By Mostafa Soliman

The purpose of this research is to explore the domestic and international markets for small arms. Firstly, the research begins by summarizing the factors contributing to the illicit market of small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, since their inception after World War II. Secondly, it explains the social, economic, and political aspects that impact weapons trafficking. Finally, it analyzes the attitudes of countries' policies towards the international regime for regulating small arms transfers, by comparing their national laws for acquiring and dealing with small weapons, as well as the various initiatives undertaken by either countries or non-governmental organizations to curb the illicit market of small arms.

Unpublished paper, 2023. 46p.

Edited by Thiago Pierobom de Ávila, Aline Yamamoto, Cristina Elsner de Faria, Jude McCulloch, Kerry Carrington

This collection of articles is the fruit of a joint project implemented between Brazilian and Australian researchers and professionals committed to the work of gender and family violence prevention and response. With the support of the Australian Embassy in Brazil and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women Brazil Country Office, an innovative project was designed to support research exchange and strenghten academic collaboration, as well as foster a collaborative network of experts and professsionals, with the aim to enhance debate on gender and family violence prevention and extract lessons from both countries’ policy experiences. The Brazil-Australia Partnership on Preventing Domestic and Gender-based Violence project included several institutions. Amongst those institutions, it is important to highlight the role played by the Gender Equality Cabinet of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Federal District (MPDFT), along with the Monash Gender and Family Violence Prevention Centre and the School of Justice of Queensland University of Technology in Australia, in the organization of international conferences and the coordination of this collection. This initiative also had the active participation of the São Paulo Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPSP), the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), the Research Group on Criminal Policies of the Law Faculty at the University Center of Brasilia (UniCEUB), the Superior School of the Public Prosecutor of the Union (ESMPU), the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the Center for Studies and Research on Women at the University of Brasilia (UnB) and the Gender Observatory of the Brazilian Senate. From the Australian side, the project was financially supported by the Council on Australia Latin America Relations (COALAR), and additionally to the institutions previously mentioned, it also had the participation of Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety (ANROWS) and RMIT University. In June 2019, as part of the Project’s planning, a delegation of Australian professionals from governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations, academic and justice sectors came to Brazil (Brasilia and São Paulo) to explore the Brazilian policy framework and analyse program cases. Following it, in December 2019, a delegation of Brazilian experts went to Australia (Brisbane and Melbourne) to participate in expert workshops and conferences, as well as visit Australian successful programs for violence prevention. As a result, the project allowed an in-depth policy dialogue and advanced debates related to measuring the costs of domestic violence, as well as its impact on the economic growth. It also created opportunties to share good practices in gender equality policies, particularly primary prevention approaches, and to promote an integrated approach across the justice, public security and public health systems. The aim is to establish collaborative arrangements between both countries, contributing to policy development on gender and family violence prevention in Brazil and Australia.

Brasilia 2021 Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios, Brazil. 2021. 203p.

By Lyla Latif

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) cost Africa around US$88.6 billion per year. They have hamstrung progress and created poverty, insecurity and financial challenges which today impede implementing the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development and the AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. IFFs have also driven the African continent towards indebtedness, in addition to eroding funds that could be used for services such as education, health care and infrastructure.

This study focuses on one form of IFF, namely corruption and the resultant money laundering. It describes and analyzes the symbiotic relationship between corruption and money laundering and how they mutually reinforce an IFF ecosystem inclined towards draining resources needed for development. It further proposes measures to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption and money laundering.

This study is produced by the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) within its mandate to support analytical work in improving coherence and coordination of the UN System support to Africa and to facilitate intergovernmental deliberations on Africa\

United Nations, 2022. 46p.

By Dan Ngabirano

illicit financial flows pose a critical challenge to African countries, as IFFs deny countries the opportunity to generate the revenues required for them to meet their expenditure needs and to fund long-term development plans. UNCTAD has put the magnitude of IFFs in Africa at an average of $88.6 billion per year, which represents about 3.7% of the continent’s total Gross Domestic Product. Curbing IFFs can reduce the region’s financing gap by 33%. IFFs drain foreign exchange reserves, affect asset prices, distort competition, and undermine the capacity of countries to maintain economic and financial stability. Consequently, African countries are constrained in meeting commitments made under various regional and international frameworks, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063.

