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COVID-19-related Trafficking of Medical Products as a Threat to Public Health

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Restrictions on movement imposed by govern- ments across the world due to the COVID-19 pandemic have had an impact on the trafficking of substandard and falsified medical products. Interpol and the World Customs Organization (WCO) reported that seizures of substandard and falsified medical products, including person- al protective equipment (PPE), increased for the first time in March 2020. The emergence of trafficking in PPE signals a significant shift in organized criminal group behaviour that is directly attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has brought huge demand for medical products such as PPE over a relatively short period of time. It is foreseeable that, with the evolution of COVID-19 and developments in medicinal treatments and/or the repurposing of existing medicines, criminal behaviour will shift from trafficking in PPE to the development and delivery of a COVID-19 vaccine. Furthermore, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure involved in addressing the pandemic are likely to continue in the form of online scams aimed at health procurement authorities. Challenges in pandemic preparedness, ranging from weak regulatory and legal frameworks to the prevention of the manufacturing and trafficking of substandard and falsified products and cyber security shortcomings, were evident before COVID-19, but the pandemic has exacerbated them and it will be difficult to make significant improvements in the immediate short term. The report concludes that crime targeting COVID-19 medical products will become more focused with significantly greater risks to pub- lic health as the containment phase of the pan- demic passes to the treatment and prevention stages.

Vienna: UNODC Research and Trend Analysis Branch. 2020. 31p

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COVID-19-related Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Policy Responses

ByThe Financial Action Task Force

he COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented global challenges, human suffering and economic disruption. It has also led to an increase in COVID-19-related crimes, including fraud, cybercrime, misdirection or exploitation of government funds or international financial assistance, which is creating new sources of proceeds for illicit actors. Using information provided to the members of the FATF Global Network on 7 and 23 April, this paper identifies challenges, good practices and policy responses to new money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities arising from the COVID-19 crisis.

As the world is focusing on responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is impacting on the ability of government and the private sector to implement anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) obligations in areas including supervision, regulation and policy reform, suspicious transaction reporting and international cooperation. This could lead to emerging risks and vulnerabilities that could result in criminals finding ways to:

  • Bypass customer due diligence measures;

  • Increase misuse of online financial services and virtual assets to move and conceal illicit funds;

  • Exploit economic stimulus measures and insolvency schemes as a means for natural and legal persons to conceal and launder illicit proceeds;

  • Increase use of the unregulated financial sector, creating additional opportunities for criminals to launder illicit funds;

  • Misuse and misappropriation of domestic and international financial aid and emergency funding;

  • Exploit COVID-19 and the associated economic downturn to move into new cash-intensive and high-liquidity lines of business in developing countries.

AML/CFT policy responses can help support the swift and effective implementation of measures to respond to COVID-19, while managing new risks and vulnerabilities. This paper provides examples of such responses, which include:

  • Domestic coordination to assess the impact of COVID-19 on AML/CFT risks and systems;

  • Strengthened communication with the private sector;

  • Encouraging the full use of a risk-based approach to customer due diligence;

  • Supporting electronic and digital payment options.

Paris: FATF, 2020. 34p.

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Update: COVID-19-Related Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented global challenges, human suffering and economic hardship. The pandemic has also spawned a range of COVID-19-related crimes, which are creating new sources of income for criminal networks. In May, the FATF highlighted the COVID-19-related money laundering and terrorist financing risks and policy responses.

Today, the FATF releases an Update-COVID-19-Related-Money-Laundering-and-Terrorist-Financing-Risks

The paper confirms the concerns expressed by the FATF in May, including:

  • Changing financial behaviours - especially significant increases in online purchases due to widespread lockdowns and temporary closures of most physical bank branches, with services transitioning online.

  • Increased financial volatility and economic contraction - largely caused by the losses of millions of jobs, closures of thousands of companies and a looming global economic crisis.

To respond to these evolving risks, authorities and the private sector need to take a risk-based approach, as required by the FATF Standards. This means mitigating the money laundering and terrorist financing risks without disrupting essential and legitimate financial services and without driving financial activities towards unregulated service providers.

Supervisors should also clearly communicate about the national risk situations and regulatory expectations. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. However, the FATF’s report on risks and policy responses provides guidance on how jurisdictions should address these issues.

