By Hayli Millar, Yvon Dandurand , Marcella Chan With the Assistance of Abeni Steegstra, Raelyn O’Hara, and Kia Neilsen 

The international community is attempting to eliminate forced labour and the worst forms of child labour, including hazardous work likely to harm children’s health, safety, or morals. Child and forced labour can be present at various points of a company’s supply chains, often out of sight of buyers, labour inspectors, and consumers. Many governments have resorted to legislation to motivate companies to be more transparent about their supply chains and to adopt due diligence measures to prevent child and forced labour. At present, there is no specific supply chain transparency legislation in Canada. Canadian private companies under applicable securities legislation do not have an obligation to disclose material labour exploitation risks within their supply chains. Given the complex, evolving and often obscure nature of supply chains, too many Canadian companies fail to offer consumers any meaningful environment, social or governance disclosure. As a result, consumers are unaware of whether the products and services at local Canadian retailers have connections to human rights abuses or detrimental environmental practices. At the same time, companies increasingly feel the pressure from investors, consumers, NGOs, industry associations and others to disclose and address the risks of labour exploitation in their supply chains. To prevent and eliminate child and forced labour, a new statutory framework may be needed to clearly define the transparency and due diligence obligations of enterprises throughout their operations and supply chains. In their efforts to prevent and combat child and forced labour globally, national and regional governments are increasingly turning to mandated disclosure (transparency) and due diligence regimes as an indirect method of regulating corporate behaviour throughout various supply chains. Recent disclosure laws require companies to provide information on their global supply chains, including due diligence measures that they have taken to prevent human rights violations by third-party suppliers. Some of these laws now extend beyond targeted due diligence in preventing child and forced labour and apply more comprehensively to the prevention of human rights violations and harmful environment practices. There is also a growing tendency for these laws to impose some specific due diligence or duty of care obligations on the companies they cover. Effective monitoring, investigation and enforcement mechanisms then become necessary to ensure accountability, along with ensuring access to judicial and non-judicial remedies for those whose rights have been violated. The thematic focus of this Guide on forced labour and child labour is intentional and timely given that 2021 is the International Year for the Elimination of Child Labour – 2021.1 The Guide was developed to assist policy makers and legislators, in Canada and elsewhere, in making policy choices and designing  legislation that will achieve an optimum impact on the elimination of child and forced labour. The Guide presents and discusses a range of legislative options and examples that policymakers and legislators may wish to consider in the development of supply chains transparency and due diligence legislation. The goal being to establish a statutory duty of care requiring businesses to take reasonable steps to avoid the use of forced labour, child labour, and human trafficking in their operations abroad, and to report publicly on these due diligence steps and their impact. The Guide fits within the broader international anti-slavery policy developments of the last decade or so, including the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the global standard for corporate human rights obligations. The development of effective legislation may be more urgent than ever given the fact that the major supply chain disruptions caused by climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic are not only responsible for slowing down the economic recovery, but also weakening the capacity of enterprises to ensure that their supply chains are not buoyed by child or forced labour. As businesses embark on the journey to recovery, supply-chain leaders are resorting to various strategies to make their supply chains far more flexible and agile, including dual sourcing of raw materials and near-shoring, or regionalizing their supply chains. As business leaders are seeking to deeply and quickly transform their supply chains, new risks emerge that must be managed in order to prevent child labour, forced labour and other human rights violations within their supply chains. At this time, many businesses are looking to establish and improve their dedicated supply-chain riskmanagement functions and processes and adopt voluntary standards for environmental, social and governance. They could be persuaded to include due diligence and reporting practices in these processes to manage the risks and potential liability associated with suppliers and partners that are less scrupulous about preventing human rights abuses. Failing to address human rights issues can create significant business risk.2 There is certainly a lot of interest among businesses in how to measure and report their social impacts and many of them have adopted voluntary standards. However, states must act to ensure that businesses do more than “launder their reputation”.3 The Guide is divided into two main parts. A first part establishes a context for the guidance offered, including a cursory review of the Canadian legislative landscape and the international policy framework for responsible business conduct. A second part offers a discussion of the various choices a legislator must consider in designing a supply chains transparency and due diligence statute that can hold business enterprises accountable for their efforts to prevent child labour and forced labour. That second part has six main sections: 1. The purpose, scope, and application of the legislation 2. The designation of the entities to be covered by the legislation 3. Creating disclosure and reporting obligations 4. Creating specific due diligence and accountability obligations 5. Complaints and grievance mechanisms, and potential remedies 6. Responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the law. The specific due diligence obligations imposed by the legislation The reader will also find two tables at the end of the Guide, one summarizing existing international standards and policy guidance instruments and one summarizing the main features of various relevant national legislation. For those readers already familiar with the Canadian context and the applicable international legal standards, they may find it easier to start with Part 2 of the Guide.   

