By Luke Kelly

This annotated bibliography includes research and evidence on militarized approaches to combating serious and organized crime (SOC) in various contexts. Militarised approaches involve using military forces or methods to deter and disrupt SOC groups. These approaches have been employed in states facing high levels of violence, fragile and conflict-affected contexts, post-conflict settings, and against threats like piracy and wildlife crime. The research finds that the evidence on the effectiveness of militarised approaches is largely negative. While there are a range of militarised approaches, applied in a variety of contexts, most papers nevertheless agree that military force, or military techniques, can only address one facet of SOC at best, and need to be linked with a range of other measures such as policing, rule of law interventions and economic interventions, to effectively combat SOC. As well as drawing resources away from these other measures, militarised approaches have also been found to have a number of direct and indirect negative effects, such as human rights abuses, increases in violence, and undermining the rule of law.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 44p.SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper 4.   

By Iffat Idris

This report gives the findings of a ‘quick scan’ review of available literature on political will and serious organized crime (SOC). It covers the five broad themes of the SOC Anti Corruption Evidence (ACE) research program: i) political will and SOC; ii) political will, SOC, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; iii) political will, SOC, and sanctions; iv) political will and trafficking; v) political will, SOC and COVID-19. Noting that political will is often used as a ‘catch all’ explanation for the failure of reforms or policies, the report begins by discussing definitions of political will. The literature generally describes it as the willingness and commitment of decision-makers to carry out reforms or implement policies to address particular problems. Malena (2009: 19) defines it as the sum of political want, political can, and political must. Reflecting the complexity of the phenomenon, political will has numerous enabling factors, notably implementation capacity, quality of governance, organizational set-up and functioning, and societal factors. With regard to the measurement of political will, there is consensus that mere statements, policies, or legislation are not enough – political will has to be manifested in concrete action. Political will and SOC: The review finds that political will is highly relevant to SOC, both because SOC and corruption often involve political leaders or government officials, and because political will is a necessary condition for effective efforts to combat SOC and corruption. Increasing recognition of the scale of SOC, and the need to combat it, is reflected in national and international commitments, frameworks, and so on. However, key implementation challenges include lack of coordination between different agencies or across different frameworks, and the fact that those tasked with implementation are often involved in SOC themselves. Measurement challenges include the clandestine nature of SOC. Capacity indicators, ‘objective’ situation indicators, and public perception indicators are three sets that can facilitate the measurement of political will to combat SOC. Political will, SOC, kleptocracy and illicit finance: The review finds that SOC is strongly connected to both kleptocracy (in which political leaders use their power to increase their wealth) and illicit financial flows (IFFs) (whereby funds are illegally transferred out of a country). The literature stresses the importance of political will to combat kleptocracy and IFFs. While there has been a rise in laws and regulatory frameworks to curb money laundering, implementation of these has been weak. The UK exemplifies this: it is one of the biggest global financial hubs and a major destination for IFFs, but despite laws and policies targeting IFFs and kleptocracy, progress has been limited. The report finds that the political will in Washington to curb illicit finance appears strong, but it is too early to assess the impact of this. Political will, SOC, and sanctions: Sanctions can be used to combat SOC, in particular transnational SOC, and by targeting individuals or groups rather than the general population, harm to ordinary citizens can be averted. However, while relatively easy to impose, the review finds that they are not the ultimate solution and a number of caveats apply to their use; for example, they are not a replacement for other law enforcement measures, and they do nothing to address root causes of SOC. The paper looks at the experience of the US, which has long used sanctions as a tool to combat SOC and human rights abuses, and of the UK, which is also making increasing use of these to target corruption, kleptocracy, and human rights abuses. Political will, SOC, and trafficking: Trafficking (for example, drugs, human trafficking for labor or sex) is one of the main forms of SOC, and traditional approaches to combat it fall into prevention, protection, and prosecution. The review finds that political will is especially relevant in combatting trafficking in two regards: a) determining the focus of efforts (supply-side versus demand-side) and b) determining which interventions are carried out. To date, the focus has been on supply-side interventions despite these showing limited effectiveness. The decision is largely a political one. The paper illustrates this by looking at approaches by the US to tackling drug trafficking, and approaches by both origin and destination countries to tackling trafficking in persons for forced labor. Political will, SOC, and COVID-19: The review finds that, as with conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, the COVID-19 pandemic has created new opportunities for SOC; for example because of increased online activities, scarcity of certain goods (such as healthcare products) and the economic downturn. Human trafficking and health sector-related crime are especially up. The paper highlights a number of factors likely to affect (diminish) political will to combat SOC related to the pandemic, including lack of public resources, and prioritization of dealing with the health impact of COVID-19. The review demonstrates the importance of political will for effectively tackling SOC, illicit finance, and transnational corruption, but also shows why it is challenging to find political will, measure it, and create demand for it.   

