Edited byAnna Triandafyllidou

This open access book discusses the socio-political context of the COVID-19 crisis and questions the management of the pandemic emergency with special reference to how this affected the governance of migration and asylum. The book offers critical insights on the impact of the pandemic on migrant workers in different world regions including North America, Europe and Asia. The book addresses several categories of migrants including medical staff, farm labourers, construction workers, care and domestic workers and international students. It looks at border closures for non-citizens, disruption for temporary migrants as well as at special arrangements made for essential (migrant) workers such as doctors or nurses as well as farmworkers, ‘shipped’ to destination with special flights to make sure emergency wards are staffed, and harvests are picked up and the food processing chain continues to function. The book illustrates how the pandemic forces us to rethink notions like membership, citizenship, belonging, but also solidarity, human rights, community, essential services or ‘essential’ workers alongside an intersectional perspective including ethnicity, gender and race.

IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer, 2022. 264p.

By Robert Warren

In 2021, the undocumented population residing in the United States (US) increased slightly to 10.3 million, compared to 10.2 million the previous year. The gradual decline or near-zero growth of this population has continued for more than a decade. However, the large increases in apprehensions at the southern border in recent years, along with continued legislative gridlock in Congress, could portend a new era of growth of this population. Unfortunately, the data needed to determine whether the population will enter a period of growth after 2021 — or whether the era of near-zero growth will continue — will not be available for at least a year or two. The most accurate demographic estimates of the undocumented population are derived from data collected in the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. Estimates of the size of the undocumented population in 2022 will not be available until early 2024.

This report focuses on the most significant trend in the undocumented population in the past decade — the remarkable decline of 1.9 million in the undocumented population from Mexico from 2011 to 2021. The decline for Mexico in this period was 600,000 more than the total population increase from the seven countries (in order) with the fastest growing US undocumented populations: Guatemala, Honduras, India, Venezuela, El Salvador, Brazil, and China. This paper finds that:

• The long-term decline, or near-zero growth, of the total undocumented population that began in 2008 continued in 2021.

• The percent of undocumented residents in the total US population declined from 3.8 percent in 2011 to 3.1 percent in 2021.

• The undocumented population from Mexico declined from 6.4 million in 2011 to 4.4 million in 2021, a drop of 1.9 million in 10 years.

• A total of 2.9 million, or 47 percent, of the US undocumented population from Mexico in 2011 had left the undocumented population by 2021.

• The drop in the undocumented population from Mexico from 2011 to 2021 occurred nationwide, and the decline affected the undocumented population in nearly every state.

• The fastest growing undocumented populations by country in the last 10 years were from Guatemala, Honduras, India, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Brazil. The combined undocumented populations from these six countries grew by 1.2 million.

• Countries that had declining populations after 2011 included Poland, Peru, Ecuador, Korea, and Philippines, in addition to the large drop for Mexico.

• California had the largest decline in undocumented residents — 665,000 from 2011 to 2021. The undocumented population from Mexico living in California during this period declined by 720,000.

• The combined undocumented population in California, New York, and Illinois fell by more than one million from 2021 to 2011.

Journal on Migration and Human Security Volume 0: Ahead of Print, 2023.

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, Luis Argueta and Randy Capps

As U.S. deportations to Mexico continue at substantial levels and the numbers returned by both the U.S. and Mexican governments to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are increasing, it has become more urgent for countries in the region to develop successful reception and reintegration programs that meet the diverse needs of returning migrants.

Between fiscal years 2012-18, the United States carried out approximately 1.8 million repatriations of Mexican migrants, and the United States and Mexico together accomplished 1.4 million returns of migrants from the three Northern Triangle countries.

Drawing on fieldwork and interviews with government officials, researchers, representatives of civil-society and international organizations, as well as returning migrants, this report highlights promising reintegration strategies and pressing challenges. Mexico and the three Northern Triangle countries exhibit different levels of capacity and degrees of implementation in their reception and reintegration programs. While most deported migrants now receive basic reception services, their access to reintegration services is somewhat more mixed. Among the challenges: Difficulty obtaining the official ID that allows returning migrants to access these services, limited awareness and geographic distribution of services, difficulty matching returning migrants’ skills with labor-market needs, and barriers to reintegration posed by social stigmatization and employment discrimination.

