By Alexander Palmer, Skyeler Jackson, and Daniel Byman

Despite the recent attack in New Orleans, longer-term trends suggest that jihadist terrorism in the United States is not resurgent. The number of jihadist plots and attacks in the United States has been low since the territorial defeat of ISIS. The average lethality of jihadist terrorist attacks has also fallen since the peak of the caliphate. International groups such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda have filled more of an inspirational role rather than directly orchestrating attacks on the United States. Although formal links between attackers and plotters in the United States appear to be rare, this has not prevented individuals from carrying out lethal “lone wolf” attacks. Overall, jihadist terrorism in the United States does not merit additional resources at this time; however, international terrorism organizations continue to merit counterterrorism efforts.

Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) , 2025. 12p.

By  Michael Osman, Monika Roszkowska, Murat Yildiz, Robert Muggah, et al.

Several Caribbean countries are registering an intensification of organized crime and rising incidence of lethal violence. A combination of risk factors including surging drug production in South America, the proliferation and competition of transnational and local gangs, and high availability and use of firearms have contributed to soaring homicide rates. Countries such as Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago currently register among the highest murder rates globally. Faced with exceedingly high levels of collective and interpersonal violence, some Caribbean governments, for example that of Jamaica have declared states of emergencies to fight violent crime while simultaneously ramping up regional efforts to curb the trafficking of firearms and ammunition. There is a growing consensus among the heads of government of CARICOM countries that the crime and violence situation could deteriorate further still. The perpetrators of collective violence in the Caribbean vary, though most are connected to a diverse array of criminal markets across the region. The determination of what constitutes  a “gang ” differs across the Caribbean. The capacity of these groups vary: there is no dominant configuration of criminal groups and criminal relationships across all locations in the region. Highly organized criminal networks and street gangs are involved in multiple transnational criminal markets spanning South and Central America, North America, and Western Europe. Larger, more sophisticated gangs alternately collude and compete with state actors and a host of non-state intermediaries to procure firearms and transport, transship, and traffic in cocaine, cannabis, and to a lesser extent heroin and amphetamines. For the most part, smaller street gangs are more domestically oriented; some are politically connected and secure government contracts to provide resources and services that are historically underserved by the state. In addition to providing social welfare, these organizations often impose protection rackets within the areas they operate. These protection rackets allow these neighborhood gangs to engage in criminal activities ranging from selling drugs, trafficking in firearms, human smuggling, and contract killing to managing lottery scams, extortion, and racketeering. A small number of the region’s gangs are more organized and have expanded their criminal networks to facilitate transnational crimes,   including the transportation and protection of drug shipments as well as firearms trafficking, human smuggling, and cyber-related crimes. In larger countries in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, aggressive state-led anti-gang measures have accelerated the fragmentation or “splintering” of gangs, further heightening inter- and intra-factional violence and demand for firearms and ammunition. While the overall number and membership of Caribbean gangs appears to have expanded, a relatively small number of them are involved in transnational trafficking of drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Only a handful of the hundreds of gangs active in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago appear to be directly implicated in cross-border crimes such as the trafficking of cocaine and cannabis or smuggling of weapons. In many cases, well-connected gang leaders, including former inmates of US prisons, facilitate shipments by leveraging their networks from Colombia and Venezuela to North America and Western Europe. Meanwhile, local gang members may be subcontracted for “protecting” transshipment of drugs, sourcing firearms abroad (primarily from the US), and organizing local distribution and retail. However, most gangs in the Caribbean  are inward-facing and connected to local political economies ranging from disrupting elections and securing government contracts to local drug dealing, prostitution, scams, and extortion. Rather than facilitate international drug shipments or human trafficking rings, gangs throughout the region are typically parochial and focused instead on protecting their territory. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 62p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  