Paris: FATF, 2020. 34;p.

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Mediating Violence in Jamaica Through a Gang Truce

By Charles M. Katz , Anthony Harriott, and E.C. Hedberg

The article examines a gang-related peace initiative instituted in Greater August Town, Jamaica. Our objective was to understand the negotiation processes and determine whether the gang truce resulted in the desired outcome: a reduction in homicide. Bivariate analyses showed a significant decline in homicides immediately following the truce. Upon closer examination, however, comparing change in the target area to the balance areas in Jamaica and accounting for temporal trends, we found that the decline in homicide was part of a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the gang truce was not responsible for the decline. The only significant effect was the possibility that homicides were displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time.

International Criminal Justice Review 35(2): 2022.

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Differentiating the local impact of global drugs and weapons trafficking: How do gangs mediate ‘residual violence’ to sustain Trinidad's homicide boom?

y Adam Baird , Matthew Louis Bishop , Dylan Kerrigan

The Southern Caribbean became a key hemispheric drug transhipment point in the late 1990s, to which the alarmingly high level of homicidal violence in Trinidad is often attributed. Existing research, concentrated in criminology and mainstream international relations, as well as the anti-drug policy establishment, tends to accept this correlation, framing the challenge as a typical post-Westphalian security threat. However, conventional accounts struggle to explain why murders have continued to rise even as the relative salience of narcotrafficking has actually declined. By consciously disentangling the main variables, we advance a more nuanced empirical account of how ‘the local’ is both inserted into and mediates the impact of ‘the global’. Relatively little violence can be ascribed to the drug trade directly: cocaine frequently transits through Trinidad peacefully, whereas firearms stubbornly remain within a distinctive geostrategic context we term a ‘weapons sink’. The ensuing murders are driven by the ways in which these ‘residues’ of the trade reconstitute the domestic gangscape. As guns filter inexorably into the community, they reshape the norms and practices underpinning acceptable and anticipated gang behaviour, generating specifically ‘residual’ forms of violence that are not new in genesis, but rather draw on long historical antecedents to exacerbate the homicide panorama. Our analysis emphasises the importance of taking firearms more seriously in understanding the diversity of historically constituted violences in places that appear to resemble—but differ to—the predominant Latin American cases from which the conventional wisdom about supposed ‘drug violence’ is generally distilled.

Political Geography. Volume 106, October 2023, 102966

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"Breaking Bad"? Gangs, masculinities and murder in Trinidad

By Adam Baird, Matthew Louis Bishop & Dylan Kerrigan

The murder rate in Port of Spain, Trinidad, rose dramatically around the turn of the millennium, driven overwhelmingly by young men in gangs in the city’s poor neighborhoods. The literature frequently suggests a causal relationship between gang violence and rising transnational drug flows through Trinidad during this period. However, this is only part of a complex picture and misses the crucial mediating effect of evolving male identities in contexts of pronounced exclusion. Using original data, this article argues that historically marginalized “social terrains” are particularly vulnerable to violence epidemics when exposed to the influence of transnational drug and gun trafficking. When combined with easily available weapons, contextually constructed male hegemonic orders that resonate with the past act as catalysts for contemporary gang violence within those milieus. The study contributes a new empirical body of work on urban violence in Trinidad and the first masculinities-specific analysis of this phenomenon. We argue that contemporary gang culture is a historically rooted, contextually legitimated, male hegemonic street project in the urban margins of Port of Spain.

International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2021.

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Man a Kill a Man for Nutin’: Gang Transnationalism, Masculinities, and Violence in Belize City

By Adam Baird

Belize has one of the highest homicide rates in the world; however, the gangs at the heart of this violence have rarely been studied. Using a masculinities lens and original empirical data, this article explores how Blood and Crip “gang transnationalism” from the United States of America flourished in Belize City. Gang transnationalism is understood as a “transnational masculinity” that makes cultural connections between local settings of urban exclusion. On one hand, social terrains in Belize City generated masculine vulnerabilities to the foreign gang as an identity package with the power to reconfigure positions of subordination; on the other, the establishment of male gang practices with a distinct hegemonic shape, galvanized violence and a patriarchy of the streets in already marginalized communities. This article adds a new body of work on gangs in Belize, and gang transnationalism, whilst contributing to theoretical discussions around the global to local dynamics of hegemonic masculinities discussed by Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) and Messerschmidt (2018).