The report offers a range of recommendations to governments and others, including: Prepare migrants for reintegration prior to their return, even before deportation; issue primary ID documents from abroad or upon reception; and ensure reintegration services tap into returning migrants' cultural roots. Improving reception and reintegration services represents a long-term investment for both destination and origin countries, the authors conclude, holding the potential to reduce re-migration while enabling countries of origin to benefit from the skills and assets migrants have acquired abroad.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2019. 43p.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPI-ReceptionReintegration-FinalWeb.pdf

At the Breaking Point: Rethinking the U.S. Immigration Court System

By Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner, Stephen Yale-Loehr, Kathleen Bush-Joseph and Christopher Levesque

With a backlog of nearly 2 million cases, the U.S. immigration court system is in crisis. Many cases now take years to adjudicate, with asylum seekers, for example, waiting four years on average for their initial hearing and longer for a final decision. Serious concerns have also been raised about the quality of court decisions.

These twin issues of caseload quantity and decision quality have wide-ranging roots, from long-standing operational challenges in the courts to new crises in the Americas that have intensified humanitarian protection needs and other migration pressures. The courts' dysfunction has had severe knock-on effects for other parts of the nation’s immigration infrastructure, including notably the immigration enforcement and asylum systems.

This report takes stock of the many challenges facing the immigration courts and outlines recommendations that would advance the goal of delivering decisions that are both timely and fair. It explores issues including court caseload and personnel levels, docket management strategies, the use of technology in the courts, and access to representation. Importantly, the report focuses on changes that can be accomplished administratively—a necessity in a time when Congress has proven itself unlikely to tackle significant immigration matters.

Washington, DC:Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 51p.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-courts-report-2023_final.pdf

Betting on Legality: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to the Venezuelan Displacement Crisis

By Luciana Gandini and Andrew Selee

More than half, and as many as two-thirds, of the estimated 6.4 million displaced Venezuelans who have settled in Latin America and the Caribbean since 2016 have been granted legal status in their host country. Most of the receiving countries in the region have responded with pragmatic measures that offer some form of legal status as well as the right to access the labor market, basic education, and emergency health care. The measures implemented are uneven and often not fully institutionalized, but they have been surprisingly generalized for a region with limited experience with large-scale immigration.

This report explores the response to Venezuelan displacement in the 15 principal host countries in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2016 and 2022. It examines the reach of different mechanisms for providing legal status and humanitarian protection—asylum systems, mobility and residence agreements, regular visas, and regularization campaigns that offer temporary status—and offers estimates of the share of Venezuelans in each country who have obtained legal status.

The report also considers the trend of governments coupling measures to provide legal status with new visa requirements that have made it increasingly difficult for more Venezuelans to arrive, pushing some into irregular migration channels. Finally, the report looks at variations in Venezuelans’ access to education and health care across the 15 countries.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 55p.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-venezuelans-legal-status-2023_eng_final.pdf

Migration Narratives in Northern Central America: How Competing Stories Shape Policy and Public Opinion in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, Aaron Clark-Ginsberg, Alejandra Lopez and Alejandro Vélez Salas

The stories told within a society about migration and migrants paint a rich picture of how its members view the opportunities and challenges associated with the movement of people, and through what lenses. These migration narratives both inform policymaking and shape the public’s reaction to government policy, affecting the policies’ chances of achieving their goals.

While El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are primarily known for emigration to the United States and Mexico, these northern Central American countries have seen notable changes in migration trends in recent years. The number of migrants from South America and the Caribbean who transit through these countries on their way north has increased, as has the number of Central Americans returning to their countries of origin.

This report presents the findings of research conducted by the Migration Policy Institute, RAND Corporation, Metropolitan Group, and National Immigration Forum, comparing migration narratives within El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—as well as a selection of migration narratives from Mexico and the United States that relate to Central America—over the 2018–22 period. The study explores how these narratives about emigration, transit migration, return, and other issues intersect, how they contradict or compound each other, and how they influence critical policy debates and decisions in the region.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 49p.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/CentAm-MigrationNarratives-2023_final.pdf

Inhumane and Counterproductive: Asylum Ban Inflicts Mounting Harm

By

Christina Asencio

Rebecca Gendelman

Five months after the Biden administration initiated its new bar on asylum, the policy continues to strand vulnerable people in places where they are targets of widespread kidnapping, torture, and violent assaults. People seeking asylum are forced to risk their lives waiting in danger in Mexico for one of the limited CBP One appointments or risk suffering the ban’s punitive asylum denials or wrongful returns to harm and persecution if they attempt to seek protection at a port of entry or cross outside ports of entry without a CBP One appointment. The targeting of migrants and asylum seekers waiting for these appointments has risen sharply recently, driving many people to cross the border in urgent search of safety. Humanitarian workers assisting asylum seekers forced to wait in Mexico are also facing alarming—and increasing—risks as well.

