By Christopher Hernandez-Roy and Rubi Bledsoe

A journalist recently made an apt joke about living under President Daniel Ortega’s dictatorship: “Hi, I am from Nicaragua, and I represent your future. I am living what you will be experiencing soon enough: harassment, persecution, and threats to your lives and imprisonment,” he said to a group of Northern Triangle colleagues by way of introduction. This anecdote recalls Charles Dickens’ Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come in his 1843 novella A Christmas Tale, where the ghost portends the demise of Ebenezer Scrooge. In this context, it portends the death of democracy in the Northern Triangle, and the dire effects of democratic backsliding. Up until very recently, the conditions in Nicaragua were starkly different from its neighbors. The Ortega regime is a dictatorship that persecutes and detains opponents at will and with complete impunity. Nicaragua’s Northern Triangle neighbors have been democracies, even if imperfect ones. However, in 2019, the election of Nayib Bukele as president of El Salvador marked the beginning of a stark shift in the anti-crime strategy of the country and a turn toward authoritarian tendencies. The new leader opted to suspend constitutional guarantees and engage in mass incarceration in order to fight crime and gang violence, setting off alarm bells across the region, as concerns grew over democratic backsliding. The self-identified “coolest dictator in the world,” used his background in marketing and social media branding to propel an extreme version of mano dura, or “zero tolerance,” to fight crime. Three years later, Honduras and other countries have taken notice of the appeal of these tactics and are now replicating it, or considering it, in whole or in part. This is a slippery slope for the region and a precedent that poses a great danger to the hemisphere’s democracies.   

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Tom Wainwright

How does a budding cartel boss succeed (and survive) in the $300 billion illegal drug business? By learning from the best, of course. From creating brand value to fine-tuning customer service, the folks running cartels have been attentive students of the strategy and tactics used by corporations such as Walmart, McDonald’s, and Coca-Cola.

And what can government learn to combat this scourge? By analyzing the cartels as companies, law enforcers might better understand how they work—and stop throwing away $100 billion a year in a futile effort to win the “war” against this global, highly organized business.

Your intrepid guide to the most exotic and brutal industry on earth is Tom Wainwright. Picking his way through Andean cocaine fields, Central American prisons, Colorado pot shops, and the online drug dens of the Dark Web, Wainwright provides a fresh, innovative look into the drug trade and its 250 million customers.

The cast of characters includes “Bin Laden,” the Bolivian coca guide; “Old Lin,” the Salvadoran gang leader; “Starboy,” the millionaire New Zealand pill maker; and a cozy Mexican grandmother who cooks blueberry pancakes while plotting murder. Along with presidents, cops, and teenage hitmen, they explain such matters as the business purpose for head-to-toe tattoos, how gangs decide whether to compete or collude, and why cartels care a surprising amount about corporate social responsibility.

More than just an investigation of how drug cartels do business, Narconomics is also a blueprint for how to defeat them

NY. Public Affairs. 2016. 288p.

By Ioan Grillo

The world has watched stunned at the bloodshed in Mexico. Thirty thousand murdered since 2006; police chiefs shot within hours of taking office; mass graves comparable to those of civil wars; car bombs shattering storefronts; headless corpses heaped in town squares. The United States throws Black Hawk helicopters and drug agents at the problem. But in secret, Washington is confused and divided about what to do. "Who are these mysterious figures tearing Mexico apart?" they wonder.

London: Bloomsbury, 2017. 250p.

