By Summer Walker

This brief summarizes research conducted in December 2022 on gender-based violence (GBV) in Cité Soleil, an impoverished, high-density commune of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. GBV – and sexual violence, in particular – has escalated dramatically in Port-au-Prince in recent years, as gangs have multiplied and taken greater control over communities, local economies and many aspects of daily life. Clashes between armed gangs, including attempts to take over territory, have severely affected security, particularly for women and girls.

A report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), published in October 2022, documented how gangs have used rape and other forms of sexual violence in their quest for power and to instill fear in communities. Meanwhile, a breakdown in public safety across Port-au-Prince is a risk factor associated with increasing levels of GBV and reduces the ability to respond in an effective way.

This brief focuses on research collected in and around Cité Soleil (in the areas of Brooklyn, Sarthe and Village des Rapatriés), using a questionnaire, focus groups and a round table discussion. The study assesses five aspects of vulnerability: safety, legal protection, mental well-being, economic empowerment and education. This research was undertaken under very difficult conditions, and with a high degree of sensitivity to the subject matter and involvement of participants.

This brief offers insight into the current state of GBV in Cité Soleil and identifies potential areas of support for donors and organizations interested in improving the situation. It offers three overarching recommendations, as outlined in the conclusion: building the capacity of institutions that women trust, identifying the ways women organize locally, and developing cross-sector cooperation.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 27p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison; Ana Paula Oliveira and Matt Herbert

Over the course of 2023 and early 2024, security has continued to deteriorate alarmingly in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and in rural areas in the center and south of the country.

The Haitian crisis worsened critically in 2023. UN reports indicate that in 2023, over 4 789 people were murdered, 1 698 injured, and 2 490 kidnapped, with a 2023 homicide rate of 40.9 per 100 000, more than double the 2022 rate. Besides these figures, the nature of the criminal actors has been profoundly transformed, posing a series of challenges to international intervention.

Over the past years, gangs have undergone a radical evolution, going from rather unstructured actors dependent on resources provided by public or private patronage to violent entrepreneurs who have been able to convert their territorial power into governance capabilities. This shift has been fueled by the gangs’ unprecedented access to firearms and the Haitian state’s inability to halt their expansion, professionalization, and propensity to impose their rule over ever-larger territories, as well as by ongoing collusion by elements of the country’s political and economic elites.

In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution authorizing a non-UN multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti. After lengthy negotiations, the Kenyan government agreed to lead the deployment to support the Haitian National Police (HNP) in addressing gang violence and re-establishing security. However, the planned operation is currently being challenged in the Kenyan courts. This resolution came after the UNSC agreed on a sanctions regime for Haiti in October 2022 and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on key gang leaders, businessmen, and politicians. The UN sanctions have been supplemented by unilateral designations issued by Canada, the US, and the European Union (EU). Further, UN sanctions were levied on gang leaders in December 2023 as the preparations accelerated for the MSS deployment.

The UN’s current initiatives on Haiti potentially augur a new international approach to how organized crime actors can be tackled both from a security and human rights perspective. Ensuring international tools are effective in mitigating harm caused by gangs in Haiti is therefore vitally important for the people of the country and the international community.

Therefore, the various international tools must be tailored to the rapidly evolving criminal and violence dynamics on the ground and implemented in a strategically coordinated fashion.

This policy report is intended to further efforts to tailor both the MSS mission and the sanctions regime to the current operational challenges in Haiti, support Haitian and international decision-makers in their mission, and provide strategic backing to the country’s civil society.

