By Heather Wolbers and Hayley Boxal

People with disability are at an increased risk of sexual violence. The extent of this increased risk online, particularly in the context of online dating, is unclear as research on dating app facilitated sexual violence (DAFSV) is in its infancy.

This study examines the prevalence and nature of online DAFSV experienced by people with disability (n=1,155), using data from a large national survey of dating platform users (n=9,987).

Overall, 88 percent of users with disability experienced some form of online DAFSV. Rates of harm were significantly higher for users with disability than for users without disability. Further, women and First Nations users with disability were particularly at risk of victimisation.

Findings support the urgency of responses to protect those most at risk of harm facilitated by online dating platforms.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 695. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 18p.

By Don Weatherburn,  Michael Doyle, Teagan Weatherall, Joanna Wang

   The Australian Indigenous imprisonment rate is currently 16.7 times the non-Indigenous imprisonment rate. The leading proximate cause of this over-representation is a high rate of Indigenous arrest. In this report we develop and test a model of Indigenous arrest in which the primary drivers of risk are substance use, stress and trauma, adverse social environment, exposure to arrest, human/economic/social capital, and state/territory of residence. We test the model using data from the 2014–15 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey. The strongest risk factors are alcohol and other drug use and having a high or very high level of psychological distress. The strongest protective factors are completing school, having an income in the top four deciles, and having a permanent home.   

  AIC reports Research Report 32

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 50p. 

By Transparency International Australia, KordaMentha

  Globally, money laundering (ML) is a major driver of poverty and inequality. It erodes public trust, democracy and leads to less government revenue for essential services including health, education, and infrastructure. It also creates economic instability and social harms while enabling criminals to take advantage of legitimate actors in the private sector, hurting organisations and the community in the long term. In this report, Transparency International Australia (TIA) in partnership with KordaMentha, consider the ML vulnerabilities that exist in Cambodia and Australia and the gaps in the relevant Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regimes that make Australia an ideal destination for regional foreign proceeds and illicit funds. The timing of this report coincides with Australia’s consultation on the ‘Tranche 2’ reforms, the proposed amendments that would extend obligations under the AML/CTF legislation to real estate agents, lawyers, accountants, trust and company service providers and dealers in precious metals and stones.1 Our research suggests that Cambodia’s cash economy, geographical position, perceived corruption, porous borders, and gaps in the effectiveness of its AML legislative regime are all factors leading to increased ML vulnerabilities. The effectiveness of Cambodia’s AML regime is limited by a largely cash-based and partially dollarised economy that is growing on the back of industries that are vulnerable from a ML perspective such as casinos, garment manufacturing and logging. 2 The Cambodian AML regulators have limited capacity to oversee the regulated population, particularly in relation to the fast-growing financial and banking industries that are responsible for remitting funds domestically and internationally. A deeply politicised judicial system and reports of heightened corruption also constrain effective enforcement. Sources of funds laundered in Cambodia are widespread, most notably because of the prevalence of crimes such as human trafficking and exploitation, drug trafficking, smuggling, fraud and corruption – all of which are predicate ML offences. Cambodia is also seen as a regional ML hub for Chinese, Myanmar and Thai interests who invest funds in both legitimate and illegal industry in Cambodia, including in the casino industry, where rapid expansion prior to the COVID-19 pandemic is believed to have allowed ML to proliferate. Our research shows that ‘dirty money’ flowing across transnational borders, including from Cambodia, tends to move out of poorer countries and into the economies of wealthier nations, including Australia and the United States. Australia’s current Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) legislative framework, and in particular its failure to implement ‘Tranche 2’ reforms and effectively regulate Designated NonFinancial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) makes Australia an attractive destination for such funds moving illegally out of the Southeast Asian Region. In general terms, the current Australian legislative regime does not sufficiently deter criminals from laundering money through Australia’s real estate and the broader economy. Australia has visibility of the flow of funds from foreign jurisdictions. Current reporting entities (REs) are required under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 Act (AML/CTF Act), to report all international transfers to the regulator, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). Furthermore, AUSTRAC collects declarations of all monetary instruments valued over $10,000. Together these two channels in this report are referred to as the ‘regulated channels’, and the figures below are the indicative value of fund flows in 2022  This report explores the significant amount of funds flowing through these ‘regulated channels’ as well as emerging typologies conducted through entities not currently captured under the AML/CTF regime (‘unregulated channels’). In particular we explore the investment Cambodian foreign persons have made into Australia’s property market. The limited dataset sourced for this report shows that between 2019 and 2023, 118 properties were settled by Cambodian foreign persons, worth a combined value of $110 million. This report concludes that greater partnerships are required between Cambodian and Australian law enforcement and regulatory bodies, as well as the strengthening of both regulatory regimes to mitigate the flow of illegal funds from Cambodia to Australia and minimise harms to both Cambodian and Australian communities. 