 Although more than 9,300 people died in violent incidents in the Sahel countries in 2022, the single greatest source of violent incidents is not related to clashes between armed groups and pro-governmental forces. Several mutually reinforcing factors have contributed to the growth of both insurgency and banditry, including intercommunal tensions, violence between farmers and herders, violent religious extremism and competition over scarce resources such as water and arable land. Environmental factors such as climate change may also be having an impact on conflicts in the Sahel. All the groups involved require firearms and ammunition, and as their numbers multiply so too do business opportunities for arms traffickers in the Sahel countries. While there is evidence of long-range firearms trafficking to the Sahel, including by air from France and from Turkey via Nigeria, it appears that the vast majority of firearms trafficked in the region are procured within Africa. Since 2019, Libya has become a source of supply for newly manufactured weapons. Apparently, newly produced AK-pattern assault rifles, sourced from Libya, are available on the black market in Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka regions of northern Mali.  Evidence shows that the diversion of weapons from national armed forces – whether through capture on the battlefield, theft from armouries, or purchase from corrupt elements in the military – is a primary source of firearms in the Sahel countries today. The AK-type models that make up a large share of the assault rifles in the Sahel are durable and often still effective in combat decades after their manufacture. Rebels who participated in the 1990 Tuareg rebellions in Mali and the Niger, as well as previous uprisings, retained many of their arms, which were either held in caches or in the possession of individuals. As well as remaining in the region, weapons trafficked in the Sahel also make their way to the coastal countries of West Africa and have been used in terrorist attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. To enable communities to defend themselves against extremist groups, some States in the region have armed militias or other non-state actors, whose weapons are even more likely to be diverted than those entrusted to official national security structures.  

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 24p.

By Iftekharul Bashar

In 2024, Bangladesh faces a growing threat of radicalism fuelled by political instability, security vacuums, and weakened counterterrorism infrastructure. Unless the interim government adopts a zero-tolerance policy and strengthens law enforcement and intelligence efforts, extremist groups may gain further ground, leading to long-term instability. COMMENTARY Bangladesh is facing an increasing threat of radicalism and terrorism. The political violence and instability of 2024 have worsened the situation, with extremist elements exploiting the security vacuum created by the regime change. Weakened law enforcement and intelligence agencies, along with the rise of armed groups and radical ideologies, pose a serious threat to the country’s stability. Bangladesh risks long-term insecurity with broader regional implications without swift and decisive action.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU , 2024. 4p.

By The UNODC Global Programme on Criminal Network Disruption and the Global Maritime Crime Programme (Border Management Branch).

The Republic of Yemen has been embroiled in a violent conflict since September 2014 when Houthi forces took military control of the capital city Sana’a and displaced the government of interim President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Yemen’s protracted conflict has claimed at least 377.000 lives, most of them civilians, and plunged Yemen, already the poorest country of the Arabian Peninsula, into a complex humanitarian catastrophe. The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), originally were a revivalist Zaidi Shia religious movement formed in the Sa’dah governorate in the 1990s under the leadership of prominent cleric Hussein al-Houthi. Critical of Yemen’s long-term President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in office from 1990 to 2012), an order for the arrest of their leader led to a low-level insurgency resulting in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by government forces in September 2004. Following his death, the political leadership of the movement passed on to his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The Houthis reportedly formed close political and military ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese movement Hezbollah and continued to challenge Saleh, exploiting the frustration of large parts of the Yemeni population with his government. They succeeded in capturing parts of the mountainous north of the country before a popular uprising linked to the Arab Spring swept the old regime from power in February 2011. In the wake of this regime change, which brought Hadi to power, the Houthis increased their presence in Sana’a and formed alliances with other groups, while simultaneously clashing with tribesmen loyal to other political movements, in particular those of the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party (“The Yemeni Congregation of Reform Party”), a Yemeni affiliate of the Muslim brotherhood. Following the ouster of President Hadi and his subsequent flight to Aden, the Houthis consolidated their dominance over large parts of northern Yemen and significantly strengthened their military power through absorbing parts of the country’s armed

forces. In March 2015, fearing a further deterioration of the security situation, a group of nine Arab countries led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia deployed military forces as part of Operation “Decisive Storm” with the aim to restore the authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Meanwhile in the coastal province of Hadramawt, militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploited the political vacuum and seized control of the local capital of Mukalla in April 2015, which they held for more than one year before being forced out by military forces backed by the United Arab Emirates.4 While the Coalition reversed some of the Houthi advances, the Houthis managed to consolidate their positions in the mountainous north of the country. The period from 2016/2017 onwards, saw a significant increase in the military capabilities of the Houthis, which included the launch of ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)5 against targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as the deployment of anti-ship missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED)6 against ships flying the flag of Coalition states in the Red Sea. While these attacks have done relatively little material damage, they allowed the Houthis to some extent to counterbalance the superiority of the Coalition forces and to project power beyond the immediate battlefield. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 30p.