This harmful bar on asylum (the “asylum ban”) is a new iteration of similar transit and entry bans promulgated by the Trump administration that federal courts repeatedly struck down because they violated U.S. law. A federal district court ruled in July that the Biden asylum ban is unlawful, but it remains in place while on appeal. The asylum ban renders nearly all asylum seekers who traveled through another country on their way to the U.S. southern border ineligible for asylum due to their transit routes and/or manner of entry unless they (1) applied for and were denied asylum in one of those countries (regardless of their safety there), or (2) managed to secure one of the asylum ban’s limited “pre-scheduled” appointments to enter at an official port of entry. To try to get a U.S. port of entry appointment, people seeking asylum (as well as other migrants who are not seeking asylum) are left to struggle to obtain an appointment via CBP One, a smartphone app that operates much like a daily lottery and is plagued by deficiencies that impede equitable access.

Not only does the asylum ban violate both U.S. and international law, but it has generated strong and diverse opposition from faith groups, Holocaust survivors, major unions, civil rights organizations, members of the president’s political party and other key Biden administration allies. President Biden should honor his campaign promise to end such restrictions by bringing this harmful policy—which his administration has pledged is only temporary—to its end now. Every day that it is left in place, it endangers refugees’ lives and subverts refugee law.

Instead, the Biden administration should double down on some of the effective, humane, and legal policies that it has already initiated or announced, and reject those that punish, ban, and block people seeking asylum, contrary to core tenets of international refugee protection. Key steps include to: quickly ramp up plans to expand regional refugee resettlement, strengthen the administration’s pivotal parole initiatives, increase critical aid to address regional protection gaps driving many to flee north, urgently increase support for safe shelter and other dire needs of people waiting in Mexico, uphold fundamental human rights in regional migration coordination, maximize access to asylum at ports of entry, properly staff asylum and immigration court adjudications, and improve and restart use of the Biden administration’s new asylum processing rule to help adjudicate a greater number of asylum cases more efficiently.

New York: Human Rights First, 2023. 67p.

https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Inhumane-and-Counterproductive-final-report.pdf

Digital Border Governance: A Human Rights Based Approach

By Lorna McGregor and Petra Molnar

In an era where digital technologies are increasingly integrated into migration processes, these technologies are reshaping border governance in a manner that impacts the human rights of people on the move and communities worldwide. As we navigate these evolving dynamics, it becomes paramount to address the potential harms the use of digital technologies poses to human rights, while also harnessing the opportunities they offer to facilitate safe and dignified migration. This collaborative study, conducted by the UN Human Rights Office and the University of Essex, analyses the human rights implications of specific border technologies. It provides recommendations for States and stakeholders on how to take a human rights-based approach in ensuring the use of digital technologies at borders aligns with international human rights law and standards. The study draws from a collective body of expertise, research, and evidence, as well as extensive interviews and collaborative meetings with experts.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights , 2023. 26p.

By Christina Asencio and Rebecca Gendelman

Five months after the Biden administration initiated its new bar on asylum, the policy continues to strand vulnerable people in places where they are targets of widespread kidnapping, torture, and violent assaults. People seeking asylum are forced to risk their lives waiting in danger in Mexico for one of the limited CBP One appointments or risk suffering the ban’s punitive asylum denials or wrongful returns to harm and persecution if they attempt to seek protection at a port of entry or cross outside ports of entry without a CBP One appointment. The targeting of migrants and asylum seekers waiting for these appointments has risen sharply recently, driving many people to cross the border in urgent search of safety. Humanitarian workers assisting asylum seekers forced to wait in Mexico are also facing alarming—and increasing—risks as well.