Law , VIC: Transparency International Australia; Melbourne, AUS: 

LaLw Courts VIC2024. 57p.  

By The State of Queensland (Office of the Information Commissioner) 2024The Honourable Catherine Holmes AC SC

This review was established as a result of the Queensland Government’s recognition that, because of the High Court’s decision in Crime and Corruption Commission v Carne, legislation would be needed to give the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission public reporting and statement powers in relation to corruption investigations, and that before legislating, the many different and sometimes competing public interest and human rights factors involved required careful consideration. The expanded terms of reference also incorporated the Commission’s prevention function so far as it concerns corruption.

This report makes recommendations for legislative change. The compatibility of each proposed change with human rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 has been considered, in each instance with a positive conclusion. The recommendations fall into five groups, prefaced by an initial recommendation which articulates this proposition: that public reports and public statements should only ever be made in the public interest, in considering which a number of specified factors should be taken into account.

Key recommendations:

• The Commission should be able to report on corruption allegations about elected officials even if the person is not found guilty. Reports must not include critical commentary or opinions or recommendations based on their conduct.

• The Commission should be able to report on investigations that reveal systemic corruption. A person cannot be named in the report unless reasonably necessary, unless they have been named in a public hearing or unless they could be named in a serious corrupt conduct report.
  

• State of Queensland, 2024. 462o.By The State of Queensland (Office of the Information Commissioner) 2024The Honourable Catherine Holmes AC SC

  This review was established as a result of the Queensland Government’s recognition that, because of the High Court’s decision in Crime and Corruption Commission v Carne, legislation would be needed to give the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission public reporting and statement powers in relation to corruption investigations, and that before legislating, the many different and sometimes competing public interest and human rights factors involved required careful consideration. The expanded terms of reference also incorporated the Commission’s prevention function so far as it concerns corruption.

  This report makes recommendations for legislative change. The compatibility of each proposed change with human rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 has been considered, in each instance with a positive conclusion. The recommendations fall into five groups, prefaced by an initial recommendation which articulates this proposition: that public reports and public statements should only ever be made in the public interest, in considering which a number of specified factors should be taken into account.

  Key recommendations:

  • The Commission should be able to report on corruption allegations about elected officials even if the person is not found guilty. Reports must not include critical commentary or opinions or recommendations based on their conduct.

  • The Commission should be able to report on investigations that reveal systemic corruption. A person cannot be named in the report unless reasonably necessary, unless they have been named in a public hearing or unless they could be named in a serious corrupt conduct report.

    State of Queensland, 2024. 462o.

By Trine Filges, Elizabeth Bengtsen, Edith Montgomery, Malene Wallach Kildemoes

Background

The number of people fleeing persecution and regional conflicts is rising. Western countries have applied increasingly stringent measures to discourage those seeking asylum from entering their country, amongst them, to confine asylum seekers in detention facilities. Clinicians have expressed concerns over the mental health impact of detention on asylum seekers, a population already burdened with trauma, advocating against such practices.

Objectives

The main objective of this review is to assess evidence about the effects of detention on the mental and physical health and social functioning of asylum seekers.

Search methods

Relevant literature was identified through electronic searches of bibliographic databases, internet search engines, hand searching of core journals and citation tracking of included studies and relevant reviews. Searches were performed up to November 2023.

Selection criteria

Studies comparing detained asylum-seekers with non-detained asylum seekers were included. Qualitative approaches were excluded.

