By Nancy Lieberman Charities 

  In 2016, the Dallas, Texas, community and its police department faced one of its most brutal days. That summer, a standoff and shooting in downtown Dallas resulted in the deaths of four Dallas Police Department (DPD) officers and a Dallas Area Rapid Transit officer. The lone shooter was motivated by his perceptions of police racism and brutality toward African American people. Barely a week after the shooting, then-chief David Brown called Basketball Hall of Famer Nancy Lieberman to discuss using Dream Courts, a core program of Nancy Lieberman Charities that builds state-of-the-art outdoor basketball courts in underserved areas, as a tool to help heal divisions in the city. The mission of Nancy Lieberman Charities was not originally oriented toward law enforcement. Nancy Lieberman Charities is an education and wellness nonprofit organization focused on assisting underserved youth in the educational field. But as a result of that conversation, we developed our Kids & Cops programming, which has now been deployed in partnership with law enforcement agencies on Dream Courts across the country. The Kids & Cops initiative aims to make basketball more accessible to kids by giving them an inexpensive recreational outlet, a safe place to play, the chance to interact socially, and a path to learning the importance of teamwork and good sportsmanship. It is a sustainable program to help build and strengthen the bond between local officers and their communities. Our goal is for this guide to give law enforcement agencies an alternative perspective on serving the community as a law enforcement agency or agency partner. Nancy Lieberman Charities is not a task force or law enforcement agency—rather, we are an organization with an outside perspective on positive community relationship building.   

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.  2023. 24p.

By Haberman, C., Ruhland, E., Frank, J., Kelsay, J. & Desmond, J.

This report outlines the results of surveys assessing citizens’ views of the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) and its response to shootings in Cincinnati’s Price Hill neighborhood before and after the implementation of ShotSpotter, an acoustic gunshot detection system. An acoustic gunshot detection system uses sensors to detect gun fire. For ShotSpotter, the sensors listen for gunshot noises. When gunshot-like noises are detected, the sound waves are analyzed and reviewed by technicians at ShotSpotter’s headquarters who determine if the sound was a gunshot or something else, such as fireworks. If the noise is determined to be a gunshot, then police are dispatched to the scene. The precise shooting scene is located by triangulating gunshot sounds across sensors. The time from gunshot to dispatch is roughly 60 seconds.1 ShotSpotter allows police to quickly respond to gunfire incidents, even if residents do not call 911, to make an arrest at the scene. Research suggests roughly 88% of gunshots recorded by ShotSpotter are not reported to the police by residents.2 It follows that implementing ShotSpotter may improve residents’ perceptions of CPD and its response to shootings because police are now responding to all gunfire incidents. This report assesses if that was the case when ShotSpotter was implemented in Cincinnati’s Price Hill neighborhood in July 2019.   

Cincinnati, OH: Institute of Crime Science, University of Cincinnati, 2020. 17p.

By Trisha Rhodes

In 2017, the Little Rock Police Department (LRPD) was awarded the BJA Technology Innovation for Public Safety (TIPS) grant. LRPD created the Crime Guns Intelligence Unit (CGIU) in March of 2018 with the primary goal of reducing violent gun crimes in Little Rock, particularly in a historical hotspot of gun crime. Once assigned, CGIU detectives began processing backlogs in ballistic evidence. A crime analyst assigned to the unit collected data to track case information and conducted link analysis to identify the connections between incidents, evidence, and suspects. ShotSpotter gunshot detection devices were deployed in mid-December of 2018. In addition to technological advancements, CGIU formed a working group with partner agencies to collectively examine violent gun incidents and develop solutions. Partners met monthly and discussed ways of improving evidence collection and investigation of cases to increase prosecution outcomes. Meetings allowed partners to communicate more openly and frequently to share intelligence and quickly address potential obstacles toward reaching program goals. As a result of meetings, LRPD developed new policies surrounding the collection of ballistic evidence and strengthened relationships with other agencies, including the ATF, Arkansas State Crime Lab, FBI, Pulaski County Prosecutor’s Office, and U.S. Attorney’s Office. Further, the CGIU has since expanded efforts to serve as a state Crime Guns Intelligence Center and work with surrounding police agencies and crime analysts. To assess CGIU's efforts to meet program goals, the City of Little Rock and LRPD hired a research partner from U.A. Little Rock to evaluate the CGIU program. The evaluation team collected data on violent gun crimes, processing of ballistic evidence, arrest clearance rates, and the prosecution of gun crime cases at the state and federal levels. Below is a summary of key findings from the evaluation of the LRPD CGIU program, which are covered in more detail in the report. Key Findings Violent Gun Crime Trends • Between 2017-2020, the City of Little Rock experienced a monthly average of 3 gun-involved homicides, 11 non-fatal shootings, 14 terroristic acts, 19 robberies, and 186 shots fired. o Gunshot alerts accounted for 80% of incidents. o Excluding gunshots, the following percentages1 show the breakdown of each crime type: ▪ 7% homicides ▪ 24% non-fatal shootings ▪ 29% terroristic acts ▪ 40% robberies. Within the ShotSpotter Zone2, there was an average of about 1 (0.65) gun-involved homicide, 3 non-fatal shootings, 3 terroristic acts, 2 robberies, and 46 shots fired per month between 2017-2020. o Gunshot alerts accounted for 85% of incidents. o Excluding gunshots, below are the percentages of each crime type: ▪ 8% homicides ▪ 34% non-fatal shootings ▪ 30% terroristic acts ▪ 28% robberies • In the ShotSpotter Zone, non-fatal shootings and terroristic acts accounted for more incidents. Fewer incidents were robberies compared to the city as a whole. • Year-to-date comparisons of citywide violent gun crime trends revealed differences by crime type. o The subtotal of crime incidents (excluding shots fired) decreased in 2018 from 686 to 466 and remained at 491 in 2019. However, crime generally increased late in 2019 and 2020 to 654 incidents with sharp increases in non-fatal shootings and terroristic acts. o Non-fatal shootings decreased from 141 to 103 in 2018 and stayed stable in 2019. They increased to 188 in 2020. o Gun-involved terroristic acts decreased from 180 to 135 in 2018 and held there until rising to 216 in 2020. o Gun-involved homicides remained relatively stable (higher in 2020 compared to 2018 and 2019, though about the same as in 2017). o Gun-involved robberies dropped from 320 in 2017 to 195 in 2018 and remained there through 2020. • ShotSpotter Zone year-to-date comparisons showed some similarities in trends of non-fatal shootings, terroristic acts, and total crimes; however, gun-involved homicide and robbery trends were different compared to the city. o The subtotal of incidents (excluding shots fired) decreased from 109 to 93 between 2017-2018. They decreased further to 81 in 2019. However, violent gun incidents increased to 116 in 2020, which was somewhat higher than 2017 levels. o Non-fatal shootings decreased from 37 to 29 in 2018 and held there in 2019. However, they rose to 38 in 2020  o Gun-involved terrorist acts decreased from 39 to 20 in 2018, increased slightly to 25 in 2019, and increased to 36 in 2020. o Gun-involved homicides increased from 6 to 11 in 2018, stayed about the same in 2019, and decreased to 4 in 2020. o Gun-involved robberies increased from 27 to 33 in 2018, dropped to 15 in 2019, and increased to 38 in 2020. • In addition to year-to-date comparisons, statistical analyses tested the relationships between the timing of CGIU program components and changes in gun violence trends. The evaluation team examined the moment in time when CGIU formed (March 2018) and the moment when ShotSpotter was fully deployed (January 2019). There were differences by crime type. o Across the city and within the ShotSpotter Zone, there were statistically significant reductions in violent gun crimes (homicides, non-fatal shootings, terroristic acts, and robberies) associated with the full deployment of ShotSpotter in January 2019. While no significant changes in crime were tied to the exact date CGIU was established, violent gun crimes did trend lower in 2018 and 2019 as noted above. It is possible that program effects were more gradual, rather than immediate and that other factors aside from evidence collection/processing and investigation influenced crime trends. ▪ There was a reduction of 18 incidents per month in the city and 1 incident per month in the ShotSpotter Zone immediately after ShotSpotter was implemented. o Analyses of gun-involved homicides did not provide evidence of an effect of the CGIU or ShotSpotter on homicides. The sample size of homicides was likely too small to identify a significant effect. It is also likely that other factors (both internal and external to LRPD) affected homicide trends. o Data indicated a likely short-term decrease in non-fatal shootings citywide immediately following the initiation of the CGIU but not at later time points. This pattern did not appear evident within the ShotSpotter Zone. o When looking at gun-involved terroristic acts alone, there were relatively slight changes in crime rates both citywide and in the ShotSpotter Zone that were not directly associated with the CGIU program. o Gun-involved robberies decreased following the use of ShotSpotter; however, this trend did not appear in the ShotSpotter Zone. o Gunshot reports declined before the formation of the CGIU and remained relatively stable until 2020. There was no indication that gunshots increased across the city broadly, though there was an expected uptick in gunshots in the ShotSpotter Zone in 2019. Most likely, the ShotSpotter devices were better able to detect gunshots (as opposed to relying on citizens to report them).  (continued)