It begins by detailing the current situation on the ground, including gangs and other violent groups’ operations, governance, and territorial domination. The following section describes the mandate and operations of the two primary international tools: the sanctions regime and the MSS mission. The third section flags key issues that need to be considered by both the sanctions regime and the international force and presents opportunities to align the two more comprehensively to strengthen public security responses and public policy initiatives to resolve the crisis.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 50p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Ana Paula Oliveira and Matt Herbert

Over the course of 2023 and early 2024, security has continued to deteriorate alarmingly in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and in rural areas in the centre and south of the country.1 Criminal gangs, the main drivers of this degradation, have grown in strength and capacity, enabling them to supplant in part or in full the control of government forces.2 The gangs’ domination of critical infrastructure, such as commercial and oil port terminals, major roads, and population centres has heightened their influence over Haiti’s economy and political system. The gangs have also imposed governance on major parts of Port-au-Prince, leading both to rising criminal predation and human rights violations, including gender-based violence.3 Moreover, 2023 saw the development of particularly strong vigilante movements while the first weeks of 2024 witnessed the rise of violent political leaders, adding to an already disastrous security situation. As one United Nations (UN) report bluntly noted: ‘The situation is unravelling.’4 The Haitian crisis worsened critically in 2023. UN reports indicate that in 2023, over 4 789 people were murdered, 1 698 injured and 2 490 kidnapped, with a 2023 homicide rate of 40.9 per 100 000, more than double the 2022 rate.5 Besides these figures, the nature of the criminal actors has been profoundly transformed, posing a series of challenges to international intervention. Over the past five years, gangs have undergone a radical evolution, going from rather unstructured actors dependent on resources provided by public or private patronage to violent entrepreneurs who have been able to convert their territorial power into governance capabilities. This shift has been fuelled by the gangs’ unprecedented access to firearms and the Haitian state’s inability to halt their expansion, profession alization and propensity to impose their rule over ever larger territories, as well as by ongoing collusion by elements of the country’s political and economic elites. In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution authorizing a non-UN multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti. After long negotiations, the Kenyan government agreed to lead the deployment, aimed at supporting the Haitian National Police (HNP) in addressing gang violence and re-establishing security,6 although the planned operation is currently being challenged in the Kenyan courts.7 This resolution came after the UNSC agreed a sanctions regime for Haiti in October 2022, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on key gang leaders, businessmen and politicians. The UN sanctions have been supplemented by unilateral designations issued by Canada, the US, and the European Union (EU). Further UN sanctions were levied on gang leaders in December 2023, as the preparations accelerated for the MSS deployment.

Intervention by the UN in Haiti is not new, with the embryonic MSS mission representing the third initiative in as many decades. However, the proposed international mission stands out, both for Haiti and more broadly for international responses to organized criminal violence. Historically, the UN has become involved in Haiti in response to political crises, worsening insecurity and repeated natural disasters.8 While the 2004-2017 United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) engaged in counter-gang operations, largely in and around Port-au-Prince, this came after the force had been on the ground for several years and was generally intermittent.9 In contrast, the prospective 2024 intervention will be conducted outside the auspices of the UN and has been motivated by, and focuses on, criminal gangs as the main threat to peace and security. This reflects the substantial change in gangs’ power, structure and capacity for territorial governance since the MINUSTAH era. These entities are nowadays far more economically autonomous and territorially powerful, making them less controllable. As one Haitian entrepreneur described the contemporary evolution of the gangs: ‘We saw a lion being born, we fed it and watched it grow, we tried to domesticate it, but the animal eventually escaped from the cage, and here we are.’10 Nonetheless, the focus by the UNSC on profit-oriented criminal entities as primary conflict actors in their own right, in both the resolutions setting up the sanctions regime and the MSS mission, is a substantial conceptual shift for the UN.11 Given the growth of transnational organized crime, and expansion of instability and violence linked to such crime, situations like the present one in Haiti are likely to become more common. The UN’s current initiatives on Haiti potentially augur a new international approach to how organized crime actors can be tackled both from a security and human rights perspective. Ensuring international tools are effective in mitigating harm caused by gangs in Haiti is therefore vitally important for the people of the country, and for the international community