By Yannick Deepen and Sabine Kurtenbach

Non-state armed actors (NSAAs) come in a variety of shapes and sizes, including warlordled groups, insurgencies, militias, and organised-crime syndicates to name just the most prominent examples hereof. In war or lower-level armed conflict, as well as violence-prone contexts, these groups pose acute problems for peacebuilding, democratic governance, and sustainable development. They control resources and territories, as well as compete, cooperate, or align with political and economic elites both within and beyond the state to promote the unstable status quo that serves their interests. Various challenges arise when dealing with NSAAs. Prevailing strategies vary between repression, co-optation, and submission to the rule of law. This analysis maps cross-regional trends regarding NSAAs based on available datasets. On this basis we develop a typology for NSAAs and a conceptual frame for their transformation. We then apply this to three paradigmatic case studies – Colombia, Mali, the Philippines – and formulate recommendations for the designing of improved strategies vis-à-vis development cooperation and other external actors.

GIGA Working Papers, No. 337,

By Omar Ashour

How did ISIS – a widely hated, massively outnumbered and ludicrously outgunned organisation – manage to occupy over 120 cities, towns and villages from the Southern Philippines to Western Libya? Seeking to understand ISIS’s combat effectiveness, Omar Ashour analyses the military and tactical innovations of ISIS and their predecessors in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt. He shows how their capacity to mix conventional military tactics with innovative guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism strategies allowed ISIS to expand and endure beyond expectations.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021.

By Rohan Gunaratna

The conflicts in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria will have a generational impact. The 7 October 2023 attack against Israel in Gaza and its consequences have set back the prospects of a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue and may attract a new wave of foreign fighters to embark on terrorist activities like what was seen following the military debacles in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. What can be done to stem another rise of the terrorist fighters?

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 3p.

Edited by Katharina Karcher, Yordanka Dimcheva ,· Mireya Toribio Medina. Mia Parkes

This open access book sheds light on collective practices of remembering, imagining and anticipating in relation to recent acts of urban terrorism in Europe. Analysing a range of personal and collective responses to urban terrorism in contemporary Europe, this book shows that current debates on this issue are shaped by multiple co-existing and intersecting memories of political violence in the past. Moreover, despite public declarations of unity and solidarity, collective memories of urban terror in contemporary Europe are far from consensual - memory can be both a catalyst for and an impediment to social and political change. Drawing on case studies from a range of European countries and creative responses by survivors, artists, and poets, this interdisciplinary volume introduces readers to key methods (e.g. discourse analysis and (auto-)ethnography) and concepts (e.g. Lieux de Mémoire and ‘grassroots memorials’) for the study of the memorialization of terror attacks.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 317p.

By Philip J. Cook and Audrey Vil

n Durham (of which 160 died) in 1011 distinct incidents – about 200 incidents per year on average. As a result of DPD investigations, 46% of the fatal-shooting incidents resulted in at least one arrest, compared with just a 16% arrest rate for incidents in which the victim(s) survived. The arrestees were processed in the Durham courts (although a handful of cases were transferred to federal court). While most defendants were prosecuted, some had all charges dismissed for various reasons. The remaining cases -- those that have been prosecuted – represent 42% of the fatal shooting incidents and just 11% of the nonfatal shooting incidents. For all 1011 shooting incidents combined, there have been 74 with a conviction in the Durham courts, 6 that were federally indicted, and 10 that were processed as juveniles (so that we lacked access to court records). Another 62 cases were still pending as of July 2022. If we assume that all of the federal cases and the cases pending in

Durham courts eventually result in a conviction, the fraction of shooting incidents in which there was both an arrest and conviction was about 15%. Thus when there is a criminal shooting in Durham, it is unlikely (85%) that anyone will be arrested and convicted. These results are troubling, not only because the system has failed to deliver justice, but also because of the urgent need to prevent future gun violence in Durham. An increase in the arrest and conviction rates for gun violence cases would reduce future gun violence through several mechanisms: incapacitating dangerous perpetrators from engaging in subsequent violence; deterring some would-be shooters by communicating a credible threat that shooting someone will result in legal consequences; and interrupting cycles of revenge. It is also plausible that a stronger performance by the police and courts would serve to send a clear message that the authorities are determined to help improve the quality of life in violence-impacted

communities. This report is intended to provide a data-based description of gun violence and the law enforcement response since 2017. It is not intended to explain the observed patterns, or provide guidance on how performance can be improved. Our hope is that documenting outcomes of police investigations and court processing will help motivate further inquiry and action.