This report is focused on IFFs linked to aggressive tax planning and other illegal commercial practices in the context of Africa. Commercial practices constitute the largest source of IFFs from Africa (65%), followed by crime (30%) and corruption (5%). The report provides a broad overview of the scale and distribution of IFFs in Africa; discusses different forms of IFFs that arise from tax and illegal commercial practices; and reviews current initiatives for combating tax and commercial-related IFFs in Africa. The report provides the conclusion and policy recommendations for combating tax and commercial IFFs in Africa.

United Nations, Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2022. 42p.

By Amazon Watch

This report, developed by Amazon Watch in collaboration with various Indigenous and human rights organizations, addresses the recent security crisis in Ecuador and the impacts of the repressive policies implemented by the government of Daniel Noboa. It highlights the increasing influence of organized crime and illegal mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon. This research exposes how criminal economies not only pose a threat to the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, and traditional rural communities by endangering their territorial governance projects and the sustainability of their ways of life, but also severely compromises the ecological integrity of the Amazon. The conclusion contains a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring the rights of the civilian population in the context of the non-international armed conflict recently declared by the national government to address this crisis. It particularly emphasizes the need to provide protection guarantees and establish coordination mechanisms with the organizational structures of Indigenous peoples and nationalities, whose territorial governance projects are at risk. Additionally, it underscores the urgency of strengthening the government’s institutional capacity by developing coordinated actions to halt the advance of illegal economies, declaring the Amazon in a state of emergency, and taking immediate measures to prevent its destruction

Oakland, CA: Amazon Watch, 2024. 24p.

By Mercedes De Freitas , et al.

Organised crime and corruption in Venezuela have become a state problem that not only keeps Venezuelans in constant danger, but their effects are already impacting a number of Latin American countries, while the United States and several European nations have witnessed how illegal operations of power groups have infiltrated their financial and real estate systems with dirty money stolen from Venezuela’s coffers. A simple explanation for the complex humanitarian emergency facing Venezuela is that the country was subjected for several years to misguided public policies and decisions by authorities, which in most cases right out aimed to steal large amounts of money from the nation’s Treasury. It was a Grand Corruption scheme,1 with systematic measures that impinged on the entire population. This context was a breeding ground for organised crime, which became stronger with substantial firepower and economic resources, to the point of collaborating—in many cases—with agencies at all levels of authority, including senior officials in the administration. In view of this situation, at the end of this investigation we propose a set of initiatives to combat this evil, which will require forceful and unprecedented actions in Venezuela, such as resorting to the support of international organisations in the search for solutions that have been effective in other countries of the hemisphere, to punish the culprits. This work encompassed a nationwide vision—as opposed to the 2019 Organised Crime and Corruption study2 focused on border issues—which shows the map of criminal organisations, the types of crimes, the regional situation in various states, the role of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), as well as an analysis of the situation of women regarding organised crime and corruption. The most important findings of this new study can be summarised as follows: 1. The existence of at least 9 major organised crime rings in Venezuela, involving more than 13,000 criminal organisations, some of which have ties to policy makers and public officials. 2. Crimes and acts of corruption boast total impunity. 3. The lack of robust public institutions, the dismantling of some of them, as well as the existence of incentives derived from some public policies such as price controls and fuel subsidies, are a breeding ground for misdeeds, crimes, human rights violations and the theft of public funds. 4. Venezuelan migrants are victims of illegal groups. 5. The implementation of a model called garrison state, “banana republic” style, whose main characteristics include institutionalised violence, colonisation of public administration and the incorporation of members of the Armed Forces into the economic leadership of the country. 6. The differentiating aspect of organised crime and corruption among Venezuelan women In this investigation, the effort was focused on determining the institutional, social and economic aspects of criminal activity in Venezuela and is developed in 6 chapters: 1. Anatomy of crime: the 9 major crime rings controlling Venezuela 2. Corruption and crime in the regions: lawless states. 3. Military power, crime and corruption. 4. Differential impact of corruption and organised crime on women in Venezuela. 5. Crime, security agencies and human rights. 6. A proposal to desmantled organized crime in Venezuela. The general objective has been to gather and organize relevant information, with the purpose of providing sufficient data and empirical analysis for political leadership, with power to lead the country, can design the strategies and public policies that will defeat and overcome corrupt practices, incentives to corruption and the action of organized crime that, to the detriment of governance and institutional integrity, have had devastating consequences for the lives of Venezuelans with violations to the human rights, destruction of the productive apparatus, of the public services, opportunities to overcome poverty, and that have generated a process of unprecedented degradation that led to the complex humanitarian emergency that they are suffering and still waiting for solutions. The statements, opinions, and ratings present in all chapters correspond experts, witnesses, victims and affected persons, some of whom have chosen not to disclose their identity

Caracas: Transparency Venezuela, 2020.....135p.