Vancouver, BC:  International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy , 2022. 83p.  

By United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

The following passage from the document contains multiple links embedded in the text: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) conducts Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (RVAs) for the federal civilian executive branch (FCEB), high priority private and public sector critical infrastructure (CI) operators, and select state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) stakeholders. Concurrently, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) conducts RVAs on maritime CI operated by SLTT and private-sector organizations. The RVA is intended to assess the entity's network capabilities and network defenses against known threats. In Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23), CISA and the USCG conducted a combined total of '143' RVAs across multiple CI sectors. [...] The goal of the RVA analysis is to develop effective strategies to improve the security posture of FCEB, CI, maritime, and SLTT stakeholders. During each RVA, CISA and the USCG collect data through remote and onsite actions. This data is combined with national threat and vulnerability information to provide organizations with actionable remediation recommendations prioritized by risk of compromise. CISA designed RVAs to identify vulnerabilities threat actors could exploit to compromise network security controls. After completing an RVA, CISA and the USCG provide the assessed entity a final report that includes recommendations, specific findings, potential mitigations, and technical attack path details. The FY23 reports provided these general observations: [1] Assessors completed their most successful attacks via common methods, such as phishing, valid accounts, and default credentials. [2] Assessors used a variety of tools and techniques CISA has captured in previous RVA analyses to successfully conduct common attacks. [3] Many organizations across varying CI sectors exhibited the same vulnerabilities. [4] CISA assessment personnel used common vulnerabilities facilitated by shortcomings in secure by design and default principles and other misconfigurations to compromise systems."

UNITED STATES. Government. Washington DC. SEP, 2024. 24p.

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Election Assistance Commission; United States. Department Of Homeland Security

From the document: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) prepared this overview to help partners defend against insider threat concerns that could materialize during the 2024 election cycle. For years, federal, state, local, and private sector partners nationwide have worked closely together to support state and local officials in safeguarding election infrastructure from cyber, physical, and insider threats. Because of these efforts, there is no evidence that malicious actors changed, altered, or deleted votes or had any impact on the outcome of elections. Over the past several years, the election infrastructure community has experienced multiple instances of election system access control compromises conducted by insider threats. While there is no evidence that malicious actors impacted election outcomes, it is important that election stakeholders at all levels are aware of the risks posed by insider threats and the steps that they can take to identify and mitigate these threats. This document outlines several recent examples of election security-related insider threats, discusses potential scenarios that could arise during the 2024 election cycle, and provides recommendations for how to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; , et al. 2024. 9p

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

NCHRP Research Report 1111/BTSCRP Research Report 12 presents a toolbox to help highway safety practitioners diagnose contributing factors leading to crashes for use in selecting appropriate countermeasures. To develop this toolbox, the research team conducted a systematic literature review; developed comprehensive evaluation and analysis procedures, methods, and tools; and conducted a workshop to demonstrate the use of the draft toolbox to receive feedback from practitioners. This publication will be of interest to state departments of transportation and other stakeholders concerned with diagnosing contributing factors leading to crashes for use in selecting appropriate countermeasures.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27890.

UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

From the document: "Over the last 3 years, we have more than doubled our global health partnerships--working directly with 50 countries to ensure they can more effectively prevent, detect, and control outbreaks. And we are working with partners to support an additional 50 countries to save even more lives and minimize economic losses. With strong bipartisan support from Congress, we also championed the creation of the Pandemic Fund, a new international body that has already catalyzed $2 billion in financing from 27 contributors, including countries, foundations, and philanthropies, to build stronger global health security capabilities. We are working to make life-saving medicines and vaccines more rapidly available in health emergencies, including through supporting Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations. And we are leading efforts to ensure international financial institutions, such as the World Bank Group, scale up lending for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response because health security, economic security, climate security, and national security are all related. This new Global Health Security Strategy lays out the actions the United States will take over the next 5 years to ensure we continue this progress[.]"

United States. White House Office. APR, 2024. 64p.

By Alexandra Gannoni , Alexandra Voce, Sarah Napier, Hayley Boxall and Dana Thomsen

This study reviews initiatives that aim to prevent child sexual abuse material (CSAM) offending, including evidence of effectiveness. Information was sourced via a literature search and input from an international expert advisory group. The study identified 74 initiatives in 16 countries, and 34 eligible studies measuring implementation and effectiveness.