Durham, NC: Duke University, 2023. 31p.

By Benjamin Jongleux and Nicolas Florquin

Prior to the recent changes to the European Union (EU) Firearms Directive, and due to inconsistent national regulations, several types of readily convertible firearms could be purchased with few restrictions in a number of EU member states, modified into lethal weapons and trafficked within the region. This situation contributed to the growing criminal use of models that were easy to convert into lethal firearms. In response, the EU adopted a number of new regulatory measures from 2017 onwards and supported joint law enforcement operations that specifically targeted trafficking in converted firearms. Based on research undertaken by the Small Arms Survey, this paper reviews these EU efforts and the evolving dynamics of firearms conversion in Europe as a whole. It argues that while EU member states are moving towards greater harmonization of their national legislation, there have been significant delays in some countries, and that the interpretation of certain standards and procedures remains inconsistent. The paper also argues that improving the strategic intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking in Europe remains critical for measuring the success of these efforts and for detecting emerging threats.

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers , no 70, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium 2020. 16p

By Europol

This report constitutes the first of a series of analytical products complementing the Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, prepared by the UNODC Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB). The aim of the present report is to analyse illicit firearms trafficking and related forms of crime from a specific geographical angle, namely the European Union region, and to deepen the understanding of the illicit firearms trafficking situation in the region and its interconnection to the rest of the world. The report is based on the quantitative and qualitative data compiled by UNODC in the Illicit Arms Flows Dataset. To further enhance the evidence base on the phenomenon, this report complements the data from the Illicit Arms Flows Dataset with other qualitative and case-based data sources, in particular previously collected data by the Flemish Peace Institute, in addition to a review of existing literature on illicit firearms trafficking in Europe and to the information exchanged among practitioners during a cross-regional expert meeting on this topic organized by UNODC in October 2019. By analysing these data sources in a joint manner, the report aims to significantly improve the understanding of the scope, characteristics and dynamics of illicit firearms trafficking into, from and across the European Union and contribute to the evidence base required to efficiently combat this phenomenon both within the region and globally. Seizures of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition in the European Union . As for the Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, the present report is predominantly based on firearms seizure data, which can be considered the best proxy for developing estimates of the scope and value of illicit firearms trafficking. However, the currently available data on firearms seizures in Europe needs to be interpreted carefully because of shortcomings with regard to the quality and comprehensiveness of the available data as a result of poor registration procedures, the lack of a uniform collection and registration approach or the lack of firearms expertise among local law enforcement officials seizing firearms.. More fundamentally, it is crucial to keep in mind that firearms can be seized in very diverse contexts and that seized firearms are not necessarily trafficked firearms or even illegally held at the time of seizure. In addition, national differences in seizure data are not necessarily a reflection of different illicit gun markets in these countries but can also be attributed to differences in national legislation and procedures and to the different levels of priority given to combat illicit firearms trafficking in these countries. Close to 60 per cent of European Union Member States provided data on seized firearms to UNODC but with varying levels of details and completeness . In total 16 European Union Member States provided quantitative data on seized and trafficked firearms in 2016 - 2017 to UNODC via the Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire (IAFQ), a new globally standardized tool developed by UNODC for enhancing the evidence base on illicit firearms trafficking and the global understanding of the firearms trafficking phenomenon. It also serves the purpose of supporting monitoring of target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals. Through this target, Member States committed, among other objectives, to significantly reduce illicit arms flows by 2030. The completeness of data varies extensively among the reporting countries as many countries face challenges with providing data that goes beyond basic information on the amount and type of weapon seized. While 16 Member States submitted data on total number of firearms seizures disaggregated by

type of weapon, data on tracing requests and outcomes was submitted by only six and eight Member States, respectively. Shotguns, pistols and rifles emerge as most seized firearms within the European Union, making up almost 70 per cent of the reported seized firearms . The 16 European Union Member States that submitted seizure data via the IAFQ seized in total about 50,000 firearms in 2016 and 40,000 firearms in 2017, representing nine per cent and seven per cent of global reported seizure, respectively. Significant national differences in the number of seized firearms can be observed: while some Member States reported thousands of seized firearms annually, other Member States reported much lower seizures.