This harmful bar on asylum (the “asylum ban”) is a new iteration of similar transit and entry bans promulgated by the Trump administration that federal courts repeatedly struck down because they violated U.S. law. A federal district court ruled in July that the Biden asylum ban is unlawful, but it remains in place while on appeal. The asylum ban renders nearly all asylum seekers who traveled through another country on their way to the U.S. southern border ineligible for asylum due to their transit routes and/or manner of entry unless they (1) applied for and were denied asylum in one of those countries (regardless of their safety there), or (2) managed to secure one of the asylum ban’s limited “pre-scheduled” appointments to enter at an official port of entry. To try to get a U.S. port of entry appointment, people seeking asylum (as well as other migrants who are not seeking asylum) are left to struggle to obtain an appointment via CBP One, a smartphone app that operates much like a daily lottery and is plagued by deficiencies that impede equitable access.

Not only does the asylum ban violate both U.S. and international law, but it has generated strong and diverse opposition from faith groups, Holocaust survivors, major unions, civil rights organizations, members of the president’s political party and other key Biden administration allies. President Biden should honor his campaign promise to end such restrictions by bringing this harmful policy—which his administration has pledged is only temporary—to its end now. Every day that it is left in place, it endangers refugees’ lives and subverts refugee law.

Instead, the Biden administration should double down on some of the effective, humane, and legal policies that it has already initiated or announced, and reject those that punish, ban, and block people seeking asylum, contrary to core tenets of international refugee protection. Key steps include to: quickly ramp up plans to expand regional refugee resettlement, strengthen the administration’s pivotal parole initiatives, increase critical aid to address regional protection gaps driving many to flee north, urgently increase support for safe shelter and other dire needs of people waiting in Mexico, uphold fundamental human rights in regional migration coordination, maximize access to asylum at ports of entry, properly staff asylum and immigration court adjudications, and improve and restart use of the Biden administration’s new asylum processing rule to help adjudicate a greater number of asylum cases more efficiently.

New York: Human Rights First, 2023. 67p.

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, Luis Argueta and Randy Capps

As U.S. deportations to Mexico continue at substantial levels and the numbers returned by both the U.S. and Mexican governments to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are increasing, it has become more urgent for countries in the region to develop successful reception and reintegration programs that meet the diverse needs of returning migrants.

Between fiscal years 2012-18, the United States carried out approximately 1.8 million repatriations of Mexican migrants, and the United States and Mexico together accomplished 1.4 million returns of migrants from the three Northern Triangle countries.

Drawing on fieldwork and interviews with government officials, researchers, representatives of civil-society and international organizations, as well as returning migrants, this report highlights promising reintegration strategies and pressing challenges. Mexico and the three Northern Triangle countries exhibit different levels of capacity and degrees of implementation in their reception and reintegration programs. While most deported migrants now receive basic reception services, their access to reintegration services is somewhat more mixed. Among the challenges: Difficulty obtaining the official ID that allows returning migrants to access these services, limited awareness and geographic distribution of services, difficulty matching returning migrants’ skills with labor-market needs, and barriers to reintegration posed by social stigmatization and employment discrimination.

The report offers a range of recommendations to governments and others, including: Prepare migrants for reintegration prior to their return, even before deportation; issue primary ID documents from abroad or upon reception; and ensure reintegration services tap into returning migrants' cultural roots. Improving reception and reintegration services represents a long-term investment for both destination and origin countries, the authors conclude, holding the potential to reduce re-migration while enabling countries of origin to benefit from the skills and assets migrants have acquired abroad.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2019. 43p.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPI-ReceptionReintegration-FinalWeb.pdf

At the Breaking Point: Rethinking the U.S. Immigration Court System

By Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner, Stephen Yale-Loehr, Kathleen Bush-Joseph and Christopher Levesque

With a backlog of nearly 2 million cases, the U.S. immigration court system is in crisis. Many cases now take years to adjudicate, with asylum seekers, for example, waiting four years on average for their initial hearing and longer for a final decision. Serious concerns have also been raised about the quality of court decisions.

These twin issues of caseload quantity and decision quality have wide-ranging roots, from long-standing operational challenges in the courts to new crises in the Americas that have intensified humanitarian protection needs and other migration pressures. The courts' dysfunction has had severe knock-on effects for other parts of the nation’s immigration infrastructure, including notably the immigration enforcement and asylum systems.

