By: Priyanka Bhatt, Katie Quigley, Azadeh Shahshahani, Gina Starfield, Ayano Kitano

Immigrants detained at the Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC) in Georgia have, for years, suffered egregious medical abuse, including invasive and medically unnecessary gynecological procedures without consent. Since Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contracted with ICDC in 2011, advocates have consistently raised concerns about the treatment of immigrants at the facility, including the lack of adequate medical and mental health care. Yet, months after that announcement, immigrants were still being detained in inhumane conditions at ICDC, until the last ones were transferred to other facilities in early September 2021. This report highlights the stories of women who suffered lasting trauma and debilitating physical and psychological effects of the medical abuse they endured while detained at ICDC. The abuses they suffered were first brought to light in September 2020, when Project South, together with Georgia Detention Watch, the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, and the South Georgia Immigrant Support Network, filed a whistleblower complaint with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE, and ICDC detailing the gross disregard for the health and medical well-being of immigrants detained at ICDC. The complaint, submitted on behalf of immigrants held at ICDC and whistleblower Dawn Wooten, a licensed practical nurse at ICDC, publicized multiple accounts of immigrant women subjected to non-consensual, medically unnecessary, or invasive gynecological procedures while in detention. Many women detained at ICDC did not understand the invasive medical procedures they were subjected to and, as a result, suffered not only lasting trauma but also debilitating effects of the procedures that they were not informed about. The complaint prompted more than 170 members of Congress to demand an investigation by DHS, which is ongoing. In October 2020, an independent team of medical experts, including board-certified obstetricians, reviewed the medical records of multiple women at ICDC and found a significant pattern of incorrect diagnoses and failure to secure informed consent for medical procedures.8 These abuses occurred despite the fact that the doctor who perpetrated them, Dr. Mahendra Amin, had already been investigated and prosecuted by the Department of Justice for similar abusive behavior, specifically for performing unnecessary medical procedures in violation of the False Claims Act. After these women and many others came forward, DHS and ICE retaliated by deporting and threatening to deport those who spoke out. These actions violate the First Amendment, which guarantees the right to petition the government and participate in federal investigations. By detaining these women for months on end during a global pandemic, DHS, ICE, and ICDC also failed to protect their health and safety, as mandated by the U.S. Constitution, statutes, and regulations. The non-consensual treatment of these women also violates fundamental human rights, including the right to informed consent and bodily autonomy, which may not be violated under any circumstances. The United States must be held accountable for failing to uphold its obligations under both domestic and international law.

Atlanta: Project South, 2021. 37p.

By Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program

The United States maintains the world’s largest immigration detention system, detaining tens of thousands of people in a network of facilities, including those managed by private prison corporations, county jails, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). At the time of writing, ICE is detaining over 35,000 people, including long-term residents of the United States, people seeking asylum, and survivors of trafficking or torture. Instead of finding refuge, these people are held in ICE custody for extended periods, enduring inhuman conditions such as solitary confinement (dubbed “segregation” by ICE), where they are isolated in small cells with minimal contact with others for days, weeks, or even years. In many instances, such conditions would meet the definition of torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under international human rights law. Solitary confinement causes a range of adverse health effects, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), self-harm, and suicide risks. Prolonged confinement can lead to lasting brain damage, hallucinations, confusion, disrupted sleep, and reduced cognitive function. These effects persist beyond the confinement period, often resulting in enduring psychological and physical disabilities, especially for people with preexisting medical and mental health conditions or other vulnerabilities. In recognition of this well-documented harm, ICE issued a directive in 2013 to limit the use of solitary confinement in its facilities, especially for people with vulnerabilities. A 2015 memorandum further protected transgender people, emphasizing solitary confinement as a last resort. In 2022, ICE reinforced reporting requirements for people with mental health conditions in solitary confinement, highlighting the need for strict oversight. Despite these directives, however, government audits and whistleblowers alike have repeatedly revealed stark failures in oversight. This report – a joint effort by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), Harvard Law School’s Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program (HIRCP), and researchers at Harvard Medical School (HMS) – provides a detailed overview of how solitary confinement is being used by ICE across detention facilities in the United States, and its failure to adhere to its own policies, guidance, and directives. It is based on a comprehensive examination of data gathered from ICE and other agencies, including through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, first filed in 2017, and partly acquired after subsequent litigation. It is further enriched by interviews with 26 people who were formerly held in immigration facilities and experienced solitary confinement over the last 10 years. Executive Summary The study reveals that immigration detention facilities fail to comply with ICE guidelines and directives regarding solitary confinement. Despite significant documented issues, including whistleblower alarms and supposed monitoring and oversight measures, there has been negligible progress. The report highlights a significant discrepancy between the 2020 campaign promise of U.S. President Joseph Biden to end solitary confinement and the ongoing practices observed in ICE detention. Over the last decade, the use of solitary confinement has persisted, and worse, the recent trend under the current administration reflects an increase in frequency and duration. Data from solitary confinement use in 2023 – though likely an underestimation as this report explains – demonstrates a marked increase in the instances of solitary confinement. This report exposes a continuing trend of ICE using solitary confinement for punitive purposes rather than as a last resort – in violation of its own directives. Many of the people interviewed were placed in solitary confinement for minor disciplinary infractions or as a form of retaliation for participating in hunger strikes or for submitting complaints. Many reported inadequate access to medical care, including mental health care, during their solitary confinement, which they said led to the exacerbation of existing conditions or the development of new ones, including symptoms consistent with depression, anxiety, and PTSD. The conditions in solitary confinement were described as dehumanizing, with people experiencing harsh living conditions, limited access to communication and recreation, and verbal abuse or harassment from facility staff. etc.....

