By Organization of American States , Department against Transnational Organized Crime

The illegal gold trade is a growing and significant challenge in Ecuador. The spread of illegal gold mining activity has brought surges of violence and instability to remote areas while attracting organized crime, at the local and international level, and triggering an increase in money laundering and contraband. Concern regarding the disruptive and harmful impact of illegal gold mining, as well as the government’s desire to develop and expand Ecuador’s mining sector away from its reliance on small-scale and artisanal operations, have also led to a renewed focus on the challenges posed by illegal mining. There is reason to believe that the illegal gold trade and its associated criminal networks are less entrenched and developed in Ecuador than in neighboring Peru and Colombia. However, there are significant challenges facing the government as it works to combat illegal mining activity, which is increasingly accelerated by illicit cross-border contraband flows and unique vulnerabilities to money laundering activity.

Washington, DC: OAS, 2021. 46p.

By Tena Prelec

Information manipulation has been a growing concern in recent years, particularly in relation to the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. However, the role of non-state actors, such as organized crime (OC) groups, in information manipulation has been largely overlooked. This research aims to fill this gap by examining the various ways in which OC groups manipulate information to achieve their objectives and those of actors connected to them. Drawing on Nicholas Barnes’ concept of ‘political criminality’ (2017), this study examines the varying degrees of proximity between criminal actors and the state, which is essential in exploring the complex interplay between OC and information manipulation. Empirical data was collected from several geographies, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania. The research highlights several dimensions of interest, including: the changing opportunities that technology gives to OC groups to shape facts and narratives; media ownership by organised crime groups and criminal actors; and the ways in which this interplay is situated within the global political economy of offshore finance – including the wider networks of enablers these actors rely on. By shedding light on these aspects, the research seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the threat posed by the misuse of information, situates it within the literatures on non-state actors and transnational kleptocracy, and puts forward a framework for analysis that can be tested in future work.

Birmingham, UK: SOC ACE Research Paper 22. University of Birmingham 2023. 44p,

By Alex Papadovassilakis, et al

El Salvador’s gangs are in disarray.

For decades, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and two factions of the 18th Street (Barrio 18) dominated the small Central American nation’s criminal landscape. The gangs embedded themselves in poor communities, terrorizing urban dwellers with extortion and murders. Successive governments tried and failed to dismantle the gangs with aggressive security policies, known as mano dura (iron fist).

In March 2022, the government of El Salvador President Nayib Bukele enacted a state of emergency (régimen de excepción) in response to a brutal gang massacre that left 87 dead. Buoyed by emergency powers, security forces tore through the gangs, arresting tens of thousands of suspected gang members and collaborators. Those who escaped arrest went underground or into exile. In a flash, the MS13 and Barrio 18 all but vanished from the streets of El Salvador.

But though battered and bruised, a surprising number of gang members remain at large. The country’s prisons, once incubators for the gangs, have never been so full.

This six-part investigation looks at how the Bukele government’s crackdown succeeded in overpowering the MS13 and Barrio 18. We assess what remains of the gangs in El Salvador, and contemplate whether these structures could one day return or mutate.

Washington, DC; Medellin, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023.56p.

By: Bryan Avelar, Juan José Martínez

Moskitia is dying. And it is organized crime that is killing it.

First came the drugs, as traffickers turned the region’s coasts and forests into a cocaine corridor. Then came the traffickers themselves, financing invaders that are clear-cutting thousands of hectares of forest and fencing off vast tracts of land with barbed wire and armed guards.

The region’s Indigenous Miskito people have been left trapped in desperate poverty, and are caught between the traffickers and an indifferent state. But some are now preparing to fight back.

Washington, DC, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023. 64p..

By Marina Caparini

This SIPRI Report examines how organized crime is intertwined with armed conflict and hybrid governance systems in three states that currently host United Nations stabilization missions. It surveys the conflict/crime/governance nexus in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali, and how UN stabilization missions, in particular the UN Police, have engaged with the challenge of organized crime.

The report argues that improving how UN stabilization interventions engage with organized crime will require a frank assessment of the significance of organized crime in systems of governance and patronage, of the role of organized crime as a driver and enabler of armed conflict by non-state armed groups, and of the involvement of state-embedded actors in illicit markets. The complex links between conflict and governance actors and organized crime in the settings examined raise fundamental questions about the assumptions underlying peace operations. The report concludes with a set of recommendations on how to move to more realistic analyses and bases for peace operations.

Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022. 57p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

This report offers empirical evidence and case studies from across the OSCE area on how women are recruited into organized crime groups, their roles within them, and how and why they exit these groups. It demonstrates that the role of women in organized crime is nuanced. Evidence shows that while women are often exploited and victimized by organized crime groups, they can also be important actors. Yet persistent gender stereotypes mean that women’s agency in organized crime is often not recognized by criminal justice practitioners. Failing to recognize women’s agency in organized crime impedes the understanding in participating States of the complexity of the organized crime landscape, and hampers their ability to combat transnational organized crime or support women to leave organized crime groups.

Vienna: OSCE, 2023. 72p.

By Alaina De Biasi Edmund F. McGarrell Scott E. Wolfe

Historically, crime in the United States has been measured by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In this system, local, county, state, Tribal and federal law enforcement agencies submit summary crime data on incidents and arrests to the UCR system. Crime patterns and trends can then be analyzed and tracked at local, state, and national levels. 

United States, Michigan Justice Statistics Center, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. 2023. 33pg

By John Gramlich

More Americans died of gun-related injuries in 2020 than in any other year on record, according to recently published statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). That included a record number of gun murders, as well as a nearrecord number of gun suicides. Despite the increase in such fatalities, the rate of gun deaths – a statistic that accounts for the nation’s growing population – remains below the levels of earlier years.

United States, Pew Research Center. 2022. 7pg.

By Michael Heise

Two broad trends inform public K-12 education’s current trajectory. One involves persisting (and recently increasing) school racial isolation which helps account for an array of costs borne by students, schools, and communities. A second trend, involving a dramatically increasing police presence in schools, is evidenced by a rising school resource officer (“SRO/police”) presence in schools. Increases in the magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence correspond with increases in the school’s propensity to engage law enforcement agencies in student disciplinary matters which, in turn, help fuel a growing school-to-prison pipeline problem. While these two broad trends propel two distinct research literatures, these research literatures do not meaningfully engage with one another. Empirical research is largely silent on the degree to which, if at all, variation in a school’s racial isolation level influences how its SRO/police presence interacts with the school’s propensity to report student discipline issues to law enforcement agencies. This Article examines whether variation in school racial isolation levels informs whether a school’s SRO/police presence influences the school’s law enforcement reporting rates. Results from this study imply that any such influence is confined to schools where non-white student enrollment ranges from 11% to 50%. The research literature on tipping points provides one helpful interpretative lens to better understand why this specific school racial isolation band systematically differs from others when it comes to SRO/police presence’s influence on a school’s propensity to report student discipline matters to law enforcement agencies.

Buffalo Law Review Vol. 71, No. 2 (2023)

By Abigail Weitzman, Mónica Caudillo, and Eldad J. Levy

In this review, we argue that to understand patterns and causes of violence in contemporary Latin America, we must explicitly consider when violence takes on interpersonal qualities. We begin by reviewing prominent definitions and measurements of interpersonal violence. We then detail the proliferation of interlocking sources of regional insecurity, including gender-based violence, gangs, narcotrafficking, vigilantism, and political corruption. Throughout this description, we highlight when and how each source of insecurity can become interpersonal. Next, we outline mutually reinforcing macro and micro conditions underlying interpersonal violence in its many hybrid forms. To conclude, we call for more multifaceted conceptualizations of interpersonal violence that embrace the complexities of Latin American security situations and discuss the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead in this area.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 163 - 186

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Research and Trend Analysis Branch

