By Walter Kemp

The report “Crooked Kaleidoscope – Organized Crime in the Balkans” by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, urges countries and organizations that have invested so much economically and politically over the past 25 years to stay engaged in the region and help it avoid back-sliding. In particular, it calls for stronger measures to fight corruption, enhance justice, and go after the proceeds of crime rather than just focusing on police reform.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 44p.

By Amy Hinsley

The ornamental orchid trade is global and comprises both a large, well-established legal market and a significant but largely unknown illegal trade. Much, though not all, of this illegal trade is driven by demand from specialist collectors for rare species. The trade in wild-harvested plants can have a severe impact on biodiversity: in one documented case, intense demand for a rare species of slipper orchid saw it harvested to near extinction. Illicit sales of wild orchids have been recorded on several online platforms, including e-commerce and social-media websites, forums and private websites, and sellers encompass both hobbyists and formal businesses. Consumers range from houseplant buyers, who want to purchase attractive plants, to specialist growers with a preference for rare species. For consumers who want to avoid illegal avenues of trade, and for researchers and law enforcement who want to monitor the trade, legality can be difficult to determine. However, it can be possible if the plant’s origin, species and final destination can be identified. This brief makes a substantial contribution to our ability to identify illicit orchid trade and the platforms most likely to host it.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 23p.

By Indah Budiani and Febri Raharningrum

This report aims to address how the illegal parrot trade is conducted online, and to what extent the use of internet-based platforms has facilitated the international trade. It examines the overall structure and key figures in the parrot trade, and addresses how trade chains and interactions between different actors in the illegal market have changed with the emergence of new, virtual forms of doing business. The increased efforts of Indonesian authorities to clamp down on wildlife trade and to pursue criminal actors operating online are also covered, as well as the effect these operations have had on the strategies used by parrot traders to avoid detection. It also addresses the relationship between the illegal and legal trade in captive-bred parrots and opportunities for laundering. Drawing together these strands, the report considers both the challenges and opportunities the online parrot trade offers for effective monitoring and law-enforcement responses.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 18p.

By Carl Miller, Jack Pay, and Josh Smith

The internet is used to trade endangered species and commodities containing parts from endangered species, and more broadly hosts communities and subcultures where this trade is normalized, routine and unchallenged. This report presents a new technical process that has been trialled to identify online marketplaces and websites involved in the trade of a selection of CITES-listed animals and plants. The technology, known as the Dynamic Data Discovery Engine (or DDDE), was developed with the aim of building upon qualitative research to produce larger, more comprehensive datasets of similar activity taking place. The report contains a description of the process and the results that it produced, its strengths and weaknesses, and some thoughts on how it might be used by others hoping to reduce the extent to which the internet can be exploited by those wishing to transact endangered animals and plants. It is hoped that the process will contribute to the creation of a more comprehensive picture of online illicit wildlife trade (IWT) activity.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019. 28p.

By Rupert Horsley

There has been startling growth in the online illegal wildlife trade (IWT), and broad recognition of the need to apply financial and anti-money-laundering tools to the fight against environmental crime. Much illicit trade carried out over the internet requires some form of electronic payment. This paper explores how various payment methods are used in the online IWT, and the challenges and opportunities these present to law enforcement. Some inroads have been made into combating the online counterfeit trade by suppressing activities of ‘rogue’ digital payment providers that facilitate illicit trade. Opportunities to target the online IWT by monitoring digital payment transactions will emerge only if regulatory systems and technology keep pace with levels of innovation used by illegal wildlife traders to avoid detection.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 20p.

By Théo Clément, Simone Haysom, and Jack Pay

Pangolins are known to be among the world’s most trafficked animals, due to the use of their meat and scales in Africa and Asia. Several species of pangolins have been driven to the brink of extinction due to a massive illicit trade that not only connects pangolin range states in Asia and Africa but also Europe and the United States. This report provides large-scale evidence supporting the claim that the internet plays a major role in the trade of pangolin-derived products across various jurisdictions.

This report provides actionable recommendations for national authorities in China and elsewhere in order to curb the online trade of pangolin-derived items. The MMFU will continue to monitor pangolin-derived products markets on the indexed web and social media sites to ensure sustained awareness about this problem and its effects, and engage with the platforms identified to request action to curb the use of their service in cases where evidence of activity that appears contrary to national and international law exists. More information about the online trade of endangered species will follow as the Unit’s investigations evolve.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 42p.