This report takes stock of the many challenges facing the immigration courts and outlines recommendations that would advance the goal of delivering decisions that are both timely and fair. It explores issues including court caseload and personnel levels, docket management strategies, the use of technology in the courts, and access to representation. Importantly, the report focuses on changes that can be accomplished administratively—a necessity in a time when Congress has proven itself unlikely to tackle significant immigration matters.

Washington, DC:Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 51p.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-courts-report-2023_final.pdf

Betting on Legality: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to the Venezuelan Displacement Crisis

By Luciana Gandini and Andrew Selee

More than half, and as many as two-thirds, of the estimated 6.4 million displaced Venezuelans who have settled in Latin America and the Caribbean since 2016 have been granted legal status in their host country. Most of the receiving countries in the region have responded with pragmatic measures that offer some form of legal status as well as the right to access the labor market, basic education, and emergency health care. The measures implemented are uneven and often not fully institutionalized, but they have been surprisingly generalized for a region with limited experience with large-scale immigration.

This report explores the response to Venezuelan displacement in the 15 principal host countries in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2016 and 2022. It examines the reach of different mechanisms for providing legal status and humanitarian protection—asylum systems, mobility and residence agreements, regular visas, and regularization campaigns that offer temporary status—and offers estimates of the share of Venezuelans in each country who have obtained legal status.

The report also considers the trend of governments coupling measures to provide legal status with new visa requirements that have made it increasingly difficult for more Venezuelans to arrive, pushing some into irregular migration channels. Finally, the report looks at variations in Venezuelans’ access to education and health care across the 15 countries.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 55p.

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-venezuelans-legal-status-2023_eng_final.pdf

Migration Narratives in Northern Central America: How Competing Stories Shape Policy and Public Opinion in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, Aaron Clark-Ginsberg, Alejandra Lopez and Alejandro Vélez Salas

The stories told within a society about migration and migrants paint a rich picture of how its members view the opportunities and challenges associated with the movement of people, and through what lenses. These migration narratives both inform policymaking and shape the public’s reaction to government policy, affecting the policies’ chances of achieving their goals.

While El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are primarily known for emigration to the United States and Mexico, these northern Central American countries have seen notable changes in migration trends in recent years. The number of migrants from South America and the Caribbean who transit through these countries on their way north has increased, as has the number of Central Americans returning to their countries of origin.

This report presents the findings of research conducted by the Migration Policy Institute, RAND Corporation, Metropolitan Group, and National Immigration Forum, comparing migration narratives within El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—as well as a selection of migration narratives from Mexico and the United States that relate to Central America—over the 2018–22 period. The study explores how these narratives about emigration, transit migration, return, and other issues intersect, how they contradict or compound each other, and how they influence critical policy debates and decisions in the region.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 49p.

By Luciana Gandini and Andrew Selee

More than half, and as many as two-thirds, of the estimated 6.4 million displaced Venezuelans who have settled in Latin America and the Caribbean since 2016 have been granted legal status in their host country. Most of the receiving countries in the region have responded with pragmatic measures that offer some form of legal status as well as the right to access the labor market, basic education, and emergency health care. The measures implemented are uneven and often not fully institutionalized, but they have been surprisingly generalized for a region with limited experience with large-scale immigration.

This report explores the response to Venezuelan displacement in the 15 principal host countries in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2016 and 2022. It examines the reach of different mechanisms for providing legal status and humanitarian protection—asylum systems, mobility and residence agreements, regular visas, and regularization campaigns that offer temporary status—and offers estimates of the share of Venezuelans in each country who have obtained legal status.

The report also considers the trend of governments coupling measures to provide legal status with new visa requirements that have made it increasingly difficult for more Venezuelans to arrive, pushing some into irregular migration channels. Finally, the report looks at variations in Venezuelans’ access to education and health care across the 15 countries.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 55p.

By Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner, Stephen Yale-Loehr, Kathleen Bush-Joseph and Christopher Levesque

With a backlog of nearly 2 million cases, the U.S. immigration court system is in crisis. Many cases now take years to adjudicate, with asylum seekers, for example, waiting four years on average for their initial hearing and longer for a final decision. Serious concerns have also been raised about the quality of court decisions.

These twin issues of caseload quantity and decision quality have wide-ranging roots, from long-standing operational challenges in the courts to new crises in the Americas that have intensified humanitarian protection needs and other migration pressures. The courts' dysfunction has had severe knock-on effects for other parts of the nation’s immigration infrastructure, including notably the immigration enforcement and asylum systems.