New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2024.  50p.

by Kathryn Hampton et al

For the last two years, the Trump administration’s Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), or “Remain in Mexico” policy, have forced almost 70,000 people seeking asylum in the United States to wait in dangerous Mexican border towns while their cases pend – in violation of U.S. and international law, which prohibits returning asylum seekers to places where they fear that they may be persecuted. With the indefinite postponement of immigration hearings due to COVID-19, asylum seekers in MPP face ever-lengthening periods of stay in Mexico, where many have experienced violence, trauma, and human rights abuses.

Since the start of MPP, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has responded to more than 100 requests by attorneys for pro bono forensic evaluations of asylum seekers enrolled in the program, most in support of asylum claims and a few in support of requests for MPP exemption due to health issues. To quantify the extent of reported health and human rights violations affecting asylum seekers in MPP, PHR partnered with the University of Southern California’s Keck Human Rights Clinic (KHRC) to review 95 deidentified affidavits based on forensic evaluations of asylum seekers from Central and South America ranging in age from 4 to 67 years. We found that at least 11 people belonged to categories that should have been exempt from MPP enrollment.  Although most affidavits focused on the harms migrants fled in their home countries, most documented compounding harms to the migrants after they were returned to Mexico under MPP, including physical violence, sexual violence, kidnapping, theft, extortion, threats, and harm to family members. The affidavits also reported unsanitary and unsafe living conditions, poor access to services, family separations, and poor treatment in U.S. immigration detention. Nearly all of those evaluated were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and many exhibited other debilitating psychological conditions or symptoms.

This study adds to the considerable evidence that it is not safe for migrants to remain in Mexico while their U.S. asylum cases are pending, and forcing them to do so violates U.S. and international law. The incoming Biden administration should immediately admit all people enrolled in MPP into community settings in the United States, rescind MPP, and initiate an investigation to determine appropriate redress for people harmed by this policy.

New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 

2021. 21p.

By Rashmi LuthraDeindustrialized cities in the United States are at a particular crossroads when it comes to the contest over refugees. Do refugees represent opportunity or danger? These cities are in desperate need to stem population and resource loss, problems that an influx of refugees could seemingly help address. However, the cities are simultaneously dealing with local communities that are already feeling internally displaced by economic and technological flux. For these existing citizens, the prospect of incoming refugee populations can be perceived as a threat to financial, cultural, and personal security. Few U.S. locations provide a more vivid case study of this fight than Metro Detroit, where competing interest groups are waging war over the meaning of the figure of the refugee. This book dives deeply into the discourse on refugees occurring among various institutions in Metro Detroit. The way in which local institutions talk about refugees gives us vital clues as to how they are negotiating competing pressures and how the city overall is negotiating competing imperatives. Indeed, this local discourse gives us a crucial glimpse into how U.S. cities are defining and redefining themselves today. The figure of the refugee becomes a slate on which groups with varied interests write their stories, aspirations, and fears. Consequently, we can figure out from local refugee discourses the ongoing question of what it means to be a Metro Detroiter—and by extension, what it means to be a revitalizing U.S. city in this age.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2024. 210p.