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 56p.    SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 1. 

By Dan Cooke, Angus Marshall

Money laundering and video games provide opportunities to criminals for easier and less detectable methods of performing money laundering. These actions may be used as part of a system of transactions, by these criminals, to further disguise the origins of their funds. The use of videogames as a tool to launder money is something that has been only briefly explored. This work identifies the ways that money laundering through video game secondary marketplaces can offer benefits to criminals looking to launder money, versus the use of traditional money laundering methods. We explore the potential for using publicly accessible data, such as that available from the Steam Marketplace, to identify suspicious transactions that may indicate the existence of money laundering within these platforms. This research focused on identifying irregularities in the frequency and quantity of trades on the Steam Marketplace. The results of this investigation show that identifying, using very simple money laundering detection methods, possible cases of money laundering within transactional data from the Steam Marketplace is possible. The data used shows that there were several suspicious transactions and accounts that could warrant further investigation and may be involved in activity that represents money laundering. As a result of this, there is scope for further investigations using larger data sets and examination of other publicly accessible data using a greater range of methods to identify suspicious transactions including, but not limited to, the value of transactions and location. 

Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation, Volume 50, September 2024, 301802

By  Nina Tvede Korshøj  , Thomas Friis Søgaard

Research exploring online-mediated drug dealing has gained momentum in recent years. Much existing research is characterized by a primary focus on the “online” aspects of drug sales facilitated by social media, resulting in a divide between “on”- and “offline” drug dealing. We wish to bridge this gap, by focusing on the hybridity of dealing drugs via social media and by arguing for a more holistic understanding of contemporary drug dealing. Methods: This article is based on in-depth digitally facilitated oral interviews with 25 individuals with experience in dealing drugs via social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps and on observational data from different apps and platforms. Results: We found that many sellers start by dealing offline and gradually drift into sales using social media technology. While the internet offers drug sellers new opportunities to expand their business, many sellers are not technological exclusionists but rather adopt a multichannel approach where they sell both via social media and occasionally or regularly also through in-person and technologically analog means. Additionally, many sellers do not draw clear-cut distinctions between whether they use social media, SMS, or encrypted apps, but rather see their “drug sales phone” as one medium for all sales-related communication. Findings also show that local offline power dynamics continue to influence sellers’ ability to build and expand their online business and that offline as well as online networks play a crucial role in sellers’ hiring of helpers and their bulk drug sourcing. Conclusion: We discuss how our findings have analytical, conceptual, and methodological implications for the development of a more nuanced and holistic approach in the study of drug sales involving online technologies. 