Data collection and analysis

Of 22,226 potential studies, 14 met the inclusion criteria. These studies, from 4 countries, involving a total of 13 asylum-seeker populations. Six studies were used in the data synthesis, all of which reported only mental health outcomes. Eight studies had a critical risk of bias. Meta-analyses, inverse variance weighted using random effects statistical models, were conducted on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety.

Main results

A total of 27,797 asylum seekers were analysed. Four studies provided data while the detained asylum seekers were still detained, and two studies after release. All outcomes are reported such that a positive effect size favours better outcomes for the non-detained asylum seekers. The weighted average SMD while detained is 0.45 [95% CI 0.19, 0.71] for PTSD and after release 0.91 [95% CI 0.24, 1.57]; for anxiety 0.42 [95% CI 0.18, 0.66] and for depression 0.68 [95% CI 0.10, 1.26] both while detained. Based on single-study data, the SMD was 0.60 [95% CI 0.02, 1.17] for depression and 0.76 [95% CI 0.17, 1.34] for anxiety, both after release. Three studies (one study each) reported outcomes related to psychological distress, self-harm and social well being. Psychological distress favoured the detained but was not significant; whereas both effect sizes on self-harm and social wellbeing indicated highly negative impacts of detention; in particular, the impact on self-harm was extremely high. The OR of self-harm was reported separately for asylum seekers detained in three types of detention: Manus Island, Nauru and onshore detention. The ORs were in the range 12.18 to 74.44; all were significant.

Authors' conclusions

Despite similar post-migration adversities amongst comparison groups, findings suggest an independent adverse impact of detention on asylum seekers' mental health, with the magnitude of the effect sizes lying in an important clinical range. These effects persisted beyond release into the community. While based on limited evidence, this review supports concerns regarding the detrimental impact of detention on the mental health of already traumatised asylum seekers. Further research is warranted to comprehensively explore these effects. Detention of asylum seekers, already grappling with significant trauma, appears to exacerbate mental health challenges. Policymakers and practitioners should consider these findings in shaping immigration and asylum policies, with a focus on minimising harm to vulnerable populations.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume 20, Issue 3

September 2024

By John Hall

Retail theft is a complex issue with conflicting narratives. Some people believe that the problem is exaggerated by authorities and retailers who are struggling to keep up with a changing marketplace. Others point to personal experiences of theft and stores being repeatedly targeted by chronic offenders and organized crews. Unfortunately, traditional crime data sources don’t give us a clear picture of the situation. This report explores the limitations of existing data and suggests ways for policymakers to get a better understanding of the problem. It uses New York City as a case study and shows how its challenges are similar to those in other cities. This paper also draws upon examples from other major cities that provide retail-theft data to highlight the commonalities and variations in how retail theft operates throughout the country and discusses some general strategies that could be used to address retail theft in cities across the country

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2024. 20p.

By Troy Allard, Molly McCarthy and Anna Stewart

  The lifetime costs of offenders to the criminal justice system provide useful information to support implementation of innovative frameworks such as justice reinvestment and payment by outcome, as well as helping to assess the effectiveness of targeted prevention programs. However, few Australian studies have explored the longitudinal costs of offenders and no research has explored whether criminal justice system costs differ based on Indigenous status. This study used linked administrative data (contacts individuals born in 1983 and 1984 had with police, courts and corrections in Queensland) to determine how offending develops over the life course and how Indigenous status influences offending trajectories. A narrow costing framework focused on direct criminal justice system costs used in service provision (police, courts, youth justice and corrections) was developed to establish unit cost estimates based on critical cost drivers (eg whether diverted, offence type, trials and sanction type). These cost estimates were modelled to assess the costs of individuals on different trajectories. Findings identified over half (53%) of the Indigenous population and 16 percent of the non-Indigenous population had moderate to chronic trajectories of offending. Because of the high levels of recontact, Indigenous offenders were on average more costly. These findings emphasise the need for innovative approaches such as justice reinvestment/payment-by outcome to reduce Indigenous over-representation.  

Report to the Criminology Research Advisory Council      

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2020. 65p.