By  Maéva Clément 

This book addresses debates around radicalisation and political violence, and presents a timely analysis of the politics of emotions in narratives of political activism and violence. Drawing on extensive primary data consisting of texts, audios, and videos produced by five Islamist organisations active in the UK in the 2000s and Germany in the early 2010s, the book explores how collective actors move from moderate politics to (violent) extremism. The book develops an innovative theoretical and methodological framework at the intersection of world politics, peace and conflict studies, critical terrorism research, literary studies, and transdisciplinary emotion research. In the first part, Clément problematises previous categorisations of Islamist activism and reconstructs organisations’ phases of activism in a data-driven, systematic way. In the second part, the analysis centres on how organisations legitimise changes in activism narratively. Specifically, the book delves into the performance of collective emotions in and through narrative and interrogates their effects on (violent) collective action. By introducing the concept of ‘narrative emotionalisation’, Clément adds to our understanding of narrative deployments in the context of political violence. While organisations couch radical changes in activism in a strikingly similar romantic narrative, the compared analysis across cases reveals that ‘narrative emotionalisation’ fully unfolds only in phases of extremism. By exploring how non-state actors manage collective emotions, this book extends beyond the ideology-centric and strategic-rationalist approaches to group radicalisation. It offers an insightful and nuanced account of non-state agency and emotion dynamics in political conflicts

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2023. 274p.

By Prem Mahadevan, Maria Khoruk, and Alla Mohamad Mohmandzaï

The fall of Kabul in August 2021 marked the onset of a fourth wave of distress migration from Afghanistan in the last 50 years, a departure from the relative stability during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2001-21). This research, conducted in collaboration with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), unveils the pervasive features of Afghan migrant smuggling and examines the ramifications of the Taliban's resurgence on human mobility.

Drawing from extensive interviews with successful migrants, those who attempted but failed, as well as the smugglers and financiers integral to their journeys, the study elucidates the enduring presence of an illicit economy crucial not only for Afghanistan but also for the broader region and the Global North.

This research study pursues a twofold objective: firstly, it analyses preliminary findings, providing insights into the evolving dynamics of human mobility post-Kabul's fall on August 15, 2021. Secondly, it addresses a literature gap by exploring the role of informal value transfer systems (IVTS) in clandestine Afghan migration. Although the study doesn't offer a comprehensive overview, it paints a vivid, albeit impressionistic, picture of contemporary Afghan clandestine movement, shaped by the experiences of migrants, their families, and those offering migrant smuggling services. These insights pave the way for a future research agenda.

Key takeaways emphasise the volatile nature of the irregular migration market in Afghanistan, requiring adaptability from those seeking an escape. The study underscores the significant role of IVTS like hawala in the Afghan human smuggling economy, with hawala brokers' trust and credibility further legitimising human smugglers. In irregular migration hotspots, IVTS serve as an integral part of the human smuggling infrastructure. Additionally, shared ethnic backgrounds establish trust relationships and are frequently leveraged by human smugglers and money transfer service providers. While enhanced barriers may increase migration costs and risks, they are unlikely to deter further migration driven by perceived economic and security imperatives, further deepening migrants' reliance on smuggler services.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2023, 33pg

By Jessica Garrick and Andrew Schrank

This study explores the relationship between “sanctuary policies” that bar local law enforcement agencies from cooperating with federal immigration authorities and immigrant attitudes toward law enforcement agencies. It draws upon original survey data collected in New Mexico in 2019 and finds:

• First, that immigrants who believe they are protected by sanctuary have more trust in their police and sheriffs than immigrants who anticipate collaboration between local law enforcement and immigration authorities;

• Second, that awareness of sanctuary policies is nonetheless the exception to the rule, particularly among immigrant men.

