By Hernando Zuleta González

The increase in the area cultivated with coca in Colombia has cast doubt on the country’s anti-drug strategy and has encouraged skepticism about the possibility of a complete and definitive peace. Furthermore, this perception of failure has given rise to policy proposals based on the idea that illicit crops are a criminal issue, not a development one. This paper is a complete review of the available evidence and aims at organizing the information related to this debate and shedding light on the convenience or inconvenience of certain policies. There are six highly relevant facts: (i) With respect to reducing cocaine supply, the efforts in seizures and destruction of infrastructure are more efficient than the efforts in eradication. (ii) Seizures and destruction of infrastructure may help in reducing coca plantations. (iii) There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the consumption of cocaine in Colombia has increased. (iv) Most regions of the country have seen a decrease in the amount of coca crops. However, at least one armed group is present in the regions where the cultivated area has increased. (v) Coca growing municipalities are, on average, poorer than the rest of the country. These municipalities have a low tax revenue, and reduced levels of connectivity and institutional development. (vi) The increase in the consumption of cocaine in the United States is concentrated in a specific age group and in certain states. This fact makes it difficult to relate the increase in consumption to an exogenous increase in the supply.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2019. 40p.

By Ted Enamorado, Luis-Felipe López-Calva, Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán, and Hernán Winkler

The relationship between income inequality and crime has attracted the interest of many researchers, but little convincing evidence exists on the causal effect of inequality on crime in developing countries. This paper estimates this effect in a unique context: Mexico's Drug War. The analysis takes advantage of a unique data set containing inequality and crime statistics for more than 2,000 Mexican municipalities covering a period of 20 years. Using an instrumental variable for inequality that tackles problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, this paper finds that an increment of one point in the Gini coefficient translates into an increase of more than 10 drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants between 2006 and 2010. There are no significant effects before 2005. The fact that the effect was found during Mexico's Drug War and not before is likely because the cost of crime decreased with the proliferation of gangs (facilitating access to knowledge and logistics, lowering the marginal cost of criminal behavior), which, combined with rising inequality, increased the expected net benefit from criminal acts after 2005.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014. 31p.

By Philip Keefer, Norman V. Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares

This paper reviews the unintended consequences of the war on drugs, particularly for developing countries, and weighs them against the evidence regarding the efficacy of prohibition to curb drug use and trade. It reviews the available evidence and presents new results that indicate that prohibition has limited effects on drug prevalence and prices, most likely indicating a combination of inelastic drug demand (due to its addictive properties) and elastic supply responses (due to black markets). This should turn the focus to the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. First, the large demand for drugs, particularly in developed countries, generates the possibility of massive profits to potential drug providers. This leads to the formation of organized crime groups, which use violence and corruption as their means of survival and expansion and which, in severe cases, challenge the state and seriously compromise public stability and safety. Second, prohibition and its derived illegal market impose greater costs on farmers than on drug traffickers. In many instances, this entails the transfer of wealth from poor peasants to rich (and ruthless) traders. Third, criminalization can exacerbate the net health effects of drug use. These consequences are so pernicious that they call for a fundamental review of drug policy around the world.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 36p.

By Peter Reuter

The production of cocaine and heroin, the two most important drugs economically, has been concentrated in a small number of poor nations for 25 years. A slightly larger number of developing nations have been affected by large-scale trafficking in these two drugs. This paper reviews what is known about drug control programs and considers non-traditional options. The usual array of programs for suppressing drug problems, enforcement, treatment, harm reduction and prevention have been assessed almost exclusively in wealthy nations. Although treatment has been shown to be cost-effective, it is of minimal relevance for reducing the drug problems of nations such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico or Tajikistan, which are primarily harmed by production and trafficking rather than consumption. Efforts to reduce drug production and trafficking have not been subject to systematic evaluation but the best interpretation of the available evidence is that they have had minimal effect on the quantities produced or trafficked. It is reasonable to conclude that international drug control efforts can do more to affect where these drugs are produced rather than the quantity. If that is the case, and given that spreading a specific level of production or trafficking to more rather than fewer nations probably decreases global welfare, it may be appropriate to consider a less aggressive stance to current producers and to make strategic decisions about the location of an industry producing a global bad.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 38p.

By Daniel Mejia and Carlos Esteban Posada

The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the information currently available on cocaine production and trafficking. The paper starts by describing the available data on cocaine production and trade, the collection methodologies (if available) used by different sources, the main biases in the data, and the accuracy of different data sources. Next, it states some of the key empirical questions and hypotheses regarding cocaine production and trade and takes a first look at how well the data match these hypotheses. The paper states some of the main puzzles in the cocaine market and studies some of the possible explanations. These puzzles and empirical questions should guide future research on the key determinants of illicit drug production and trafficking. Finally, the paper studies the different policies that producer countries have adopted to fight against cocaine production and the role consumer countries play in the implementation of anti-drug policies.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 62p.

By Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo

This paper provides a thorough economic evaluation of the anti-drug policies implemented in Colombia between 2000 and 2006 under the so-called Plan Colombia. The paper develops a game theory model of the war against illegal drugs in producer countries. We explicitly model illegal drug markets, which allows us to account for the feedback effects between policies and market outcomes that are potentially important when evaluating large scale policy interventions such as Plan Colombia. We use available data for the war on cocaine production and trafficking as well as outcomes from the cocaine markets to calibrate the parameters of the model. Using the results from the calibration we estimate important measures of the costs, effectiveness, and efficiency of the war on drugs in Colombia. Finally we carry out simulations in order to assess the impact of increases in the U.S. budget allocated to Plan Colombia, and find that a three-fold increase in the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia would decrease the amount of cocaine that successfully reaches consumer countries by about 17%.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2008. 60p.

By Juan Camilo Castillo

Experience from the last decade in Colombia and Mexico suggests that violence increases when governments achieve their objective of beheading and fragmenting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). In this paper I provide a theoretical framework to understand this behavior. Drawing elements from industrial organization, I model DTOs as firms that collude by not attacking each other in order to increase their profits. DTOs always collude when they interact repeatedly; thus, previous analyses focusing on a static Nash equilibrium miss an important part of the dynamics between DTOs. I show that a peaceful equilibrium arises if there are only a few DTOs that care enough about the future. Policies resulting either in a larger number of DTOs or in more impatient leaders increase violence between DTOs without reducing supply. On the other hand, policies that reduce the productivity of DTOs, without directly attacking their leaders and fragmenting them, are more desirable since they can curb supply, although this comes at the cost of increased violence if the elasticity of demand is below a certain threshold. I calculate this threshold, which is a refinement of the value suggested by Becker et al. (2006) for consumer markets.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE2013. 52p.

By Marcel Boyer and Rachidi Kotchoni

Connor and Lande (2006) conducted a survey of cartel overcharge estimates and found an average in the range of 31% to 49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010b) finds a median of 23.3% for all type of cartels and a mean of 50.4% for successful cartels. However, the data used in these studies are estimates rather than true observations, since the true illegal profits of cartels are rarely observable. Therefore, these data are subject to model error, estimation error and publication bias. A quick glance at the Connor database reveals that the universe of overcharge estimates is asymmetric, heterogenous and contains a number of influential observations. Beside the fact that overcharge estimates are potentially biased, fitting a linear OLS model to the data without providing a careful treatment of the problems raised by the publication bias, outliers, asymmetry, and heterogeneity will necessarily produce distorted results. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in the spirit of Connor and Bolotova (2006), but providing a sound treatment of the matters raised above. We find for cartels with initial overcharge estimates lying between 0% and 50%.a bias-corrected mean overcharge estimate of 13.6% with a median of 13.6% and for all cartels of all types a bias-corrected mean of 17.5% with a median of 14.1%

Paris: Institut de Polytechnic Paris, Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique, 2011. 60p.

By Marie-Laure Allain, Marcel Boyer, Rachidi Kotchoni and Jean-Pierre Ponssard

The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. We provide an analysis of static and dynamic frameworks to characterize the restitution and deterrence properties of fines: cartel stability depends on their ability to prevent deviation by firms, while the benefit of a deviation depends on the fines to be imposed in case of detection by the antitrust authority. We show that the proper consideration of the dynamics of competition has a major impact on the determination of optimal dissuasive fines: our results suggest that a clear majority of fines imposed by the European Commission in recent years meet the deterrence objective.

Paris: Ecole Polytechnique Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, 2011. 38p.

By Patrick Guillaumont and Frédéric Puech

Relying on samples taken from developing and developed countries, several recent papers, such as those by Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Soares (2004) and Neumayer (2003, 2005), have emphasized the influence of macro-economic variables on crime. Those studies highlight the impact of the average level of income and of its growth rate. But none of them consider the impact of its instability. This paper argues that the factors corresponding to economic shocks or macro-economic instability have a significant and robust influence on crime. It suggests that this influence comes from disappointed anticipations, formed during periods of rapid increase of income, which, to some extent, generates frustration and possibly crime. It also suggests that illegal activities are used by some agents to compensate their loss of income and, in this way, smooth their consumption. It mainly deals with the direct effect of instability on crime. Nevertheless, since macro instability reduces growth, as it has been largely substantiated in literature, and growth has been found to have a negative impact on crime, it can also be supposed to have an indirect effect on crime through the growth rate.

CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International, 2006. 26p.

By Thomas Friis Søgaard, Marie Højlund Bræmer, and Michael Mulbjerg Pedersen

This report provides an analysis of current drug supply models and the related violence and exploitation of vulnerable groups in Denmark. Recent years have seen a growth in criminals’ exploitation of vulnerable groups for drug-related crimes. This development appears to be driven by several structural factors, including increased drug market competition and a proliferation of more labour-intensive supply models. Based on the findings of this study, we identify some priorities for future research to understand the impact of digital developments in retail-level drug distribution on vulnerable individuals and to inform responses to reduce criminal exploitation.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA); Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 55p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The report provides a regional analysis of the key trends and emerging developments of the synthetic drugs and NPS market as well as options for response in Latin America and the Caribbean. Over the past years, the synthetics drug market has experienced a massive expansion and diversification in the region and seen a rapid emergence of a wide range of NPS.

The latest developments include an expanding methamphetamine market, growing concerns around the non-medical use of ketamine, the emergence of fentanyl and MDMA manufacture, as well as new “ecstasy” trends such as higher dosed MDMA tablets and new forms of presentation such as crystalline MDMA. Moreover, the report sheds light on the comparatively high prevalence of use of hallucinogens in the region and the high prevalence of use of tranquilizers among women.

Vienna: UNODC, 2021. 56p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The present case digest contains an analysis of cases of cyber organized crime. The digest is global in scope and attempts, to the extent possible, to ensure an equitable representation of cases from different geographical regions and legal systems. On the basis of more than 100 cases from more than 20 jurisdictions, observations are made about the ways in which cyber organized crime is identified in case law and how this illicit activity is investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated across jurisdictions. The case digest examines the structure and organization of cyber organized criminal groups, tools used by perpetrators of cyber organized crime, types of cyber organized crime and procedural issues relating to the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of cyber organized crime cases. The case digest contains summaries of relevant judicial proceedings concerning cyber organized crime, organized according to theme. The ultimate goals of the digest are to identify cases involving cyber organized crime and the manner in which such crime has been investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated in different areas of the world. The digest concludes by identifying challenges to investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving cyber organized crime, as well as the lessons learned for criminal justice professionals, including some of the challenging aspects of criminal justice responses to such crime.

Vienna: UNODC, 2021.144p.

By Ana Paula Oliveira

Afghanistan experienced a marked rise in violent crimes, including kidnappings and armed robbery in 2021. The reported increase in targeted attacks against civilians in the country, specifically regarding women human rights defenders and media workers, had already raised concerns in the period preceding the Taliban takeover. These events and the changing nature of the killings—from widespread casualties to targeted violence— underscored the need for a nuanced examination of the different ways conflict and crime converge to create conditions that incentivise violent actors and instability. This paper looks at these issues through the lens of illicit market violence in Afghanistan. It explores its potential as a key proxy to project current and future trends of other illicit and criminal market development in the country. The paper suggests a framework for further research to examine the evolution of illicit markets in Afghanistan by using a methodologically sound proxy indicator of such violence. First, it draws on a literature review on violence related to illicit markets and presents the methodology developed by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) to research assassinations. Second, the paper undertakes a focused literature review on targeted violence in Afghanistan, focusing particularly on the 2020–2021 period.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 22p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Globalization and growing economic interdependence have encouraged and promoted the transformation of crime beyond borders in all parts of the world. Improved communications and information technologies, increased blurring of national borders, greater mobility of people, goods and services across countries, and the emergence of a globalized economy have moved crime further away from its domestic base. The nature of organized crime in the contemporary world then cannot be understood separately from the concept of globalization. In 1998, in recognition of these factors, the Member States of the United Nations decided to established an ad hoc Committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The ad hoc Committee succeeded in drafting four international legal instruments -- the Convention and three Protocols on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants and Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms -- that will facilitate the prevention and combating of transnational organized crime. Through the ratification of these instruments several new legal concepts and mechanisms will be adopted by the State Parties who ratify the Convention. Of importance in this regard, is the criminalizing of participation in the activities of a criminal group itself. Importantly too, the Convention will provide a basic framework of cooperation across a large number of countries in the fight against organized crime. Critical to the implementation and monitoring of the TOC Convention will be the ability to access reliable information on international organized crime trends. Adequate information on ongoing developments from a global perspective may provide a useful marker against which progress can be measured and changes in the nature of organized crime assessed. At the same time, an international effort to collect data on developments in organized crime around the globe would provide a platform for the work of a wide ranging number of individuals and governments who are increasingly adopting more systematic ways of acquiring information on organized criminal groups. Beyond the establishment of an overall measure to assess trends in organized crime, the development of a more comprehensive system of classification and the ongoing collection of data on criminal groups provides a useful tool for both law enforcement officials and prosecutors. Information on various criminal groups serves not only to inform counterparts in other countries what kind of criminal groups are being investigated in specific states, but allows information on the activities of similar groups to be compared.