By David Bartlett, Janet Ransley, Lucy Forrester and Kristine Middendorp

Government and public concern about corporate wrongdoing in Australia is arguably at an all-time high. However, the extent and nature of corporate crime is largely unknown; it is concealed by regulatory agency reporting practices and the absence of a single data source which combines data across all regulators. This study addresses the problem by examining corporate offending by 33 of the country’s top companies, and their wholly owned subsidiaries, over a five-year period. The results indicate that corporate offending is patterned and unevenly distributed across the business community. Drawing on the findings and on their experience of conducting the research, the authors make recommendations for improving policy and practice, including the establishment of a national database of corporate offending.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 613. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 17p.

By David Bartlett,  Janet Ransley and Lucy Forrester

   Corporate crime is increasingly becoming a topic of importance for the Australian Government and public. Recent inquiries have highlighted the extent of wrongdoing by some corporations and within some industries. However, the overall extent of corporate offending in Australia is largely unknown and unable to be ascertained due to the absence of centralised reporting. This study examines 33 of Australia’s largest corporations and their subsidiaries over a five-year period. Drawing upon publicly available data, the findings highlight that offending is concentrated in particular industry sectors, with some specific corporations accounting for a substantial proportion of offences. The type and extent of enforcement action taken against those corporations is examined and reveals differences, in part based upon the different enforcement styles of regulators. The findings from this study have important implications for regulatory practice and emphasise the need for a centralised corporate crime data collection in Australia.  

Report to the Criminology Research Advisory Council

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2020. 56p.

By Paul Andon and Clinton Free 

  Although serious fraud is typically perpetrated over a prolonged time frame, fraud research has been heavily focused on the decision to commit fraud rather than the way it is sustained. Based on an analysis of 42 interviews with offenders who have committed serious fraud, we examine how fraud perpetrators continue to offend over extended periods. We find that fraudulent offending is frequently associated with strain for offenders including fear of detection, guilt and shame. We present a typology of strategies used by offenders to cope with this strain over the course of their offending comprising (1) problem-focused coping, (2) emotion-focused coping, (3) meaning-focused coping and (4) social-focused coping. While notions of rationalisation are germane for initial decisions to engage in fraud, we find limited recourse to rationalisation in the latter stages of offending. Offenders have often considerable scope for managing diverse, fragile, perhaps even contradictory, understandings of their selves. Control system implications for addressing organizational precipitators of fraud, including controlling situational prompts, pressures, work-based permissibility and provocations are discussed.  

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2020. 52p.

By Paul Andon and Clinton Free 

   Research across a range of disciplines has generally focused on the decision to commit fraud rather than how fraud is sustained over time. This study uses interviews with serious workplace fraudsters to examine enablers of sustained offending. We present coping strategies offenders use to manage strain and sustain offending. We highlight that while rationalisation is germane for first-time offending, coping may be a more useful construct for understanding how offending is sustained over time

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 596. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2020. 14p.

By Tom Sullivan Emily Faulconbridge Samantha Bricknell Merran McAlister

The first data from the new Australian Sexual Offence Statistical (ASOS) collection shows:

• There were 8,326 unique alleged sexual offenders proceeded against by police in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory in 2021–22.

•  The male sexual offending rate in these six jurisdictions was 75.64 per 100,000 and the female sexual offending rate was 5.12 per 100,000.

• The largest proportion of offenders proceeded against for sexual offences in 2021–22 were alleged to have committed penetrative or non-penetrative sexual conduct offences (77%, n=6,450), followed by handling of unlawful sexual material offences (24%, n=2,024), enabling unlawful sexual conduct offences (8%, n=656) and persistent sexual abuse offences (1%, n=82).

• Around one-third of offenders in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Northern Territory were a non-family member known to the victim (32%, n=1,891), 15 percent (n=886) were an intimate partner, 19 percent (n=1,124) were other family and 21 percent (n=1,267) were a stranger.

Statistical Report no. 47. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 65p.

By Mieke Snijder

How, for whom, and under what conditions does Participatory Action Research (PAR) generate innovation to tackle the drivers of the worst forms of child labour (WFCL)?

This paper presents the findings of a realist evaluation that investigated how PAR groups facilitated children who work in exploitative and harmful labour and business owners in the leather industry in Bangladesh and the adult entertainment sector in Nepal to generate innovative actions. These PAR groups were facilitated over a period of 18 months to two years by non-governmental organisation professionals trained in PAR approaches.

