeus and question how these efforts, together with the growth of the port, are affecting the overall territory of and around the port. This article will first argue that the (perceived) increase in cocaine trade towards/in the port of Piraeus has activated a ‘utopia of security’ in the policing and security responses at the port. This utopia of security leads to paradoxes when it comes to being effective against organised crime in the port. The article will conclude by discussing the possibility of a different approach, one of displacement of countering efforts rather than of cocaine flows. This different approach can also rebalance the focus of policing and security authorities on the relationship between the port and its territory. 

European Journal of Criminology 1–21 © The Author(s) 2023 

By Lucas Bartolomé -Chairperson, Mihnea Dorneanu -Chairperson

At the present time, the demand for drugs is growing as strong as ever, and to meet this demand, criminal organizations set up drug production operations, particularly in politically unstable regions, often with the collaboration of local militias. These operations help fund the violence and many other criminal activities committed by these organizations, including money laundering, wildlife trading, smuggling, prostitution, human trafficking, and modern-day slavery. Furthermore, the kind of drugs grown are harmful both to the growers of the raw material in the origin country, as they are often trapped in cycles of poverty which inhibit economic development, as well as to the users, due to the societal harm addiction causes upon the population. Therefore, it is essential to fight against the drug trade and find ways to mitigate its effect; however, this is notoriously difficult. Typically, the mechanism for these kinds of operations is the following: farmers in politically unstable regions are forced to grow the plants from which drugs are extracted as they are the only ones from which they are able to make a living; they do this under the protection of local warlords or militias, to whom they often have to pay tax to. Raw opium is delivered, generally through local middlemen, to the criminal organizations that handle the refining and distribution to the rest of the world. This is usually done with either the tacit acceptance of the government, which might consider the militias as strategically useful, or by bribing corrupt government officials who will turn a blind eye. Nowadays in Asia, there exist two main areas where drug production is rampant. These are the socalled "Golden Crescent" and "Golden Triangle". The Golden Crescent covers parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, though production is nowadays mostly concentrated in Afghanistan. The area has had a long history of cultivating poppies in order to extract opium at a small scale; nonetheless, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, many mujahideen guerrillas turned to poppy farming and opium refining as a source of income, and this continued and increased throughout the end of the Soviet occupation, and the beginning of Taliban rule, as Afghanistan became the world's major source of opioids and replaced Iran and Pakistan's dominance in the region. This lasted right up until the Taliban introduced a ban on poppy farming in 2001, which was brutally enforced and caused a sharp drop in poppy farming with an accompanying skyrocketing of the price. This was short-lived as the September 11th attacks soon occurred and the ensuing invasion of the country by the United States yet again plunged the area into conflict and poppy production once more became the only source of income for many farmers. Despite many attempts by the democratic Afghan government, to this day Afghanistan continues to be the world's largest producer of opioids, which mostly get trafficked to Europe and North America, and the end of the Afghan War and resumption of Taliban rule don't seem to have put a stop to it. Despite nominally being against the drug trade, the Taliban has been accused of using poppy farming to secure its own funding and of intentionally causing the spike in price in 2001 to sell its own reserves at a higher price. The democratic government seemed more inclined to genuinely try to solve the problem; however, local corrupt officials severely undermined its efforts. Though the Golden Crescent's main export is opium, recent forays into the production of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines have been reported, and the region is also the top exporter of cannabis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Model United Nations of Bucharest, 2023. 30p.