Little Rock, AAR: University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Justice Research & Policy Center, 2021. 102p.  

By the United States Department of Justice.  Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office For the Southern District of Mississippi 

Hours after the Department of Justice announced its investigation of the Lexington Police Department (LPD) on November 8, 2023, officers chased a Black man through a field and tased him nine times. The man began foaming at the mouth. One officer pointed to a Taser probe lodged in the man’s hat and said, “Damn, one of my probes hit him in the head.” The man, who has a behavioral health disability, had been accused of disturbing a business. This was not the man’s first encounter with LPD. Earlier that year, LPD officers had jailed him for ten days for trespassing; four days for stealing a cup of coffee; and twelve days for stealing packets of sugar. Each time they arrested him, LPD unlawfully refused to release the man until he paid money towards old fines and fees he owed from misdemeanors and traffic tickets. But each arrest added more fines and fees to the ledger. By November 2023, the man— who has no job, no assets, and no bank account—owed more than $7,500. In encounter after encounter with the man, LPD violated his rights. But like countless people in Lexington, the man had little recourse. Through a combination of poor leadership, retaliation, and a complete lack of internal accountability, LPD has created a system where officers can relentlessly violate the law. FINDINGS The Department of Justice has reasonable cause to believe that the City of Lexington and the Lexington Police Department engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law. Specifically, we find that LPD unlawfully: • Arrests, jails, and detains people who cannot pay fines or fees, without assessing their ability to pay; • Uses excessive force; • Conducts stops, searches, and arrests without probable cause, including jailing people on illegal “investigative holds” and arresting people solely because they owe outstanding fines; • Imposes money bail without justification or assessment of ability to pay; • Jails people without prompt access to court; • Violates the rights of people engaged in free speech and expression, including by retaliating against people who criticize the police; • Discriminates against Black people; and • Operates under an unconstitutional conflict of interest because LPD’s funding depends on the money it raises through its enforcement.. 

Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division, 2024. 47p.

By Benjamin Carleton, Tammy Felix, Monique Jenkins, Stephen Rickman, Chief Robert C. White (retired), Tom Woodmansee, and Michael Speer,   A. Nicole Phillips, Brian G. Remondino, and Kimberly L. Sachs

On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old African American man died after being handcuffed and pinned to the ground by a Minneapolis police officer. Community bystanders captured the event on video, which was shared widely on social media and resulted in community outrage, an FBI investigation, a civil rights investigation, and the firing and arrests of all four involved officers. The compelling video—8 minutes and 46 seconds of Officer Derek Chauvin kneeling on the neck of George Floyd—quickly spread amongst social media, cable news stations, and major news outlets, sparking strong reactions both within the Minneapolis community and across the nation. This incident contributed to a growing public perception of biased and sometimes brutal treatment of African Americans by police officers. This incident occurred within the context of other recent shootings and deaths of African Americans at the hands of police officers. George Floyd’s cries of “I can’t breathe” harken back to 2014 and the in-custody death of Eric Garner by use of a chokehold. More recently, with the shooting deaths of Walter Scott, Alton Sterling, Breonna Taylor, and Philando Castile, many Americans reached a tipping point in their patience with systemic racism and the pace of police reforms, leading to nationwide protests. The day after the killing of Floyd, protests in the city of Minneapolis ended with a march to Minneapolis Third Precinct Headquarters. Tensions rose as protestors threw water bottles, and police responded with rubber bullets and tear gas. Protests resumed the following day. Once again, in the evening hours, protest led to confrontations with police, who responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and flash bangs. Later that evening in nearby neighborhoods, windows of businesses were broken, some stores were looted, and two buildings were set ablaze. For the remainder of the week, Minneapolis experienced ongoing protests and damage to public buildings, looting, fires, and civil disturbances across the City. Protests and civil disturbances surfaced in other cities, beginning in earnest in Philadelphia on May 30. For the next several weeks, Philadelphia experienced peaceful protests coupled with civil unrest resulting in looting, vandalism, and burning of buildings. Police deployed tear gas, rubber bullets, and other crowd control munitions and tools, sometimes directly affecting Philadelphia residential neighborhoods. In the aftermath, Mayor James Kenney and Police Commissioner Danielle Outlaw announced plans “to engage an independent consultant to conduct a comprehensive examination of the City’s response to recent protests and other activities, which will include investigations of the Philadelphia Police Department’s use of force.” Police Commissioner Outlaw stated that “the Department’s commitment to reform must include an assessment of how police responded to the very protests that called for change.” She also pledged to make public a final comprehensive report. The City of Philadelphia contracted CNA (a nationally recognized, well-established, non-profit research organization with extensive experience in police assessments) along with Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, LLP (a Philadelphia-based law firm with extensive experience in conducting government and corporate internal investigations) to conduct the after-action analysis of the City’s response to the Floyd protests. The City committed to an independently conducted analysis and openly provided the consulting team access to relevant data and personnel needed to perform the analysis. The purpose of this after-action analysis is to provide the PPD and other City officials with an enhanced understanding of what happened during the Floyd protests, and to provide guidance on improving future PPD and City responses. This report is a “forward-thinking document” that emphasizes developing recommendations and remedial actions that will strengthen PPD and the City’s future responses to demonstrations, protests, and civil unrest. Importantly, this analysis is not an investigation of wrongdoing (which will be addressed by other agencies), but rather an effort to provide a roadmap to PPD and support agencies to apply best practices and lessons learned for more effective responses in the future. The timeline for this analysis extends from the national events leading up to the Philadelphia protests beginning the afternoon of May 30, 2020, through June 15, after which there was a falloff in the number, size, and tenor of the protests. This analysis focuses on the actions taken by PPD, coupled with the nature and extent of support of other agencies in response to these protests and civil disturbances. This report does not broadly examine PPD policy, training and practices, but rather focuses on those relevant to this response.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2020. 110p.