By Lucia Bird

On 1 February 2022, gunshots at the governmental palace in Bissau signalled the beginning of a reported failed coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau, a country long known for its prominent role in international cocaine trafficking. Had the incident resulted in a military overthrow of power, it would have been the fifth successful coup in Guinea-Bissau’s history, and also the fifth coup in West Africa in the preceding 12 months, hot on the heels of the seizure of power in Burkina Faso in late January.1 Hours after the gunfire had begun, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló addressed the press, condemning the incident and declaring the perpetrators had failed. In press statements, he indicated that those behind the attack were involved in the drugs trade.2 This implication appeared to echo history: a 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau was so clearly motivated by competition for control over the country’s lucrative cocaine markets that it has been dubbed the ‘cocaine coup’.3 The nature of the February attack, and the identity of the perpetrators, is still unclear – as explored further below. However, arrests announced by the government following the attack include individuals with known links to the cocaine trade – most prominently Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto – underscoring the drug connection implied by the president. Guinea-Bissau is a key entry point for cocaine into West Africa, a region that operates as a transit point on international cocaine trafficking routes between cultivation countries in Latin America and consumer end-markets in Europe. The country has played an important role in international cocaine trafficking dynamics since the late 1990s. The close involvement of Guinea-Bissau’s political-military elite in the cocaine market over the years has been a critical factor in Guinea-Bissau’s repeated cycles of political turmoil. In turn, profits from the cocaine market have bankrolled a remarkably resilient elite protection network composed of elements of the state infrastructure. Guinea-Bissau is at a critical juncture once again. The curious February incident has brought to the fore the country’s cyclical tendency towards political volatility, and the president has deemed the country to be in ‘political crisis’ and dissolved the National Assembly. This report explores the role, past and present, of the cocaine trade both as a driver of political instability in the country and as a source of resilience for elite power-sharing arrangements.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 50p.

The International Crisis Group

What’s the issue? After fifteen years of failed security policies, the government of El Salvador is in the middle of an open confrontation. Efforts aimed at fighting gangs’ deep social roots have not produced desired results due to a lack of political commitment and social divisions that gangs use to their advantage. Why does it matter? Born in the wake of U.S. deportation policies in the late 90s, gang violence in El Salvador has developed into a national security problem that accounts for the country’s sky-high murder rate. The combination of mano dura (iron fist) policies and the U.S. administration’s approach to migration could worsen El Salvador’s already critical security situation. What should be done? All political actors should honour the government’s holistic violence prevention strategies by fully implementing them and reframing anti-gang policies. Specific police and justice reforms, as well as a legal framework for rehabilitating

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 46p,

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Violence, coca production and drug trafficking have spiked along Colombia’s Pacific coast since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and FARC guerrillas. New and old armed groups battle for control over communities, territory and illegal business, triggering ongoing displacement and low-intensity warfare. Why does it matter? Long one of Colombia’s poorest and most peripheral regions, the Pacific’s struggles highlight huge difficulties in improving security without addressing economic and political roots of armed group recruitment and the co-option of communities by organised crime. What should be done? Instead of depending on a counter-insurgency strategy or a “kill/capture” policy to dismantle armed groups, the Colombian government should prioritise building a stable, trustworthy civilian police and state presence, demobilising combatants, fulfilling its peace accord promises on local development and coca substitution, and furnishing educational opportunities for local people.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2019. 51p.

By International Crisis Group

Coca stands at the heart of a fierce debate over Colombia’s worsening rural insecurity. The plant’s leaves are the sole raw material from which cocaine, an illegal drug that generates outlandish profits and finances armed and criminal groups, can be manufactured. Colombian President Iván Duque argues that the whole narcotic supply chain – from coca cultivation to global cocaine trafficking – is the scourge behind rising massacres, forced displacement and assassinations of community leaders in Colombia. With cultivation hitting new highs in recent years, Bogotá has vastly expanded campaigns that involve sending in the army and police to pull up or otherwise eradicate coca crops. It also threatens to restart aerial fumigation. Yet an approach based on forceful eradication of coca, which the U.S. has stoutly backed, tends to worsen rural violence, while failing to reduce drug supply. A new strategy is needed that persuades coca farmers to abandon a plant that offers a stable income and an attractive alternative to other legal crops.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 44p.