The situation presents an extremely difficult test. Haitian armed groups today are more militarily powerful, networked, and resilient than those during the MINUSTAH intervention. It is therefore essential that the various international tools be tailored to the rapidly evolving criminal and violence dynamics on the ground, and be implemented in a strategically coordinated fashion. Meetings between Kenyan and Haitian police teams have taken place, as well as trainings, and vetting processes prior to deployment. However, the proposed mission, the UNSC and the Haitian government have yet to present a public plan and strategy for the intervention, either for short-term engagement on the ground or for a long-term political solution.12 This policy report is intended to further efforts to tailor both the MSS mission and the sanctions regime to the current operational challenges in Haiti, support Haitian and international decision-makers in their mission, and provide strategic backing to the country’s civil society. It begins by detailing the current situation on the ground, including gangs and other violent groups’ operations, governance and territorial domination. The next section details the mandate and oper ations of the two primary international tools, the sanctions regime and the MSS mission. The third section flags key issues which need to be considered for both the sanctions regime and the interna t ional force, and presents opportunities to align the two more comprehensively, to strengthen public security responses and public policy initiatives so as to resolve the crisis. This report is the first of several planned publications on the political economy of violence in Haiti and the international cooperation that seeks to uproot it. It follows a 2022 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) report on gang evolution and a 2023 GI-TOC report on gender-based violence in the country.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 50p.

By David C. Brotherton and Rafael Gude

In 2008, the Ecuadorian Government launched a policy to increase public safety as part of its “Citizens’ Revolution” (La Revolución Ciudadana). An innovative aspect of this policy was the legalization of the country’s largest street gangs. During the years 2016–2017, we conducted ethnographic research with these groups focusing on the impact of legalization as a form of social inclusion. We were guided by two research questions: (1) What changed between these groups and society? and (2) What changed within these groups? We completed feld observations and sixty qualitative interviews with group members, as well as multiple formal and informal inter views with government advisors, police leaders and state actors related to the initiative. Our data show that the commitment to social citizenship had a major impact on gang-related violence and was a factor in reducing the nation’s homicide rate. The study provides an example of social control where the state is committed to polices of social inclusion while rejecting

Critical Criminology, Volume 29, pages 931–955, (2021)

By: The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Foreign security personnel are expected to begin arriving in Haiti in early 2024 to assist the national police in fighting the gangs besieging much of the country. UN-authorised, Kenyan-led and designed with U.S. support, this multinational mission aims to restore security and enable long overdue elections.

Why does it matter?: Haiti’s wave of violence and political breakdown have deepened the country’s humanitarian emergency. With police outnumbered and outgunned by criminal groups, foreign assistance is needed. But the mission must overcome daunting operational and political challenges for it to be effective.

What should be done?: The mission should not deploy in force until it has sufficient troops, training and equipment to overpower the gangs. It should prepare for urban combat, and develop community-level sources of intelligence, to help minimise civilian harm. A political settlement and major reforms will be required for gains to endure.

Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Briefing N°49, Port-au-Prince/New York/Washington/Brussels, 5 January 2024 . 24p.

By James A. Densley

Drawing on extensive interviews with gang members, this book provides a vivid portrayal of gang life. Topics include the profiles and motivations of gang members; the processes of gang evolution, organization, and recruitment; gang members' uses of violence, media, and technology and the role of gangs in the drugs trade and organized crime

Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 226p.

By  Suojellaan Lapsia, Protect Children

A new report by Suojellaan Lapsia, Protect Children provides chilling insights on the ways offenders use mainstream tech platforms to access and distribute child sexual abuse material (CSAM, the more apt term for "child pornography"). Some highlights:

• 77% of surveyed CSAM offenders have encountered CSAM or links to CSAM on the surface web (e.g. on a social media platform, a pornography website, a messaging app, or other mainstream website) 

• 32% say that they have used social media platforms to search for, view, or disseminate CSAM.

  • The top platforms used for this purpose were Instagram (29%), X (Twitter) (26%), and Discord (23%).

• 40% said they sought contact with a child after viewing CSAM

• Of those, 70% sought such contact online (e.g. on social media platforms, gaming platforms, or messaging apps

Suojellaan Lapsia, Protect Children ry, 2024. 35p.