By Julia Yansura and Lakshmi Kumar

In this report, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) presents an analysis of narcotics-related illicit financial flows between the United States and the major narcotics production and transit countries of Mexico and Colombia. The report was commissioned by the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission as part of its mandate to evaluate US drug policies and programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, assess current efforts to reduce the illicit drug supply and address the harms associated with trafficking and drug abuse. A variety of strategies can and have been used to address drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere, from manual and aerial crop eradication, to interdiction, illicit crop substitution and other alternate development approaches. While existing strategies have resulted in temporary disruptions to narcotics cultivation and trafficking, they have not been successful in addressing these issues in a comprehensive, lasting manner. At the same time, history has shown that many of these policies have had unintended consequences and caused harm to people, their communities and the environment in very profound ways. Financial strategies from the anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) toolkit offer a different lens to view and address the problem of drug trafficking. In this report, GFI argues that AML/CFT is underutilized in current US and regional counter-narcotics efforts and needs to be reprioritized. Effectively responding to the challenges of drug trafficking and transnational organized crime will require a multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary effort that includes AML/CFT, as well as a more comprehensive approach to drug policies that encompasses human rights, public health and development.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity , 2020. 67p.

By Tibor Kiss & Ákos Szigeti

The process of illicit drug trafficking on darknet markets is highly affected by various trust factors. Although the factors potentially affecting customers’ risk perception can be identified based on previous research, cyber criminology has not produced empirical research ranking the importance of the specific factors. This study was designed to fill this gap by developing a tool that measures the importance of the various trust factors. To test out the measurement tool, a large-scale survey with projective situational questions was conducted among university students in Hungary. The sample (n = 5481) was compiled to include potential darknet market customers, respondents with above-average computer skills needed to access the darknet, and taking into account that university students are a group of society particularly exposed to drug consumption. The end product of this research is a trust matrix ranking the factors affecting illicit drug purchases on darknet markets. Among the factors, the survey’s target group ranked reliable and undamaged delivery of goods and the reliability of vendors as the most important. The measurement tool developed in this research will facilitate further criminological research on vendor reputation. Its findings also point to the need for further research on delivery providers and predict that influencing the delivery-related risk perception of potential customers could effectively reduce demand.

May 2023 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research

By Venezuela Investigative Unit

In 2013, Nicolás Maduro became president of Venezuela following the death of his charismatic predecessor Hugo Chávez. Since then, the country’s cocaine trade has undergone revolutionary changes. Today, Venezuela is at risk of becoming the world’s fourth cocaine-producing country. And the Maduro regime has positioned itself as the gatekeeper to the country’s drug trade, controlling access to cocaine’s riches not only for drug traffickers but also for corrupt politicians and the military-embedded trafficking network known as the “Cartel of the Suns.” The product of more than three years of investigations, hundreds of interviews and field work in all of Venezuela’s key drug trafficking territories, this InSight Crime investigation looks at one of the world’s most important cocaine trafficking hubs – and the authoritarian regime that keeps the drugs flowing.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2022. 53p.

United States. Executive Office Of The President; United States. Office Of National Drug Control Policy

From the document: "On April 12, 2023, Dr. Rahul Gupta, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), formally designated fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine as an emerging drug threat, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. [United States Code] § 1708. [...] The emerging threat designation, made under the authority provided by 'The Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act of 2018' (P.L. [Public Law] 115-271), requires the Executive Branch to take several steps: First, ONDCP, in collaboration with relevant federal agencies, must draft and publicly issue a fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine Response Plan (within 90 days of designation). Second, ONDCP must issue Implementation Guidance to agencies (120 days after designation). Third, agencies must provide a specific Agency Implementation Report to ONDCP (180 days after designation). Fourth, ONDCP must publish a National Implementation Report on the Response Plan (in February 2024, with other ONDCP annual reports). The response plan presented here fulfills the first of these requirements and addresses urgent public health and safety needs. The SUPPORT Act also requires that the ONDCP Director decide whether a stand-alone national media campaign would be effective in addressing the emerging threat. In the case of xylazine-adulterated fentanyl, Director Gupta has determined that it will be productive to include such public messaging on fentanyl adulterants in existing campaigns and other federal messaging on fentanyl, in lieu of establishing a new stand-alone campaign focused solely on xylazine. The SUPPORT Act requires that an emerging threat response plan include evidence-based prevention, treatment, and supply reduction action steps, in addition to establishing goals and performance measures informed by comprehensive data. In the plan outlined below, we apply those requirements to the case of fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine and describe critically important and urgent next action steps."