By Jerry Langton

A frightening look at Mexico's new power elite-the Mexican drug cartels The members of Mexico's drug cartels are among the criminal underworld's most ambitious and ruthless entrepreneurs. Supplanting the once dominant Colombian cartels, the Mexican drug cartels are now the major distributor of heroin and cocaine to the U.S. and Canada. Not only have their drugs crossed north of the border, so have the cartels (in 2009, 230 active Mexican drug cartels have been reported in U.S. cities). In Gangland, bestselling author Jerry Langton details their frightening stranglehold on the economy and daily life of Mexico today-and what it portends for the future of Mexico and its neighbours. Offering a firsthand look from members of law enforcement, politicians, journalists, and people involved in the drug trade in Mexico and Canada, Gangland sheds a harsh light on the multibillion dollar industry that is the drug trade, the territorial wars, and the on-the-street reality for the United States, with the importation of narco-terrorists. With the unstinting realism and keen analysis that have made him an internationally respected journalist, Langton offers the bleak prospects of what a collapsed government in Mexico might lead to-a new Mexican warlord state not unlike Somalia.

NY. Harper Collins. 2011. 288p.

By Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson & J. C. Sharman

Every year a staggering number of unidentified shell corporations succeed in hiding perpetrators of terrorist financing, corruption and illegal arms trades, but the degree to which firms flout global identification standards remains unknown. Adopting a unique, experimental methodology, Global Shell Games attempts to unveil the sordid world of anonymous shell corporations. Posing as twenty-one different international consultants, the authors approached nearly 4,000 services in over 180 countries to discover just how easy it is to form an untraceable company. Combining rigorous quantitative analysis, qualitative investigation of responses and lurid news reports, this book makes a significant research contribution to compliance with international law and international crime and terrorism whilst offering a novel, new approach to the field of political science research.

Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 250p.

By Joseph D. Serio

In the 1990s, the so-called Russian mafia dominated newspaper headlines, political analysis, and academic articles around the world. It was the new scourge, a threat so massive that it was believed to hold the Russian economy hostage. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh announced that the Russian mafia was a significant threat to the national security of the United States.

Before the end of the decade, Director Freeh reversed himself, saying that in reality the magnitude of the danger from the Russian mafia had been overestimated. Heading into the new millennium, the international hue and cry about gangsters from the former Soviet Union subsided dramatically, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Al-Qaeda shifted the spotlight from organized crime to terrorism and U.S. homeland security. Has the Russian mafia been eradicated or has it simply fallen below the radar?

Countless books and articles have reported on the Russian mafia in breathless terms bordering on hysteria. Casting a broad net, Serio brings a different, more analytical approach to his exploration of the subject. In Investigating the Russian Mafia, Part I begins by asking a series of basic questions: What did the Soviets understand 'mafia' to mean? Was this a Russian phenomenon or more broadly-based, multi-ethnic groups? How did the media influence the perception of the Russian mafia? What does a close examination of the official statistics reveal about the nature of crime groups in the former Soviet Union?

In Part II, Serio discusses an overview of attitudes and practices of the criminal world, business, and policing, among others, in Russian history. He demonstrates that many of the forces at work in the 1990s did not originate in the Communist era or arise because of the collapse of the USSR. Part III presents a discussion of the crime groups that developed in the post-Soviet era, the challenges that faced the business world, and the law enforcement response.

Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2008. 324p.

By Anthony DeStefano

He was the last of his kind-an old-world mob boss steeped in omert , the mob code of silence. While his arrogant friend John Gotti was being secretly recorded by the FBI, Joseph Massino, head of the Bonanno family, quietly became known as "The Ear" by ordering his men to point to their ear instead of saying his name out loud.

For more than twenty years Massino ran what was called the largest criminal network in the U.S., employing over 250 made men and untold numbers of associates. The Bonanno family was responsible for over 30 murders, even killing a dozen of its own members to settle scores. Massino ran a tight organization, obsessively checking his social club for bugging devices, frustrating FBI surveillance. But in the end Massino would be brought down from the inside, by the underboss who was not only his closest and most trusted friend—but a member of his blood family.

Based on exclusive interviews with Massino's family and closest associates, as well as law enforcement officials and confidential sources, The Last Godfather is an epic inside story from Pulitzer Prizewinning reporter Anthony DeStefano.

New York: Kensington Publishing, 2006. 351p.

