By Lucia Bird

On 1 February 2022, gunshots at the governmental palace in Bissau signalled the beginning of a reported failed coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau, a country long known for its prominent role in international cocaine trafficking. Had the incident resulted in a military overthrow of power, it would have been the fifth successful coup in Guinea-Bissau’s history, and also the fifth coup in West Africa in the preceding 12 months, hot on the heels of the seizure of power in Burkina Faso in late January.1 Hours after the gunfire had begun, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló addressed the press, condemning the incident and declaring the perpetrators had failed. In press statements, he indicated that those behind the attack were involved in the drugs trade.2 This implication appeared to echo history: a 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau was so clearly motivated by competition for control over the country’s lucrative cocaine markets that it has been dubbed the ‘cocaine coup’.3 The nature of the February attack, and the identity of the perpetrators, is still unclear – as explored further below. However, arrests announced by the government following the attack include individuals with known links to the cocaine trade – most prominently Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto – underscoring the drug connection implied by the president. Guinea-Bissau is a key entry point for cocaine into West Africa, a region that operates as a transit point on international cocaine trafficking routes between cultivation countries in Latin America and consumer end-markets in Europe. The country has played an important role in international cocaine trafficking dynamics since the late 1990s. The close involvement of Guinea-Bissau’s political-military elite in the cocaine market over the years has been a critical factor in Guinea-Bissau’s repeated cycles of political turmoil. In turn, profits from the cocaine market have bankrolled a remarkably resilient elite protection network composed of elements of the state infrastructure. Guinea-Bissau is at a critical juncture once again. The curious February incident has brought to the fore the country’s cyclical tendency towards political volatility, and the president has deemed the country to be in ‘political crisis’ and dissolved the National Assembly. This report explores the role, past and present, of the cocaine trade both as a driver of political instability in the country and as a source of resilience for elite power-sharing arrangements.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 50p.

The International Crisis Group

What’s the issue? After fifteen years of failed security policies, the government of El Salvador is in the middle of an open confrontation. Efforts aimed at fighting gangs’ deep social roots have not produced desired results due to a lack of political commitment and social divisions that gangs use to their advantage. Why does it matter? Born in the wake of U.S. deportation policies in the late 90s, gang violence in El Salvador has developed into a national security problem that accounts for the country’s sky-high murder rate. The combination of mano dura (iron fist) policies and the U.S. administration’s approach to migration could worsen El Salvador’s already critical security situation. What should be done? All political actors should honour the government’s holistic violence prevention strategies by fully implementing them and reframing anti-gang policies. Specific police and justice reforms, as well as a legal framework for rehabilitating

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 46p,

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Violence, coca production and drug trafficking have spiked along Colombia’s Pacific coast since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and FARC guerrillas. New and old armed groups battle for control over communities, territory and illegal business, triggering ongoing displacement and low-intensity warfare. Why does it matter? Long one of Colombia’s poorest and most peripheral regions, the Pacific’s struggles highlight huge difficulties in improving security without addressing economic and political roots of armed group recruitment and the co-option of communities by organised crime. What should be done? Instead of depending on a counter-insurgency strategy or a “kill/capture” policy to dismantle armed groups, the Colombian government should prioritise building a stable, trustworthy civilian police and state presence, demobilising combatants, fulfilling its peace accord promises on local development and coca substitution, and furnishing educational opportunities for local people.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2019. 51p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? The COVID-19 pandemic had an immediate impact on organised crime across Mexico and Central America’s northern countries as lockdowns slowed movement of people and goods. But criminal groups swiftly adapted to the new normal, using it to tighten or expand their control over people and territory. Why does it matter? The region’s criminal groups, many acting in collusion with rogue state actors, are largely responsible for some of the world’s highest murder rates and wield asphyxiating power in an increasing number of communities. With state budgets under huge strain, official responses are set to remain lacklustre. What should be done? Governments should combine policing to contain and deter crime with increased support to the most insecure areas and vulnerable populations. Rather than reverting to heavy-handed tactics, they should invest in programs that reduce impunity and create economic alternatives for at-risk young people, potentially with the help of COVID-19 emergency funds.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 37p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Crime and violence have simmered along the lengthy ColombianVenezuelan frontier for decades. But the regional spillover of Venezuela’s political conflict and economic collapse has caused ties between the two states to fray as well, amid border closures, a migrant exodus and rival military exercises. Why does it matter? Numerous armed groups clash with one another and harm citizens along a border marked by abundant coca crops and informal crossings. High bilateral tensions could spur escalating border hostilities while perpetuating the mistreatment of migrants and refugees whose movements have been restricted by COVID-19. What should be done? Colombian and Venezuelan authorities should urgently establish communication channels to resolve violent incidents along the border, possibly with international backing. They should reopen formal border crossings as planned, but also increase humanitarian aid to help ensure that migrants and refugees are healthy and can move safely.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 44p.