By Susan Burke, et al

This Code of Practice document provides guidelines that were designed to guide juvenile justice administrators as they establish policies, procedures, and practices in alignment with research-supported evidence, and to promote discussion within jurisdictions on existing practices. The document is divided into five primary sections: general policy considerations; training; de-escalation and nonphysical interventions; physical interventions; and after-action reviews. The “General Policy Considerations” section provides guidance on how agencies can create and educate staff on their use of force continuum. The sections are presented in a sequence that aims to reinforce their dependency and relationship to other components. The document concludes with sections of term definitions and links resources cited.

Hingham, MA: The Council of Juvenile Justice Administrators (CJJA) , et al, 2023. 24p.

By Sarah Hockenberry; Charles Puzzanchera

Juvenile Court Statistics 2021 draws on data from the National Juvenile Court Data Archive to profile 437,300 delinquency cases and 51,500 petitioned status offense cases handled in 2021 by U.S. courts with juvenile jurisdiction. The report also tracks trends in delinquency and petitioned status cases between 2005 and 2021. The data used in this report were contributed to the Archive by nearly 2,400 courts with jurisdiction over 83% of the juvenile population in 2021. National estimates of juvenile court delinquency caseloads in 2021 were based on analyses of 299,432 automated case records and court-level statistics summarizing an additional 29,369 cases. Estimates of status offense cases formally processed by juvenile courts in 2021 were based on analyses of 32,897 automated case-level records and court-level summary statistics on an additional 2,852 cases. The data used in the analyses were contributed to the National Juvenile Court Data Archive by nearly 2,400 courts with jurisdiction over 83% of the juvenile population in 2021. Courts with juvenile jurisdiction may handle a variety of matters, including child maltreatment, traffic violations, child support, and adoptions. This report focuses on cases involving juveniles charged with law violations (delinquency or status offenses).

Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2024. 114p.

By Sharon Pette

This white paper provides recommendations for programming for youth ages 17 and older residing in secure custody setting and provides policy, practice, and legislative considerations that may warrant future exploration by juvenile justice professionals and policymakers. The goal of this publication is to provide the audience with program-related resources for working with these youth and introduce potential funding resources for age-appropriate programming. This paper also intends to bring to the forefront the shared challenges that juvenile justice facilities face when serving older individuals and offers feasible solutions to these challenges.  The Center for Coordinated Assistance to States and its partner recommend the innovative practices offered in this document for working with older youth.

Washington, DC: OJJDP, 2024. 29p

By Carla McDonald-Heffernan and Carmen Robin-D’Cruz

Children with special educational needs and disabilities (SEND) are hugely over-represented at all points in the criminal justice system. Evidence suggests that 70–90% of children in the justice system have some form of SEND. Yet the lack of support for their communication needs may make these children’s experiences particularly difficult and the impact of educational disruptions as a result of justice system involvement can be particularly severe. Youth diversion offers many children a pathway out of the criminal justice system. In this informal non-statutory approach, children are offered the chance to partake in a community-based intervention rather than receiving a formal out-of-court disposal or prosecution. Evidence strongly suggests that youth diversion benefits children by reducing their likelihood of coming back into the justice system or getting further entrenched into it. Youth diversion might be particularly beneficial to children with SEND. However, given the range of communication barriers that children with SEND face in navigating the system, they may be less likely to receive diversion, particularly where communication difficulties are misconstrued as behavioural issues. Unequal access to diversion may create further disparity later on in the youth justice system. As part of the Centre for Justice Innovation’s ongoing interest in supporting effective use diversion, this report aims to understand how diversion is working for children with SEND. In order to research this report, we interviewed children with SEND who had received diversion as well as a range of professionals including youth justice service (YJS) practitioners, police officers and solicitors. We also conducted a survey of YJS practitioners. We are conscious that ‘SEND’ is a deficits-focused category that has been criticised for responsibilising children rather than highlighting the system that underserves them, as well as being an all-encompassing label that does not adequately account for differences within it. We have nevertheless chosen to frame our research around ‘SEND’ rather than using other overlapping categories such as ‘neurodivergent’ or ‘additional learning needs’ firstly because this project was in part driven by our response to the Government’s Green Paper, ‘SEND Review: Right support, Right place, Right time’. The fact that SEND is still the prevailing term used in the education sector, by the youth justice service and in joint decision-making panels for youth diversion specifically was also a key consideration. 