Edited by Laura Y. Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Rita E. Kuckertz, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk

This is the second edition of Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Like last year’s report, this study builds on 10 years of reports published by Justice in Mexico under the title Drug Violence in Mexico. The Drug Violence in Mexico series examined patterns of crime and violence attributable to organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking organizations, as well as other related issues, such as judicial sector reform and human rights in Mexico. At the 10 year mark, in 2019, this series of reports was retitled “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico” to reflect the proliferation and diversification of organized crime groups over the last decade and the corresponding wave of violence. As in previous years, this report compiles the most recent data. and analysis of crime, violence, and rule of law in Mexico to help inform government officials, policy analysts, and the general public.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2021. 70p.

Edited by Eric L. Olson, Andrew Selee, and David A. Shirk

The clichés describing United States-Mexico relations are well known and well worn. Given the enormity of the geographic, historical, cultural, and economic ties between both countries it’s now a commonplace to say Mexico is the United States’ most important bilateral relationship, and vice-versa. The nature of this critical binational relationship has been dissected and probed from every conceivable angle. Yet as we began to research the security relationship between both countries we realized that there is still much that is not generally known amongst the public and policy communities about how Mexico and the United States are working together to deal with the threats posed by organized crime. For example, the unique nature of money laundering operations taking place across the U.S.-Mexico border; the extent to which high-powered firearms are finding their way from U.S. gun shops into the hands of organized crime and street gangs in Mexico; and the surprisingly limited information about the amount of illegal drugs consumed in the United States are not widely understood. Likewise, the deployment of Mexico’s armed forces is only one aspect of the country’s anti-drug strategy. Police agencies are being reorganized and efforts at professionalization are underway. A major reform of Mexico’s justice system was adopted in 2008 that, if fully implemented, should help greatly strengthen the rule of law and reduce the relative power and impunity of organized crime. Yet, while significant progress has already been made in some of Mexico’s 31 states, many questions remain about the efficacy and sustainability of these reforms. But despite these developments, the extreme violence brought on by conflicts amongst and between organized crime groups still garners the most attention. The horrifying and gruesome details of drug violence are plastered on the front pages of daily newspapers and videos of narco-violence are easily available on public websites and YouTube. In some cases, the criminals themselves are publicizing their actions for their own aggrandizement and to terrorize the public. While understanding the nature and extent of the violence afflicting Mexico in recent times is important, we also recognized that the violence itself is more symptom than cause of the underlying problem. For this reason, we thought it important to focus this project’s research on a series of key issues that are feeding the growth of organized crime and related violence in Mexico. We also found it important to examine several policy areas where reform and action by one or both governments could contribute to a long term sustainable approach to weakening the grip of organized crime and illegal drugs on both countries

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center and San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2011. 388p.

Edited by Laura Y. Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Rita E. Kuckertz, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk

This is the second edition of Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Like last year’s report, this study builds on 10 years of reports published by Justice in Mexico under the title Drug Violence in Mexico. The Drug Violence in Mexico series examined patterns of crime and violence attributable to organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking organizations, as well as other related issues, such as judicial sector reform and human rights in Mexico. At the 10 year mark, in 2019, this series of reports was retitled “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico” to reflect the proliferation and diversification of organized crime groups over the last decade and the corresponding wave of violence. As in previous years, this report compiles the most recent data. and analysis of crime, violence, and rule of law in Mexico to help inform government officials, policy analysts, and the general public.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2021. 70p.

By InSight Crime

CACIF is the de facto political party of Guatemala's economic elites. It unites the most important economic actors and is capable of integrating, via informal mechanisms, the heads of consortia and family groups with significant weight in a variety of economic sectors. Private security firms under the umbrella of the “Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos deSeguridad - CIACS) weave in and out of organized crime activity involving drug, arms and human trafficking, systematically blocking investigations and operating with impunity. The CIACS are what raised the alarm to spur creation of the United Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 112p.

By InSight Crime

Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia and Nicaragua represent an illuminating cross section of criminal organizations and types of elites. Elite dynamics in each of these countries are different, but with important commonalities; the makeup, role and penetration of criminal groups into intellectual, societal, legal, government and economic circles is varied, but interrelated. The study findings show local and national dynamics that influence intersections between organized crime and elites, and enable inferences and conclusions about what unifies these examples. The case studies reach the upper echelons of government and impact how the state deals with organized crime.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 51p.

By Sight Crime

Colombia's elite has always been made up predominantly of Colombian nationals. The country's economic and political elites overlap to a large extent, and the wealthy exert political power. The lack of government presence in many parts of the country and a tradition of contraband smuggling created trafficking expertise and a tolerance for illicit activities. The mass purchase of land by drug traffickers was so substantial that it is known as the "counter-reform" -- skewing Colombia's land further into the hands of the few. The paper also traces the rise and fall of drug lord Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 117p.