By Yehor Hrynyk, Andrii Biletskyi, and Amanda Cabrejo le Roux

This report offers a detailed deep dive into how corruption fuelled illegal logging in Ukraine during the period before the full-scale war. It explains how the Russian invasion has raised the risks of illegal logging, by increasing demand for wood and its relative value as a resource, and by reducing inspections and civil society oversight.

Building on pre-war case studies, selected interviews and a review process with various stakeholders, the report outlines the widespread corruption challenges in Ukraine's forestry sector and proposes relevant interventions in the war and reconstruction contexts.

The report identifies specific corruption patterns linked to three main types of illegal logging:

By private actors such as communities and criminal groups, who can evade justice by corrupting law enforcement officials.

By forest management officials, who sometimes obtain false paperwork to fell trees – thus easing their export abroad.

Following the illegal appropriation of forests through manipulation of land documents.

A significant proportion of wood illegally logged in Ukraine comes with (illegally obtained) permits, so can be "legally" exported to foreign markets in the European Union and elsewhere.

Both governments and the private sector in countries that import wood and/or support Ukraine's reconstruction efforts have a role to play in preventing the illegal destruction of Ukraine's forests.

Working Paper 43

Basil SWIT: Basel Institute on Governance, 2023. 62p.

By Jacopo Costa

This report is part of a multi-disciplinary project focused on intelligence-led action against financial crime in illegal wildlife trade (IWT). Under this project, the Public Governance division of the Basel Institute on Governance is leading research in East Africa that aims to contribute to the prevention and combating of IWT by developing a better understanding of the context-specific drivers of the trafficking and the role of criminal networks in sustaining such illicit strategies. The three main research questions are: • Why does wildlife trafficking happen? • How does wildlife trafficking happen? • What can be done to curb it? This report empirically answers the second research question and, in doing so, offers several promising avenues to answer the third. This report was funded by PMI IMPACT, a grant award initiative of Philip Morris International (PMI). In the performance of their research, the authors maintained full independence from PMI. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of PMI. Neither PMI, nor any of its affiliates, nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.

Working Paper 35

Basel, SWIT: Basel Institute of Governance, 2021. 58p.

By The Basel Institute on Governance

This guide is a high-level “how-to” for carrying out a corruption risk assessment in a conservation/environmental law enforcement context, using the Map, Characterize, Assess, and Recommend (MCAR) approach designed by the Basel Institute on Governance.

The first section covers planning: the resources, timing, and other considerations for setting up the assessment.

The second section lays out each step of the assessment, with tips, basic instructions, and implementation recommendations for each stage.

Finally, the annexes provide sample supporting materials, including a simplified process diagram and map, a sample questionnaire for interviews, and a basic confidentiality agreement.

It was developed under the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme as part of a wider research collaboration between the Basel Institute and Targeting Natural Resource Corruption (TNRC) project consortium.

Basel, SWIT: Basel Institute on Governance , 2023. 26p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime - ECO-SOLVE

This international conference was convened in recognition of environmental crimes as threat multipliers to an increasingly fractured and vulnerable planet. They pose threats to not only the environment, but also public health, security, political stability, the rule of law, human rights, sustainable development, food security, livelihoods, habitats, cultural heritage, and the global economy and integrity of the international financial system. Coalescing a more coherent and effective international response was a daunting, but necessary common objective of the government of France and the GI-TOC, who invited a diverse set of participants in Paris for the third security and development dialogue on environmental crime in Paris in April 2025, with the financial support of the European Union through the ECO-SOLVE project. The event is part of a series aimed at building political will and momentum for a more ambitious global response to environmental crime through the multilateral system. The dialogue series aims to determine shared priorities for action and to prepare for collective engagement ahead of important multilateral processes taking place in 2025 and 2026, with an agenda focused on ways of prioritizing environmental crimes for urgent and collective action at global, regional and national levels to protect both people and planet. As such, it enables participants to: ■ discuss strategies to draw attention to the environmental crimes in upcoming multilateral processes; ■ debate ways to advocate for and work towards the adoption of the most ambitious and effective measures (at global, regional and national levels) to deter environmental criminality and end impunity, while ensuring sustainable alternative livelihoods for affected communities and individuals; ■ reaffirm the critical role, expertise and contributions of civil society in supporting states in their efforts to prevent, detect, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate environmental crimes, and related corruption and financial crimes; and ■ commit to further develop multistake-holder cooperation and partnerships against environmental crimes and support the active participation and engagement of members of civil society in multilateral discussions. More than 100 participants from across government, civil society, academia, law enforcement and criminal justice gathered, under the Chatham House Rule, to discuss these issues and make recommendations for the international system. This report reflects the common priority issues identified, and considers what can be done to enhance international action. It highlights the key takeaways from the discussions, and lays out a set of the conclusions and recommendations put forward by speakers. These are packaged to support upcoming multilateral processes, and delegates who attend them.