By Citygate Associates, LLC

The City of Berkeley (City) retained Citygate Associates, LLC (Citygate) to conduct a Workload Organizational Study of the Police Department (Department). This assessment includes a review of the adequacy of current and future deployment systems, staffing levels throughout the Department, sustainable alternatives, beat structure, overtime, and organizational structure. The methodology utilized in this study can be found in Section 1 of this report. Citygate’s review includes a detailed analysis of the data that drives staffing recommendations including data related to police unit response times, crime, calls for service, and overtime. The review also includes a staffing analysis of supervision, management, and support functions within each division of the Department. Our work was combined with a review of the City’s ongoing efforts related to alternative response methods to non-police or low-level emergencies and other care needs in the City. This transition is already underway to provide appropriate alternative services to the community when a traditional 9-1-1 police patrol response is not necessary. Citygate’s assessment encompasses recommendations to support the Department’s success over the next five to seven years. Overall, this report contains 74 key findings and 54 specific, actionable recommendations. Findings and recommendations are presented in their narrative context in Sections 2 through Section 7. A comprehensive list of all findings and recommendations is presented sequentially in Section 8. Recommendations are also presented in Table 1 of this Executive Summary. POLICY CHOICES FRAMEWORK Currently, there are no mandatory federal or state regulations directing the level of police field service staffing, response times, and necessary outcomes. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) recommend methods for determining appropriate staffing levels based on local priorities. The National Emergency Number Association (NENA) provides standards for 9-1-1 call answering, and the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International (APCO) and the International Academies of Emergency Dispatching (IAED) provide best practices that illuminate staffing needs for communications centers providing dispatch services. Using a data-driven framework as advocated in this report—and already embraced and practiced by the Department—the City can continue to engage the community in adapting future public safety services to utilize alternative and community-focused, non-police officer strategies to address community-wide, neighborhood, and social issues. Personnel costs are often the most significant cost center in any department budget. One of the City Council’s greatest challenges is managing scarce fiscal resources and allocating them wisely across the vast needs of municipal government public safety operations. The recommendations in this Workload Organizational Study are made based on best practices, Citygate’s experience, and guidelines established by professional industry organizations. The City’s fiscal capabilities and non-9-1-1 alternative services delivery measures must be considered when weighing these recommendations. GENERAL SUMMARY OF CITYGATE’S ASSESSMENT Citygate commends the Department and the City for its many innovative, forward-looking, and community-focused programs, including its Transparency Hub; the Mental Health Division’s Mobile Crisis Unit; the Specialized Care Unit, which provides crisis service with no police involvement; the prioritization of employee wellness; the Community Services Bureau (CSB) and its community liaisons; and the Bike Team. Residents can call 9-1-1 for life-threatening emergencies and can ask dispatchers for mental health support. All Mobile Crisis Team (MCT) calls may be accompanied by firefighter-paramedics or police officers, who ensure safety at the scene while allowing the MCT to assist. If such calls are made when MCT members are off duty, City police officers have extensive experience helping people through mental health and substance abuse crises, and regularly utilize de-escalation and crisis intervention strategies. Further, the City’s Specialized Care Unit (SCU) is a partnership program with Bonita House, Inc. Staff assigned to the SCU will respond to those undergoing a mental health- or substance-use-related crisis without police involvement. The Chief of Police has also recently created a new Deputy Chief’s position and a new unit: the Office of Strategic Planning and Accountability (OSPA). The Office of Strategic Planning and Accountability will report directly to the Chief and will serve as a pivotal entity in enhancing data driven approaches in policing performance, Departmental accountability, risk management, and oversight—as well as addressing community and external stakeholder needs. Throughout Citygate’s assessment, Citygate found a department with high professionalism at all levels and a staff willing to implement new ideas and technologies to improve policing in the City. The members of the Department are extremely dedicated to the community they serve. No organization is perfect, and many of the findings and recommendations in this report are items the Department is aware of and is already taking steps to implement. Some changes will take time and require resources as part of the Department’s normal budgeting process. All of the City’s work to date and the issues researched for this study present two policy challenges for the Council and community to work together on—not to the exclusion of one or the other. Both challenges require resources because, if one set of services falls short, other services and overall public well-being can be negatively impacted. 