Men and Masculinities Volume 24, Issue 3. 1-21 , 2019

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2021 Durham Community Gang Assessment\

2021 Durham Community Gang Assessment

By Michelle Young

Beginning in 2021, the Durham Gang Reduction Strategy Steering Committee (GRSSC) commissioned an updated community gang assessment for Durham. The GRSSC community gang assessment used the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model Guide to Assessing Your Community’s Youth Gang Problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2009). This report presents five key findings and related recommendations arising from that exercise. Key finding 1: What is the most acute problem related to gangs/violence in Durham and where is it most acute? At least 12 census tracts/neighborhoods in Durham are currently affected by extremely high rates of violent person incidents (aggravated assault and homicide) that are up to 7.5 times higher than Durham’s overall rate per capita of these crimes. Eight of these census tracts have experienced high rates of violence since the last community gang assessment was conducted in Durham. Violence exposure in these areas is exacerbated by extreme poverty and exposure to other social vulnerabilities that have remained mostly unchanged since 2014. Key finding 2: Why are youth in Durham joining gangs? What risk factors locally must be addressed to keep youth out of gangs? Young people in Durham experience an elevated level of exposure to risk factors for gang involvement, including substance use, delinquency, the presence of gangs in their neighborhood and at school, family gang involvement, victimization, and exposure to violence. This level of risk exposure is higher for youth who enter the juvenile justice system and highest for gang involved individuals. Key finding 3: What is keeping young people in gangs? What must be addressed to help gang-involved individuals exit gangs? Research indicates that young people who join gangs become disconnected from mainstream pursuits. Gang involved individuals in Durham have difficulty exiting gangs because of high rates of school dropout, unemployment/underemployment, substance use, gang activity in the neighborhood, and a need to replace the social and emotional needs currently met by their gang. Key finding 4: How is this issue affecting the wider community? What should motivate policymakers to address the problem? People who live and work in Durham experience the gang issue very differently depending on their role and location. In some neighborhoods, gangs are deeply imbedded in the neighborhood’s culture which plays a key role in the decision to join a gang in Durham. Other neighborhoods experience gang issues indirectly. However, surveys across constituency groups indicates that the widespread nature of gang activity and community violence in Durham reduces quality of life for residents across the community. Key finding 5: How well is the current response to gangs working? What should be done differently in the future? All constituency groups that participated in this study described low levels of satisfaction with the current response to gangs and identified specific deficits that have caused this dissatisfaction. These issues include a failure to address the underlying conditions that give rise to gangs, a lack of awareness about the current responses to gangs across constituency groups, lack of information about the results of current strategies, and concerns about criminal justice policies. Recommendations Recommendation 1: Implement intensive, place-based strategies to address underlying social conditions that increase the vulnerability of children and youth in the most violence affected census tracts to gang involvement Recommendation 2: Implement comprehensive, intensive, and neighborhood-based service delivery specifically for gang-involved individuals in the highest violence neighborhoods. Recommendation 3: Because of the elevated level of gang exposure/involvement and youth risk exposure locally, Durham policymakers should expand available gang prevention and intervention programming, localize these services in the most violence/gang affected census tracts, and prioritize these services for children and youth who are at the highest level of risk of involvement in violence and gangs Recommendation 4: More regularly collect and report data that reflects the progress of the community’s gang violence reduction efforts. Recommendation 5: Institute standardized performance measures to track reductions in violence and improve existing criminogenic social conditions at the census tract level and more regularly report the outcomes attained by gang prevention, intervention and desistance strategies to policymakers and the community at the census tract level.

Wake Forest, NC: Michelle Young Consulting, 2022. 257p.

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'I Get More in Contact with My Soul’: Gang Disengagement, Desistance and the Role of Spirituality

By Ross Deuchar

This article explores the links between gangs, masculinity, religion, spirituality and desistance from an international perspective. It presents insights from life history interviews conducted with a small sample of 17 male reforming gang members in Denmark who had become immersed in a holistic spiritual intervention programme that foregrounded meditation, yoga and dynamic breathing techniques. Engagement with the programme enabled the men to begin to perform broader versions of masculinity, experience improved mental health and well-being and develop a greater commitment to criminal desistance. Links with religious and spiritual engagement are discussed, and policy implications for the UK gang context included.