New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2002. 123p.

By Blue Justice

The Large Ocean Nations Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime was launched at the UN City in Copenhagen on 15 October 2018. The forum was hosted by PescaDOLUS in cooperation with the Faroese Ministry of Fisheries, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the Nordic Council of Ministers. The forum, which gathered more than 80 participants from Large Ocean Nations (LONs) as well as from other countries, intergovernmental organizations and civil society, was opened by the Ministers of Faroe Islands, Palau, and Kiribati alongside high-level participants from the Nordic Council of Ministers and Norway. The establishment of the Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime built on the Large Ocean Nations Forum on Blue Growth launched in Malta in 2017. The objective of the LON Forum on Fisheries Crime was to facilitate agreement between LON participants on the particular challenges posed by transnational organised fisheries crime to LONs and the importance of cooperatively fighting such crime. Presentations from Fiji, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles highlighted the common challenges and opportunities of Large Ocean Nations and the need for cooperative action to address transnational fisheries crime towards fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals and Blue Growth. Drawing on the content of the speeches, presentations and discussion points at the Forum, suggested ways forward are highlighted at the end of the Report. The launching of the LON Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime is a concrete first step towards fostering such cooperation, as subsequently reflected in the joint ministerial declaration agreed by the LON government representatives present at the meeting

Oslo: Blue Justice, 2019. 53p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

.The global fishing industry is made up of a complex net of activities, actors and authorities spread across multiple countries and jurisdictions. The sheer complexity brings with it regulatory and enforcement challenges, and provides numerous opportunities for criminals to break the law. Corruption strikes at the core of the fight against fisheries crime. It threatens effective regulation and crime prevention at every stage of the fisheries value chain, exposing it to a wide range of risks, from the preparation of forged licences and the underreporting of quantities of caught fish at landing, through to the sale of mislabeled fish, among others. Corruption also undercuts the efforts of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute fisheries crime when it does occur. All other efforts to regulate the fisheries sector and combat fisheries crime will fail unless the disease of corruption is addressed.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019. 66p.

By North Atlantic Fisheries Intelligence Group and INTERPOL

Secrecy, or the ability to keep one's identity hidden behind a corporate veil, is a key facilitator of fisheries crime, including tax crime and other ancillary crimes in the fisheries sector. Secrecy means that investigators “don’t know what they don’t know” and is a fundamental challenge to fisheries crime law enforcement. The focus of this report is the jurisdictions that facilitate secrecy in fisheries, the flags of convenience, and particularly those that are contracted out to private companies, the so-called private flags, and the impact flags of convenience and secrecy has on effective fisheries crime law enforcement.

NA-FIG, INTERPOL, the Nordic Council of Ministers and Norad 2017. 76p.

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By Eve de Coning

The study posed the questions whether there is transnational organized crime and other criminal activity in the fishing industry and, if so, what the vulnerabilities of the fishing industry are to transnational organized crime or other criminal activity. The research took the form of a six-month desk review of available literature, supplemented by ad hoc consultations and a two-day expert consultation held in Vienna, Austria. Importantly the study did not set out to tarnish the fishing industry. Rather, the study sought to determine whether criminal activities take place within the fishing industry to the detriment of law-abiding fishers, the legitimate fishing industry, local fishing communities, and the general public alike. The study considered the involvement of the fishing industry or the use of fishing vessels in trafficking in persons (Chapter 2); smuggling of migrants (Chapter 3); illicit traffic in drugs (Chapter 4); and other forms of crime such as marine living resource crime, corruption, and piracy and other security related crimes (Chapter 5).

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011. 144p.

By Sjarief Widjaja, Tony Long and Hassan Wirajuda

By looking at the breadth of areas in need of reform, this Blue Paper lays out a methodology for addressing IUU fishing, including best practices for implementing the Port State Measures Agreement and other means to prevent IUU fishing catches from entering the market. It also discusses ways to promote technologies for combating IUU fishing, strategies for transitioning IUU fishing fleets, and the role of regional and international partnerships.

Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2020. 60p.