London: Centre for Justice Innovation. 2024, 39pg

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

August Aichhorn

Wayward Youth by August Aichhorn delves into the complexities of working with troubled youth in a compassionate and insightful manner. Aichhorn, a renowned Austrian psychoanalyst, draws from his extensive experience to explore the psychological roots of delinquent behavior in adolescents. Through compelling case studies and thoughtful analysis, he sheds light on the inner struggles of young individuals caught in the throes of rebellion and defiance.

With empathy and wisdom, Aichhorn navigates the turbulent waters of adolescence, offering a fresh perspective on how society can better understand and support its wayward youth. Wayward Youth is a compelling read for anyone interested in the intersection of psychology, social work, and juvenile delinquency.

NY. Meridian Books. 1931. 193p

By Charlotte Gill, David Weisburd, Denise Nazaire, Heather Prince, Claudia Gross Shader

Research Summary

This paper describes Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth (ABSPY), a community-led, place-based, data-driven initiative to improve community safety and reduce crime involving young people at hot spots in Seattle, Washington. The ABSPY model puts crime prevention into the hands of the community, compared to traditional problem-solving approaches that may involve community stakeholders but are led by the police. We evaluated the initiative using a quasi-experimental research design comparing the five hot spots in the Rainier Beach neighborhood, where ABSPY was implemented, to five similarly situated hot spots elsewhere in the city. We used 9 years of police calls for service and offense reports, from 2011 to 2019, to assess ABSPY's effects on crime and a five-wave community survey conducted pre- and 4 years post-implementation to examine community perceptions. Although there were no significant effects on calls for service or crime, ABSPY significantly improved community members’ perceptions of serious crime and the police in the short and medium term.

Policy Implications

Our results show positive changes in community perceptions that offer a foundation for relationship and capacity building in problem-solving efforts. Although ABSPY is not associated with reductions in crime, our results suggest that even communities with entrenched crime problems can leverage this capacity to reduce crime in the longer term. Community coalitions also offer some benefits relative to police-led efforts, such as shared culture and values; stability; and consistency. However, community coalitions must build capacity for action as well as community engagement, and consider if and how the police should be involved, ensuring that the specific expertise of each coalition member is leveraged. Furthermore, our study highlights the importance of identifying measures of crime that are not affected by increased trust and collaboration between the police and the community.

Criminology & Public Policy Early View, 2024.

By Tyson Whitten, Jesse Cale, Russell Brewer, Katie Logos, Thomas J. Holt and Andrew Goldsmith

A disproportionally large number of adolescents engage in cyber-deviance. However, it is unclear if distinct patterns of adolescent cyber-deviance are evident, and if so, whether and to what extent low self-control is associated with different patterns of cyber-deviance. The current study addressed this research gap by examining the relationship between self-control and distinct latent classes of adolescent cyber-deviance net of potential confounders among a cross-sectional sample of 1793 South Australian adolescents. Four latent classes were identified, each characterized by varying probabilities of involvement in six types of cyber-deviance that were measured. The versatile class (n = 413) had the lowest average level of self-control, followed by the harmful content users (n = 439) and digital piracy (n = 356) classes, with the abstainer class (n = 585) characterized by the highest self-control. Analysis of covariance indicated that the abstainer group had significantly higher self-control than other classes of cyber-deviance. Although the versatile class had noticeably lower average self-control scores than the harmful content users and digital piracy groups, this difference was not significant after correcting for multiple comparisons. Collectively, these findings suggest that self-control appears to distinguish between those who do and do not engage in cyber-deviance but may not distinguish between distinct patterns of cyber-deviance net of other factors.

International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology Volume 0: Ahead of Print, 2024.

By Millie Harris and Mia Edwards  

This evidence review, part of a funded by Barrow Cadbury Trust, summarises the policy context and existing evidence on young people turning 18 in the criminal justice system.