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States. Office of National Drug Control Policy 2023. 15p.

Steven Dudley – Victoria Dittmar – Sara García, Jaime López-Aranda, Annie Pforzheimer, and Ben Westhoff

Precursor chemicals pose an unprecedented challenge for governments and multilateral organizations seeking to mitigate the development, manufacturing, production, and distribution of illicit synthetic drugs. As opposed to most legacy drugs -- which rely on plants, harvests, favorable weather, significant and varied manual labor, and transport of bulk amounts of illicit substances across heavily-policed terrain -- synthetic drugs can be produced in laboratories all year-round using a wide variety of mostly sparsely or unevenly regulated chemicals, which can be employed at different stages of the process in rudimentary laboratories and transported in large or small amounts, often without the knowledge of the transporters themselves. The sources for these chemicals span the globe. They are currently concentrated in China, where a relatively small number of companies appear to be producing precursor chemicals, in mainly two provinces. These chemicals are marketed and sold on the internet, where an army of online providers offer well-regulated and unregulated chemicals via the Clearnet and the dark web. These marketers are sometimes extensions of these same production companies and sometimes independent. Some are also clans, which appear to own numerous production and marketing companies. The precursors are transported to Mexico via cargo ships or air cargo, traveling direct or via circuitous routes. Cargo is often mislabeled, camouflaging the contents, purpose, or amount of their shipment. In Mexico, brokers and independent buyers facilitate this trade, filing paperwork, creating fictitious companies, or bribing officials.

• More...

  The chemicals then make their way to small producers. Often referred to as “cooks,” these producers synthesize the precursors into illicit synthetic drugs that are then sold to large buyers and transport specialists. Two large criminal networks buy and move synthetic drugs in bulk: the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG). These networks are responsible for bringing this product across the most difficult part of its journey and thus charge a premium for their services. After they sell the drugs wholesale, they are largely absent, leaving the distribution and retail sales to other local criminal networks. The precursor industry -- and the synthetic drug industry writ large -- is so challenging to disrupt precisely because it works across legal and illegal spheres, involves many layers and different criminal networks, and has many means to obtain its final objective: the sale of synthetic drugs to an increasing number of consumers. …

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 147p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The World Drug Report 2023 comes as countries are struggling at the halfway point to revive stalled progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Crises and conflict continue to inflict untold suffering and deprivation, with the number of people forcibly displaced globally hitting a new record high of 110 million. Peace, justice and human rights, which should be the birthright of all, remain out of reach for far too many. The harms caused by drug trafficking and illicit drug economies are contributing to and compounding many of these threats, from instability and violence to environmental devastation. Illicit drug markets continue to expand in terms of harm as well as scope, from the growing cocaine supply and drug sales on social media platforms to the relentless spread of synthetic drugs – cheap and easy to manufacture anywhere in the world, and in the case of fentanyl, deadly in the smallest of doses. Drug use disorders are harming health, including mental health, safety and well-being. Stigma and discrimination make it less likely that people who use drugs will get the help they need. Fewer than 20 per cent of people with drug use disorders are in treatment, and access is highly unequal. Women account for almost half the people who use amphetamine-type stimulants, but only 27 per cent of those receiving treatment. Controlled drugs needed for palliative care and pain relief, namely pharmaceutical opioids, are denied to those who desperately need them, with too little access in many countries – mainly low- and middle-income countries, where some 86 per cent of the world’s population lives. Drug challenges pose difficult policy dilemmas that cannot be addressed by any one country or region alone. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publishes the World Drug Report every year to provide a global perspective and overview of the world drug problem, offering impartial evidence with the aim of supporting dialogue and shared responses. This edition of the World Drug Report highlights the growing complexity of evolving drug threats. A special chapter explores how illicit drug economies intersect with crimes that affect the environment and insecurity in the Amazon Basin, with impoverished rural populations and Indigenous groups paying the price. Other sections of the report explore urgent challenges, including drug use in humanitarian settings, drugs in conflict situations and the changing dynamics of synthetic drug markets. The report also delves into new clinical trials involving psychedelics, medical use of cannabis and innovations in drug treatment and other services.   