Geneva: ECO-SOLVE - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 22p.

By Abbas Panjwani, Greg Oxley, William Downs

Criminals successfully stole £1.2 billion from individuals through banking fraud and scams in 2023 according to industry figures. 1 Fraud accounted for over 40% of crimes against individuals in England and Wales in 2024. And the government has said the total impact of fraud when counting things like emotional harm and investigatory costs is over double that of the direct losses from fraud. Despite the prevalence of fraud and the public costs, the government and police approach to fraud in recent years has been criticised for failing to take the crime seriously. For example, in the year ending March 2024, only around 2% of fraud offences recorded by police were referred to territorial forces for investigation. In 2023 the government published its fraud strategy which included a range of measures to stop fraud happening in the first place, pursue fraudsters when they are successful, and help victims. Some of the main initiatives include establishing a National Fraud Squad of specialist investigators, overhauling the fraud reporting system and requiring payment service providers to reimburse victims of authorised payment fraud. The nature and scale of banking fraud Industry body UK Finance estimates that criminals successfully stole £1.17 billion through banking fraud and scams in 2023. Of this £709 million was unauthorised and £460 million was authorised, levels which have remained broadly flat since 2021. Unauthorised fraud is where the fraudulent transaction is carried out by a third party, not the victim. Authorised fraud involves the victim being tricked into paying money into another account that is controlled by a criminal. This is also known as Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud. Payment providers almost always reimburse victims of unauthorised fraud. For APP fraud, in 2023 62% of losses were reimbursed, a figure which has increased over time. From October 2024, payment providers are required by law to reimburse APP victims, subject to some conditions.

London: House of Commons Library, 2025. 32p.

By Avalere Health

In 2022, over six million people in the United States reported having an opioid use disorder (OUD). Past research has not yielded comprehensive estimates of the full societal burden of OUD or the impact of OUD treatments in limiting associated costs. To evaluate the costs of OUD and the benefits and cost savings associated with OUD treatment, Avalere Health conducted secondary research and modeled the costs as well as the savings associated with treatment of OUD, nationally and by state. This research (1) characterized the prevalence of OUD, (2) modeled the costs of OUD, and (3) modeled the net cost impact of four ambulatory OUD treatments: (a) behavioral therapy alone, (b) behavioral therapy plus methadone, (c) behavioral therapy plus transmucosal buprenorphine, and (d) behavioral therapy plus longacting injectable (LAI) buprenorphine. Key findings: 1. OUD prevalence: OUD cases per capita (the percentage of individuals per state with OUD) ranged among states from 0.75% to 2.99%. New Hampshire, Nevada, Massachusetts, and Kentucky had the highest rates of OUD (greater than 2.5%), while Wyoming, Hawaii, Washington DC, and Minnesota had the lowest (less than 1.0%). 2. Cost burden of OUD: The average annual total cost per OUD case OUD is approximately $695,000 across all stakeholders analyzed. The annual cost per OUD case, excluding the patient burden to the individual with OUD, is approximately $163,000, spread across public and private stakeholders. Including lost quality and length of life, the patient burden of OUD is approximately $532,000 per year. 3. Costs to external stakeholders: The costs to the federal government, state/local government, private businesses, and society are driven by lost productivity for employers ($438 billion), employees ($248 billion), and households ($73 billion). Health insurance and uninsured costs were $111 billion, criminal justice costs are $52 billion, and other substance use treatment costs are: $12 billion. 4. Treatment benefits of OUD: Medications and behavioral therapy to treat OUD are associated with significant average cost savings per case. Estimated annual per-case savings net of treatment cost from ambulatory treatments are estimated to be: • $144,000 for behavioral therapy alone • $271,000 for behavioral therapy plus methadone • $271,000 for behavioral therapy plus sublingual buprenorphine • $295,000 for behavioral therapy plus LAI buprenorphine

Washington, DC: Avalere Health, 2025. 21p.