The review sets out available data on the numbers and characteristics of young people in transition in the criminal justice system. It examines young people’s experiences of transition between Youth Offending Team and adult Probation; from the children’s secure estate to adult prison; the experiences of young people at risk of harm, particularly criminal exploitation; and disparities in transition and the support available to racially minoritised young people. The review considers the multiple other transitions outside of the criminal justice system impacting young people as they turn 18.

This evidence base will inform the project’s research priorities and the development of thematic policy briefings and recommendations across the project’s three thematic focuses: custody, safeguarding young people at risk, and racial injustice.

London: Alliance for Youth Justice, 2023. 54p.

By Alliance for Youth Justice  

This briefing explores how racially minoritised young people experience particularly destabilising transitions due to deficits in support before and after turning 18. It highlights the crucial role the ‘by and for’ voluntary and community sector plays in addressing these shortfalls, arguing for reforms to better facilitate and fund the sector’s involvement in racially minoritised young people’s lives.

London: Alliance for Youth Justice, 2024. 53p.

By Anna Laura Baraldi, Erasmo Papagni and Marco Stimolo 

Organised crime tightens its corrupting influence on politics through violent intimidation. Anti-crime measures that increase the cost of corruption but not of the exercise of violence might accordingly lead mafia-style organizations to retaliate by resorting to violence in lieu of bribery. On the other hand, this kind of anti-crime measure might also induce criminal clans to go inactive, owing to the lower expected payoff from the "business" of influencing politics, which would reduce violence. To determine which of these possible effects is prevalent, we undertake an empirical assessment of the impact of city council dissolution for mafia influence in Italy as prescribed by Decree Law 164/1991 in discouraging violence against politicians in the period 2010-2019. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that in the dissolved municipalities the enforcement of the Law reduces violence and that the effect persists (at least) for two electoral rounds. The most likely driving channel of this result is the renewed pool of politicians elected after compulsory administration. These findings are robust to a series of endogeneity tests.

Working Paper No. 010.2023

Publisher: 

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano

By Soeren C. Schwuchow

We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens’ wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization’s higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge.

Eur J Law Econ 55, 469–509 (2023).

By Jamie Bergin  

Various customs administrations have reported that their officials are physically threatened by organised criminal groups to abuse their power and facilitate illicit activities, such as drug trafficking. This Helpdesk Answer conceptually analyses how organised criminal groups use corruption and physical threats to influence customs officials and enable their profit-making activities, before describing how applying certain integrity measures could potentially prevent and counter the emergence of such threats.

Berlin: U4 Helpdesk Answer. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre and Transparency International , 2023. 18p.

By Michelle Jeanis, Meng Ru Shih, Bryanna Fox

Background: Studies have shown that Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) greatly effect negative life outcomes, especially delinquency. However, some variables and their roles remain elusive, and pathways to delinquency have not been fully explored.

Objective: The study proposes to (1) identify whether running away is an initial delinquency or a result of ACEs, (2) examine the similarities and differences of chronic and one-time ACEs on gender and delinquency and (3) further examine the role of exposure to violence by gender.

Participants and Setting: The study uses the public accessible data in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health).

Methods: The study used factorial logistic regression models to analyze the ACEs and their influence on juvenile behavior.

Results: Chronic neglect (Female: β=.74; Male: β=.43) and multiple exposures to violence (ETV) (Female: β=1.43; Male: β=.94) were significantly related to reporting property crime in both genders. Gender differences are apparent. Girls who reported single-time physical abuse (β=1.93) and multiple ETVs (β=3.19) are more likely to commit violent offenses. Also, multiple ETVs (three types: β=2.123; four types: β=3.38; five types: β=3.90) are most significant for explaining violent offending among boys. Runaway behavior functions as a condition to the occurrence of juvenile offending, rather than a predictor.

Conclusions: ACEs typically affect boys and girls differently. Running away appears to shape the delinquency experience but does not fully mediate it. Policy implications are discussed.

Unpublished paper, 2024.