By InSight Crime

This detailed study traces connections between wealthy and political elites in Honduras, and organized crime. For Honduran transnational elites, the state’s role is simple: to create and enforce rules that favour their continued power over key industries and the capital accumulation that accompanies it. Currently, all the elites seem to be facing the same dilemma: align their interests with the narco-powers surging in the country, or stand by as they assume control of the country’s most important economic and political levers. The dirty money provided by illicit criminal groups and businesses has become the difference that makes the difference in survival for the elite classes

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 95p.

By Steven Dudley and Matthew Taylor

There are three major types of criminal networks in the Americas, and each requires the United States government to take a substantially different approach towards mitigating their power and effect . State-embedded networks are embedded in elected bodies, law enforcement, judicial entities, regulatory agencies, and other parts of the government. They use state power to enrich themselves and their partners via corrupt and criminal schemes and to systematically undermine the rule of law and regulatory powers, so as to protect their activities and ensure impunity. These networks are the most difficult for the United States government to address because they are, by definition, the US government’s counterparts. They may also play a double game, employing their resources towards battling some criminal activities, which may correspond with US interests, even while they shelter and build out their own criminal portfolios. Battling state-embedded networks requires empowering international and local bodies, as well as supporting civil society organizations and media. Social-constituency networks draw from a constituency, built on shared circumstances, heritage, and/or political beliefs, and create criminal networks that advance the interests of the constituency. They may provide protection from rival criminal groups and a predatory state, while also providing tools for social and economic advancement. They draw from various criminal economies, but their power base is decidedly social and political in nature. Entrepreneurial networks are designed like a commercial enterprise with multiple layers and a loose structure, which allow them to maximize profit and minimize risk. They mostly provide goods and services, but they are sometimes predatory and often employ violence. While the core of these networks is often one or more tight-knit families – which provide them many built-in advantages in terms of trust, recruitment, and conflict resolution – these networks are governed by profit motives, and they derive their power from economic capital.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, 2022. 155p.

By InSight Crime

Drug traffickers today realize that their best protection is not a private army but anonymity. This is the story of “Memo Fantasma” or “Will the Ghost,” who started life in the Medellín Cartel, funded the bloody rise of a paramilitary army, and today lives the high life in Madrid. He has helped move hundreds of tons of cocaine yet has no arrest warrants, and nobody is looking for him.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2020. 50p.

By Eric Przyswa

The combat against counterfeiting started during the 1980s and, at that time, was limited to sectors where it was frequently the consumer who asked for the product, and was even party to the purchase. Above all, it is only since the start of the 2000s that the situation expanded substantially particularly with the liberalisation of the World Trade Organization, technological developments, containerisation and the significance of China as the world's factory. On the other hand, it was only later that counterfeiting seemed to affect the pharmaceutical sector, at least from the industrial point of view. Studies and reports have covered the involvement of organised crime in 'traditional' counterfeiting, particularly in creative industries (luxury goods, audiovisual). Nevertheless, even if there are more and more discussions on the topics of 'counterfeit medicines' and 'organised crime', very few researchers have analysed the relationship between the two phenomena. Consequently, it appeared that such a report should be written and a dual objective was decided: - To take as objective and as rigorous a view as possible on the reality of the "counterfeiting - criminal organisations" combination in the area of medicines. - From a criminology and strategic standpoint, to give some consideration to what could be done to guide current actions. What about the reality of this phenomenon? How can criminal organisations be characterised in our area of study? Are these organisations transnational? Is the Internet a genuine Eldorado for criminal organisations dealing in medicines? The questions relating to our problems proved to be varied and complex. One of the interests in this research is to offer new food for thought on a potentially real, but still opaque threat for which an interpretation can only be made through a documented, pragmatic and also imaginative approach. In the first part, the framework of our new conceptual study will be explained. It is important to define the counterfeiting and falsification of medicines in a clear field of analysis, presenting the specific features of the Internet in particular. In the second part, we will analyse the reality of the relationship between counterfeit medicines and criminal organisations both in the physical world and on the Internet. Theoretical considerations will also supplement our own thoughts. Thirdly, we will go into detail on the criminological issues raised by our problems. Finally, we will analyse to what extent knowledge of the phenomenon can be improved and therefore eliminated with new forms of expertise.

IRCAM, 2013. 130p.