By Sung Hwan Joo, Doyun Koo, Stephen J. Watts

With the notable recent population growth of the Asian population in the US, the need for scholarly attention to offending patterns of this population has correspondingly increased. Utilizing waves of 1 to 4 of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) (n=9412), the current study examines the offending trajectories among Asian populations in the US, with particular attention to the distinct experiences and offending patterns between US-born and non-USborn individuals. Employing group-based trajectory modeling (GBTM) and multivariate regression, the study reveals distinct patterns of offending between Asian and non-Asian populations, while highlighting significant variations in offending trajectories between US-born and non-US-born Asian populations. Results indicate that social control factors, such as social bonds and self-control, have varied influences across US-born and non-US-born Asian populations. Overall, the findings point to the importance of considering how distinct institutional adjustment processes and identity negotiations shape offending trajectories among Asian populations in the US. The discussion focuses on how the current study contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities facing Asian populations in the US, suggesting future studies incorporate institutional adjustment processes to elucidate Asian offending trajectories further.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:501–524

By M. Lankester, C. Coles, A. Trotter, S. Scott, J. Downs, H. Dickson, A. Wickersham

The association between academic achievement and youth offending has yet to be clearly quantified. This meta-analysis aims to provide a robust estimate of the longitudinal association between academic achievement and subsequent youth offending. We searched PsycINFO, ERIC, British Education Index, and Web of Science from inception to 2 April 2024 using a comprehensive search strategy. We identified eligible studies reporting on the association between academic achievement and subsequent youth offending, as measured using self-report or administrative records up to the age of 25 years. Correlation coefficients and odds ratios were pooled in a meta-analysis. Effect modifiers were investigated in a sub-group analysis, and other findings were narratively synthesised. PROSPERO record: CRD42023402103. Seventeen studies were included, of which eight were pooled in a meta-analysis. The findings showed a small but statistically significant association between lower academic achievement and youth offending (pooled Fisher z= −0.21, 95% CI [−0.29,−0.12], I 2=98.4%). Subgroup analysis and narrative synthesis yielded mixed findings on the possible role of measurement timing and offence types. Lower academic achievement was associated with subsequent youth offending, underlining the need for a child-first approach to early prevention and intervention strategies in educational and forensic settings.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:457–476

By Brandon C. Welsh

Early developmental crime prevention is an important component of an overall strategy to reduce crime. Key features include a commitment to prevention in the first instance—intervening before a delinquent act has been committed and before a child has contact with the justice system—and a larger focus on improving the life chances of at-risk children and families, extending well beyond delinquency or criminal offending. The main aim of this article is to set out an agenda for action— a manifesto of sorts—to advance developmental crime prevention, with a special focus on the early stages of the life-course. Structured as a ten-point plan and organized around three core areas (policy directions, research priorities, and outreach), the agenda is designed to bring attention to what I view as the most important and pressing matters confronting early developmental crime prevention today. The good news is that the groundwork has been started on many fronts, with some successes and a great deal of promise. David Farrington’s research and scholarly contributions fgure prominently in this work, and this article also serves as a remembrance of David Farrington (1944–2024) and a way to celebrate his enduring life-work to help build a safer, more just society.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:457–476 