Youth JusticeVolume 20, Issue 1-2, April-August 2020, Pages 113-127

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Rethinking How We View Gang Members: An Examination into Affective, Behavioral, and Mental Health Predictors of UK Gang-Involved Youth

By Sarah Frisby-Osman and Jane L. Wood

Mental health difficulties, conduct problems, and emotional maladjustment predict a range of negative outcomes, and this may include gang involvement. However, few studies have examined how behavioral, mental health, socio-cognitive, and emotional factors all relate to adolescent gang involvement. This study examined 91 adolescents to compare non-gang with gang-involved youth on their conduct problems, emotional distress, guilt-proneness, anxiety and depression, and use of moral disengagement and rumination. Analyses revealed that gang-involved youth had higher levels of anxiety, depression, moral disengagement, and rumination. Gang-involved youth also had higher levels of conduct disorder and exposure to violence, but they did not differ from non-gang youth on levels of emotional distress and guiltproneness. Discriminant function analysis further showed that conduct problems, moral disengagement, and rumination were the most important predictors of gang involvement. Discussion focuses on how intervention and prevention efforts to tackle gang involvement need to consider the mental health and behavioral needs of gang-involved youth. Further research is also needed to build an evidence base that identifies the cause/effect relationship between mental health and gang involvement to inform the best practice when tackling gang membership

Youth Justice 2020, Vol. 20(1-2) 93–112

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The Watts Gang Treaty: Hidden History and the Power of Social Movements

By William J. Aceves

On the eve of the 1992 Los Angeles uprising, a small group of gang leaders and community activists drafted an agreement to curtail violence in south Los Angeles. Several gangs in Watts accepted the truce and established a cease-fire agreement. By most accounts, the 1992 Watts Gang Treaty succeeded in reducing gang violence in Los Angeles. Local activists attributed the reduction in shootings to the Treaty. Even law enforcement officials grudgingly recognized the Treaty’s contribution to reducing gang violence and a corresponding decrease in homicides. The origins of the Watts Gang Treaty can be traced to gang leaders recognizing that the devastating struggle between rival gangs was analogous to a military conflict—complete with “no-man’s land,” assault weapons, targeted killings, and civilian casualties—and, therefore, it required a diplomatic solution. Seeking inspiration from international conflict resolution efforts, gang members looked to the 1949 Armistice Agreement adopted by Egypt and Israel to end the Arab-Israeli War. The drafters of the Watts Gang Treaty mirrored the key provisions of the Armistice Agreement, including a cease-fire agreement and other confidence-building measures. The drafters then built a social movement to support the Treaty. This Article examines the origins, impact, and legacy of the Watts Gang Treaty. It also pursues a prescriptive agenda. It supports the study of hidden history that runs counter to the common narrative of power and privilege in the United States. Moreover, this Article argues that social movements can achieve meaningful change even in the face of poverty, violence, and structural racism.

Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review (CR-CL), Vol. 57, 2022. 63p.

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Taking Stock of Half A Decade of Drug Policy: An Evaluation of UNGASS Implementation

By Marie Nougier, Adrià Cots Fernández & Dania Putri

April 2021 marks the five-year anniversary of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs. This report aims to take stock of progress made on the implementation of the operational recommendations included in the UNGASS Outcome Document. Using desk-based research, and drawing on data and analysis from UN reports, academia, civil society and the community, the report focuses on six critical areas: public health, development, human rights, civil society engagement, UN agency collaboration and cooperation, and drug policy evaluation. While some progress has been undeniably made, the research gathered in this report shows that in the last five years the gap between policy commitments on paper and meaningful change on the ground has continued to widen.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2021. 115p.

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Daring to Regulate Coca and Cocaine: Lessons from Colombia's Drug War Trenches

By David Restrepo

On August 25th, 2020, a group of Colombian legislators challenged one of the last drug policy taboos left standing since the start of the current prohibition era: they proposed the legal regulation of both coca and cocaine.