Preventing and reducing homicide means sparing hundreds of thousands of lives lost to violence every year. To do that, we must understand the complex and highly diverse range of threats and phenomena that drive and intersect with such lethal violence – from interpersonal dynamics to organized crime and rule of law to climate change, poverty and inequality to demographics, and much more – and how they differ across national and regional contexts. This Global Study on Homicide is an effort to reveal and delve into the facts behind the violence, to try and identify notable trends and to inform policies and solutions. The Study shows that 2021 was an exceptionally lethal year, with an estimated 458,000 intentional homicides worldwide, averaging 52 killings every hour. The global homicide rate was at 5.8 for every 100,000 persons, a number that sadly reflects little progress in reducing lethal violence worldwide since the launch of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015. The biggest share of the victims were killed with firearms, which accounted for 47 per cent of homicides committed with a known mechanism worldwide. That number rises to 75 per cent in the Americas, which has the highest homicide rate in the world, and where organized crime is responsible for at least half of all homicides. In different parts of the world, organized crime can lead to spikes in homicide, particularly as criminal groups compete for control. Organized crime has also had an impact on homicide rates in Europe. While the regional homicide rate has decreased over the last six years, there are signs of increased lethal violence connected to organized crime in various countries of the continent. Such organized crime-related killing – and all homicidal violence, in all parts of the world – is far more likely to be committed by, and against, men. Men account for 81 per cent of the victims of intentional homicide globally, and around 90 per cent of the suspects. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to be killed because of their gender, and more likely to lose their lives to violence at home. Women account for the victims in 54 per cent of killings in the home, and 66 per cent of intimate partner killings. Many people are also killed because of what they do, including human rights defenders, humanitarian workers, journalists, and environmental activists. The current global situation, characterized by growing conflicts and rule of law challenges, is fuelling such sociopolitical homicides, which in many cases happen with impunity. Given the broad and diverse factors driving lethal violence around the world, effective responses to homicide must cover a wide spectrum of context-specific interventions. Some interventions will be designed to reduce genderbased violence against women and girls, others will be geared towards reducing organized crime and gang violence, and others still may focus on firearm laws and regulations, vocational training to at-risk demographics, or mental health interventions. But all responses must share common threads, namely the need to be based on evidence, the need to prioritize prevention and address root causes, and the need to invest significantly. Investing in homicide prevention and responses is of particular priority in Africa, which this Global Study projects to be the most at-risk region over the coming decades, in large part due to its younger population, economic inequality levels, climate vulnerability, and weaker response capabilities. This study also highlights the significant limitations in the information available across regions, and the need to invest in better data collection. It is highly important to understand the types of homicide in any given context, whether family-related, gang-related, or any of the other identified typologies, yet more than a third of all detected homicides are classified as “unknown”. Similarly, four out of every ten killings of women and girls do not have information on the victim-perpetrator relationship, despite the prevalence of intimate partner killings against women and girls.

Vienna/New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Research and Trend Analysis Branch, 2023. 155pp; December 2023

By: Nira Wickramasinghe and Alicia Schrikker

"Being a Slave brings together scholars and writers who try to come to terms with the histories and legacies of European slavery in the Indian Ocean. This volume discusses a variety of qualitative data on the experience of being a slave in order to recover ordinary lives and, crucially, to place this experience in its Asian local context. Building on the rich scholarship on the slave trade, this volume offers a unique perspective that embraces the origin and afterlife of enslavement as well as the imaginaries and representations of slaves rather than the trade in slaves itself. From Cape to Batavia, slavery is understood as a diffuse practice. This approach helps unearth 18th and 19th century experiences of being a slave in the Indian Ocean world, but also sheds light on continuities in bondage into the present. Contributors face an often hostile archive to extract traces of the lived experience of slavery in court records, petitions or private letters. They also listen to local voices by prying unexplored primary sources such as oral histories, memories and objects."

[Leiden] : Leiden University Press, [2020]

Edited by Nick Gill and Anthony Good

Drawing on new research material from ten European countries, Asylum Determination in Europe: Ethnographic Perspectives brings together a range of detailed accounts of the legal and bureaucratic processes by which asylum claims are decided. The book includes a legal overview of European asylum determination procedures, followed by sections on the diverse actors involved, the means by which they communicate, and the ways in which they make life-and-death decisions on a daily basis. It offers a contextually rich account that moves beyond doctrinal law to uncover the gaps and variances between formal policy and legislation, and law as actually practiced. The contributors employ a variety of disciplinary perspectives – sociological, anthropological, geographical, and linguistic – but are united in their use of an ethnographic methodological approach. Through this lens, the book captures the confusion, improvisation, inconsistency, complexity, and emotional turmoil inherent to the process of claiming asylum in Europe.

Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 346p.