New York: United Nations, 2023. 70p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The booklet opens with a look at the challenges posed to law enforcement by synthetic drugs, both in terms of their increasing potency, adaptability and ease of manufacture and their shorter supply chains, reduced risk and lower production costs compared with drugs of natural origin. Other law enforcement challenges are considered in the context of the increasing use of social media for buying and selling drugs online.
Booklet 2 also examines approaches to regulating the medical cannabis market in different countries and assesses recent developments surrounding the therapeutic, spiritual and non-medical use of substances known as “psychedelics”. The remainder of the booklet focuses on issues related to drugs in specific contexts, including the Amazon Basin, where the convergence of drug crime and crimes that affect the environment poses a threat to natural and human ecosystems. The risk factors for and vulnerability to substance use disorders among forcibly displaced populations are also discussed in the booklet, and the interim outcomes of innovations and modifications of services for people who use drugs during the COVID-19 pandemic are summarized.

New York: United Nations,  2023. 205p.

By Carolina Sampó · Valeska Troncoso

  This article presents the results of an exploratory study aimed to analyze the contexts in which the use of Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and counterintuitive routes is prioritized, based on the experience of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Moreover, we show that criminal organizations prioritize the Ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio and Montevideo, and the counter-intuitive routes that lead to them, because they are spaces that generate incentives linked to the porosity of borders, the lack of control at the ports, and the possibility of exploiting the country’s lack of reputation for drug exportation to re-export cocaine undetected. This study constitutes a precedent for future research on the role of South American Southern Cone ports in cocaine trafficking. We can identify at least four emerging lines of research: 1. Cocaine trafficking from landlocked countries; 2. The role of the waterway Paraná-Paraguay; 3. The link between Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and new markets; and 4. Other Non-Traditional Ports of cocaine departure, which are not containerized.

Trends in Organized Crime, 2022. 

By Charles Fain Lehman

While most Americans have focused on the Covid-19 pandemic, the nation’s other great epidemic has continued to burn. Drug overdoses now claim the lives of over 100,000 Americans every year, a rate that appears likely to continue or grow for the foreseeable future. While the crisis once was concentrated predominantly in rural, white communities, the introduction of novel synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl, into the illicit drug supply has spread overdoses across urbanizations. Today, small-town and big-city leaders alike desperately need tools to fight back against the drug crisis. It can often seem as though drug policy is outside the ambit of local leaders, who lack the capacity to go after international traffickers or spend trillions of dollars on care. But local government, as the closest entity to the front lines of the crisis, plays a vital role in addressing it. This paper, therefore, explores options for local policymakers to respond to the drug crisis. In particular, it considers six frequently discussed local-scale policies: • Naloxone access and distribution • Investing in treatment capacity • Drug court programs • Wastewater tracking • Supervised consumption sites • Drug market interventions For each policy, this paper examines the evidence, offers estimates of costs, and provides caution where necessary. The overall goal is to give local policymakers a better understanding of what tools they have to more effectively tackle the other health crisis in their communities.  

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2022. 19p.

By Tom Sullivan and Alexandra Voce  

 This study explores how police detainees in Australia use mobile phones within the illicit drug market. Fifty-nine percent of respondents had used mobile phones to buy, deliver or supply drugs, mainly through phone calls, text messages or messaging apps. Detainees who had used apps for drug buying or supplying were on average significantly younger than those using other phone-based services for drug buying or supplying. Drug suppliers were significantly more likely than drug buyers to have used messaging apps. Respondents used messaging apps for convenience and to conceal their activities. Almost 50 percent of drug suppliers report having stopped using mobile phones because of law enforcement’s ability to intercept communications.