The bill, Proyecto de Ley No. 236, unexpectedly passed the first round of committee-level congressional debate in 2021, but was archived by Colombia’s conservative-dominated legislature. Its opponents claimed that legalisation would unleash drug use and a crime wave, kicking the country back to its Pablo Escobarera international pariah status (Colombian Congress, 2021).

Despite its shelving, the bill’s relative success in Congress reflects a growing understanding that, no matter what governments do, drugs are here to stay. If a drug-free world is not an option, societies are better served by making peace with drugs via regulations that help us contain their harms and maximise their benefits.

Sensible drug policy today means leaving behind disproven measures like eradication, crop substitution, drug seizures and incarceration, which do little to prevent “drug addictions”, henceforth referred to as substance use disorders or SUDs. Like child abuse, punitive drug policy achieves the opposite of education. It unleashes highly profitable, powerful underground markets where drug use is promoted and glamourised, and violence and corruption become the business model (Durán-Martínez, 2018). Punitive drug policy channels public and private resources towards attacking rather than helping marginalised populations whose livelihoods depend on the least lucrative and most unsafe rungs of the illicit drug supply chain.

In Colombia, the Amazon basin, and South East Asia, conflicts and economies made possible by cocaine or opioid prohibition do not just victimise people: they are also speeding the demise of mega-biodiverse ecosystems, tugging the world towards the cliff of runaway climate change (McSweeney, 2015). In Mexico and Central America, homicidal drug wars are destabilising democracies and sending out waves of refugees, vulnerable to exploitation and xenophobia even as they attempt to rebuild their lives (Junger & Quested, 2020; Agren, 2020). In Central Asia, illicit opium helped fund the Taliban’s reconquest of Afghanistan, after trillions of dollars spent on the US war on terror (Felbab-Brown, 2021). In the Global North, punitive drug laws reinforce ethnic and racial profiling, turn low-income neighbourhoods into ganglands, and promote the mass incarceration of people of colour (Davis, 2003).

Colombia’s bill does not endorse cocaine use. Neither does it overlook the risk of turning coca and cocaine into for-profit industries like alcohol and tobacco. It is unwise to hand private corporations unchecked control of the plants and molecules that can inebriate and damage our mental health, but also, in the right circumstances, connect us with others, spark our creativity, and even allow us to experience altered states of mind that facilitate personal and community growth (Griffiths et al., 2019). Rather, managing the power, risk and benefits of psychoactive substances demands careful regulatory design that harnesses democratic accountability and knowhow from as diverse an array of human experience as possible.

Colombia’s bill captures the evidence-based perspective that regulations can help contain the self-serving excesses of legal markets. They can delay the age of drug initiation, promote moderation and encourage pro-social norms. They do this whilst enabling the emergence of legal industries that pay taxes, provide legal employment and generate medical and social benefits. If done via controls that prevent publicity and reduce profit motives, regulation can minimise drug-related harms even if drug use were to rise, which is not a foregone conclusion. Overall, welldesigned regulatory regimes for psychoactive substances offer the possibility of a better cost-benefit balance for society than prohibition appears to do.

Colombia’s proposal laid the groundwork for a regulatory architecture that has social justice at its core. It recognised the authority of Indigenous and local government institutions to shape the low-potency, whole coca leaf market, thereby providing an alternative to corporate takeover. This would honour the collective property rights to coca that generations of Indigenous people have fought for, whilst benefitting small coca farmers and integrating beneficial coca leaf uses into society.

Following these equity and inclusion principles could transform coca and cocaine markets from a source of devastation to a potential driver of regenerative, intercultural development, not to mention a form of long-overdue reparations for ethnic and small farmer communities.

The proponents of Colombia’s coca and cocaine regulation bill knew it would likely fail on its first try, but challenging this longstanding taboo could nudge people to conceive another world (Marulanda, 2020). By unlocking the imagination, new strategies might emerge, and this might ultimately change the political balance of power that blocks legal regulation.

This essay seeks to build on that approach. It comments on the bill’s comprehensive proposals: the result of a group of legislators, NGOs, and local communities coming together to condense decades of lessons from Colombia’s drug war trenches. It also imagines what the legal regime would look like from farming to consumption, assessing the outcomes in terms of the potential benefits and costs. The essay closes by exploring insights for overcoming the forces that doomed the bill: a stagnant political economy that sustains the war on coca and cocaine as one of the deadliest and most environmentally destructive of all the drug wars.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2022. 34p.