. Shotguns (30 percent) are the most widely seized firearms in these Member States, especially in Southern European countries. Also pistols (22 per cent) and rifles (15 percent) are frequently seized. Revolvers (8 per cent) and military-grade firearms (2 percent), such as machine guns and submachine guns, are seized much less frequently. In some countries, as for example in Sweden (9 per cent) and Croatia (7 per cent), the share of seized submachine guns and machine guns is however much higher and equals or surpasses the share of other types of firearms. Compared to other regions, the share of firearms seized in Europe also includes a significant proportion of pneumatic, blank-firing and gas weapons. Illicit possession ranks as number one justification for the seizure of firearms . Firearms are seized in various contexts in the European Union. In line with the findings of the UNODC Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, the most frequent legal justification for firearms seizures in the European Union in 2016-2017 is ‘illicit possession’ (34 per cent)..

The share of seizures with ‘illicit trafficking’ as legal justification fluctuated between zero - four per cent in the reporting Member States. This is believed to be an underestimate as the offence of illicit possession is generally an easier and quicker way for law enforcement and other relevant agencies to justify the prohibition of a transfer than the offence of illicit trafficking. The analysis of IAFQ data further demonstrates that most firearms seizures occur within the country’s national territory. Some Member States also report a significant share of seizures at the land border or at airports. Firearms seizures on vessels or at harbours are rather exceptional in the European Union. With 79 per cent of the seized firearms within the European Union for which related data was available uniquely marked, an important foundation for tracing and identifying the illicit origin of the seized weapon exists . Ten European Union Member States reported on the markings of seized firearms. 79 per cent of the seized firearms for which data on markings was available were uniquely marked.

. This implies national authorities generally can trace seized firearms, attempt to identify their point of diversion, analyse illicit arms flows and subsequently take appropriate measures to mitigate diversion risks and combat trafficking. Six European Union Member States reported that during the most recent reporting year they had sent a total of 301 tracing requests on a total of 1,137 firearms to other countries or regional/international organizations. Most of these tracing requests were sent to other European countries. The limited availability of data on seizures of ammunition impedes an informed analysis of related crimes . Nine European Union Member States submitted data on ammunition seizures from 2016 - 2017 to the IAFQ. In total these countries seized more than 800,000 rounds of ammunition in 2016 and about 350,000 rounds of ammunition in 2017. Strong differences between these countries can be observed in the annual number of ammunition seizures. However, the limited availability of data on seizures of ammunition hinders an in-depth analysis of crimes related to this commodity. In the European

Union, the seizures of firearms and parts and components are numerically closer to each other than in other parts of the world

. Ten European Union Member States reported on seizures of firearm parts and components from 2016 - 2017 to the IAFQ. In total these countries seized almost 4,800 items in 2016 and almost 1,700 items in 2017. Strong differences can be observed between these countries in the annual number of seizures of parts and components. On a global scale the average number of seized firearms was about 20 times higher than the number of seized parts and components. This ratio was less than seven times in the reporting European Union Member States. While this relatively high share of seizures of parts and components may reflect increased attention from law enforcement authorities to the phenomenon of illicit trafficking in these items, it may also be linked to the high number of converted and reactivated firearms seized in the European Union, as access to parts and components constitutes an important prerequisite to illicit firearms manufacture. Demand for illicit firearms in the European Union The demand for illicit firearms trafficking within the European Union is largely driven by criminals . Illicit firearms trafficking in the European Union is mainly driven by criminal demand given that access to firearms enables and facilitates various criminal activities. Firearms are also acquired and possessed by criminals in Europe as tools for power or as ‘trophies’ to display reputation. Ten European Union Member States reported on the number of firearms seized in connection to other suspected offences to the IAFQ. An analysis of this data shows that firearms are often seized from criminals involved in violent crime and drug trafficking. Previous studies and other data have pointed to drugs criminals, mafia organizations, outlaw motorcycle gangs, armed robbers, terrorists and various other types of criminals such as street gangs, loan sharks, criminals involved in prostitution and criminal groups specialised in assassinations as customers on illicit gun markets in the European Union. Most criminals tend to possess and use handguns, which are relatively cheap and easy to conceal. The possession and use of automatic firearms and other types of military-grade firearms by criminals is much less common in the European Union.