By Kyle Johnson, Felipe Botero, Mariana Botero, Andrés Aponte and Lina Asprilla

Governance by illegal armed groups and criminal actors has increasingly been identified as a serious problem for communities and states in Latin America. This is particularly true in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro’s government has implemented a policy known as “Paz Total” (“Total Peace”), which aims to negotiate with all illegal armed groups and numerous criminal organisations in the country. Contrary to initial expectations, the development of simultaneous negotiations has not progressed as quickly or effectively as anticipated, leading to the unintended consequence of increasing the capacity of armed and criminal groups to govern the territories involved in the Total Peace Process (TPP). This has prompted some think tanks, opinion leaders and experts to argue that the policy is strengthening both rebels and criminals, including enhancing their ability to govern the territories, neighbourhoods and communities where they operate. This paper explores the argument and demonstrates that this trajectory is not generic: it depends on the armed and criminal actors, the specific areas and the populations involved. Through case studies from three regions (Buenaventura, Arauca and Tumaco) where armed and criminal actors of different natures operate (including Los Shottas and Los Espartanos in Buenaventura, the Frente Domingo Laín (Domingo Laín Front) in Arauca and the Segunda Marquetalia (Second Marquetalia) in Tumaco), we provide evidence that governance models and territorial control vary significantly. These variations occur within distinct hybrid political order contexts. By examining the differences in governance between these three cases, as well as how governance has evolved over time, the paper highlights an understudied aspect of criminal and rebel governance. This comparison explores not only which aspects of life are governed, but also how they are governed. The research concludes with several key findings: criminals and rebels exercise control over different dimensions of life in their areas of influence, a capacity that has been amplified during the implementation of the TPP; ceasefires have facilitated this process; hybrid political orders have contributed to this trajectory; and the timing and sequencing of the peace process are crucial. The paper stresses the importance of considering the on-the-ground effects of initiating negotiations with the rebel and criminal actors who control these territories. By incorporating violence reduction and confidence-building measures into the incipient peace process, the research highlights potential perverse effects that need to be anticipated and mitigated. Additionally, it highlights the importance of breaking the links between criminal and rebel groups and local armed forces or state institutions to undermine criminal and rebel governance. Finally, it suggests that zones of dispute and strategic competition between illegal armed organisations should be treated differently from zones of hegemonic control in terms of public policy

SOC ACE Research Paper 34.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham , 2025. 67p.

By Maloney, William, Marcela Melendez, and Raul Morales

The report titled “Organized Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean” underscores how these issues exacerbate the region's already fragile economic landscape. Latin America and the Caribbean are projected to grow by 2.1 percent in 2025 and 2.4 percent in 2026, positioning it as the slowest-growing region globally.

The region grapples with alarmingly high levels of lethal violence linked to organized crime. Victimization rates are three times higher than the global average, with homicide rates standing at eight times the global average.

The report outlines several factors contributing to the rise in organized crime, including escalating global demand for illegal goods, government crackdowns that have reconfigured criminal networks, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which allowed these groups to solidify their power in areas where state presence is weak.

“Organized crime is rapidly proliferating across the region, transcending domestic borders and becoming a pervasive threat. This is no longer an isolated issue; it demands a regional and global dialogue to elevate solutions and mobilize our collective expertise and resources,” said Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank.

This proliferation has clear development consequences. The report outlines how it threatens public safety, stifles economic growth and erodes the integrity of public institutions. The uncertainty surrounding property rights, rampant extortion, and pervasive insecurity inflate transaction costs for businesses, undermining competitiveness. Moreover, the diversion of public security resources from essential services like health and education burden countries already facing high debt and fiscal challenges.

“Fighting organized crime is not merely a law enforcement issue; it’s a development priority. It undermines governance, distorts investment, and exacerbates inequality. We must address this issue head-on to prevent it from becoming a permanent drag on growth,” said William Maloney, Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank.

To address these challenges, the report calls for a robust agenda to enhance state capacity against organized crime, including police reform, improved prison systems, and strengthened judicial processes. Well-equipped institutions are key to achieving growth and development in the region.

Economic policies also play a crucial role in combating organized crime, promoting growth and job-creating reforms while providing youth with options through improved education and training. These initiatives raise the opportunity cost of crime, reducing its labor supply.

Finally, the report stresses the need for long-term research to inform government actions, as the absence of regular, comparable surveys hampers the development of effective policies

Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025. 92p.