Challenge #1 Maintain Emergency and Needed Police Services Commensurate to Current Demands  Citygate found that many sections of the Department—especially Patrol and the Communications Center (Dispatch)—suffer from a shortage in staffing, which frequently necessitates overtime or diverting staff from other units to fill vacancies in Patrol.  Many sworn members, particularly those with supervisory responsibilities, are responsible for several ancillary duties and often find themselves spending increasingly more time on administrative tasks apart from their primary duties, which include leadership and supervision in the field.  The Department also faces hurdles in recruiting, hiring, and training new staff while keeping pace with attrition as the public perception of the law enforcement profession evolves. To heighten the focus on recruiting, the Chief has recently assigned a full-time Recruitment Officer.  Overall, from 9-1-1 call receipt to the arrival of the right resource in response to a specific incident—whether Patrol, Investigations, Traffic, Mobile Crisis Team, etc.—there are multiple current limitations adversely affecting the Department’s efforts to meet the high volume of calls for assistance received every hour.  Staffing shortages and technical limitations affect morale, overtime, recruitment, and retention. Challenge #2 Grow Non-9-1-1 Services to Support Berkeley’s Compassionate and Caring Human Services The City is actively working on reimagining public safety, a process initiated in 2021. City goals emphasize a more holistic, integrated, and community-centered approach to society’s needs that do not require an emergent police/fire/ambulance response. The City’s goals, and the work the City has already started, aim to address these needs by incorporating a range of professionals and response strategies.  Alternatives to a police patrol response require the programs to be developed and non-sworn personnel to be hired—such as Community Service Officers (CSOs) and specialists for response to people experiencing homelessness-related issues or mental health crisis.  Building the desired enhanced programs requires planning, mid-managers, recruitment, training, and quality of care oversight—all of which the Department is strained to provide currently.  The Specialized Care Unit (SCU) is an innovative partnership program between the City of Berkeley and Bonita House, Inc. The SCU currently operates 24 hours per day Sunday through Wednesday. The SCU also operates from 6:00 am to 4:00 pm Thursday through Saturday. When someone calls 9-1-1, they can ask public safety dispatchers for support related to mental health or substance-use issues, which may also come in the form of the Mental Health Division’s Mobile Crisis Unit. Firefighter-paramedics or police officers may also accompany all Mobile Crisis Unit calls, while an SCU response is one with no police involvement. The SCU can be reached directly if someone is undergoing a mental health- or substance-use-related crisis and needs assistance.  The Vision Zero Action Plan is a strategy to eliminate all traffic fatalities and severe injuries while increasing safe, healthy, and equitable mobility for all. It is, first and foremost, an engineering strategy that aims to design and build Berkeley streets to eliminate severe and fatal traffic injuries. Equity-driven Vision Zero traffic enforcement utilizes the best possible data and is focused on areas of the City where engineering and education efforts have already been implemented.  The Berkeley Police Department’s online Transparency Hub shares Police Department policies, actions, and data with City partners and community stakeholders. This data includes police stop data to ensure fair and impartial policing through an analysis of calls for service, use of force, and current trends.  The Department’s four Area Coordinators serve as community liaisons for the Department. They can help with long-term problems such as persistent issues with illegal dumping or abandoned vehicles. CITYGATE’S RECOMMENDATIONS AND GOALS Throughout this assessment, Citygate provides recommendations to serve the Department in its efforts to achieve the following six goals: 1. Increasing staffing in some areas and deploying and redeploying staff where and when they are most needed based on accurate and timely data and analysis. 2. 3. In the context of employee wellness and accountability, carefully evaluating the various collateral duties many employees are assigned, giving particular attention to supervisors who are often being pulled from their supervisory roles. Continuing efforts to track and manage overtime and limiting its use to when it is necessary. 4. 5. 6. Continuing the Department’s strong and creative efforts related to data analysis to drive performance and continuous improvement. Continuing the Department’s strong focus on employee wellness. A focus on wellbeing not only benefits individual employees but also promotes a healthier work environment, reducing the risk of fatigue and enhancing Departmental morale. Improving employee retention and prioritizing employee morale. The benefits of improving police morale are many, including better service for the community, more community trust in the Department, and a motivated, purposeful workforce. Citygate analyzed current capabilities to project future needs for the Department, with actionable recommendations and strategies provided for implementation based on the growth and development of the City. If this study’s recommendations are implemented over several fiscal years:  The Department will be well positioned to deepen its ability to provide proactive policing.  The community will be able to increase interaction with partners in the Department to foster joint crime prevention strategies.  The prevention of crime and disorder and the closure of investigations of serious incidents will increase.  When the public interacts with Berkeley police, they will know them and trust them to be fair—and will not assume they are representative of what is wrong with policing elsewhere in America. SUMMARY OF POLICE SERVICES FINDINGS BY TOPIC Organizational Summary At the time of Citygate’s analysis, the Department was operating with an authorized (budgeted) total staffing level of 313.20 employees, which includes 181 total authorized sworn staff. The Department is currently organized into four major divisions—Operations, Investigations, Professional Standards, and Support Services—each commanded by a Police Captain. The Chief of Police recently informed staff of a planned Departmental reorganization that will result in the creation of a new Deputy Chief’s position and a new Office of Strategic Planning and Accountability (OSPA). The reorganization will also entail a Captain being promoted to Deputy Chief, and units within the current Professional Standards Division being transferred to other Departmental offices or divisions. ....continued....    

Berkeley, CA: Citygate Associates, 2024. 155p.

By Minnesota Independent Evaluator, Judge Karen Janisch

In compliance with paragraph 407 of the Settlement Agreement and Order (“Agreement”) dated July 13, 2023, in the matter captioned State of Minnesota by Rebecca Lucero, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, plaintiff vs. City of Minneapolis, Court File No. 27-cv-23-4177 (Judge Karen Janisch), the Independent Evaluator (“IE”) submits this Implementation Progress Evaluation Plan (the “Plan”).1 The Agreement identifies what the City of Minneapolis (“the City”) and the Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”) must achieve to comply with the Agreement but not necessarily how to do it, or in what sequence. In other words, the Agreement is a requirements document not a planning document. Moreover, the Agreement contains many overlapping requirements. For example, some of the Agreement’s sections, captioned as Parts, are devoted to overarching practices such as policies and training, but other Parts that address practices also include policy and training requirements. Similarly, supervision requirements are embedded throughout various Parts of the Agreement. The overarching purpose of this Plan is to align the Parties and the IE Team on the processes, sequence, and requirements the IE Team will be considering when evaluating the implementation of the Agreement and how implementation and compliance will be measured. This Plan is based on the IE Team’s 90-day assessment of the City's and MPD’s operations related to the Agreement, including the progress they have made implementing the Agreement. Recognizing, however, the inherent limitations on forecasting a four-year implementation process, the IE Team reserves the right to modify this Plan in response to changed or unforeseen information, conditions, or developments, in consultation with the Parties. The IE Team will report any such changes to the Plan to the public.2 On behalf of the Implementation Team, we look forward to partnering with the City, the MPD, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (“MDHR”), and the Minneapolis public to achieve the Agreement’s eagerly anticipated and laudable goals.   