The CSAM offending prevention initiatives identified in the study include helplines, therapeutic treatment and psychoeducation, online self-management courses, education and awareness campaigns, and other forms of support. Importantly, findings indicate that media and social media campaigns have successfully reached large numbers of offenders, both detected and undetected. While outcomes of programs are mixed, findings indicate that prevention initiatives can encourage help-seeking, reduce risk factors for offending, enhance protective factors, and reduce contact sexual offending against children. Findings also suggest that initiatives aimed at contact child sexual abuse offenders are not necessarily effective in reducing CSAM offending. Evaluations of initiatives aimed specifically at CSAM offending show promise but are limited methodologically. Further and more robust evaluations are required to determine their effect on CSAM use.

Research Report no. 28. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.2023. 125p.

By Rafael A. Mangual

  After a long period of continuous violent-crime declines throughout the U.S.—spanning from the mid-1990s through the early 2010s—many American cities are now seeing significant increases in violence. Nationally, in 2015 and 2016, murders rose nearly 11% and 8%, respectively. The national homicide rate declined slightly in 2017 and 2018, before ticking upward in 2019. In 2020, the nation saw its largest single-year spike in homicides in at least 100 years—which was followed by another increase in murders in 2021, according to CDC data and FBI estimates. In the last few years, a number of cities have seen murders hit an all-time high. In addition to homicides, the risk of other types of violent victimizations rose significantly, as well. While various analyses estimated a slight decline in homicides for the country in 2022, many American cities still find themselves dealing with levels of violence far higher than they were a decade ago. While violent crime—particularly murder—is the most serious due in large part to its social costs, there have also been worrying increases in crimes such as retail theft, carjacking, and auto theft, as well as in other visible signs of disorder in public spaces (from open-air drug use and public urination to illegal street racing and large-scale looting and riots). Although several contributing factors are likely, this general deterioration in public safety and order was unquestionably preceded and accompanied by a virtually unidirectional shift toward leniency and away from accountability in the policing, prosecutorial, and criminal-justice policy spaces. That shift is evidenced by, among other things, three major trends in enforcement: • A 25% decline in the number of those imprisoned during 2011–2212 • A 15% decline in the number of those held in jail during 2010–211 • A 26% decline in the number of arrests effected by law-enforcement officers during 2009–1914 Notable contributing factors to the decline in enforcement include: • A sharp uptick in public scrutiny and interventions—in the form of investigations and legal action taken by state attorneys general and the federal Department of Justice—against local law-enforcement agencies • The worsening of an ongoing police recruitment and retention crisis, particularly in large urban departments • The electoral success of the so-called progressive prosecutor movement, which, by 2022, had won seats in 75 jurisdictions, representing more than 72 million U.S. residents • Perhaps most important, the adoption of a slew of criminal-justice and policing reform measures at all levels of government Those who are skeptical of the criminal-justice reform movement have devoted most of their efforts to arguing against the movement’s excesses and explaining why it would be unwise to enact certain measures. Less effort has been devoted to the extremely important task of articulating a positive agenda for regaining what has been lost on the safety and order front. This paper seeks to add to that positive agenda for safety by proposing three model policies that, if adopted, would help, directly and indirectly, stem the tide of rising crime and violence, primarily by maximizing the benefits that attend the incapacitation of serious criminals (especially repeat offenders) and by encouraging the collection and public reporting of data that can inform the public about the downside risks that are glossed over by decarceration and depolicing activists ....

New York: Manhattan Institute. 2023, 19pg

By Peter Leasure

This study, co-produced by the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center and the York College of Pennsylvania School of Behavioral Sciences and Education Criminology and Criminal Justice Department, evaluated the impact of York City’s Group Violence Initiative on firearm incidents, violent crime incidents, and recidivism. The results of the primary model did not support the hypothesis that the intervention reduced firearm incidents in York City. The results of the primary model also did not support the hypothesis that the intervention reduced violent crime incidents in York City. However, potential violations of assumptions for time series designs and inconsistent regression results did not support strong conclusions regarding the effect of the intervention on the rate of firearm incidents and violent crime incidents. The recidivism rate for individuals involved in call-in meetings was 83.33%. Data recording procedures and data quality meaningfully improved over the course of the project. These improvements allow York City to be well-positioned for future evaluation projects and data-driven policy shifts.

Drug Enforcement and Policy Center. September 2023, 66pg