By Grace Kena and Jennifer L. Truman 

This report describes trends and patterns in fatal and nonfatal firearm violence from 1993 to 2018 and for the more recent period of 2014 to 2018. The report includes data on the type of firearm; location of the incident; victim and offender demographic characteristics and relationship; type of violence, injury, and treatment; police notification; and victims’ self-protective behaviors.

Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Crime Statistics, 2022. 26p.

By Chris A Rees . Michael C Monuteaux , Isabella Steidley, Rebekah Mannix , Lois K Lee , Jefferson T Barrett , and Eric W Fleegler

Firearm fatality rates in the United States have reached a 28-year high. Describing the evolution of firearm fatality rates across intents, demographics, and geography over time may highlight high-risk groups and inform interventions for firearm injury prevention.

Objective: To understand variations in rates of firearm fatalities stratified by intent, demographics, and geography in the US.

Design, setting, and participants: This cross-sectional study analyzed firearm fatalities in the US from 1990 to 2021 using data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Heat maps, maximum and mean fatality rate graphs, and choropleth maps of county-level rates were created to examine trends in firearm fatality rates by intent over time by age, sex, race, ethnicity, and urbanicity of individuals who died from firearms. Data were analyzed from December 2018 through September 2022.

Main outcomes and measures: Rates of firearm fatalities by age, sex, race, ethnicity, urbanicity, and county of individuals killed stratified by specific intent (suicide or homicide) per 100 000 persons per year.

Results: There were a total of 1 110 421 firearm fatalities from 1990 to 2021 (952 984 among males [85.8%] and 157 165 among females [14.2%]; 286 075 among Black non-Hispanic individuals [25.8%], 115 616 among Hispanic individuals [10.4%], and 672 132 among White non-Hispanic individuals [60.5%]). All-intents total firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons declined to a low of 10.1 fatalities in 2004, then increased to 14.7 fatalities (45.5% increase) by 2021. From 2014 to 2021, male and female firearm homicide rates per 100 000 persons per year increased from 5.9 to 10.9 fatalities (84.7% increase) and 1.1 to 2.0 fatalities (87.0% increase), respectively. Firearm suicide rates were highest among White non-Hispanic men aged 80 to 84 years (up to 46.8 fatalities/100 000 persons in 2021). By 2021, maximum rates of firearm homicide were up to 22.5 times higher among Black non-Hispanic men (up to 141.8 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 20-24 years) and up to 3.6 times higher among Hispanic men (up to 22.8 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 20-24 years) compared with White non-Hispanic men (up to 6.3 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 30-34 years). Males had higher rates of suicide (14.1 fatalities vs 2.0 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021) and homicide (10.9 fatalities vs. 2.0 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021) compared with females. Metropolitan areas had higher homicide rates than nonmetropolitan areas (6.6 fatalities vs 4.8 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021). Firearm fatalities by county level increased over time, spreading from the West to the South. From 1999 to 2011 until 2014 to 2016, fatalities per 100 000 persons per year decreased from 10.6 to 10.5 fatalities in Western states and increased from 12.8 to 13.9 fatalities in Southern states.

Conclusions and relevance: This study found marked disparities in firearm fatality rates by demographic group, which increased over the past decade. These findings suggest that public health approaches to reduce firearm violence should consider underlying demographic and geographic trends and differences by intent.

JAMA Netw Open. 2022 Nov 1;5(11):e2244221. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.44221. PMID: 36445703; PMCID: PMC9709653.

By Alice Levins

Recent decades have seen a widespread effort to imprison more people for sexual violence. The Stains of Imprisonment offers an ethnographic account of one of the worlds that this push has created: an English prison for men convicted of sex offenses. This book examines the ways in which prisons are morally communicative institutions, instilling in prisoners particular ideas about the offenses they have committed—ideas that carry implications for prisoners’ moral character. Investigating the moral messages contained in the prosaic yet power-imbued processes that make up daily life in custody, Ievins finds that the prison she studied communicated a pervasive sense of disgust and shame, marking the men it held as permanently stained. Rather than promoting accountability, this message discouraged prisoners from engaging in serious moral reflection on the harms they had caused. Analyzing these effects, Ievins explores the role that imprisonment plays as a response to sexual harm, and the extent to which it takes us closer to and further from justice.

Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2023. 215p.

By UK Parliament, House of Commons, Justice Committee

1. When a defendant is remanded into custody, this means that they are to be held in prison until the time of their trial or subsequent sentencing hearing. Schedule 1 of the Bail Act 1976 gives judges and magistrates the power to take this decision for a number of reasons, including that there are grounds for believing that the defendant might not turn up to a court hearing, that they would interfere with a witness or might commit additional crimes if released on bail. Custodial remand is intended to be used as a last resort—courts are required to justify their decision for refusing bail in line with grounds prescribed in the Act.

2. The Bail Act 1976 stipulates a presumption in favour of bail over custodial remand for all defendants awaiting trial except those on charges of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, rape, or attempted rape. The starting point is release upon unconditional bail, where defendants await their trial in the community on the promise that they will later appear at court. Conditional bail is increasingly being used as an alternative to this, with restrictions such as curfews, limits on contact with other individuals related to a case, or geographical areas of exclusion being imposed pending trial. Failure to comply with these conditions can lead to bail being revoked and remand into custody instead.

3. Decisions on remand and bail are solely matters for the courts, with the defence and prosecution able to make submissions as to whether release on bail should be granted or denied. The defence has an automatic right to appeal against bail decisions in the magistrates’ court, as well as a right to make subsequent bail applications should circumstances change.

4. The use of custodial remand is primarily governed by the Bail Act 1976 and the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020. In addition, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 introduced the ‘no real prospect’ test, which states that defendants should not be remanded into custody if the offence is such that they are unlikely to receive a custodial sentence if convicted.

The growing remand population

5. Figure 1 below shows trends over time in the remand population in England and Wales. In the first half of the last decade, there was a decline in the remand population. However, recent years have seen a significant increase—as of 30 September 2022, the daily remand population stood at 14,507. This represented a 44% increase from 31 March 2020 when the population was 10,043. The remand prison population is currently the highest it has been for at least 50 years.

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons, Justice Committee, 2023. 55p.

By Sharon Shalev and Philippa Tomczak

Hundreds of prisoners die every year in England and Wales, resulting in tremendous harms and costs. These deaths will almost always be investigated by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) after a police investigation and before a Coroner’s inquest. PPO reports are usually produced far more quickly than inquest findings, hence could be a valuable catalyst for improved prison safety. The sustained high numbers of prisoner deaths in England and Wales suggest this potential is not being realized. This guide reports on extensive qualitative research carried out with PPO staff, prison staff, coroners and bereaved families. It also highlights the policy implications of the research findings.  

Nottingham, UK: University of Nottingham, 2023.  35p.