Vienna: UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2020. 178p.

By Mancuso Marina and Manzi Deborah

Project ECOFIT – Options for EnhanCing Operational instruments in the area of FIrearms Trafficking (www.transcrime. it/ecofit/) is a research project co-funded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund – Police (ISFP-2018-AG-OCFIRE). Project ECOFIT aims to enhance operational cooperation between Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in the fight against firearms trafficking across the 27 EU Member States (MSs) and seven non-EU SELEC MSs (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey). It analyses five operational

instruments that have been selected as indicators of international cooperation, namely: mechanisms for data collection, mechanisms for data sharing, National Firearms Focal Points (NFPs), joint criminal investigations and controlled delivery procedures. Based on the findings of the Project, it provides recommendations for the EU and guidelines for LEAs concerning how to better put into action these instruments and how to more effectively reduce, prevent and tackle illicit trafficking of firearms offences. In order to achieve its objectives, Project ECOFIT conducts five impact assessments (one for each of the operational instruments included in the analysis). The methodology utilises the Better Regulation “Toolbox” of the European Commission (European Commission 2017). Besides the definition of the problem addressed by Project ECOFIT and the methodology.

mproving the intelligence picture (collection and exchange of systematic and harmonised information between LEAs, knowledge on modi operandi, tactics, new trends, etc.); • Intensifying the pressure on criminal markets (fully operational NFPs, joint actions, etc.). The five operational instruments are strongly interrelated, as also stressed by EMPACT Firearms: having fully staffed and operational NFPs will enhance both data collection and data sharing procedures as well as facilitating the standardisation of practices amongst countries.

Milano: Transcrime – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 2021. 154p.

By Astrid De Schutter

KEY FINDINGS • Most European Union (EU) member states show relatively low and stable levels of family homicide. Nevertheless, a significant number of women are regularly and disproportionately victimized in incidents of firearm- and non-firearm-related family violence. • Firearms have certain characteristics that make them a convenient

modus operandi in some specific constellations of family violence. • Firearms can allow a family member to overpower a physically stronger opponent in family conflicts, which may explain their appeal to adolescents, women, and elderly family members. • Incidents of family gun violence involve legally held firearms more than those sourced from a criminal milieu, suggesting that firearms trafficking and the illicit gun market play a less important role in this context. The analysis of a randomized sample size of media reports in the EU further indicates that there is little evidence to suggest that these guns tend to be illegally held. • A firearm is often the weapon of choice in familicide–suicides, despite their low prevalence rate.

Brussels: Flemish Institute for Peace, 2023. 20p.

By Giovanna Maletta

Some European Union (EU) member states—as well as the EU, through Eurostat—collect and publish useful and gender-disaggregated information about violent crimes, intentional homicides, or domestic violence. In addition

to using different methodologies and definitions, however, available data does not always include information on the weapons used in the commission of such crimes, the relationship between victim and perpetrator, or the context in which the violence has occurred.

Available data collected at the international, regional, and national level does not allow for a comprehensive picture of the trends and dynamics of gender-based violence (GBV), including firearm violence, within the EU.

The EU is working to establish a common understanding of GBV at the EU level and among its member states, and to detail minimum standards for the criminalization of GBV against women and domestic violence—thus providing the opportunity to address the use of firearms to facilitate and commit GBV across the EU. These regulatory initiatives also have the potential to improve the availability of relevant information by promoting the collection of comparable data and the development of harmonized practices in collecting and reporting this information, which in turn will allow states to better monitor and adapt measures being taken to tackle GBV.

These EU initiatives could benefit from establishing linkages with the existing EU framework for the control of the production, trade, and possession of firearms.

KEY FINDINGS • Some European Union (EU) member states—as well as the EU, through Eurostat— collect and publish useful and gender-disaggregated information about violent crimes, intentional homicides, or domestic violence. In addition to using different methodologies and definitions, however, available data does not always include

information on the weapons used in the commission of such crimes, the relationship between victim and perpetrator, or the context in which the violence has occurred. • Available data collected at the international, regional, and national level does not allow for a comprehensive picture of the trends and dynamics of gender-based violence (GBV), including firearm violence, within the EU. • The EU is working to establish a common understanding of GBV at the EU level and among its member states, and to detail minimum standards for the criminalization of GBV against women and domestic violence—thus providing the opportunity to address the use of firearms to facilitate and commit GBV across the EU. These regulatory initiatives also have the potential to improve the availability of relevant information by promoting the collection of comparable data and the development of harmonized practices in collecting and reporting this information, which in turn will allow states to better monitor

and adapt measures being taken to tackle GBV. • These EU initiatives could benefit from establishing linkages with the existing EU framework for the control of the production, trade, and possession of firearms.