The study therefore highlights not only the limits to sanctuary policies sensu stricto but the limited scope and gendered nature of legal consciousness among immigrants in a multilayered enforcement regime.

Our findings suggest that promoting sanctuary policies to immigrant communities, particularly through immigrant-serving agencies, may be nearly as critical in improved immigrant-police relations, as adopting sanctuary policies. The Department of Homeland Security and the courts should therefore adopt a uniform definition of sanctuary and disseminate it to state and local officials — especially in law enforcement — throughout the country. Furthermore, localities that adopt sanctuary policies should publicize them as widely as possible so that they have the desired effect in immigrant communities and facilitate the improvement of police-community relations in particular.

Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2023.

By Rose Cuison Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram

Resistance to the Trump Administration’s immigration enforcement policies in the form of sanctuary has increased and spread. In addition to the traditional types of sanctuary such as sanctuary cities and churches, the past year has witnessed the proliferation of novel sites of sanctuary—workplaces, school districts, universities, corporations, private homes, and social media—that collectively seek to protect vulnerable immigrants against immigration enforcement. To date, however, legal scholarship on sanctuary has focused almost exclusively on states and municipalities that limit participation with federal immigration authorities. Accordingly, doctrinal and theoretical discussion has centered on sanctuary’s constitutional dimensions, on Tenth Amendment and federalism concerns. This narrow framing is myopic. It fails to capture the varied legal and policy issues that surround the innovative and evolving concept of sanctuary today.

This Article is the first to comprehensively describe and theorize both conventional and emerging types of sanctuary. Adopting network governance theories developed by political theorists, this Article coins the term “sanctuary network” to argue that current public and private examples of sanctuary are best understood as part of a broader system of legal resistance characterized by a decentralized and distributed set of actors. By reframing sanctuary in this way, this Article makes three points. First, doctrinally, this framework forces a rethinking of the legal issues that animate these sanctuaries. Our recasting moves the sanctuary debate beyond federalism and draws attention to several underappreciated common law, statutory, and constitutional sources that support these variegated claims. Second, as a normative claim, this Article argues that when operating as a networked sanctuary, public and private actors are more effectively able to instantiate an alternative set of norms to challenge the federal government’s enforcement scheme. Finally, as a prescriptive matter, this Article concludes that sanctuary networks are desirable because they democratize our national debate over immigration policy, allowing multiple institutions and individuals to calibrate immigration enforcement. Ultimately, this new way of understanding modern day sanctuary networks encourages novel methods of legal resistance.