By Avinash Bhati

In Spring 2022, the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) launched the Task Force on Long Sentences. The group of 16 experts represents a broad range of experience and perspectives, including crime victims and survivors, formerly incarcerated people, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement, courts, and corrections. Its mission is to examine how long prison sentences—defined as 10 years or more—affect public safety, crime victims and survivors, incarcerated individuals and their families, communities, and correctional staff, and to develop recommendations to strengthen public safety and advance justice. The analysis presented here was commissioned by the Task Force to examine the relationship between long prison sentences and public safety in one state, Illinois. The project was made possible by a partnership between the Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council, CCJ, and Maxarth LLC, a data analytics firm. Long sentences are often imposed with an expectation that they will prevent some crime by incapacitating individuals and deterring them from engaging in future crime after release. While there are several other purposes of sentencing, including punishing offenders, restoring victims and survivors, and deterring others from committing crimes, the research question explored in this brief is whether people serving long sentences may be confined beyond their likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior. Incarcerating individuals beyond this point would increase the size of the total prison population—and associated costs— without producing additional benefits for public safety. To examine this question, Maxarth LLC analyzed detailed arrest history data for people who were released from Illinois prisons between June 2016 and June 2019. For the 1,127 people in this release cohort who had served 10 years of more prior to release, microsimulations were created to estimate the number of arrests averted due to the individuals’ long prison terms.1 The number of arrests averted includes: (a) estimated arrests that did not happen because the person was incarcerated (incapacitation effect), (b) arrests that did not happen during a 30-month post-release tracking period because the person reduced their criminal activity (specific deterrence or rehabilitation effects), and (c) arrests that happened postrelease because the person increased their criminal behavior following their incarceration (criminogenic effect). The incapacitation effect was calculated using the length of each person’s prison stay (time served); the specific deterrence and criminogenic effects were calculated in the 30 months following each person’s release date. The analysis accounted for the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, which overlapped with the 30-month post-release tracking period for some members of the sample. See the supplemental methodology report for detailed procedures.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2023. 30p.

By Izedomi Ayeni

Purpose: The purpose of this phenomenological qualitative study was to discover the attitudes and perceptions of police officers on the legalization of recreational cannabis and crime.

Methodology: This qualitative, phenomenological methodology employed the use of semi-structured interview questions consisting of open-ended questions to understand the lived experiences of Colorado Police and Sheriff Officers and their perspectives on the experiences with the legalization of cannabis and crime. The sample size of 16 officers was selected from the sampling frame, which included Denver Police officers and Larimer County Sheriff officers.

Findings: Analysis of the data from interviews resulted in the identification of 14 major findings; 1) Officers oppose legalization; 2) Officers have an unfavorable opinion regarding legalization because they feel it can lead to increased access/use of illicit drugs; 3) Officers feel that the only reason the state legalized cannabis is for the tax revenue it generates for the state; 4) Officers’ viewpoint is that legalization has led to more violent crimes; 5) Officers perceive that Amendment 64 was designed to change perceptions about legal recreational marijuana; 6) Officers feel that legalization has led to an increase in burglary; 7) Officers are cognizant of the possibility of an increase in organized crime activities; 8) Officers expressed displeasure with the decriminalization of non-medical use, possession, and purchase of narcotics; 9) Officers express how an increase in crime has negatively impacted policing efforts; 10) Officers attribute an increase in homelessness and transient population as a symptom of the legalization of recreational cannabis; 11) Officers express frustration with lack of effective regulation; 12) Officers expressed that legalization has had no effect on timely responses to crime; 13) Officers expressed that the biggest challenge faced is maneuvering the demands of state versus federal law; 14) Officers express frustration in navigating the legal requirements relating to legal search and seizure.

Conclusions: As more states are considering legalizing cannabis for recreational use, these findings present significant suggestions for the state legislature and the members of the law enforcement community in those states.

Recommendations: Additional research should be conducted in other states to expand on the perceptions of the law enforcement community pre-and post-legalization of recreational cannabis and the impact it has on crime.

Irvine, CA: Brandman University, 2020. 217p.

By Ty Miller

In December of 2012, Washington and Colorado implemented the legalization of possession and use of marijuana for recreational purposes. Following this, January of 2014, Colorado opened the first recreational marijuana dispensaries in the United States. Although the debate about recreational marijuana has been fought in the public and academic spheres, we have limited empirical data as to the effect of these policies. With this, arguments in regard to whether marijuana should be legalized in the United States have far outpaced reliable scientific research. As more states, and potentially the federal government, begin to vote on whether to legalize, reliable research will be necessary. Sociology provides possible theoretical justifications for both sides of the recreational marijuana debate. However, there is still relatively little research on the effects of legalization in the United States. The current project analyzes changes in measures of excessive drinking, crime, DUI-related fatalities, and DUI arrests in Washington and Colorado following legalization of recreational marijuana. Each set of analyses are carried out in two parts. First, I examine the effects of legalizing possession and use in 2013. Second, I examine the effects of opening recreational dispensaries in Colorado in 2014. These separate analyses are utilized to uncover any shock-effects that might be inherently tied to legalization of possession and use or the opening of recreational dispensaries. Results indicate that, in most of the analyses, there are no significant effects of either part of legalization on the outcome variables of interest. The lone significant effect is that policing of DUI appears to increase following the legalization of possession and use in Washington and Colorado in 2013. The implications of these findings for both sociological theory and policy-making are discussed in the concluding chapter

West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, 2018. 282p.