This report takes stock of the many challenges facing the immigration courts and outlines recommendations that would advance the goal of delivering decisions that are both timely and fair. It explores issues including court caseload and personnel levels, docket management strategies, the use of technology in the courts, and access to representation. Importantly, the report focuses on changes that can be accomplished administratively—a necessity in a time when Congress has proven itself unlikely to tackle significant immigration matters.

Washington, DC:Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 51p.

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, Luis Argueta and Randy Capps

As U.S. deportations to Mexico continue at substantial levels and the numbers returned by both the U.S. and Mexican governments to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are increasing, it has become more urgent for countries in the region to develop successful reception and reintegration programs that meet the diverse needs of returning migrants.

Between fiscal years 2012-18, the United States carried out approximately 1.8 million repatriations of Mexican migrants, and the United States and Mexico together accomplished 1.4 million returns of migrants from the three Northern Triangle countries.

Drawing on fieldwork and interviews with government officials, researchers, representatives of civil-society and international organizations, as well as returning migrants, this report highlights promising reintegration strategies and pressing challenges. Mexico and the three Northern Triangle countries exhibit different levels of capacity and degrees of implementation in their reception and reintegration programs. While most deported migrants now receive basic reception services, their access to reintegration services is somewhat more mixed. Among the challenges: Difficulty obtaining the official ID that allows returning migrants to access these services, limited awareness and geographic distribution of services, difficulty matching returning migrants’ skills with labor-market needs, and barriers to reintegration posed by social stigmatization and employment discrimination.

The report offers a range of recommendations to governments and others, including: Prepare migrants for reintegration prior to their return, even before deportation; issue primary ID documents from abroad or upon reception; and ensure reintegration services tap into returning migrants' cultural roots. Improving reception and reintegration services represents a long-term investment for both destination and origin countries, the authors conclude, holding the potential to reduce re-migration while enabling countries of origin to benefit from the skills and assets migrants have acquired abroad.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2019. 43p.

By Andrew Selee, Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Andrea Tanco, Luis Argueta and Jessica Bolter

The region that stretches from Panama northward to the United States is a major corridor for unauthorized migration. In recent years, most people on the move have come from Guatemala, Honduras, and, to a lesser extent, El Salvador. But there has also been an increasing number of migrants from outside the region who pass through Central America on their way to the U.S.-Mexico border. Amid these changing migration patterns, countries in this region have an unprecedented opportunity to work together to lay the foundation for a regional migration system that privileges safe, orderly, and legal movement.A critical first step to capitalizing on this opportunity is understanding these countries’ institutional capacities, legal frameworks, and migration and asylum policies. This report takes stock of these elements of migration-management systems in Mexico and Central America, drawing insights in part from interviews with more than 75 policymakers, civil-society leaders, and other stakeholders.

In recent years, the analysis finds, Mexico and Costa Rica have taken steps to leverage their existing migration institutions to improve operational capacity, though notable challenges remain. Meanwhile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama are at earlier stages in this process. Across the region, international organizations play an important role in supporting these efforts, while civil society is vital to expanding migrants’ access to protection mechanisms and reintegration supports. Among the major areas the report identifies as important for capacity-building efforts are: developing clear migration policymaking processes; professionalizing border and immigration enforcement efforts, with an emphasis on transparency and sensitivity to the circumstances of families, children, and other vulnerable migrants; and investing in asylum systems, protection mechanisms for people displaced within countries, and reintegration programs for returning migrants. Such efforts, the authors note, would not only help governments in the region more effectively address current migration issues, they also promise to better equip them to proactively respond to future challenges.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2021. 65p.

By Rhoda Margesson, Kristin Finklea

Migrant smuggling, also known as human smuggling, refers to the voluntary transportation of an individual across international borders, in violation of one or more countries’ laws. Smugglers facilitate migrant travel, typically in exchange for payment, sometimes using fraudulent identity documents and covert transit. While smuggled migrants agree to be smuggled—a condition that distinguishes the practice from human trafficking—they may be vulnerable to abuse by their smuggler or later become a trafficking victim. Various United Nations (U.N.) sources cite estimates that globally, migrant smuggling totals $7-$10 billion a year or more, but the full extent of the problem is not known. Through oversight hearings and proposed legislation, Congress has sought more information on migrant smuggling and on ways to deter and punish smugglers

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021. 3p.