Minneapolis: The Independent Evaluation Team, 2024. 88p,

By Doug Rowe,  Michele Weinzetl, and BerryDunn 

In November 2021, the Village of Oak Park (Village), Illinois, contracted with BerryDunn to conduct an operational assessment of the Oak Park Police Department (OPPD). The overall project included four specific areas in relation to the OPPD: 1. Full management and operational assessment study 2. Audit of race equity issues (internal and external) 3. Recommendations and research for alternative response to traditional police services 4. Presentation of successful measures to contribute to Fair and Impartial Policing (FIP), which have been accomplished in similar cities During the project, BerryDunn conducted more than 50 interviews with staff, government officials, and select community members identified by OPPD. Community members also had the opportunity to provide direct feedback through several in-person and virtual town hall meetings, and through online feedback to BerryDunn through Social Pinpoint, a customized website provided by BerryDunn. Staff from the OPPD completed an in-house workforce survey and provided BerryDunn with substantial information through numerous other data-gathering instruments. Finally, BerryDunn conducted significant analysis of current data and new data generated as part of this assessment and produced a series of findings and recommendations. Studies of this nature are predisposed toward the identification of areas requiring improvement, and accordingly, they have a propensity to present what needs work, without fully acknowledging and highlighting positive aspects of an organization. This report follows a similar progression. Because of the numerous recommendations contained within this study, those consuming this report might mistakenly conclude that the police department is in a poor condition. BerryDunn wishes to state the opposite quite clearly. Although this report contains several areas for improvement, and the OPPD has faced some challenges in recent years, particularly related to staffing, BerryDunn made many positive observations of the OPPD, some of which are examples of best practices that other agencies would do well to emulate. Examples of best practices within the OPPD include: • Posting 10 Shared Principles and Guiding Principles and Values in the Patrol Room • Resident Beat Officer (RBO)/Neighborhood Relations Officer (NRO) program for community-oriented policing (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) • Dedicated COP foot patrols • Staggered shifts for investigators • Training officers on the history of Oak Park Notwithstanding the findings and recommendations outlined in this report, the OPPD is a generally efficient and effective agency with a commitment to community policing, and staff  provided BerryDunn with several examples of collaborative problem-solving efforts. Staff at all levels present a high level of commitment and pride in their work. The OPPD provided BerryDunn unfettered access to staff and all data at its disposal, without reservation or hesitation. It was evident to the BerryDunn team that the command staff at the OPPD want what is best for the agency and the community, and they are willing to take the necessary steps to help ensure positive and appropriate change takes place. This assessment examined more than 20 primary areas of department operation (distributed throughout the chapters of this report), as well as several sub-areas and specialized positions. BerryDunn’s analysis determined that several areas within the police department require adjustment to assist the OPPD in meeting service demands, improving operational efficiency, and sustaining positive relationships and trust between the police department and the community. This study provides 42 recommendations, separated into three rank-prioritized categories, following five major themes: • Staffing (including recruiting, hiring, and retention) • Personnel development • Policies and procedures • Impartial policing and transparency • Technology utilization • Training This report outlines the process and methodology BerryDunn used to conduct the assessment of the police culture and practices of the OPPD. The analysis provided by BerryDunn is balanced, and it fairly represents the conditions, expectations, and desired outcomes studied, and those that prompted and drove this assessment. Where external data was used for comparison purposes, references have been provided.  

Portland, ME:  BerryDunn, 2022. 273p

By Edward Flynn, Debora Friedl, Keri Richardson, Monique Jenkins, Brenda Bond

In May of 2020, the City of Methuen, through a competitive bid, selected the CNA Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct a performance audit of the Methuen Police Department (MPD). In conducting this audit, the CNA team developed an objective and in-depth understanding of MPD’s operations in areas including budget, equipment, training, staffing levels, and processes (hiring, equipment acquisition, and development of policies and procedures). After the onset of the audit, the CNA audit team was made aware of concerns about department leadership, organizational culture, and department personnel morale. Although the City of Methuen did not originally contract with the CNA audit team to explore these issues, we expanded the scope of our inquiry and this report to reflect these emerging topics. The CNA audit team developed this report by reviewing department operations, policies, procedures, general orders, department data, and culture. The report includes findings and actionable recommendations that outline specific items for improvement related to different areas of department operation. To develop these, we compared MPD’s standard operating procedures with national best and evidence-based practices, Massachusetts Police Accreditation Standards, and practices of similar Massachusetts law enforcement agencies. The audit team also collected data from interviews and surveys of department personnel. This report presents the results, findings, and recommendations from the audit.

CNA's comprehensive assessment of MPD included an examination of the following:

•  Organizational structure and governance

• Budgeting and planning

• Operating policies and procedures

• Department culture

• Professional standards and accountability

As a result of this audit, our key findings include:

• MPD lacks a formal procedure or process for conducting a comprehensive review of policies and procedures on a regular basis.

• Members of the organization do not trust the department’s use of the assessment center to make promotional decisions because there seem to be conflicting interests involved in the process.

• The MPD’s high number of assigned specialist positions is not warranted, given its size and operations.

• There is widespread perception that favoritism affects management and discipline decisions within the MPD.

Arlington, CA: CNA, 2021. 70p.

By Tom Christoff, Benjamin Carleton, and Theron Bowman

The ability of a police department to act in a fair and just manner is vitally important to creating internal and external trust, which in turn increases the perception of legitimacy by those who work for the department and those the department serves. Law enforcement agencies across the U.S. have faced increased scrutiny from the public in the last several years, with the events of 2020 exacerbating already simmering community relationships. The City of Little Rock has experienced recent issues of internal and external legitimacy stemming from the officer-involved shooting of Bradley Blackshire, a Black man, who was killed by a Little Rock Police Department (LRPD) officer in February 2019. The incident, in which Mr. Blackshire was fired upon at least 15 times, led not only to backlash from the public, but also internal strife within the LRPD. Since the February 2019 incident, the City of Little Rock, LRPD, the Chief of Police, and other members of LRPD have been the subjects of various lawsuits. In response to calls from members and leadership of the LRPD for an investigation, the City of Little Rock, through a competitive bid, selected CNA’s Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct an independent audit of the LRPD. This report details the findings and recommendations of this targeted audit of the LRPD. The audit team used a variety of sources, including policies, training records, administrative data, and focus groups and interviews with LPRD personnel to assess the department. Throughout this report we identify both strengths and weaknesses of LRPD’s operations with in the following areas:

1. Personnel policies and procedures

2. Training and professional standards

3. Accountability system data

4. Performance evaluations

5. Promotional process

6. De-escalation

7. Cultural competency

8. Harassment

9. Nepotism

10. Handling of private and confidential information

11. Early Intervention System

12. Body-worn cameras

13. Vehicle pursuits

14. Asset forfeiture

15. Take-home vehicle

Overall, this assessment will help LRPD standardize processes and metrics related to these topic areas, ultimately improving officers’ and community members’ levels of trust in the department.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 104p.