By Marie Gottschalk

A closer examination of media coverage, the response of law enforcement and policy makers, the legislative record, and the availability of proven, highquality treatments for substance abuse casts doubt on claims that the country pivoted toward public health and harm-reduction strategies to address the opioid crisis because its victims were disproportionately white people. Law enforcement solutions directed at people who use and sell street drugs continue to far outpace public health and harm-reduction strategies. Government support for expanding access to proven treatments for opioid use disorder that save and rebuild lives remains paltry given the scale of this public health catastrophe. And although the rhetoric has been somewhat more sympathetic, at times it rivals the excesses of the crack era. The article examines the various phases of the opioid crisis as they have unfolded over the past 25 years; related geographic and racial shifts in overdose fatalities with each new phase; media coverage of the crisis; the federal government’s response, including by the US Congress and presidents from George H.W. Bush to Joe Biden; punitive developments at the state and local levels; and the country’s poor record on prevention and making effective treatment widely available for people with substance use disorder.

Annual Review of Criminology, 2023. 6:363–98 . 39p.

By Jeffrey A. Singer and Trevor Burrus

Fifty‐one years after President Richard M. Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” overdose deaths from illicit drug use have climbed to record levels. Last November, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported 100,000 overdose deaths for the 12‐month period ending in April 2021, a 28.5 percent increase over the year before. Nearly 76,000 of those deaths were opioid related, and 83 percent of opioid‐related deaths involved illicit fentanyl.

Fentanyl is a highly potent opioid—about 50 times stronger than heroin—that can easily cause overdoses, particularly if users don’t know if it is in their drug supply or how much. Over the past decade, drug traffickers have increasingly preferred fentanyl because of its compact size. The smuggler’s preference for higher potency drugs is a manifestation of the “iron law of prohibition,” and it is almost the entire reason fentanyl has poisoned the American drug supply. The iron law of prohibition states that, all things being equal, as enforcement ramps up, smugglers prefer higher potency forms of a drug for the same reason those who sneak alcohol into a football game prefer hard alcohol in flasks to 12‐packs of beer. The lethal logic of the iron law of prohibition means that we cannot enforce our way out of the opioid crisis. And if fentanyl smugglers bexcome somehow easy to catch, there’s always carfentanil, which is about 100 times more potent than fentanyl and has already been showing up in America’s drug supply.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2022. 10p.

By Jeffrey A. Singer and Sophia Heimow 

  Every state except Alaska has laws that criminalize the possession and/or sale of paraphernalia for the consumption of illicit drugs. State-level drug paraphernalia laws prevent people who use those drugs from accessing the means to reduce the risk of infection or overdose. This makes nonmedical drug use even more dangerous because the laws often prevent access to clean needles and syringes along with products to test drugs for deadly contaminants. These laws are meant to discourage illicit drug use. Instead, they produce avoidable disease and death. Drug prohibition puts peaceful, voluntary drug users at risk of losing their liberty and often their lives. Paraphernalia laws similarly increase the risk that users will lose their lives. Some states have amended their laws to permit harmreduction programs and tools. For example, many states allow syringe services programs (also called SSPs or “needle exchange programs”) to operate within narrowly defined parameters. The goal of drug paraphernalia policy should be to save lives by reducing the risks of overdose and disease. This means removing government barriers to obtaining and distributing clean syringes and drug testing equipment. Because Alaska leaves residents free to purchase syringes and other paraphernalia in any quantity, anyone can operate an SSP and implement other harm-reduction measures. States should follow Alaska’s lead by repealing their drug paraphernalia laws so that programs aimed at reducing overdoses and disease can proliferate and succeed.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2022. 24p.