PAR is defined as a knowledge-, action-, and innovation-generating intervention that enabled a group of children or business owners to meet over a period of time to build evidence, generate theories of change, develop and implement innovative solutions, and reflect on and evaluate how these solutions were working (or not). Our evidence showed that PAR generated innovative solutions to WFCL through raising group members’ critical consciousness of the underlying causal dynamics that drive WFCL. This critical consciousness-raising was done through gathering their own evidence and reflecting on their own experiences, as well as through developing their own theory of change through which they could identify on which part of the causal chain they could take action. Furthermore, PAR processes allowed groups of individuals, who because of their experience of marginalisation in urban settings did not have opportunities to come together, to build a collective identity that was grounded in their shared experiences and a common goal to take action to tackle these issues. This collective identity allowed them, as a new collective that was more than the sum of its parts, to develop innovative actions. Finally, by taking action and reflecting on these actions, PAR group members were able to harness their experiential knowledge on causal and power dynamics that underpinned and perpetuated their issues and use this new knowledge to develop further innovative actions.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 14

Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 60p.

DOI: 10.19088/CLARISSA.2024.009

By Jason Eligh

  I n recent years, the global landscape of illicit synthetic drug markets has undergone profound transformations, driven by a complex interplay of factors ranging from decentralized production models and deepening geopolitical schisms to open source databases and other technological advancements. From the proliferation of dark web marketplaces to the emergence of new and novel psychoactive substances (NPS), these trends have generated significant and sometimes contradictory challenges to law enforcement agencies, public health systems and policymakers worldwide. Rapid, unregulated expansion of the global pharmaceutical and chemical sectors has been a fundamental driver behind what has become, over the last 10 years, but particularly in the last two years, a global explosion in illicit synthetic drug production, trafficking and use. A mass proliferation of chemists and firms producing and vending synthetic substances and their many precursors has helped propel an unprecedented propensity for licit industrial production channels and supply chains being diverted into illicit economic activity. One consequence of all this is the realization that synthetic drugs have become the future of drug trafficking. One of the most notable trends in illicit synthetic drug markets has been the rapid expansion of online platforms, particularly on the dark web. These anonymous marketplaces provide a convenient and relatively secure environment for the sale and distribution of illicit substances, allowing vendors and buyers to operate with a degree of anonymity. Cryptocurrencies, some boasting of their untraceable digital footprint, have facilitated transactions, enabling actors to evade basic anti-money laundering requirements and law enforcement efforts. Moreover, the globalization of supply chains has enabled the widespread dissemination of synthetic drugs across borders. Production hubs in countries with lax regulations and enforcement mechanisms serve as primary sources of supply for a diverse array of substances to markets around the world. The decentralization of production and distribution networks complicates efforts to disrupt these illicit activities. The proliferation of NPS is a major concern. These synthetic compounds are often chemically modified versions of existing drugs, developed to mimic their effects while evading legal restrictions because of their chemical composition. Through its Early Warning Advisory on NPS, and in partnership with voluntary reporting by member states, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified over 1 200 NPS from 141 different countries.2 The rapid pace of innovation in this domain  challenges regulatory frameworks, as authorities struggle to keep pace with the emergence of these new synthetic substances, their potential health risks and their potential contribution to wider illicit drug market dynamics. The escalation in the use of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl and its analogues in North America, and tramadol in Africa, is a particularly alarming trend within illicit drug markets. These substances, vital to public health institutions for pain relief and palliative care purposes, but too often also produced clandestinely in makeshift laboratories, have been responsible for a significant increase in drug-related morbidity and mortality worldwide. Their potency and availability pose unprecedented challenges to public health systems and law enforcement agencies.  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