By Earthsight

Introduction The EU banned wood products from Russia and Belarus soon after the illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.1 The move recognised the importance of the forestry sector to the economies of the 1 Article 3i Paragraph 1 of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as inserted via COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/576 of 8 April 2022, states that “it shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, goods which generate significant revenues for Russia thereby enabling its actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as listed in Annex XXI into the Union if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia”. When initially passed in April 2022, Annex XXI included HS Code 44: Wood and articles of wood, as well as HS Codes 4705 Key Findings • An undercover investigation by Earthsight has revealed widespread laundering of Russian and Belarusian timber into the EU in breach of sanctions put in place in response to Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. ‘Blood timber’ with a retail value of over €1.5bn is estimated to have entered the EU since sanctions took effect in July 2022. Twenty container-loads continue to arrive every day. • The Russian military profits directly from timber sales, and Russia is among the largest producers of wood in the world. The EU sanctioned wood imports from Russia and its ally Belarus in recognition of the industry’s importance to their economies, and in response to appeals by civil society. • Earthsight has spent nine months investigating clandestine trade in the most valuable sanctioned product – birch plywood. Now, we reveal the actors at every stage of the supply chain, from the manufacturing giants in Russia, through the firms laundering their products in China, Kazakhstan and Turkey, to their customers in the EU. • Earthsight found evidence that goods from seven of Russia’s 10 biggest birch ply manufacturers are still being sold in the EU. These include two firms whose largest shareholders are billionaire oligarchs who met with Putin on the day Russia invaded Ukraine. One of these, Alexei Mordashov, is also on the EU’s sanctions list, while the other, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, controls Russia’s largest logging firm. Our evidence also implicates Belarusian state-owned birch ply producers. • Sanctioned plywood is making its way into a wide range of products, including kitchens, flooring, furniture and toys. Birch ply suppliers in China, Kazakhstan and Turkey claimed to Earthsight undercover investigators to be laundering sanctioned Russian wood into the EU. Buyers of birch ply from the same firms, records show, include Walltopia, the world’s largest manufacturer of artificial climbing walls. Though we have no proof these European buyers are breaching sanctions or are aware of the risk of the plywood they buy being of Russian origin, other EU firms we met with undercover were all too aware of the provenance of the birch ply in their supply chains. • Illegal, blood-stained birch plywood has entered every EU member state, our research suggests. The biggest importers at present are Poland, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Estonia and Greece. • Efforts to enforce sanctions on timber have been ill-coordinated and ineffective, with smugglers easily able to adapt and continue trading. The EU Commission and member states must take urgent, coordinated action to halt this trade, and Poland, by far the largest importer of blood-stained birch, must use its current Presidency of the EU to lead the charge

London: Earthsight, 2025. 25p.

By Sjoukje van Deuren, Marianne F. H. Hirsch Ballin, Edward R. Kleemans & Arjan A. J. Blokland

The Dutch criminal law system is based on individual liability, yet part of the crime and violence Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMCG) members commit is collective in nature. This study examines the criminal law approach towards collective criminal behavior of OMCG members. The study analyzes police files and court judgements of criminal law cases that were filed against members of Dutch OMCGs. Additionally, interviews were carried out with public prosecutors involved in these criminal cases. The results show that it is often difficult to legally address OMCGs as criminal organizations or weigh the mere symbolic contribution of fellow club members to crime, such as the use of the OMCGs’ violent reputation. Furthermore, the results suggest that in order to circumvent legal difficulties in addressing group symbolism and OMCGs as collectives via criminal law, the Dutch Public Prosecution Office has recently opted for a stronger interplay between criminal and civil law, targeting both individual OMCG members and the structural aspects of OMCGs. Future research is needed to establish which (interplays between) legal instruments are most effective in responding to collective criminal behavior.

Trends in Organized Crime (2025) 28:79–99

By Frederike Ambagtsheer

The human organ trade is proliferating globally. However, far fewer cases have been prosecuted than would be expected based on estimates of the crime. Research exploring the challenges to investigating and prosecuting organ trafficking cases is practically non-existent. Also no studies exist that explain these challenges utilizing a criminal justice framework. This article aims to explain the legal, institutional and environmental factors that affected the investigation and prosecution of two organ trafficking cases: the Netcare case, exposed in South Africa and the Medicus case, exposed in Kosovo. It analyzes these factors through a comparative, mixed-method design, utilizing a theoretical criminal justice framework. Both cases constituted globally operating criminal networks involving brokers and transplant professionals that colluded in organizing illegal transplants. Both cases contained human trafficking elements, however only the Medicus case was prosecuted as a human trafficking case. Legal uncertainty, a lack of institutional readiness and cross-border collaboration issues hampered investigation and prosecution of the Netcare case. The Medicus case also reported problems during cross-border collaboration, as well as a corrupt environment and institutional barriers, which impeded a successful case outcome. Recommendations to improve enforcement of organ trafficking include improving identification of suspicious transplant activity, streng

Trends in Organized Crime (2025) 28:51–78