By International Crisis Group

Coca stands at the heart of a fierce debate over Colombia’s worsening rural insecurity. The plant’s leaves are the sole raw material from which cocaine, an illegal drug that generates outlandish profits and finances armed and criminal groups, can be manufactured. Colombian President Iván Duque argues that the whole narcotic supply chain – from coca cultivation to global cocaine trafficking – is the scourge behind rising massacres, forced displacement and assassinations of community leaders in Colombia. With cultivation hitting new highs in recent years, Bogotá has vastly expanded campaigns that involve sending in the army and police to pull up or otherwise eradicate coca crops. It also threatens to restart aerial fumigation. Yet an approach based on forceful eradication of coca, which the U.S. has stoutly backed, tends to worsen rural violence, while failing to reduce drug supply. A new strategy is needed that persuades coca farmers to abandon a plant that offers a stable income and an attractive alternative to other legal crops.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 44p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? On 6 June, Mexico will stage its largest-ever election day, with 21,000 contests nationwide. Opposition forces accuse President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of planning to deepen authoritarian rule should his allies prevail in the polls. Meanwhile, criminal groups exploit electoral competition in their quest for impunity and power. Why does it matter? The country’s politics are highly polarised, and its parties are weak and opportunistic. Criminal groups can use favours and threats to gain influence over future elected officials. Entanglements between government and organised crime that have long undermined security policies help perpetuate Mexico’s high levels of violence. What should be done? Severing links between criminals and state officials will be challenging, especially given the government’s apparent reticence to act. Still, outside actors should encourage investment in independent election oversight bodies and local institutions, and a shift toward tailored and less militarised policies to curb insecurity in Mexico’s most conflict-ridden areas.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 33p.

Edited by Eric L. Olson, Andrew Selee, and David A. Shirk

The clichés describing United States-Mexico relations are well known and well worn. Given the enormity of the geographic, historical, cultural, and economic ties between both countries it’s now a commonplace to say Mexico is the United States’ most important bilateral relationship, and vice-versa. The nature of this critical binational relationship has been dissected and probed from every conceivable angle. Yet as we began to research the security relationship between both countries we realized that there is still much that is not generally known amongst the public and policy communities about how Mexico and the United States are working together to deal with the threats posed by organized crime. For example, the unique nature of money laundering operations taking place across the U.S.-Mexico border; the extent to which high-powered firearms are finding their way from U.S. gun shops into the hands of organized crime and street gangs in Mexico; and the surprisingly limited information about the amount of illegal drugs consumed in the United States are not widely understood. Likewise, the deployment of Mexico’s armed forces is only one aspect of the country’s anti-drug strategy. Police agencies are being reorganized and efforts at professionalization are underway. A major reform of Mexico’s justice system was adopted in 2008 that, if fully implemented, should help greatly strengthen the rule of law and reduce the relative power and impunity of organized crime. Yet, while significant progress has already been made in some of Mexico’s 31 states, many questions remain about the efficacy and sustainability of these reforms. But despite these developments, the extreme violence brought on by conflicts amongst and between organized crime groups still garners the most attention. The horrifying and gruesome details of drug violence are plastered on the front pages of daily newspapers and videos of narco-violence are easily available on public websites and YouTube. In some cases, the criminals themselves are publicizing their actions for their own aggrandizement and to terrorize the public. While understanding the nature and extent of the violence afflicting Mexico in recent times is important, we also recognized that the violence itself is more symptom than cause of the underlying problem. For this reason, we thought it important to focus this project’s research on a series of key issues that are feeding the growth of organized crime and related violence in Mexico. We also found it important to examine several policy areas where reform and action by one or both governments could contribute to a long term sustainable approach to weakening the grip of organized crime and illegal drugs on both countries

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center and San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2011. 388p.

By Sight Crime

Colombia's elite has always been made up predominantly of Colombian nationals. The country's economic and political elites overlap to a large extent, and the wealthy exert political power. The lack of government presence in many parts of the country and a tradition of contraband smuggling created trafficking expertise and a tolerance for illicit activities. The mass purchase of land by drug traffickers was so substantial that it is known as the "counter-reform" -- skewing Colombia's land further into the hands of the few. The paper also traces the rise and fall of drug lord Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 117p.