Minnesota Law Review, February 14, 2019

By the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 

There is no official or agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a “sanctuary” jurisdiction, and there has been debate as to whether the term applies to particular states and localities. Moreover, state and local jurisdictions have varied reasons for opting not to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement efforts, including reasons not necessarily motivated by disagreement with federal policies, such as concern about potential civil liability or the costs associated with assisting federal efforts. But traditional sanctuary policies are often described as falling under one of three categories. First, so-called “don’t enforce” policies generally bar state or local police from assisting federal immigration authorities. Second, “don’t ask” policies generally bar certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person’s immigration status. Third, “don’t tell” policies typically restrict information sharing between state or local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. One legal question relevant to sanctuary policies is the extent to which states, as sovereign entities, may decline to assist in federal immigration enforcement, and the degree to which the federal government can stop state measures that undermine federal objectives. The Tenth Amendment preserves the states’ broad police powers, and states have frequently enacted measures that, directly or indirectly, address aliens residing in their communities. Under the doctrine of preemption—derived from the Supremacy Clause—Congress may displace many state or local laws pertaining to immigration. But not every state or local law touching on immigration matters is necessarily preempted; the measure must interfere with, or be contrary to, federal law to be rendered unenforceable. Further, the anti-commandeering doctrine, rooted in the Constitution's allocation of powers between the federal government and the states, prohibits Congress from forcing state entities to perform regulatory functions on the federal government's behalf, including in the context of immigration. A series of Supreme Court cases inform the boundaries of preemption and the anti-commandeering doctrine, with the Court most recently opining on the issue in Murphy v. NCAA. These dueling federal and state interests are front and center in numerous lawsuits challenging actions taken by the Trump Administration to curb states and localities from implementing sanctuary-type policies. Notably, Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” directs the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to withhold federal grants from jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373—a statute that bars states and localities from prohibiting their employees from sharing with federal immigration authorities certain immigration-related information. The executive order further directs the Attorney General to take “appropriate enforcement action” against jurisdictions that violate Section 1373 or have policies that “prevent or hinder the enforcement of federal law.” To implement the executive order, the Department of Justice added new eligibility conditions to the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and grants administered by the Justice Department’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). These conditions tied eligibility to compliance with Section 1373 and other federal immigration priorities, like granting federal authorities access to state and local detention facilities housing aliens and giving immigration authorities notice before releasing from custody an alien wanted for removal. Several lawsuits were filed challenging the constitutionality of the executive order and new grant conditions. So far the courts that have reviewed these challenges—principally contending that the executive order and grant conditions violate the separation of powers and anti-commandeering principles—generally agree that the Trump Administration acted unconstitutionally. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a permanent injunction blocking enforcement of “Sanctuary” Jurisdictions: Federal, State, and Local Policies and Related Liti Section 9(a) against California. Additionally, two separate district courts permanently enjoined the Byrne JAG conditions as applied to Chicago and Philadelphia. In doing so, these courts concluded that the Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of the anti-commandeering doctrine in Murphy requires holding Section 1373 unconstitutional. These lawsuits notwithstanding, the courts still recognize the federal government’s pervasive, nearly exclusive role in immigration enforcement. This can be seen in the federal government’s lawsuit challenging three California measures governing the state’s regulation of private and public actors’ involvement in immigration enforcement within its border. Although a district court opined that several measures likely were lawful exercises of the state’s police powers, it also concluded that two provisions regulating private employers are likely unlawful under the Supremacy Clause. This ruling was mostly upheld on appeal, in which the Ninth Circuit additionally opined that a provision requiring the California attorney general to review the circumstances surrounding detained aliens’ apprehension and transfer to detention facilities within the state also violates the Supremacy Clause.

Washington, DC: CRS. 2019. 44p.

By Margaret Monyani, Adamnesh Bogale and Ottilia Anna Maunganidze

Robust legal frameworks and migration management measures in Ethiopia and Kenya give these countries a strong basis for effective migration governance consistent with the rule of law. However, some policy improvements are needed, along with more consistent implementation and better protection of migrants’ rights. Filling these gaps is vital if Ethiopia and Kenya are to advance their role in continental migration governance.

Key findings : The Horn of Africa is a key source, transit and destination region for migrants. National, regional, continental and international multilateral processes to improve migration governance are in place in the region. Countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have developed frameworks to address evolving dynamics, aimed at enhancing legal migration pathways, responding to forced displacement, stimulating regional integration, and tackling the smuggling and trafficking of persons. In Ethiopia and Kenya, policies and practices are informed by regional and global mixed migration trends. While migration governance frameworks in Ethiopia and Kenya are fairly robust and factor in the rule of law, there are weaknesses that need to be addressed. These include gaps in practical migration governance and the inconsistent application of the rule of law. Migration governance should be factored across various government departments in a consistent and coherent manner. For good migration governance to enhance development and growth, gaps in policies and practices must be dealt with. 

Recommendations : The governments of Ethiopia and Kenya should: Review existing migration policies to identify inconsistencies with rule of law principles. Harmonise migration policies in line with international and continental standards and ensure the protection of migrants’ rights. Regularly evaluate the impact of policies and programmes to identify areas for improvement. Encourage community participation in migration-related initiatives to foster shared responsibility and ownership, including through awareness-raising campaigns. Invest in strengthening the capacity of law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders involved in managing migration, focusing on skills and knowledge of migration laws. Engage the private sector in migration governance, particularly regarding labour migration and migrant integration. While migration governance frameworks in Ethiopia and Kenya are fairly robust and factor in the rule of law, there are weaknesses that need to be addressed. These include gaps in practical migration governance and the inconsistent application of the rule of law. Migration governance should be factored across various government departments in a consistent and coherent manner.

EAST AFRICA REPORT 51 |  Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 23p.