By Katrin Hohl

The COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns have provided an unprecedented opportunity to study how such situational factors affect police recorded domestic abuse. This article presents findings from a large, representative study of the effect of the introduction and lifting of lockdowns on the volume and nature of domestic abuse recorded by seven English police forces within the first 12 months of the pandemic. The results suggest that lockdowns and the pandemic context did not create the domestic abuse crisis, and that the crisis does not go away when lockdown restrictions lift. Lockdowns interact with and amplify underlying patterns of domestic abuse. Notable differences between police forces suggest that local contexts and local police force practices play a role, with implications beyond pandemic contexts.

London: Criminology & Criminal Justice, 2023, 23p.

By David Hureau, Theodore Wilson, Hilary Jackl, Jalon Arthur, Christopher Patterson, Andrew Papachristos

Gun violence is a leading cause of premature death and a driver of racial disparities in life expectancy in the United States. Community-based interventions are the foremost policy strategy for reducing gun violence without exacerbating harm associated with criminal justice approaches. However, little is known about the interventionist workforce. In 2021, we used a researcher-guided survey to obtain a near-census of Chicago violence interventionists (n = 181, 93% response rate). Workers were mostly male (84%) and Black (80.9%), with a mean age of 43.6 years. Interventionists commonly experienced work-related exposure to violence and direct victimization. A total of 59.4% witnessed someone being shot at, whereas 32.4% witnessed a victim struck by gunfire. During work hours, 19.6% were shot at, while 2.2% were nonfatally shot. Single-year rates of gun violence victimization exceeded those of Chicago police. Results suggest that investment in community violence intervention should prioritize improving worker safety and reducing violence exposure while developing support for vulnerable frontline practitioners

United States, Sciences Advances Research Article. 2022, 7pg

By Mark Galeotti

Time of Troubles is the first comprehensive assessment of the impact of the Ukraine war on the Russian underworld. The war’s human and economic costs, along with the political retrenchment of a regime under growing pressure, are all transforming illegal markets and organized crime in Russia with potentially destabilizing effects. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent undeclared conflict in the Donbas region had already begun to reshape the Russian underworld. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however, brought dramatic changes. An almost complete split between Ukrainian and Russian criminal groups has had a significant negative impact, not least because of their dominance over transnational narcotics flows. At the same time, new opportunities to smuggle sanctioned luxury goods for the rich and critical components for the defence–industrial complex have enriched and elevated other gangs, especially those able to exploit and control routes through Belarus, Armenia and Central Asia. All this is putting pressure on the underworld status quo – and the state’s capacity to manage and maintain it – and even reshaping the relationship between Russian criminal networks and their partners and subsidiaries abroad. Even when the war does end, some form of sanctions or trade and investment controls will almost certainly remain in place. The Kremlin will find it difficult to integrate large numbers of traumatized, impoverished and disillusioned veterans, many of whom risk drifting into organized and disorganized crime. Condemned to pariah status and looking for alternative ways to support itself, the state may turn its existing ad hoc relations with the underworld into something much more focused and institutionalized, creating new dangers for its neighbours and the global order as a whole. The stakes could hardly be higher.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 72p.

By InfoAmazonia, Armando.Info and La Liga Contra el Silencio), Amazon Watch and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC).