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Lethal Exchange: Synthetic Drug Networks in the Digital Era

By C4ADS

The illicit synthetic drug networks that fuel the ongoing opioid epidemic in the United States continue to evolve and adapt to changing incentives and pressures, finding innovative ways to exploit technology and increased global interconnectivity. The digital age, in particular, has had a transformative role in allowing synthetic drug networks to take root. Fentanyl networks are among the world’s first digital native drug networks. Global internet connectivity has opened a new era of drug distribution by facilitating direct-to-consumer transactions, rapid reaction to enforcement trends, and the delivery of retail, rather than wholesale, drug volumes through licit commercial delivery services.

C4ADS investigated these drug supply chains, conducting extensive multilingual analysis of Chinese corporate entities, the clear web, and social media, in order to better understand the methods by which they operate.

Washington, DC: C4ADS 2020, 45p.

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Alternative Sentencing for Drug Offenses: An Evaluation of the First Offender Call Unified for Success (FOCUS) Program

By Jessica Reichert, Sharyn Adams, Morgan McGuirk,

Lauren Weisner

Court diversion programs for individuals convicted for drug crimes have been found to reduce recidivism and be cost effective. Some courts have established programs offering alternative sentencing and specialized programming for persons convicted of felony drug offenses. We conducted a process evaluation of a court diversion program for individuals charged with a first-time felony drug possession offense in DuPage County, Illinois called the First Offender Call Unified for Success (FOCUS) program. We examined the program’s development, operations, and participants, as well as collected feedback from the participants and probation and court staff involved in the program. We conducted interviews, administered surveys, and analyzed administrative data. As of April 2021, there were 231 active participants; a majority of participants were White males with a Class 4 felony drug possession charge. Thirty-nine participants had successfully completed the two-year program and three were unsuccessful. Overall, participants and clients provided positive feedback on the program. Based on our findings, we offered several recommendations to improve program operations.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority 2022. 57p.

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Complexities and conveniences in the international drug trade: the involvement of Mexican criminal actors in the EU drug market

By Europol and US Drug Enforcement Administration

The EU drug landscape is populated by a diverse range of criminal actors involved in the production, trafficking and distribution of a variety of illicit substances. These actors benefit from a number of criminal enablers and facilitators in their operations. In recent years, seizures of methamphetamine and cocaine linked to Mexican criminal actors have emerged as a prominent feature of the EU drug landscape. Mexican criminal actors and EU-based criminal networks have been working together to traffic both of these illicit drug types from Latin America to the EU.

This report delves into the activities of these criminals and their methods. Drug trafficking operations benefit from a number of different actors, such as brokers, cooks, envoys, intermediaries and money laundering service providers. Examples of the methods used by the criminals include the corruption of officials in the public and private sectors and the exploitation of legal business structures. The report also provides an outlook on potential threats that may develop in the future.

In the first initiative of this kind, Europol and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have issued this joint strategic product with the aim of expanding the intelligence picture on the involvement of Mexican criminal actors in the EU drug market.

The Hague: Europol and the DEA, 2022. 8p.

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Supplier Enforcement and the Opioid Crisis,

By J. Travis Donahoe

This paper studies the effects of shutting down prescribers, dispensers, and distributors that inappropriately handle prescription opioids on local opioid supply and mortality. With competitive supply, theory suggests the effects of closing any single supplier will be offset by substitution. Closing a supplier may have an effect on overall supply, however, if the targeted supplier is more lax with prescriptions than others or if the action has general deterrence effects. To examine enforcement empirically, I exploit differential timing of initial enforcement actions across areas following a federal expansion of enforcement in 2008. I show enforcement reduced overall opioid shipments by 20 percent in the average affected county for three years. Results further show that enforcement actions targeting distributors primarily reduced opioid shipments to pharmacies and clinics with suspicious order patterns. Overall, these findings demonstrate a large role for supplier enforcement to reduce harmful prescription opioid supply. Enforcement actions had heterogeneous effects on mortality. In Florida, which experienced the most enforcement, overdose death rates fell by 22 percent due to enforcement actions for five years. Outside of Florida, where enforcement was less intensive, overall mortality was unaffected. This heterogeneity is an important policy issue. (Job Market Paper)

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2022. 69p.