By Zoë Thorkildsen, Bridgette Bryson, Emma Wohl, Kalani Johnson, Rodney Monroe, and Steve Rickman 

In late 2020, the City of North Charleston hired CNA to conduct a racial bias assessment of the North Charleston Police Department (NCPD). Beginning in March 2021, CNA undertook a comprehensive assessment of NCPD’s policies and practices, focusing on assessing racially biased practices and procedures. Assessments such as these, which touch on more than racial and social justice matters, help police departments gauge the status of their community relationships, especially amongst minority and disenfranchised communities. In addition, the assessment can help identify policies and practices that may unintentionally negatively affect the community, especially those who feel they have been marginalized. Through this assessment, the CNA team developed a strong objective understanding of NCPD’s operations in various areas including law enforcement operations, community-oriented policing practices, complaints, training, oversight and accountability, and recruitment, hiring, and promotions. We developed this report by reviewing community engagement programming documents, strategic plans, training lesson plans, training curriculum, general orders, department data, and sentiments from interviews with community members and NCPD personnel and community listening sessions. This report includes findings and associated actionable recommendations for the department. In developing our recommendations, we assessed the NCPD’s policy manual against emerging best practices.

CNA’s comprehensive assessment of NCPD included an examination of the following:

• Law enforcement operations

• Community-oriented policing practices

• Complaints

• Recruitment, hiring, and promotions

• Training

• Oversight and accountability

This assessment includes 67 findings and 139 recommendations. Our key findings include:

• Racial disparities are present in many of NCPD’s interactions with the community, indicative
  of potential systemic, organizational, or individual bias, and these disparities are deeply felt
  by the community.

• Community members have substantial concerns regarding NCPD’s police presence and
  perceived over-enforcement of certain individuals, community groups, and neighborhoods.

• NCPD’s School Resource Officer Program has room to improve to better serve the youth of
  the North Charleston community.

• NCPD lacks proper translation services and information for Spanish-speaking residents in the
  community.

• Although NCPD emphasizes community-oriented policing practices, not all officers in the
  department have embraced the importance of community policing.

• Members of the North Charleston community have expressed a desire to better understand
  the roles, responsibilities, policies, practices, and operations of the department.

• Many community members have not filed complaints even after negative experiences with
  NCPD personnel, and the complaint process is confusing to most.
  • NCPD has a strong commitment to hiring and retaining personnel that reflect the ethnic,
  racial, and gender composition of the North Charleston community. They have an established
  plan to specifically recruit women and people of color.

• NCPD’s officers have not been consistently trained in topics of critical importance for 21st
  century policing.

• Community members expressed high confidence in Chief Burgess and his abilities to
  meaningfully engage with the community.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 124p.

By Zoë Thorkildsen, Bryce Peterson, Keri Richardson, Monique Jenkins, Allie Land, Jocelyn Cox, Bill Komiss, and Ed Flynn

Goals and Objectives

This analysis will achieve the following:

• Recommend staffing resources that can effectively and efficiently meet the demand for service.

• Review internal business processes and identify gaps and areas for improvement.

• Inform needs for resource allocations that are aligned with City needs and demand for public safety services.

• Position the MPD for future success by providing the tools to further adapt staffing and processes to future changes in demand for service.

Areas of Focus and Approach

Our report is organized into four major focus areas: staffing analysis, operations analysis, and problem nature code analysis, and business processes analysis.

Staffing Analysis

Using a workload-based approach, CNA produced estimates of the staffing required to support the MPD’s current patrol workloads and evaluated the use of different shift lengths. In addition, we analyzed breakouts by specific call response types to estimate the effects of changing response policies (e.g., implementing alternate response models for mental health calls and property crimes) on staffing needs.

Operations Analysis 

Using data collected from personnel interviews as well as review of the literature and peer agency practices, CNA assessed MPD operations and policies, including the use of one- versus two-person patrols, relative levels of civilianization, alternative response models (which also have implications for the staffing analysis), and information technology enterprise system use.

Problem Nature Code Analysis

Using calls-for-service data, including 9-1-1 call data, CNA reviewed the use of problem nature codes in the MECC using an exploratory descriptive analytical approach.

Business Process Analysis

Using information from personnel interviews as well as review of operational documents, CNA assessed business processes in the MECC, Patrol Bureau, specialty units, and the investigative functions at MPD. We used a process mapping and pain points identification approach to map how business processes currently function and areas to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of these processes.

Across each of these focus areas, CNA relied on both quantitative and qualitative data from the MPD and MECC. These data sources included calls-for-service and 9-1-1 call data from 2016 through 2020, staffing data, documentation of MPD and MECC policies and procedures (including training materials), and information gathered through interviews with MPD and MECC personnel. Data sources and analytical techniques are described in more detail in each of the sections below.

For most of the quantitative analyses in the report, we used data from 2016 through 2020. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as changes in policing practice and policy after the death of George Floyd, policing response in 2020 differed from preceding years in substantive ways. Specifically, in Minneapolis as well as other cities across the country, nearly all measures of police activity were lower in 2020. However, we included 2020 in our analyses for the following reasons:

• Despite being unusual, 2020 represents the most recent year of data available at the time we performed analysis, and timely data are almost always preferable to older data.

• For the majority of our analyses, we relied on a five-year period of data, and thus the inclusion of 2020 did not drive the results.

• Trends seen in 2020 continued into 2021 for agencies nationwide; it is unclear whether or when police activity levels will return to pre-2020 levels, so to discount 2020 data as irrelevant would be improper.

Overview of the Report

This report contains six sections, including this introductory section. Following this section are sections presenting analysis, findings, and recommendations related to the staffing analysis, operations analysis, problem nature code analysis, and business processes analysis. The report closes with a brief conclusion section.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2022. 84p.