By Trevor Burrus and Jeffrey A. Singer.

People have used opium and its derivatives both medically and recreationally since antiquity. However, since the early 20th century, law and society have viewed people who use opioids, cocaine, and certain other psychoactive substances as immoral and even criminal. For more than 100 years, this viewpoint has destructively intruded on the patient‐doctor relationship. Government and law enforcement increasingly surveil and influence the way doctors treat pain, psychoactive substance use, and substance use disorder. This change has happened in two discernible waves, which we call Drug War I and Drug War II.

Drug War I occurred after Congress enacted the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914, which permitted doctors to prescribe opioids to treat their patients. A wave of arrests and prosecutions of thousands of doctors ensued as agents of the U.S. Treasury Department, empowered to enforce the act, took it upon themselves to define legitimate medical practice.

Drug War II began in the 1970s, with government‐funded education/indoctrination campaigns that caused both doctors and patients to fear opioids for their addictive and overdose potential. Later, as the scientific literature led medical specialty organizations and government health officials to overcome this apprehension and take the treatment of pain more seriously, opioid prescribing increased considerably.

By 2006, federal regulatory agencies perceived what they called an “opioid crisis” and mistakenly attributed it to doctors “overprescribing” opioids and generating a growing population of opioid addicts. This formed the basis for an even more massive intrusion of federal and state power into the privacy of medical records, patient‐doctor confidentiality, and the very way in which doctors are allowed to use scientific and professional knowledge to practice medicine. Medical decisionmaking came increasingly under the purview of law enforcement, sparking a new wave of arrests and prosecutions.

Patients who had their pain controlled with long‐term opioid treatment are being denied treatment or involuntarily tapered off their pain control, as doctors fear arrest and an end to their medical careers. A growing population of “pain refugees” has emerged, with some patients turning in desperation to the black market for opioids and some even turning to suicide. As prescribing rates continue to plunge, overdoses from the nonmedical use of opioids are skyrocketing, now largely caused by illicit fentanyl.

The medical mismanagement of pain, which causes harm to patients, is best addressed through the civil tort system. Additionally, states establish professional licensing boards specifically to enforce the “standard of care” rendered by the professionals they oversee. Law enforcement has no medical expertise and should have no say in classifying narcotics and psychoactive substances. Lawmakers should avoid passing or repeal any laws that cast in stone prescribing guidelines released by any state or federal public health agencies. Federal and state law enforcement should be required to get a warrant before perusing state prescription drug monitoring program databases. Law enforcement should be required to report any suspected standard‐of‐care deviations to state professional licensing boards for review and adjudication. Neither the practice of medicine nor the act of self‐medication belongs in the realm of the criminal legal system.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2022. 37p.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

This report examines the emergence of new hubs for cocaine trafficking, noting that countries in Southeastern Europe and Africa – particularly those in West and Central Africa – are increasingly being used as key transit zones for the drug. Ports on the North Sea like Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, meanwhile, have eclipsed traditional entry points in Spain and Portugal for cocaine arriving in Western Europe. Traffickers are also diversifying their routes in Central America by sending more and more cocaine to Europe, in addition to North America.

The modalities of cocaine traffickers are also examined in this report, with findings showing that the criminal landscape is fragmenting into a myriad of trafficking networks. The demobilization of fighters from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - who had previously controlled many of Colombia’s coca-growing regions – created an opening for others to step in, such as new, local actors; ex-FARC guerillas; or even foreign groups from Mexico and Europe. Additionally, the report reveals that so-called “service providers”, i.e., specialized groups that lend their services at all stages of the supply chain for a fee, have proliferated.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 184p.