By Maria Khoruk

  More than two years after the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, the country is once again high on the UN’s agenda. The levels of conflict-related violence may have significantly decreased compared to the Taliban’s time as an insurgent group, but extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and other gross human rights violations have continued, targeting in particular women, ethnic minorities, former state officials and people who use drugs (PWUD). The security situation has been further undermined by the alleged presence and escalating activities of non-state armed groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq, the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – although the Taliban has repeatedly denied the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan. In March 2024, the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) will be reviewed. It follows the release (on 8 November 2023) of the independent assessment of the international response in Afghanistan, which the UN Security Council (UNSC) requested in Resolution 2679 (2023). The independent assessment’s recommendations for the international community’s activities in Afghanistan include a structured engagement strategy to address the basic needs of the Afghan people, cooperation on issues affecting regional and global security, and political engagement with the state of Afghanistan and Afghan stakeholders. On 29 December 2023, subsequent to the independent assessment, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2721, in an attempt to balance a call to reintegrate Afghanistan into the international community and the need to meet international obligations. The UNSC’s request for a Special Envoy for Afghanistan, with robust expertise on human rights and gender, sent a call from the main security body that these issues should be front and centre in a coordinated international response. The independent assessment lists the country’s counter-narcotics strategy as a key reason to engage with the Afghan government, noting the Taliban’s success in significantly reducing the ‘cultivation, processing and trafficking of narcotics’ in Afghanistan. It indicates that ‘[m]any stakeholders expressed interest in exploring greater international cooperation in this area, in particular on alternative crops and livelihoods for the hundreds of Afghans that have relied on the production and trade of narcotics for income’, and that counter-narcotics efforts are linked to addressing the basic needs of the Afghan people through livelihoods programmes. The country’s potential to become a source of uncontrolled outmigration is also listed as a risk factor for regional security  Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban has established and enforced stricter controls of the country’s vast informal economy. Some of the economies have been absorbed by the Taliban, while others have been strictly enforced against – the major trend has been consolidation in one way or the other from more heterogeneous markets. For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has reported a major reduction in opium cultivation (estimated at 95 per cent year-on-year).8 This short-term success in significantly reducing illicit opium cultivation has had dire implications for the Afghan population and exacerbated the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country. Over time, the country’s illicit economy has diversified to include a range of markets – from the trafficking of arms, mineral resources, timber, antiquities and licit commodities to human trafficking. This brief traces changes in the regulatory landscape and enforcement efforts by the Taliban in relation to various illicit markets within the context of the Taliban’s consolidation and centralization of power in Afghanistan. Its objective is to outline developments in illicit economies since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 and transformed from an insurgency group into a de facto government. In doing so, its aim is to provide the UN, member states and other stakeholders with a better understanding of the potential security risks and obstacles to sustainable development linked to the recent trends in the operations of Afghanistan’s illicit economies.  

: 

UNSC Illicit Economies Watch series

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2024. 27p.

By  Edith Nyabichi

The report examines the regulatory and legal framework governing Kenya's mining industry and offers an in-depth exploration of the challenges and gaps in implementing and enforcing beneficial ownership in the country.

The report offers an analysis of Kenya's corporate income taxes, mining royalties, and other mining taxes, providing insight into the complex dynamics and possible risks of illicit financial flows (IFFs) within the sector. The GFI research outlines key deficiencies in the current system and offers practical recommendations to enhance transparency and accountability.  

Key findings of the report include:

• Regulatory and Legal Framework: An assessment of Kenya's current policies and regulations concerning the mining sector, emphasizing the need for reforms to reduce the risks associated with IFFs.

• Corporate Income Taxes and Mining Royalties: An analysis of the existing tax frameworks, with a focus on the identification of potential vulnerabilities and loopholes that could facilitate illicit financial activities.

• Beneficial Ownership Implementation Challenges: An examination of the legal, administrative, and operational challenges that hamper the enforcement of beneficial ownership transparency.

• Recommendations: Strategic recommendations designed to strengthen the regulatory framework, improve enforcement mechanisms, and promote greater transparency in the mining sector.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity (GFI), 2024. 33p.

By Sarah Pedersen,  Natascha Mueller-Hirth, Leia Miller

COVID-19 exacerbated challenges that already existed in the policing of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in remote and rural northern Scotland. Victims’ direct access to the police and third-sector organisations was impeded by social distancing while the pandemic exacerbated extant issues relating to staffing, particularly in relation to female police officers. On the positive side, the flexibility that already characterised rural and remote policing continued, and police officers and third-sector organisations worked together to support victims. The move to videoconferencing was hailed as a positive move in an area where travel to meetings or court can be difficult and expensive. A lack of training for officers with no specific GBV role was identified as particularly problematic during the pandemic when officers on the ground in rural and remote Scotland had to take over work usually undertaken by specialist task forces.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2023. 12p.