By Eric Przyswa

The combat against counterfeiting started during the 1980s and, at that time, was limited to sectors where it was frequently the consumer who asked for the product, and was even party to the purchase. Above all, it is only since the start of the 2000s that the situation expanded substantially particularly with the liberalisation of the World Trade Organization, technological developments, containerisation and the significance of China as the world's factory. On the other hand, it was only later that counterfeiting seemed to affect the pharmaceutical sector, at least from the industrial point of view. Studies and reports have covered the involvement of organised crime in 'traditional' counterfeiting, particularly in creative industries (luxury goods, audiovisual). Nevertheless, even if there are more and more discussions on the topics of 'counterfeit medicines' and 'organised crime', very few researchers have analysed the relationship between the two phenomena. Consequently, it appeared that such a report should be written and a dual objective was decided: - To take as objective and as rigorous a view as possible on the reality of the "counterfeiting - criminal organisations" combination in the area of medicines. - From a criminology and strategic standpoint, to give some consideration to what could be done to guide current actions. What about the reality of this phenomenon? How can criminal organisations be characterised in our area of study? Are these organisations transnational? Is the Internet a genuine Eldorado for criminal organisations dealing in medicines? The questions relating to our problems proved to be varied and complex. One of the interests in this research is to offer new food for thought on a potentially real, but still opaque threat for which an interpretation can only be made through a documented, pragmatic and also imaginative approach. In the first part, the framework of our new conceptual study will be explained. It is important to define the counterfeiting and falsification of medicines in a clear field of analysis, presenting the specific features of the Internet in particular. In the second part, we will analyse the reality of the relationship between counterfeit medicines and criminal organisations both in the physical world and on the Internet. Theoretical considerations will also supplement our own thoughts. Thirdly, we will go into detail on the criminological issues raised by our problems. Finally, we will analyse to what extent knowledge of the phenomenon can be improved and therefore eliminated with new forms of expertise.

IRCAM, 2013. 130p.

By Jo Hastie

The International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) has been researching the threat that online wildlife trade poses to endangered species since 2004. During that time, our research in over 25 countries around the globe has revealed the vast scale of trade in wildlife and their parts and products on the world’s largest marketplace, the Internet - a market that is open for business 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Whilst legal trade exists in respect of many species of wildlife, online platforms can provide easy opportunities for criminal activities. Trade over the Internet is often largely unregulated and anonymous, often with little to no monitoring or enforcement action being taken against wildlife cybercriminals. In addition, cyber-related criminal investigations are complicated by jurisdictional issues, with perpetrators in different geographical locations and laws differing from country to country. This poses a serious threat to the survival of some of the world’s most iconic species and the welfare of individual animals. This report outlines the results of new IFAW research in seven different countries in Africa, exploring the availability of wild animals and their products in an area of the world with a rapid growth in access to the Internet.

Washington, DC: International fund for Animal Welfare - IFAW, 2017. 32p.

By Amy Woolloff, Sone Nkoke, Louisa Musing, Magdalena S. Svensson

A TRAFFIC survey of seventy-two online platforms found a staggering 1,267 CITES*-listed species for sale in Central African countries and Nigeria between March 2018 and January 2021. In delivering these findings to the governments of the countries involved, TRAFFIC seeks to bolster national legislation to regulate these online sales when these do not comply with CITES regulations, which might be jeopardising populations of already threatened species. Threatened African species are facing an increasing peril from an unregulated and illegal cyber-enabled wildlife trade in Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, and Nigeria. These countries have a higher rate of growth in internet users than the global average, so it is likely that the volumes of online trade in CITES-listed species will increase as internet penetration rates continue to rise.

Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC, 2022. 54p.

By Julie Ayling

This article contributes to the growing literature on organised crime prevention by examining the approaches of two countries, Australia and the Netherlands. In many respects these countries are similar. They also have many organised crime problems in common. But their responses to those problems have been quite distinct. The Dutch administrative approach has been hailed as both unique and successful, while the Australian approach, primarily a reactive criminal law-based response, has encountered a storm of criticism. The article compares the two approaches and addresses the questions of whether and what Australia should learn from the Dutch approach.

Canberra: RegNet School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University; European University Institute Dept of Law, 2013. 54p.

By Julie Ayling

Demand reduction has now been recognised as crucial to prevention of wildlife crime, but ideas for effectively decreasing demand are still in short supply. Two demand reduction strategies currently predominate, consumer education campaigns and legal prohibitions on consumption. But further strategies need to be found urgently, as Earth is losing wildlife at frightening rates. This paper argues for greater regulatory pluralism and a more systematic approach to addressing demand. The complex and multi-layered concept of demand is unpacked and current demand reduction activities by states and non-state actors are discussed. The paper identifies third parties (non-state non-offending actors) in prime positions to intervene to reduce demand and sets out diverse ways in which their capacities could be harnessed as part of a whole-of-society demand reduction response.