International Journal of Drug Policy. Volume 130, August 2024, 104509

By Huma Haide

Organized crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Policymakers and practitioners have in some cases engaged in a strategic trade-off – accepting organized crime as part of the political settlement to achieve short-term stability. However, the relationship between illicit markets and conflict can deepen over time, entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state. As Kemp and Shaw (2014, p. 16) argue, ‘failure to integrate issues of organized crime into mediation strategies and peace processes will leave the international community with a potentially dangerous blind spot.’ Negotiating with organized crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. There is, however, limited research on negotiating with criminal actors in peace processes. In seeking to address this gap, this paper reviews scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines.1 Key findings from this evidence review include: • Confrontation approaches have failed to resolve the problem of serious organized crime (SOC) and, in some cases, have fuelled more violence and criminality. • Organised crime groups that have strong internal cohesion and hierarchical leadership are more likely to be considered potential partners in negotiation. • Negotiation can be a necessary approach when criminal groups have strong territorial control – serving as de facto authorities that fill governance gaps. • Socio-economic and financial opportunities, and legal leniency, can encourage criminal actors to come to the negotiating table and agree on a deal. • A criminal group’s demand for legal leniency tends to be higher when they are expected to make larger concessions, such as to disarm and demobilize. • It is challenging to determine an ‘end state’ for a criminal group and to achieve a complete resolution of the criminal agenda. • Lack of political will, inadequate resources, and weak long-term planning constrain positive outcomes of negotiation processes and deal implementation. • Negotiators and mediators need to mitigate the risks of moral hazard and strengthen criminal groups. • The lack of broad public support for negotiating with SOC actors can undermine and destroy such processes. • A balance is needed between satisfying the interests of victims and of perpetrators to avoid alienating victims and producing public backlash for negotiated deals. • Many negotiations tend to occur in secret, yet lack of transparency can undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of outcomes. This review demonstrates the importance of creating a framework for engaging with criminality and organized crime groups that extend beyond confrontation – allowing for accommodation and incorporating a wider societal change agenda through transformation. This requires an understanding of when to address SOC and engage criminal groups in peace processes; how to motivate actors to negotiate, conclude, and implement deals; how to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes; and how to mitigate risks associated with negotiation. Drawing on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to provide insights into these crucial questions. The case studies illustrate key themes and findings from this review (see Appendix 1). In El Salvador, ineffective confrontation, the internal cohesion of gangs, and an opportune moment contributed to the successful conclusion of a gang truce. It ultimately failed, however, due in large part to public outrage that translated into political pullback. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC2 produced an innovative transitional justice mechanism that, alongside security guarantees, served as an effective inducement for disarmament. In contrast, the absence of a requirement to disarm and demobilize was a key criticism of negotiations with gangs in Jamaica, where violence has continued. In Mali and in Kosovo, international actors were initially hesitant to address organized crime in peace processes, yet this was subsequently recognized as contributing to longer-term instability, resulting in new strategies to address SOC actors.   

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 3. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.2023. 88p.

By Eunsik Chang, Sandra Orozco-Aleman, María Padilla-Romo:

This paper studies the effects of mothers' long-term pre-conception exposure to local violence on birth outcomes. Using administrative data from Mexico and two different empirical strategies, our results indicate that mothers' long-term exposure to local violence prior to conception has detrimental effects on infant health at birth. The results suggest that loss of women's human capital and deterioration of mental health are potential underlying mechanisms behind the adverse effects, highlighting intergenerational consequences of exposure to local violence. Our findings shed light on the welfare implications of local violence that are not captured in in-utero exposure to violence.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 

By Akinbowale, Oluwatoyin E., Mashigo, Mariann P., Zerihun, Prof. Mulatu

The book covers the overview of cyberfraud and the associated global statistics. It demonstrates practicable techniques that financial institutions can employ to make effective decisions geared toward cyberfraud mitigation. Furthermore, the book contains some emerging technologies, such as information and communication technologies (ICT), forensic accounting, big data technologies, tools, and analytics employed in fraud mitigation. In addition, it highlights the implementation of some techniques, such as the fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (FAHP) and system thinking approach to address information and security challenges. The book combines a case study, empirical findings, a systematic literature review, and theoretical and conceptual concepts to provide practicable solutions to mitigate cyber fraud. The major contributions of this book include the demonstration of digital and emerging techniques, such as forensic accounting for cyber fraud mitigation. It also provides in-depth statistics about cyber fraud, its causes, its threat actors, practicable mitigation solutions, and the application of a theoretical framework for fraud profiling and mitigation.

Capetown, AOSIS, 2024 

By Krstić, Igor

From Jacob Riis’ How The Other Half Lives (1890) to Danny Boyle’s Slumdog Millionaire (2008), Igor Krstić outlines a transnational history of films that either document or fictionalise the favelas, shantytowns, barrios poulares or chawls of our ‘planet of slums’.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