By The European Parliament

In the past decade, continuous migration and asylum pressure on European Union Member States has made the external dimension of the EU's approach to migration management all the more important. The need to address challenges relating to external border management has reoriented EU migration policy towards extended and stricter border controls, combined with the externalisation of migration management through cooperation with third countries. In this context, the external processing of asylum claims has also been put forward as a possibility. External processing entails applications for international protection being processed beyond the EU's external borders, in third countries. An individual processed externally whose claim was successful would then, in theory, be resettled to an EU Member State. Asylum is governed by international, EU and national laws. Both EU and national asylum legislation must be aligned with the international legal framework. Although EU law does not provide for the processing of asylum applications outside the EU, the idea of 'transit' or 'processing' centres in third countries has been recurrent over the years. Examples of externalisation procedures can be found around the world. Some non-EU countries, such as Australia and the United States, have practical experience of the extra-territorial processing of asylum claims. Back in 1986, Denmark tabled a draft resolution in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to create UN centres where asylum claims could be processed, in order to coordinate the resettlement of refugees among all states. Later, in 2001 and 2002, when the EU experienced the first peak of migrant arrivals in the EU, this was followed by a series of proposals involving the external processing of asylum requests. Extraterritorial processing was first put forward by the United Kingdom in 2003, while Germany proposed the establishment of asylum centres in North Africa in 2005. Another upsurge of arrivals was experienced from 2014 to 2016; this led – among other things – to the signature of the EU-Turkey Statement. The series of proposals made over the years with a view to externalising migration policies, have raised concerns, not least in relation to the human rights implications, asylum procedures and EU and international law.

Brussels, Belgium: European Parliament, 2024. 12p.

By Polaris

We have long known human trafficking to be a pervasive and versatile crime, as traffickers and exploiters adjust to changing environments. The COVID-19 pandemic showed us the profound adaptability of human trafficking. A global pandemic did not stop or impede trafficking from happening and, with few exceptions, did not seem to change how it happens or to whom it happens. In this report, we examine data from the National Human Trafficking Hotline from January 2020 through August 2022 and explore a snapshot of the top findings of human trafficking during the calamitous pandemic years. We provide top trends and answers to questions we typically report on as a part of our data analysis, and introduce how select trends that began early in the pandemic changed or continued as the crisis evolved. 

Washington, DC: Polaris, 2024. 10p

Josiah Heyman, Chair; Roberto Álvarez; Julie Peteet; Reinhard Bernbeck ; Zahir Ahmed;Fabian Crespo

Themes:

Connection between displacement and borders/walls ➢ Historical depth to structural means of inclusion/exclusion ➢ Walls include/exclude and define parameters of belonging and rights/privileges ➢ Violence – pervasive - overt and always a potential ➢ Climate change and its impacts are going to trigger massive flows north (We haven’t done much on this topic, but it is certainly on the horizon) ➢ North-South global divide – fortress north; global apartheid continues to take shape and adapt to changing circumstances ➢ Unevenness in mobilities ➢ Booming and lucrative industry around control over mobility from actual building of walls to surveillance technologies (i.e., vested interests are at work) ➢ Documentary regimes – as an accompaniment to borders and walls from identity cards to passports to possible, impending health passports. ➢ Environmental impact is serious ➢ Human Rights violations – mobility as a human right; the right to seek asylum

Arlington, VA; American Anthropological Association, 2021. 131p.

By: Anja Radjenovic

In recent years, the migration policy of the European Union (EU) has focused on strict border controls and the externalisation of migration management through cooperation with third countries. Although states have the right to decide whether to grant non-EU nationals access to their territory, they must do this in accordance with the law and uphold individuals' fundamental rights. Not only do the practices and policies of stopping asylum-seekers and migrants in need of protection at or before they reach the European Union's external borders ('pushbacks') erode EU values as enshrined in the EU Treaties, they may also violate international and European humanitarian and human rights laws. National human rights institutions, international bodies and civil society organisations regularly report cases of pushbacks at the European Union's land and sea borders. According to those reports, pushbacks often involve excessive use of force by EU Member States' authorities and EU agencies operating at external borders, and degrading and inhuman treatment of migrants and their arbitrary detention. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for Member States and EU agencies to comply with fundamental rights in their activities to protect the EU's external borders. Several international organizations and other stakeholders have condemned or filed legal actions against the practice of pushbacks carried out at the EU's external borders. In September 2020, the European Commission presented a pact on migration and asylum, including a proposal on pre-entry screening of third-country nationals at EU external borders, in a bid to address these potential breaches of fundamental rights.