Edited by Jussi P. Laine , Daniel Rauhut , and Marika Gruber

Focusing on the social impact of migration, this book explores migration as an inevitable part of rural development and transition in light of the sharp political divides in European and national political arenas on the topic. It provides an innovative immigration impact assessment based on recently conducted empirical work to enhance local development in European rural and remote regions, looking to promote change in the perception of migration and related policies and practices.

Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2023. 274p.

Edited by Christian Larsen

This timely book explores how Northern European countries have sought to balance their welfare states with increased levels of migration from low-income countries outside the EU. Using case studies of the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, leading scholars analyse the varying approaches to this so-called ‘progressive dilemma’.

Cheltenham, UK: Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2022. 228p.

By Alia Fakhry

Since 2015, European partners have funded interventions in the Sahel to help countries like Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali increase their capacity to regulate and control migration. Through these interventions, the European Union has set precedents and encouraged securitised policies that reinforce the security interests of governments in the Sahel, and undermine the capacity of regional and continental organisations to establish comprehensive migration frameworks.

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 24p.

By United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations - Minority Report

INTRODUCTION The illegal migration crisis at the U.S. southern border presents a grave security threat to the United States and a humanitarian catastrophe for the vulnerable people involved. Illegal migration to the United States has reached astronomical levels since the Biden Administration entered office in January 2021.1 The sheer number of illegal migrants, combined with the evolving tactics that transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) employ to smuggle and traffic individuals, presents an untenable security and humanitarian situation. Weak U.S. border security and enforcement of immigration laws undermines U.S. efforts to improve the rule of law and humanitarian conditions in the region, takes a mental and physical toll on U.S. law enforcement personnel, and challenges their ability to defend our nation’s borders. The prevailing conditions benefit dangerous criminals and expose vulnerable populations to unspeakable dangers and abuse. The Biden Administration’s failure to secure our nation’s borders is worsening this crisis. Further, it undermines efforts to address inadequate law enforcement as well as asylum processing policies and capabilities in Mexico and the northern Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This report puts forward concrete ideas to: • Establish effective migration controls in the United States; • Strengthen border security and migration management capacities in the region; and • Target TCOs smuggling and trafficking migrants.

Washington, DC: The Committee, 2023. 56p.

By Yves Guermond

The crisis of citizenship in democratic countries is a topic that I am accustomed to study and that I have developed in a recent book [1]. A definitive definition of the concept is hazardous as it continuously evolves across the centuries. It is presently caught in the crossfire between two emerging trends: the diversification of the public sphere with the extension of critical analysis, and on the other side the growth of various kinds of cosmopolitism.

The leading classes became aware progressively of the depreciation of the notion of citizenship and of the need to fill the gap of an ideological perspective and of the necessity of an admitted goal for a large majority of the population throughout the diverse tendencies. In France the idea has been secularism (laïcité), meaning that the religious influences must be set aside to maintain an ideal social live. The problem is that these religious influences often stem from the various cultural backgrounds of the local population.

Academic Letters. July 2021. 3p.

By Mary Holper

Immigration detainees challenging immigration judges’ bond decisions are hitting a jurisdictional wall — federal courts are given license to ignore errors that immigration judges make in determining dangerousness and flight risk, because such decisions can be categorized as “discretionary.” This license comes from a 1996 amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which removed federal courts’ jurisdiction over discretionary decision to detain for immigration purposes. Detainees’ important liberty interests are left to the whims of a single immigration judge, who determines bond under conditions representing an implicit bias minefield. This article explores justifications for unreviewable discretion and for stripping federal courts over immigration decisions and argues that none of these justifications are applicable when an immigration judge decides whether to detain a person pending their removal proceedings. The article explores manners in which the judiciary can limit the reach of this jurisdiction-stripping statute, and in order to ensure that immigration detainees will not face an unclimbable wall when seeking federal court review of their bond decisions.

Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 607 2023.

By The International Detention Coalition

The arbitrary and indefinite immigration detention of Rohingya is harmful to refugees and their families. As Rohingya flee ongoing persecution in Myanmar and deteriorating security conditions in camps in Bangladesh, punitive immigration detention has not and will not deter them from coming to Malaysia for safety. Immigration detention is expensive, harmful and must be reformed.