By Gisli Vogler

How should those profiting from injustice and violence respond to their complicity? And how can they remain responsive when faced with the many ways in which they are entangled in an unjust world? We are at a deciding moment in affluent (Western) societies when it comes to addressing these kinds of questions. On the one hand, there is cause for optimism: the last decade has seen a significant shift towards open discussion of patriarchal society, institutional racism, capitalist exploitation, and the destruction of the environment, amongst many other contemporary political problems. Social movements such as #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, Fridays for Future, and Occupy Wall Street have helped turn assuming responsibility for violence and injustice into a dominant political issue. As a consequence, unjust practices, as diverse as Amazon’s working conditions and the Oxfam sexual exploitation scandal, are met with global condemnation. Debates about how those benefiting from exploitation and expropriation can act more responsibly now pervade many aspects of everyday life, from what to eat and wear, to who has what kind of opportunities. On the other hand, societies continue to be characterized by a failure to act upon the omnipresent demands for facing up to one’s involvement in injustice. Racism, sexism and ableism, and the exploitation of minorities, poorer countries and people, and nature all remain integral parts of human existence. The re-emergence of reactionary populist forces and parties in the US and large parts of Europe, together with the consolidation of power by authoritarian leaders across the world, has exacerbated the problem. The enduring failures by complicit actors to address injustice are cause for much despair and frustration. However, they have also served as catalysts for a sustained scholarly reflection on the complexities of complicity and how to address them (Beausoleil, 2019;  Hayward, 2017; Mihai, 2022; Schaap, 2020). It is my intention in this book to contribute to this interrogation and to think further how people can appropriately respond to their complicity in injustice and violence. To this end, I begin with a constructive evaluation of recent scholarship on complicity.  

Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2024. 194p.

Edited by Tony Roberts and Karekwaivanane, George Hamandishe

In an era when hashtag campaigns like #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter capture global attention for victims of injustice, politicians and corporations are now spending billions employing Cambridge Analytica-type consultancies to manufacture disinformation - employing trolls, cyborgs and bots to disrupt dialogue and drown-out dissent. In the first study of its kind, this open-access book presents a range of case studies of these emerging dynamics across Africa, mapping and analyzing disinformation operations in ten different countries, and using innovative techniques to determine who is producing and coordinating these increasingly sophisticated disinformation machines. Drawing on scholars from across the continent, case studies document the actors and mechanisms used to profile citizens, manipulate beliefs and behaviour, and close the political space for democratic dialogue and policy debate. Chapters include examinations of how the Nigerian government deployed disinformation when the #EndSARS campaign focused attention on police brutality and corruption; insights into how pro-government actors responded to the viral #ZimbabweanLivesMatter campaign; and how misogynists mobilized against the #AmINext campaign against gender-based violence in South Africa. Through the documentation of episodes of unruly politics in digital spaces, these studies provide a valuable assessment of the implications of these dynamics for digital rights, moving beyond a focus on elaborations of the idea of ‘fake news’, and providing actionable recommendations in the areas of policy, legislation and practice. The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

London: Zed Books, 2024. 256p.

By Neil Websdale

This book explores dementia-related aggression, violence, and homicide through a detailed analysis of “gray mist killings.” The term gray mist killing refers to intimate partner homicides (IPHs) committed by spouses/partners suffering from dementia, homicides of dementia sufferers committed by their caregiving spouses/partners or other family members, and IPHs attributable to the complications of caring for a co-resident family member suffering from dementia. Killings by people with dementia raise questions about the role of biological, psychological, and sociological forces. This book therefore encourages discussions around the relative weighting of these interrelated forces, and why the criminal justice system and the courts have a hard time handling these killings. It also adds to our understanding of the social responses to people with dementia, the orchestration of services, the nature of caring, and the interaction between sufferers and those familial, community, and state actors who provide support and care. The vividly detailed case studies (from the US, UK, and Australia) uniquely inform criminological debates about violence, homicide, and the social responses to these complex phenomena. They are organized around the apparent motives for the killing, such as mercy, theft, prior intimate partner violence, mental illness, and exhaustion. The social responses of families, communities, and state actors are examined and contextualized against what researchers and dementia specialists suggest are promising or best practices for intervention. Apparent triggers or circumstantial precipitants for the killings invite discussion of signals, risks, and preventive interventions. The book culminates in an attempt to make sense of gray mist killings, as well as a discussion of broader implications and significance in relation to globalization, violence against women, the rising prevalence of the dementias, declining birthrates, climate change, and sustainable economic development. Drawing from a variety of disciplines, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of criminology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, gender studies, social work, law, public policy, and gerontology. It should also appeal to judges, prosecutors, lawyers, social workers, gerontologists, law enforcement, adult protective services, physicians, psychologists, and psychiatrists.

Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Routledge, 2024. 252p.

By: Newson, Linda A and Minchin, Susie

Based on exceptionally rich private papers of Portuguese slave traders, this study provides unique insight into the diet, health, and medical care of slaves during their journey from Africa to Peru in the early seventeenth century.; Readership: All those interested in the history of the slave trade and slavery in both Africa and Spanish America, as well as the history of food and medicine in the early modern period.

Brill, 2007. 388p.

By Gian Maria Campedelli, Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie

Detection is one of the main challenges in the fight against organized crime. We show that machine learning can be used to predict mafias infiltration in Italian local governments, as measured by the dismissal of city councils infiltrated by organized crime. The model successfully predicts up to 96% of out-of-sample municipalities previously identified as infiltrated by mafias, up to two years earlier, making this index a valuable tool for identifying municipalities at risk of infiltration well in advance. Furthermore, we can identify “high-risk” local governments that may be infiltrated by organized crime but have not been detected by the state, thereby improving the efficacy of detection. We then apply this new time-varying measure of organized crime to investigate the underlying causes of this type of rent-seeking. As criminals infiltrate politics to capture public resources, we study how a positive shock in public spending (European Union transfers), affects this phenomenon. Employing a geographic Difference-in-Discontinuities design, we find a substantial and lasting increase in the predicted risk of mafia infiltration (up to 14 p.p.), emphasizing the unintended effects of delivering aid where criminal organizations can appropriate public funds.

Unpublished paper, 2024. 103p.

By  C.M. Hoeboer*, W.M. Kitselaar, J.F. Henrich, E.J. Miedzobrodzka, B. Wohlstetter, E. Giebels, G. Meynen, E.W. Kruisbergen, M. Kempes, M. Olff, C.H. de Kogel

COVID-19 caused a great burden on the healthcare system and led to lockdown measures across the globe. These measures are likely to influence crime rates, but a comprehensive overview on the impact of COVID-19 on crime rates is lacking. The aim of the current study was to systematically review evidence on the impact of COVID-19 measures on crime rates across the globe. We conducted a systematic search in several databases to identify eligible studies up until 6–12-2021. A total of 46 studies were identifed, reporting on 99 crime rates about robberies (n=12), property crime (n=15), drug crime (n=5), fraud (n=5), physical violence (n=15), sexual violence (n=11), homicides (n=12), cybercrime (n=3), domestic violence (n=3), intimate partner violence (n=14), and other crimes (n=4). Overall, studies showed that most types of crime temporarily declined during COVID-19 measures. Homicides and cybercrime were an exception to this rule and did not show significant changes following COVID-19 restrictions. Studies on domestic violence often found increased crime rates, and this was particularly true for studies based on call data rather than crime records. Studies on intimate partner violence reported mixed results. We found an immediate impact of COVID-19 restrictions on almost all crime rates except for homicides, cybercrimes and intimate partner violence.  

Published in American Journal of Criminal, Sociology, Political Science, Medicine November 2023

By Lin Liu, Jiayu Chang, Dongping Long, and Heng Liu

Existing research suggests that COVID-19 lockdowns tend to contribute to a decrease in overall urban crime rates. Most studies have compared pre-lockdown and post-lockdown periods to lockdown periods in Western cities. Few have touched on the fine variations during lockdowns. Equally rare are intracity studies conducted in China. This study tested the relationship between violent crime and COVID-19 lockdown policies in ZG City in southern China. The distance from the isolation location to the nearest violent crime site, called “the nearest crime distance”, is a key variable in this study. Kernel density mapping and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are used to compare the pre-lockdown and post-lockdown periods to the lockdown period. Panel logistic regression is used to test the fine variations among different stages during the lockdown. The result found an overall decline in violent crime during the lockdown and a bounce-back post-lockdown. Violent crime moved away from the isolated location during the lockdown. This outward spread continued for the first two months after the lifting of the lockdown, suggesting a lasting effect of the lockdown policy. During the lockdown, weekly changes in COVID-19 risk ratings at the district level in ZG City also affected changes in the nearest crime distance. In particular, an increase in the risk rating increased that distance, and a drop in the risk rating decreased that distance. These findings add new results to the literature and could have policy implications for joint crime and pandemic prevention and control.

Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2022 Dec; 19(23): 15525.

By Amy E. Nivette, Renee Zahnow, Raul Aguilar, Andri Ahven, et al.

The stay-at-home restrictions to control the spread of COVID-19 led to unparalleled sudden change in daily life, but it is unclear how they affected urban crime globally. We collected data on daily counts of crime in 27 cities across 23 countries in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. We conducted interrupted time series analyses to assess the impact of stay-at-home restrictions on different types of crime in each city. Our findings show that the stay-at-home policies were associated with a considerable drop in urban crime but with substantial variation across cities and types of crime. Meta-regression results showed that more stringent restrictions over movement in public spaces were predictive of larger declines in crime.

Nature Human Behaviour.2021.

By Daniel O'Connell,  Christy Visher,  Lin Liu

This Article reviews what is known from the field of criminology about the nature of crime patterns in general, focusing particularly on violence, violent people, and how violence manifests in the lives of individuals who commit crime. Broad consensus exists in the research community that offending careers of individuals who commit crimes vary substantially from person to person. Most people tend to commit non-violent crimes and while many violent offenders recidivate after being released from prison, the majority do not. Moreover, the type of violent crime committed—expressive versus instrumental—may be an important distinction. We draw several conclusions from the research on violence and violent recidivism and what it can mean for policymakers and their decision-making. Armed with accurate information about violent offending, policymakers, and practitioners may be able to propose appropriate policy changes and make more informed decisions about the likelihood of violent offending and recidivism among persons who commit crimes.  

103 Marq. L. Rev. 983 (2020). 

By The New South Wales Crime Commission

Tracking devices are a growing enabler of serious and organized crime in NSW. Accessible, inexpensive, and easily concealed – they are used by organized crime networks to monitor, locate, and ultimately attack their rivals. An initial review of joint operations between the Commission and partner agencies identified frequent and increasing use of tracking devices to facilitate murders, public place shootings, kidnappings, violent drug thefts, and drug trafficking, and tracking devices are extensively being used by high-risk domestic and family violence offenders. 

By matching sales data against criminal histories and intelligence records, Project Hakea identified that:

• 37% of customers who had purchased tracking devices were adversely known to police

• 25% of customers had a history of domestic and family violence

• 15% had a history of serious and organized crime

•  9% of customers had a history of both domestic and family violence and serious and organized crime.

In addition to the extensive use of tracking devices by organized criminals, their widespread use by domestic and family violence offenders creates an urgent need to address the issue. 

By Richard Sinclair, Matthew Bland, Bradley Savage

We found that romance fraud was rising year-on-year across every region in England and Wales, increasing 55% during the 3 years between October 2018 and October 2021. Fifty percent of all the romance fraud victims in the period resided in 17% of the places where romance fraud had occurred. A total of 439 locations (outward postcode areas) were identified as the “power few” in the first year of the data set. Of these 439 locations, 162 of them recurred in both of the following years, becoming chronic “hot spot” locations containing more than one in six of all reported romance fraud victims. The demography of victims in repeat locations differed considerably, but hot spots were more frequently predominantly populated by less affluent populations. We conclude that the current national one-size-fits-all fraud prevention approach may not be the most efficient or effective way to reach those victims who most require crime prevention advice. The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, based in the City of London Police, could adopt a tailored approach to providing preventative information to local police forces based on the year-to-year patterns in crime and the associated intelligence provided by sociodemographic data sources such as Acorn.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 22, Issue 4: Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Nov 2023 Pages 585-894

By Katherine Verdery

Surveillance and Identity: The author, Katherine Verdery, explores how being under surveillance by Romania's secret police during the Cold War affected her sense of identity and her work as an anthropologist.

Ethnography and Spying: The book delves into the similarities and differences between ethnographic research and spying, questioning the ethical implications of both practices.

Impact of Surveillance: Verdery reflects on the emotional and psychological impact of discovering her secret police file, which contained extensive surveillance records and accusations of espionage.

Historical Context: The narrative provides a detailed account of life în Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu's regime, highlighting the pervasive nature of state surveillance and its effects on individuals and society.

Duke University Press, 2018, 323 pages