Strasbourg, France: European Parliament, 2021. 8p.

By: The European Parliament

The number of border walls and fences worldwide has increased dramatically in recent decades. This also holds for the EU/Schengen area, which is currently surrounded or criss-crossed by 19 border or separation fences stretching for more than 2 000 kilometres (km). Between 2014 and 2022, the aggregate length of border fences at the EU's external borders and within the EU/Schengen area grew from 315 km to 2 048 km. Two main official reasons are put forward for building border fences: to prevent irregular migration and combat terrorism. The construction of fences at EU borders raises important questions as to their compatibility with EU law, in particular the Schengen Borders Code, fundamental rights obligations, and EU funding rules on borders and migration. While border fences are not explicitly forbidden under EU law, their construction and use must be in accordance with fundamental rights (such as the right to seek international protection) and the rights and procedural safeguards provided by EU migration law. Amid renewed pressure and tensions at the EU's external borders, in 2021, several Member States asked the European Commission to allow them the use of EU funds to construct border fences, which they regarded as an effective border protection measure against irregular migration. According to Regulation (EU) 2021/1148, EU funding can support 'infrastructure, buildings, systems, and services' required to implement border checks and border surveillance. The Commission has so far resisted demands to interpret this provision as allowing for the construction or maintenance of border fences. The European Parliament has condemned the practice of 'pushbacks' at the EU borders consistently, expressing deep concern 'about reports of severe human rights violations and deplorable detention conditions in transit zones or detention centers in border areas'. Moreover, Parliament stressed that the protection of EU external borders must be carried out in compliance with relevant international and EU law, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Strasbourg, France, European Parliament 2023. 8p.

By: DUMBRAVA Costica

More than 90 % of people who cross the external borders of the European Union (EU) irregularly do so with the assistance of migrant smugglers. The facilitation of irregular migration is a highly profitable criminal activity, given the relatively low risks incurred by the perpetrators. Detections of irregular border crossings are at their highest levels since 2016, yet demand for migration facilitation services has also risen to a new high. This high demand is not only due to the fact that people in severe distress – whether because of genuine fear for their lives or for economic reasons – keep trying to reach the EU, by irregular means if necessary. Demand is also high because it has become harder to cross the EU's external borders illegally, because of increased external border controls and other measures put in place to prevent irregular migration. This is where migrant smuggling networks step in. Migrant smugglers are among some of the most agile criminals. They go to great lengths to avoid getting caught, quickly adapting the routes and methods they use to smuggle migrants into, within or beyond the EU. The facilitation of irregular migration is a complex crime, interconnected with many other criminal activities, such as document fraud, trafficking in human beings and other types of illicit smuggling. The criminal organisations involved in smuggling migrants are increasingly sophisticated, professional and violent. Although people willingly pay smugglers to help them cross borders, they do so at great personal risk. Too many lose their lives, or are at risk of serious harm or exploitation. Preventing and combating migrant smuggling and related crimes is therefore one of the key priorities of EU action against irregular migration and organised crime. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for more and better operational cooperation, data sharing and legal migration channels. The European Commission has just proposed new legislation to break the smugglers' business model. This is an update of a briefing from 2021.