By Hildy Saizow, Valerie Schmitt, Bridgette Bryson, Rodney Monroe, and Steven Rickman

Community collaboration is at the heart of policing in the 21st century. Based on this premise, the City of Tulsa developed 77 recommendations for implementing community policing in its jurisdiction. These recommendations closely followed the substance and format of The Final Report of The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, a national report developed by policing experts and community collaborators in 2015. In order to determine whether the Tulsa Police Department (TPD) is making progress in this area, the City of Tulsa hired CNA’s Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct a community policing evaluation; the project started in November 2020. CNA used the community-based participatory action research (CBPAR) model as the basis of the evaluation approach to promote the inclusion of input from a diverse range of TPD officers and community stakeholders from across the City of Tulsa. Four Tulsans with experience working with different community groups served as community co-researchers on the evaluation team. The goal of the Tulsa Community Policing Evaluation was to gain an objective and in-depth understanding of TPD’s community policing practices. More specifically, the evaluation was designed to determine whether TPD has made progress in collaborating with the community, identify what community policing should look like in Tulsa, and develop a roadmap for how to achieve the community policing vision. A key part of the evaluation was a community consultation process to get input, insights, and perspectives on policing and community safety issues. The process included individual interviews, focus groups, community meetings and dialogues, and a community survey. The evaluation also involved the collection and review of documents pertaining to community policing and an analysis of crime, calls for service, demographic, and complaint data. This report presents insightful findings about community policing and actionable recommendations that TPD and the City of Tulsa can implement in order for TPD to become an effective and forward-leaning community policing organization. The 54 recommendations found in this report are organized by the six 21st Century Policing pillars—building trust and legitimacy, policy and oversight, technology and social media, community policing and crime reduction, training and education, and officer wellness and safety. These recommendations are based on the insights and perspectives learned through the community consultation, findings of The Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, the evaluation team’s knowledge of best practices and their experiences working in police agencies nationwide, and police reforms in cities where reforms are driven by teams of policing experts and criminal justice researchers.

Our key evaluation findings include the following: TPD has made positive changes and progress in many areas, including support for crime victims, relations with Hispanic community members, body-worn camera implementation, formation of the Community Engagement Unit, creation of Community Advisory Boards (CABs), implementation of new collaborative partnerships, and establishment of the Tulsa Sobering Center (TSC) as a jail diversion program. TPD’s current emphasis on the term “collaborative policing” sets just the right tone for community policing in Tulsa. Officers and community members alike express that trust in policing is lower in marginalized communities. There are widespread perceptions in the community that TPD engages in disparities in how Black neighborhoods and individuals are treated. Many community members expressed frustration, saying that they know very little about the department’s decisions and changes, and that they would like to see more transparency in many areas of TPD’s operations. The creation of CABs is an important step forward, but the boards lack community leadership and transparency. TPD’s performance evaluation system does not currently reflect the principles and practices of collaborative policing. TPD can use technology solutions to benefit community policing efforts. TPD does not currently have an accessible, dynamic, searchable website to provide information to the public. Many officers do not see community policing as part of their job. Community members expressed that TPD officers do not engage in enough casual, non-enforcement interactions with the community. TPD has a wide range of training courses relevant to community policing but lacks an overall vision and process to integrate training courses across training domains to support a holistic approach to community policing. Officer wellness programs and proactive activities support more effective community engagement.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2022. 120p.

By Rachel Johnston, Daniel S. Lawrence, Benjamin Carleton, Harold Medlock, Thomas Christoff, Keri Richardson, and Scott E. Wolfe

The ability of a police department to act in a fair and just manner is vitally important to creating internal and external trust, which in turn increases the perception of legitimacy by those who work for the department and those the department serves. Law enforcement agencies across the US have faced increased scrutiny from the public in the last several years, with the events of 2020 exacerbating already simmering community relationships. The City of East Lansing, through a competitive bid process, selected CNA’s Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct an assessment of fair and impartial policing in the East Lansing Police Department (ELPD). This report details the findings and recommendations of this assessment of the ELPD. The assessment team used a variety of sources, including policies, training records, administrative data, employee surveys, and interviews with ELPD personnel to assess the department. Throughout this report we identify both strengths and weaknesses of the ELPD’s operations within the following areas:

1. Organizational Justice and Culture

2. Community Relations, Interactions, and Perspectives

3. Training and Technology

4. Traffic Enforcement

5. Use of Force and Complaints

6. Early Intervention System

In this executive summary, we present a summary of the findings of our assessment and a summary of the key recommendations offered to the ELPD and the city. We encourage interested individuals to read the details in the body of this report, where they will find detailed the supporting evidence associated with our 72 findings and 92 recommendations. See Appendix E for the full list of findings and recommendations. Through review of policy, procedures, and practices, as well as collected and analyzed data, the assessment team discovered the following key findings:

Summary of Key Findings

ELPD Data

• The manual entry of information into the ELPD use-of-force report creates data inconsistencies.

• The ELPD does not collect all necessary information important to use-of-force events.

• The method ELPD uses to record information pertaining to uses of force does not allow for each specific combination of event, involved officer, type of force, sustained injuries, and involved community member to be assessed.

• Demographic information collected during a traffic stop cannot easily be connected to traffic stop information in the calls-for-service database.

Organizational Justice and Culture

• Several ELPD policies appear to use boilerplate language that is not sufficiently tailored to ELPD.

• Several ELPD policies are poorly written.

• Some ELPD policies include language that serves as an accountability escape clause.

• Some ELPD processes rely on the discretion of the Chief of Police, which at times may be unnecessary or inappropriate.

• Morale among ELPD employees is reported to be low.

• About half of ELPD survey respondents feel that ELPD’s procedure for investigating complaints is not a fair process.

Community Relations, Interactions, and Perspectives

• ELPD Policy 300-21 (Interacting with People Who Have Mental Illness/EIP) requires significant revision.

• ELPD Policy 400-11 (Juvenile Matters) predominantly focuses on processes and considerations for juvenile suspects and does not adequately explain processes and considerations for juvenile victims and witnesses.

• ELPD Policies 100-12 (Media Relations/Officer Involved Critical Incident Information Sharing) and 47-13 (Social Networking/Social Media) do not indicate whether ELPD operates any official social media accounts or what the protocols would be for the operation of such accounts.

• ELPD Policy 3-20 (Civil Disorders) requires significant revision. The current policy includes outdated practices and is not consistent with best practices.

• Several ELPD survey respondents noted that they often do not feel supported by community groups and local stakeholders.

• Trust between community and police could further be strengthened.

• The community perceives a disconnect between the ELPD and the City Council and Independent Police Oversight Commission.

• The ELPD staffing may not be adequate for the current requirements and future community initiatives.

Training and Technology

• Less Lethal and Defensive Tactics are high liability and should be addressed separately in policy.
  The firearms training and assessment policy language is unclear, and it does not specifically state what encompasses the firearms training and assessment program.

• ELPD Policy 100-21 (Annual In-Service Training) has numerous areas that could use improvement and strengthening.

• Overall, ELPD Policy 300-22 (Mobile Video Recorder) does provide a framework for the department’s operations but could be improved in areas such that would strengthen clarity for procedures related to transparency and accountability.

• Overall, many of the policies related to technology are vague and left room for ambiguity and alternative interpretation.

• Several ELPD survey respondents feel that training could be improved to help officers be prepared for some of the critical situations they face in the field.