Canberra: RegNet School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University; European University Institute Dept of Law, 2015. 23p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Southeast Asia, with its linkages into the larger Asian market that includes China, Indonesia, and India, is one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots as well as one of the world’s hotspots for the illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife parts. Although demand markets for wildlife, including illegally traded wildlife are present throughout the world, China ranks as the world’s largest market for illegal trade in wildlife, and wildlife products, followed by the United States. Globally, the volume and diversity of traded and consumed species have increased to phenomenal and unprecedented levels, contributing to very intense species loss. In Southeast Asia alone, where the illegal trade in wildlife is estimated to be worth $8-10 billion per year, wildlife is harvested at many times the sustainable level, decimating ecosystems and driving species to extinction.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2011. 43p.

By Julie Ayling

The problem of illegal trading in wildlife is a long-standing one. Humans have always regarded other sentient and non-sentient species as resources and tradeable commodities, frequently resulting in negative effects for biodiversity. However, the illegal trade in wildlife is increasingly meeting with resistance from states and the international community in the form of law enforcement and regulatory initiatives. So why does it persist? What makes the criminal networks involved in it resilient? In this paper we consider the networks involved in the illegal trade in rhinoceros horn that is currently posing an existential threat to most rhino species. The paper considers possible sources of these networks’ resilience, both internal and external, and the implications for how the trade could be tackled.

Canberra: Transnational Environmental Crime Project, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 2012. 22p.

By Tanya Wyatt

Wildlife trafficking is a major black market, and is thought to be the second most profitable illicit market after drug trafficking. It has significant negative impacts on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity. After habitat loss, wildlife trafficking is the leading cause of extinction. It is also a threat to food industries and human health with its connection to disease transmission. The patterns of wildlife trafficking vary throughout the world and nations approach the prevention of it differently. The differences that exist raise the question as to why the levels differ between nations that appear to be similar. This is the case with the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, which are demographically similar with a significant shared cultural history. Yet New Zealand has high levels of wildlife trafficking, Australia low levels, and the UK somewhere in between. This research uses the trade database from the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) to explore all the illegal trade incidents of these three countries reported to CITES from its creation in 1973. Combined with a review of the literature, the paper investigates the differences and similarities in the wildlife that is traded and the legislation that is implemented. It appears that more regulation in this instance may be connected to decreased levels of wildlife trafficking.

Canberra: Transnational Environmental Crime Project, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 2013. 25p.

By Matthew Marshall

This paper summarises, analyses, and assesses four working papers published by the Transnational Environmental Crime (TEC) Project and written by two employees of the Australian Government’s Department of the Environment (DoE) who served as Visiting Fellows to the TEC Project. This working paper also forms part of the TEC Project. It synthesises the data and concludes the overall contribution made by DoE, emphasising future areas of consideration. Part of this involves enunciating research findings in such a way that they can be better utilised by DoE to subsequently develop policy in the area of TEC regulation, which is also one of the aims of the TEC Project generally: that the course of academic research provide assistance in the development of government policy on the matter of TEC with subsequent operational benefits.

Canberra: Transnational Environmental Crime Project, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 2014. 24p.,

By Jiang Nan

The illegal ivory trade fuels illegal elephant poaching in both Africa and Asia. The illegal ivory trade in China is considered a key threat to the survival of the elephant species: since 2009, China has become the largest illegal ivory market in the world. Although China has uncovered a great number of cases of illegal ivory trade with the seizure of illegal ivory in the past decade, this trade is still growing. A deeper understanding of the nature and patterns of illegal ivory trade through an analysis of ivory seizure data should improve the efficiency of efforts to prevent the illegal ivory trade in China. This paper analyses data on 106 seizures of illegal ivory that was collected from Chinese news reports between 1999 and 2014, with a particular focus on its frequency and illegal trade ‘hotspot’ locations in China. The analysis found three illegal ivory trade cycles (2001–2005, 2006–2010, and 2011–2014) and four hotspots. Preventing the illegal ivory trade will require more international cooperation and coordination between China and other countries,

Canberra: Transnational Environmental Crime Project, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 2015. 17p.

By Environmental Investigation Agency, UK

This is a tragic true story of high culture, peerless art forms, and a rich historical identity being warped by greed and obsession, which consumes its very foundations to extinction and sparks a violent crime wave across Asian forests. This report details the findings of EIA’s investigations into the Siamese rosewood trade in recent years, including in the year since the CITES listing. It reveals how crime, corruption, and ill-conceived government policies from Thailand to China, via Laos and Vietnam, are likely to result in the demise of Siamese rosewood in the coming years, unless significant and rapid reforms are made.

London: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2014. 28p.