A new joint report from the Protecting Rohingya Refugees in Asia (PRRiA) project demonstrates the far-reaching impact and trauma inflicted upon Rohingya refugees because of immigration detention. Rohingya in detention experience physical and psychological abuse that can compound pre-existing trauma. For detained children especially, the impact has long-term effects on their well-being.

The report also speaks to the incompatibility of detention practices with Malaysia’s desire to offer a protection-centred environment for persons in need.

International Detention Coalition, 2023. 32p,

By Peter J. Meyer

U.S. policy toward Central America has been a subject of significant debate and oversight over the past decade as Congress has sought to address the underlying factors driving migration from the region to the United States. Recent Trends According to a model developed at the University of Texas at Austin, an estimated 377,000 people, on average, left Northern Central America (see Figure 1) annually from FY2018 to FY2021, with the majority bound for the United States. Flows have varied from year to year, with an estimated 651,000 people leaving the region in FY2019, followed by 92,000 in FY2020, and 487,000 in FY2021. Surveys conducted in 2020 found many potential migrants had postponed their plans in the midst of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic but intended to undertake their journeys once governments lifted crossborder travel restrictions.

In FY2022, U.S. Border Patrol encountered nearly 521,000 foreign nationals from Northern Central America at the U.S. Southwest border, including 199,000 Hondurans, 228,000 Guatemalans, and 93,000 Salvadorans (see Figure 2). The Border Patrol apprehended 177,000 of those individuals under Title 8 of the U.S. Code (immigration) and expelled nearly 344,000 under Title 42 of the U.S. Code (public health). According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the use of Title 42 corresponded with an increase in recidivism, with repeat encounters accounting for 26.5% of total encounters in FY2020 and FY2021, up from an average of 11.8% in FY2015-FY2019. Of those encountered from Northern Central America in FY2022, about 22% were unaccompanied minors, 24% were traveling with family members, and 54% were single adults.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023. 3p.

By Andrés Dae Keun Kwon

Los Angeles County has a proud history of providing public defenders to people who cannot afford a lawyer to defend them in criminal court. On January 9, 1914, the county opened the first public defender office in the United States. In addition to being first, this office is the biggest in the nation. The Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Office (LACPD) currently employs about 700 public defenders, who handle approximately 300,000 criminal cases a year. And yet there is a crisis today in our county’s public defender system. In particular, LACPD has been grossly under-resourced as measured against recommended staffing ratios and compared to other California public defender offices. As a result, LACPD underserves a large and vital segment of the Los Angeles population: the immigrant community. This report, Defend L.A., examines the failures of the county’s public defender system and demands legal representation that, at a minimum, meets the standards of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S Constitution for all Los Angeles community members— including immigrants. The report documents many cases in which LACPD’s noncitizen clients pleaded to criminal dispositions triggering severe immigration consequences when more immigration-favorable alternative dispositions were available. Uninformed and unaware, LACPD’s noncitizen clients have pleaded guilty only to face mandatory deportation and permanent separation from family, community, and home—the loss “of all that makes life worth living.

Los Angeles: American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, 2018. 80p.

By The United States Government Accountability Office; Rebecca Gambler, et al.

Within the Department of Homeland Security, ICE is responsible for providing safe, secure, and humane confinement for detained noncitizens in the United States. In that capacity, ICE oversees and at some detention facilities provides on-site medical care services. ICE also oversees referrals and pays for off-site medical care when services are not available at detention facilities. GAO was asked to review issues related to informed consent for medical care for noncitizens in immigration detention facilities. Among other things, GAO examined the extent to which ICE has policies for obtaining informed consent for medical care, and how selected facilities implemented the policies; and oversees implementation of policies related to informed consent to help ensure compliance. GAO interviewed ICE officials and medical staff from six facilities selected, in part, based on whether ICE staff provided on-site medical care. GAO also reviewed 48 medical files from these facilities. Further, GAO analyzed oversight results for fiscal years 2019 through 2021, and reviewed ICE documentation in light of federal internal control standards. What GAO Recommends GAO is making three recommendations, including that ICE require detention facilities to collect informed consent documentation from off-site providers, and then require a review of this documentation as part of its oversight mechanisms for detention facilities. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with each of the recommendations.

Washington, DC: GAO, 2022. 53p.