Strasbourg, France:European Parliament , 2023. 12p

By Haodong Qi and Tuba Bircan

Google Trends (GT) collate the volumes of search keywords over time and by geographical location. Such data could, in theory, provide insights into people’s ex ante intentions to migrate, and hence be useful for predictive analysis of future migration. Empirically, however, the predictive power of GT is sensitive, it may vary depending on geographical context, the search keywords selected for analysis, as well as Google’s market share and its users’ characteristics and search behavior, among others. Unlike most previous studies attempting to demonstrate the benefit of using GT for forecasting migration flows, this article addresses a critical but less discussed issue: when GT cannot enhance the performances of migration models. Using EUROSTAT statistics on first-time asylum applications and a set of push-pull indicators gathered from various data sources, we train three classes of gravity models that are commonly used in the migration literature, and examine how the inclusion of GT may affect models’ abilities to predict refugees’ destination choices. The results suggest that the effects of including GT are highly contingent on the complexity of different models. Specifically, GT can only improve the performance of relatively simple models, but not of those augmented by flow Fixed-Effects or by Auto-Regressive effects. These findings call for a more comprehensive analysis of the strengths and limitations of using GT, as well as other digital trace data, in the context of modeling and forecasting migration. It is our hope that this nuanced perspective can spur further innovations in the field, and ultimately bring us closer to a comprehensive modeling framework of human migration.

EPJ Data Science (2023) 12:41

By: Haodong Qi and Tuba Bircan

Migration models have evolved significantly during the last decade, most notably the so-called flow Fixed-Effects (FE) gravity models. Such models attempt to infer how human mobility may be driven by changing economy, geopolitics, and the environment among other things. They are also increasingly used for migration projections and forecasts. However, recent research shows that this class of models can neither explain, nor predict the temporal dynamics of human movement. This shortcoming is even more apparent in the context of forced migration, in which the processes and drivers tend to be heterogeneous and complex. In this article, we derived a Flow–Specific Temporal Gravity (FTG) model which, compared to the FE models, is theoretically similar (informed by the random utility framework), but empirically less restrictive. Using EUROSTAT data with climate, economic, and conflict indicators, we trained both models and compared their performances. The results suggest that the predictive power of these models is highly dependent on the length of training data. Specifically, as time-series migration data lengthens, FTG’s predictions can be increasingly accurate, whereas the FE model becomes less predictive.

PLoS ONE 18(4): e0284416. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pone.0284416 Editor: Luca De Benedictis, U

By Lynn Tramonte and Suma Setty

What if you were forced to pack your belongings and leave your family, friends, career, home, and life behind? Could you say good-bye to everyone and everything you love, not knowing if you will see them again? That is what deportation is: permanent banishment from your home, family, friends, and job, from a life built over years. It is an extreme action that causes lasting harm to everyone it touches.

From 2022 to 2023, Maryam Sy, an organizer with the Ohio Immigrant Alliance (OHIA), spent hundreds of hours interviewing over 250 people who were deported to find out what they wanted the world to know.

“A lot of these people went through, I think, the hardest part of their life when they were deported,” she reflected. “Because it was like a broken hope, like the government broke their hope. They came to America to seek asylum for a better life.”

Immigration detention and deportation unravels lives, with crushing consequences for children, partners, parents, and communities. Broken Hope connects the experiences of individuals with studies that show these harms are universal. And it details how deportation is an extreme response to a visa problem.

This issue brief summarizes a book Broken Hope: Deportation and the Road Home, a collaboration between the OHIA and the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) that highlights the experiences, hopes, and dreams of 255 people who were deported from the United States, as well as their loved ones. They are part of OHIA’s #ReuniteUS campaign, which seeks to change policy so that more people who were deported can return

Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy | CLASP, 2023. 20p.

By: Kim Voss, Fabiana Silva & Irene Bloemraad

Activists do not just ‘name’ problems faced by migrants; they ‘frame’ them, constructing a particular meaning of the social world. Activists in the United States are especially likely to use rights language. Some appeal to human rights; others call on the history and resonance of civil rights. Those who contest immigrant inclusion often instead evoke ‘American values’. Are these competing frames persuasive? Drawing on a survey experiment of California voters, we examine whether these frames affect support for undocumented immigrants and U.S. citizens in need. We find that although respondents agree that food insecurity, sexual harassment, and inadequate health care violate the human rights of citizens and noncitizens equally, a human rights frame does not equalize support for government action to address the situation. Indeed, overall, respondents are much less supportive of government action for undocumented immigrants than citizens; neither rights nor value frames mitigate this inequality. The civil rights frame, relative to the American values frame, actually decreases respondents’ support for government action, for citizens and noncitizens alike. The type of hardship also matters: in scenarios concerning sexual harassment, legal status is not a barrier to claims-making. These findings reveal some limits of rights language for mobilization around immigration.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46:4, 791-819, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2018.1556463