 By Virginia Comolli   

Building and expanding on the analysis in the Global Organized Crime Index, the GI-TOC has undertaken to map trends in organized criminality in the Pacific (Oceania). The resulting papers contribute to filling some of the gaps in a region where crime-related data can be scarce. In turn, these analyses allow us to identify vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for intervention and mitigation. The Pacific islands now occupy a more prominent place on the international strategic chessboard as a result of the proliferation of trade, diplomatic and security engagements in the region in the 21st century.  This is due to greater foreign presence and influence in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, and intensifying geopolitical competition among external partners. This reality, alongside greater connectivity and market trends, is also drastically  transforming the criminal landscape. Pacific islands have traditionally been considered as mostly immune from high levels of criminality due to their geographic remoteness.  However, highly pernicious illicit markets are taking hold, and the islands are becoming increasingly vulnerable to new threats in the form of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes and the introduction of new narcotics, to mention just two examples. Who is behind these activities? There are multiple criminal actors present and active in the Pacific islands, but the most pervasive are foreign actors.  And within the foreign actor sub-set, there are a diverse array of nationalities and sectors. The one thing they have in common is their pivotal role vis a vis evolving crime dynamics. Across the series of papers, we map their different typologies. The emerging pictures suggest that, possibly contrary to expectations, business operators are often responsible for the bulk of organized criminality. This is particularly evident in the extractive industries, but also in sectors such as real estate and financial services. Yet, more ‘obvious’ criminal actors such as cartels and triads have also made their way to the islands and intensified their operations.

Geneva, SWIT:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 29p.

By Insight Crime

  At least 117,492 people were murdered in Latin America and the Caribbean during 2023, putting the median homicide rate around 20 per 100,000 people. But homicide data in many countries is missing or unreliable, so the actual number is likely higher. Here, InSight Crime dives into our yearly round-up, analyzing the organized crime dynamics behind the violence in each country of the region.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 52p.  

By Jeanne Batalova, Andriy Shymonyak, and Michelle Mittelstadt

  Although international migrants account for just 3.5 percent of the world’s population, their number—almost 272 million people as of 2019—is far from insubstantial. Current and historical research shows that immigration brings significant and long-lasting benefits to countries of destination and origin and to migrants and their families alike. But it also shows that immigration often comes with tremendous challenges for individuals, communities, and institutions. In the United States, a country with a long and complex immigration history, public and political debates that started well back into the 18th century about the size and type of immigration, as well as its socioeconomic impacts, show no sign of abating. And as other countries around the world become migrant-sending, receiving, or transit places (or frequently a combination), migration—whether voluntary or forced—has arguably earned a prime and enduring spot on national and international policy agendas. It also continues to capture significant public and media attention. What is often missing from these conversations is accurate, complete data about who these immigrants are, why they come and leave, and what places they occupy in the socioeconomic hierarchies of their sending and destination countries. In this edition, Immigration Data Matters, which updates an earlier Population Reference Bureau - Migration Policy Institute guide, we have significantly expanded a list of online resources that provide authoritative migration-related data and statistics to help inform understanding of this phenomenon in the United States and globally. As before, our main guiding principle is to offer data from population censuses and surveys, administrative datasets, and new analyses that can help our audience understand the size of immigrant populations and inflows and outflows, enforcement actions, public opinion, historical trends, citizenship acquisition, and many other aspects. Here we list and describe more than 250 data resources, half U.S., half international. These resources are collected or compiled by a wide range of sources, including government statistical agencies, international organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and reputable research organizations. We use these resources in our own research, and while the list is by no means exhaustive, our goal is to share the most accurate, relevant, publicly available migration-related data, in one user-friendly and accessible guide. We hope this guide helps bring more knowledge to an issue area where the facts are often missing  

Migration Policy Institute and The   Population Reference Bureau , 2020. 49p.