The Amazon, the world’s largest rainforest, covering some 7 million square kilometres and linking nine countries, has become one of the main sources and transit points for criminal economies in Latin America. From shipments of cocaine, gold and timber moving down its hundreds of rivers, to the makeshift airstrips that facilitate the nightly movement of small contraband planes, the Amazon is now home to a complex underground economy that feeds growing global demand but also fuels violence and deforestation. The unchecked actions of increasingly powerful criminal organizations pose an existential threat to the planet’s most biodiverse region and the communities it shelters. Over the past decade, the Amazon has become one of the most dangerous regions in Latin America, with marginalized communities bearing the brunt of the violence. In Brazil, for example, indigenous communities have been systematically subjected to violent invasions by armed garimpeiros (miners), while in Colombia’s nine Amazon departments, where 43 massacres have been documented since 2020, non-state armed groups terrorize rural communities. In Peru, drug traffickers are increasingly recruiting indigenous children to work on coca plantations, and guerrilla groups are sending entire families to work in illegal gold mines in Venezuela. In 2022, one in five killings of land and environmental defenders worldwide occurred in the Amazon.As demand for illicit goods, particularly cocaine, has risen to historically high levels and the price of gold has increased dramatically since the early 2000s, so have criminal opportunities.4 This, combined with a low state presence, high levels of corruption, decades of faltering security strategies and a lack of coordination between states, has created the perfect environment for some of Latin America’s most prolific criminal groups to reorganize and take over. The reshuffling of the local criminal ecosystem – which includes Colombian guerrilla groups, Brazilian gangs, Peruvian criminal groups (including drug and human traffickers) and Venezuelan crime syndicates – has resulted in some groups being wiped off the map, leaving room for others to emerge or expand. Through field research and data analysis, Amazon Underworld found that non-state armed groups or crime syndicates are active in 70 per cent of the municipalities investigated in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (see the methodology section below), and that all of the Amazon’s borders have at least one armed actor on one side of the divide.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2023. 40p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Since 2007, negotiations with violent organised crime groups (hereafter, “criminal groups”) have been increasingly featured in government, church and NGO responses to violent criminality in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are enormously controversial, both politically and ethically. Many consider them unacceptable and counterproductive, as they may involve risks such as legitimising the criminal group or emboldening others to engage in criminal activities. The relative rarity with which such negotiations produce a deal and the great uncertainty as to their long-term outcomes are further sources of controversy. The sensitivity and risks are so large that some who have participated in the situations examined in this paper are wary of calling them “negotiations.” They may avoid the term even when they have bargained from a position of superiority or succeeded in striking a deal. In attempting to address the challenges criminal groups present, most countries understandably employ a tough-on-crime stance. Any other would be hard to justify to the public. Yet, where the activities of these groups have become especially pervasive and violent, there is often a lack of deterrence capacity, leading to public anger and desperation. Negotiation can thus sometimes become an option and may be pursued in conjunction with coercive tactics, institutional strengthening, legalisation measures and more. As a diplomat involved in the talks with criminal gangs in El Salvador and Honduras put it, by negotiating “we were not trying to get to heaven; we were just trying to avoid hell.” But if negotiation with criminal groups sometimes becomes necessary, which group characteristics and contextual factors must be taken into account? What end-goals are appropriate and realistic? What inducements, concessions and redlines must be contemplated? And how do such processes compare and contrast with negotiations conducted with politically-motivated insurgents? These are just some of the questions examined in this paper.   

Barcelona, Spain: The Institute for Integrated Transitions, 2021. 47p,

By Bodean Hedwards,, Lucia Bird, and Perkha Traxl 

This report analyzes recent trends in maritime people smuggling from South and South East Asia on journeys towards Asia-Pacific, focusing on four case study countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Sri Lanka. These were chosen to provide a cross-section of source, transit and destination countries in the region, with Sri Lanka and Indonesia being well-established departure countries toward Oceania. The paper considers key trends, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and intersections with human trafficking. It is important to note that maritime migration does not occur in isolation but typically forms part of what is usually a longer migration journey that involves land border crossings as well as air routes. This report examines trends in the smuggling of migrants across maritime pathways in South and South East Asia, with a particular focus on journeys towards the Asia-Pacific region. The paper provides insight into the conditions that compel migrants to choose people smuggling – and particularly maritime smuggling – as a means of migration and details the reasons that influence migrants’ decisions in relation to destination and migration routes. It explores the factors that make irregular migrants vulnerable to trafficking during their journey and examines the nature of maritime people-smuggling models and operations around the region, looking at, among other factors, recruitment, payment, and border crossing and immigration arrangements. Finally, drawing on what is known about people-smuggling dynamics and experiences across South and South East Asia, the report explores emerging responses identified during interviews that are thought to be having an impact on the various intersections of people smuggling and human trafficking.

Geneva, SWIT:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 60p.  

By Gemma Dipoppa

The widespread presence of criminal organizations in strong states presents a theoretical and empirical puzzle. How do criminal organizations — widely believed to thrive in weak states — expand to states with strong capacity? I argue that criminal groups expand where they can strike agreements with local actors for the provision of illegal resources they control, and that this practice is particularly profitable in strong states where costs from prosecution are higher. Using a novel measure of organized crime presence, I show that (1) increases in demand for unskilled labor — and in criminals’ capacity to fill it by exploiting migrants — allowed southern Italian mafias to expand to the north, and that (2) mafia expansion gave a persistent electoral advantage to political parties collaborating with them. This suggests the need to reconceptualize criminal organizations not only as substitutes for weak states but as complements to strong states.

Preprint, 2021. 59p.