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Detoxifying Colombia's Drug Policy: Colombia's counternarcotics options and their ipact on peace and state building

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Colombia’s counternarcotics policy choices have profound impact on consolidating peace in the wake of the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and on the building of an effective state. Strategies of forced or voluntary eradication of coca crops have proven ineffective. As evidence from around the world shows, a long-term comprehensive effort to promote alternative livelihoods for coca growers — integrated into rural development and supported by well-designed interdiction efforts, with eradication delayed until these alternative livelihoods are generating sustainable income — has the best prospects for producing peace and a capable state and for reducing drug production.

To achieve sustainable and robust reduction of illicit crop cultivation, Colombia must thus expand its timeline of drug policy and state-building intervention well beyond 15 years. To achieve any viable transformative effects, it will also have to concentrate resources to selected zones of strategic intervention and gradually connect them and expand them to encompass larger areas in state intervention efforts.

The alternative livelihoods approach requires a concerted effort to build international support, particularly with the United States. It also requires countering the objections of Colombia’s political right. Arguments can be framed around the ineffective and counterproductive outcomes of forced eradication, the demonstrated benefits of comprehensive alternatives livelihood combined with well-designed interdiction to reduce the power of criminal groups, and other counternarcotics priorities in the United States.

A zero-coca conceptualization that insists on eradication first and conditions development aid on prior eradication of coca jeopardizes peace-building and statebuilding. In Colombia and elsewhere in the world, it has consistently failed to produce a sustainable reduction of coca cultivation. Forced eradication undermines the peace deal with the FARC and the broader legitimacy and presence of the state by jeopardizing the state’s ability to establish meaningful presence in areas formerly dominated by nonstate armed groups and radicalizing communities and cocalero (coca cultivator) movements. Aerial spraying will only compound these problems; drones will not redress the negative political effects, even if somewhat increasing the precision of spraying.

Washington, DC: Brookings Foreign Policy , 2020. 30p.

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Contested Heritage: Jewish Cultural Property after 1945 (Edition 1)

By Enrico Lucca, et al.

In the wake of the Nazi regime’s policies, European Jewish cultural property was dispersed, dislocated, and destroyed. Books, manuscripts, and artworks were either taken by their fleeing owners and were transferred to different places worldwide, or they fell prey to systematic looting and destruction under German occupation. Until today, a significant amount of items can be found in private and public collections in Germany as well as abroad with an unclear or disputed provenance. Contested Heritage. Jewish Cultural Property after 1945 illuminates the political and cultural implications of Jewish cultural property looted and displaced during the Holocaust. The volume includes seventeen essays, accompanied by newly discovered archival material and illustrations, which address a wide range of topics: from the shifting meaning and character of the objects themselves, the so-called object biographies, their restitution processes after 1945, conflicting ideas about their appropriate location, political interests in their preservation, actors and networks involved in salvage operations, to questions of intellectual and cultural transfer processes revolving around the moving objects and their literary resonances. Thus, it offers a fascinating insight into lesser-known dimensions of the aftermath of the Holocaust and the history of Jews in postwar Europe.

Göttingen : Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, [2020]

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Inconvenient Heritage: Colonial Collections and Restitution in the Netherlands and Belgium

By Jos van Beurden

The discussion about objects, human remains and archives from former colonial territories is becoming increasingly heated. Over the centuries, a multitude of items – including a cannon of the King of Kandy, power-objects from DR Congo, Benin bronzes, Javanese temple statues, M.ori heads and strategic documents – has ended up in museums and private collections in Belgium and the Netherlands by improper means. Since gaining independence, former colonies have been calling for the return of their lost heritage. As continued possession of these objects only grows more uncomfortable, governments and museums must decide what to do. How did these objects get here? Are they all looted, and how can we find out? How does restitution work in practice? Are there any appealing examples? How do other former colonial powers deal with restitution? Do former colonies trust their intentions? The answers to these questions are far from unambiguous, but indispensable for a balanced discussion.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022. 249p.

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