Statistical Bulletin 22.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2022. 11p.

By Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (UK)

  Serious violence and drug abuse are major problems in England and Wales. In its Serious Violence Strategy, published in April 2018, the Government identified strong links between increases in violence and the exploitation of children and vulnerable adults by criminal drug dealers operating ‘county lines’. The strategy included a commitment that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services would carry out an inspection. Policing county lines drug offending involves three main components as follows: • The 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales. Each is responsible for policing a local area (usually a county, several counties or a metropolitan area). • A network of police-led regional organised crime units. These provide specialist policing capabilities to help the forces in their region tackle organised crime. • The National Crime Agency. This operates on a national (and international) basis, providing further specialist capabilities to support regional organised crime units and individual forces. Also, the National Crime Agency hosts the national county lines co-ordination centre (also referred to in this report as ‘the centre’), which it operates jointly with the police. For this inspection, we analysed documents and data. We visited the national county lines co-ordination centre, three regional organised crime units and ten police forces. We visited British Transport Police (which polices the rail network across Great Britain) because rail travel is a common feature of county lines offending. We interviewed relevant staff in each location. We also consulted representatives from other bodies. 

London: HMICFRS, 2020. 38p.

By Leonardo Castro-Gonzalez

The County Lines Model (CLM) is a relatively new illicit drugs distribution method found in Great Britain. The CLM has brought modern slavery and public health issues, while challenging the law-enforcement capacity to act, as coordination between different local police forces is necessary. Our objective is to understand the territorial logic behind the line operators when establishing a connection between two places. We use three different spatial models (gravity, radiation and retail models), as each one of them understands flow from place i to j in a different way. Using public data from the Metropolitan Police of London, we train and cross-validate the models to understand which of the different physical and socio-demographic variables are considered when establishing a connection. We analyse hospital admissions by drugs, disposable household income, police presence and knife crime events, in addition to the population of a particular place and the distance and travel times between two different locations. Our results show that knife crime events and hospital admissions by misuse of drugs are the most important variables. We also find that London operators distribute to the territory known as the ‘south’ of England, as negligible presence of them is observed outside of it.

R. Soc. Open Sci. 10: 221297

By Steven Dudley, Victoria Dittmar, Sara García, Jaime López-Aranda, Annie Pforzheimer, and Ben Westhoff 

 Precursors are transported to Mexico via cargo ships or air cargo, traveling direct or via circuitous routes. Cargo is often mislabeled, camouflaging the contents, purpose, or amount of their shipment. In Mexico, brokers and independent buyers facilitate this trade, filing paperwork, creating fictitious companies, or bribing officials. The chemicals then make their way to small producers. Often referred to as “cooks,” these producers synthesize the precursors into illicit synthetic drugs that are then sold to large buyers and transport specialists. Two large criminal networks buy and move synthetic drugs in bulk: the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG). These networks are responsible for bringing this product across the most difficult part of its journey and thus charge a premium for their services. After they sell the drugs wholesale, they are largely absent, leaving the distribution and retail sales to other local criminal networks.

The precursor industry -- and the synthetic drug industry writ large -- is so challenging to disrupt precisely because it works across legal and illegal spheres, involves many layers and different criminal networks, and has many means to obtain its final objective: the sale of synthetic drugs to an increasing number of consumers. Those consumers are not just in the United States where synthetic drugs -- in particular fentanyl -- are responsible for tens of thousands of drug overdoses per year. Places like Mexico are experiencing a dramatic uptick in synthetic drug consumption, mostly methamphetamine but also fentanyl. The synthetic drug industry is also having ill effects on the environment in Mexico and is behind a surge in violence in the corridors where it is trafficked and sold on the local markets.

The problem requires governments to rethink their traditional strategies for fighting illicit drugs. In addition to developing regional and global coalitions to monitor and regulate the chemicals, governments must enlist private industry to play a much more active role in mitigating the trade and limiting the spread of these destructive substances.

Washington DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 147p.