Brussels: Flemish Institute for Peace, 28p.

By Amy D. Lauger. Danielle Kaeble and Mark Motivans, etc.

The Combat Human Trafficking Act of 2015 (CHTA) (34 U.S.C. § 20709(e)) requires the director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to prepare an annual report on human trafficking. The report must include information on the following: „ arrests by state law enforcement officers for human trafficking offenses „ prosecutions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ convictions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ sentences imposed on individuals convicted in state courts for human trafficking offenses. BJS obtains information on human trafficking through several data collections, including those on victim service providers, law enforcement, prosecution and adjudication, and corrections. For each collection, these data are available for some combination of the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. The information in each data collection contributes to a general profile of human trafficking in the United States. Some differences exist across collections due to varying definitions of human trafficking, data availability, and other factors. At the federal level, human trafficking offenses are defined according to federal statutes that include peonage, slavery, forced labor, sex trafficking, sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, and transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes. The classification of human trafficking offenses varies among state and local jurisdictions. This report describes the BJS data collections and activities across various jurisdictional levels that include various offenses that may be categorized as human trafficking, and it presents the most recent statistical findings.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics , 2024. 7p.

By Graham Farrell and Toby Davies

Knife crime has become a prominent and seemingly intractable problem in England & Wales. Theory and evidence indicate that reducing crime opportunities is an effective means of crime control, including restrictions on lethal weapons. While public debate has centred on zombie and other ‘status’ knives, the most prevalent homicide weapon is a kitchen knife. Here we argue that replacing lethal pointed-tip kitchen knives with safer round-tip knives would reduce knife crime with little or no displacement. Drawing on the approach to remove fossil-fuel vehicles from roads, we propose a phased removal of lethal kitchen knives that we estimate will cut knife-related homicide in half, reduce other knife crime and criminality, and prevent thousands of non-criminal knife-related injuries

Crime Science (2024) 13:44

U.S.Court of Appeals 5th Circuit. No. 23-30033

700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (“NRA I”), this court upheld those provisions. But that decision, which was criticized at the time, see National Rifle Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (“NRA II”) (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), preceded two recent clarifying Supreme Court opinions on the methodology by which we construe gun regulations under the Second Amendment. We are now compelled to focus intently on the evidence of firearm access and ownership by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds near and at the founding, and we conclude that (1) NRA I is incompatible with the Bruen and Rahimi decisions of the Supreme Court, and (2) these provisions are inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion..

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 6:20-CV-1438. 29p.

By Michael Jensen, Sheehan Kane, and Elena Akers

Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) is a database of 3,203 Islamist, far-left, far-right, and single-issue extremists who have radicalized to violent and non-violent extremism in the United States from 1948 through 2021. This update adds 955 subjects to the database who were charged with committing extremist crimes in the United States from 2019-2021.1 The database is freely available for download on START’s webpage at https://www.start.umd.edu/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus-keshif. The analysis for this research brief draws on the full dataset and illustrates the important differences that exist across ideological groups and highlights recent trends in the data.

College Park, MD: START , 2023. 10p.

By Michael Jensen, Sheehan Kane, and Elena Akers

Included with the current update to the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) data are a suite of variables that allow users to investigate extremist offenders who plotted to commit, or committed, mass casualty attacks in the United States from 1990-2021. A mass casualty plot is defined as an event in which the perpetrator(s) intended to kill or injure four or more victims. Unlike other data resources on mass casualty events, PIRUS allows users to investigate successful mass casualty attacks as well as unsuccessful plots where the perpetrators clearly intended to kill or injure four or more people but failed. The inclusion of failed and foiled mass casualty plots in PIRUS gives users a more accurate estimate of how often extremists plan to cause significant harm. It also allows users to compare ideological groups and offenders on measures of plot success. This research brief provides an overview of the mass casualty crimes in PIRUS, including their frequency, links to ideological and sub-ideological groups, and a comparison of their perpetrators.

College Park, MD: START (March). 2023, 4p.