• The East Lansing Diversity, Equity, Inclusion training provided at the City level by Truth & Titus was a missed opportunity for police staff.

Traffic Enforcement

• ELPD Policy 300-26 ([Traffic] Enforcement Options) is very comprehensive and provides good direction to officers.

• White drivers accounted for the majority of traffic stops from August 2021 to July 2022, although Black drivers were the second-most stopped individuals. The number of traffic stops declined from August 2021 to July 2022 by similar degrees across each racial group of the driver.

• The amount of stops by race relative to the population indicates that Black drivers are stopped to a greater extent than White drivers; however, the “veil of darkness” analysis finds that Black drivers are stopped by a statistically nonsignificant magnitude of 1.08 compared to non-Black drivers. Furthermore, the risk of being stopped as a Black driver during the daylight portion of the inter-twilight period is similar to stops for Black drivers made during the dark period, and this difference is not statistically different when compared to all other drivers.

Use of Force and Complaints

• ELPD Policy 100-3 (Complaint Intake and Management) requires significant revision, as the policy does not adequately and clearly describe the complaint intake and management process.

• ELPD Policy 12-20 (Response to Resistance) positively emphasizes the sanctity of life and the importance of de-escalation, but the policy can go a step further.

• ELPD Policy 12-20 (Response to Resistance) problematically allows for the use of head stabilization.

• Eighteen percent of ELPD officers were involved in three or more complaints during the period analyzed.

• Twenty-two percent of ELPD officers were involved in 7.5 or more use-of-force events per year during the period analyzed.

• One-quarter of the use-of-force events involved disorderly conduct or a mental health investigation, while arrests that involved offenses against family and children, burglary/home invasion, and obstruction-type events each resulted in a use of force more than 50 percent of the time.

• The ELPD predominately uses low levels of force in its use-of-force events; 62 percent of the types of uses of force involved either a handcuffing, a control hold or takedown, or other physical contact. However, the other largest type of use of force, which accounted for 24 percent, was a weapon display.

• Black community members are arrested more frequently than would be predicted based on their proportion of the East Lansing population compared with White community members. Among those arrested, use-of-force levels were slightly elevated for Black community members compared with White community members. However, when controlling for event characteristics and demographics in more rigorous statistical analyses, these differences are not observed.

Early Intervention System

• The ELPD’s aggregate-threshold approach to its early intervention system (EIS) is overall reasonable given agency characteristics.

• Despite being considered wellness oriented, the ELPD’s EIS approach has the potential to be considered disciplinary.

• The ELPD unnecessarily limits the input of officers’ direct supervisors in evaluating and acting upon an EIS alert.

• The ELPD’s EIS approach can be expanded to include a peer-comparison element.

• ELPD Policy 200-7 (Early Warning System) should be revised.

• The training on EIS focuses on the technical process of navigating the Guardian Tracking software.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2022. 145p.

By Bridgette Bryson and Zoë Thorkildsen

Law enforcement agencies across the country continuously face challenges due to the ever-changing nature of policing, especially with recent events including the deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor. These recent events have called into question the objectivity and fairness of policing practices. These developments  signal a need for strengthened police-community relations, and the Town of Niskayuna, New York, and the Niskayuna Police Department (NPD) are working hard to ensure their community has positive relationships with their police department. This audit provides baseline information to inform the Town of Niskayuna’s response to Governor Andrew M. Cuomo’s Executive Order No. 203: New York State Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative.1 In December of 2020, the Town of Niskayuna developed a contract with CNA’s Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct a racial bias audit of the NPD. This assessment focused on  policies and practices, while also touching on more than racial matters. These types of assessments can help police departments gauge the status of community  relationships and work towards improvement. CNA designed this racial bias audit to accomplish the following:

• Assess NPD’s internal operations, policies, and procedures to detect the presence of implicit bias and systemic racial bias.

• Collect and analyze data related to traffic stops, use of force, and other police officer/civilian interactions to determine disparate outcomes for Black and Brown community members.

• Assess compliance with existing police reform policies initiated by NPD.

• Provide actionable recommendations (e.g., realistic within legal, budgetary, and organizational constraints) for reforms that reduce or eliminate racial and implicit biases in policing deployments, strategies, policies, procedures, and practices. These recommendations focus on specific, measurable issues. Such recommendations must meet the following requirements:

  • Promote community engagement, transparency, professionalism, accountability, community inclusion, fairness, effectiveness, and public trust; 

  • Be guided by evidence-based best practices and community expectations; and 

  • Are likely, given meaningful organizational support, to reduce or eliminate racial and implicit biases in policing deployments, strategies, policies,  procedures and practices.

Based on CNA’s review of policies, procedures, and practices, as well as data provided by the NPD, our key findings included the following:

• NPD’s traffic stops data collection process should be refined to help the department further understand its activity for all outcomes and why the activities may look different over time.

• NPD lacks body-worn cameras (BWCs) for its officers and should obtain funding to outfit all officers, patrol officers at a minimum, with the cameras.

• NPD’s complaint process is not clearly written and is poorly understood by officers and community members. NPD should clarify the process and structure it to be open and transparent.

• Currently, there is no disciplinary matrix in place to make certain that officers receive equitable discipline outcomes, to ensure there are no disparities among discipline across race, ethnicity, and gender.

• NPD does not utilize an early intervention system to identify behavioral issues, signs of job exhaustion, and training concerns that could be handled in a proactive manner before an issue arises.

• NPD’s newly revised use of force policy is a very clear and detailed policy that defines when different types of force are justified.

• Currently, there is no formal tracking system for use of force incidents other than the department’s paper filing system. Creating a database to track these incidents will allow the department to begin developing annual summary reports of all use of force in the department.

• NPD currently does not have a strong commitment to community policing practices; however, personnel are very interested and open to working to employ proactive policing strategies, as opposed to reactive.

• NPD does not have designated personnel that oversee the department’s community engagement efforts; however, this has not weakened the trusting relationship expressed by community members and NPD officers.

• NPD personnel have not received sufficient training in the past; however, the new administration is prioritizing training for all officers in various topic areas.

• There are no formal recruitment plans in place, especially for people of color, women, and youth in the community.

• NPD personnel lack trust in the promotion and specialty assignment process.

• NPD does not have a performance evaluation process in place; not all officers receive informal feedback on their performance.

Over the next 12 to 18 months, NPD will work with the Town of Niskayuna officials and community leaders to digest, prioritize, and implement the recommendations proposed in this report, reflecting its dedication to improving community trust, eliminating racial disparities and bias, providing more transparency, and creating a collaborative working environment. We recommend that the NPD and the Town of Niskayuna seek an independent firm to help implement the proposed recommendations and track NPD’s progress. 

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 88p.