By Caitlin McCulloch, Brian A. Jackson, Sameer M. Siddiqi, Jordan R. Reimer, Emily Allendorf

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has changed and expanded its efforts in violence prevention in the past five years. DHS asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) to examine the change in efforts by the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) and its predecessor organizations in preventing terrorism and other violence and explore options for CP3 moving forward.

In the United States, the full potential value of countering violent extremism (CVE) has never been realized because of key disconnects between the intent of CVE programs and the realities of their implementation. Although it might not have been the intent, efforts singled out and stigmatized American Muslim communities. The disconnect between stated intention and reality stimulated potent opposition to CVE as a concept. In response, the federal government decided to make significant changes in its approaches in this policy area. In late 2021, DHS asked HSOAC to examine and characterize the changes that had been made, providing an outside viewpoint on the extent of change and how those changes had responded to the concerns about CVE efforts. This report documents the researchers' approach, findings, and recommendations.

Key Findings

• There has been enormous growth in CP3, and it is currently working on developing and standardizing the institutions and processes that are required to support a larger organization. These efforts include extensive standardization efforts in training and evaluation of CP3's work. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) posed some problems, including making it difficult to create a cohesive whole with new personnel, but also presented some new opportunities, such as an increased ability to reach a diversity of stakeholders digitally.

• CP3 and the government more broadly have made major shifts in the rhetorical framing of their work, toward a public health–informed approach, a framing that aligns more closely with the intent of their programs. Although there is still discussion of the implications of a public health–informed approach, this shift was reflected in both interviews and official documentation.

• In line with this rhetorical shift is the expansion in the diversity of stakeholders, both in engagement and in grantees, including evidence of a shift away from criminal justice and security partners, although they remain important collaborators.

• External stakeholders remain skeptical, but there are some signs of increasing trust in relevant actors outside government.

Recommendations

• Continue efforts to build and sustain consistency in messages and activities. Many external stakeholders noted the importance of rebuilding trust and that sustainable and continuous actions and relationships were essential for fostering that trust.

• Continue to codify and standardize internal office procedures—with rapid growth comes a renewed need for new internal institutions to keep all personnel on the same page.

• More clearly define the elements of a public health–informed approach and how they will be applied to violence prevention for CP3 programs and outreach. There are many definitions present in practitioner circles and the academic literature; choosing one and fully exploring the implications of the definition will be key for aligning stated CP3 goals with programmatic action.

• Invest further in program evaluation. The research team recognizes that it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness in this area, but, without standardized evaluation, supporting the impact of CP3 programs will be difficult.

• Commit to transparency and external communication. Transparency in actions taken and evidence collected, as well as communication with skeptical audiences, will be key in showing change and growth in CP3 and its activities to external actors and in further building trust with external audiences.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) are easily accessible to large numbers of people and have limited security or protective measures in place, making them vulnerable to attack. Examples include sports arenas, shopping centers, schools, transportation systems, and houses of worship. Although attacks on them are relatively rare, they result in significant loss of life and contribute to an atmosphere of fear throughout society. Researchers performed a landscape assessment of the threat to and major vulnerabilities of ST-CPs, existing security measures and initiatives, and ways to improve allocation of security resources. The researchers then developed a road map for future investments and made recommendations for improving ST-CP security and response to attacks. These recommendations include research, development, test, and evaluation priorities to improve prevention and protection, such as seeking methods of deterring and dissuading would-be attackers, more evaluation of the effectiveness of security measures, and developing a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces. In addition, they recommended funding and policy priorities focused on public education and training, providing additional resources to cross-organizational security teams and managers, and increasing funding for access control systems.

Key Findings

• The most-common motivations for attacks are personal, followed by terrorism and extremism.

• Education and private buildings are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs.

• Attacks on ST-CPs with large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, have the highest average lethality.

• Layered security strategies, in which measures work together, improve the chance that an attack will be prevented, halted, or mitigated.

• Tips from the public have prevented attacks. Public education on what to report and how, and support for threat assessment teams, would make tips more effective.

• Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient but need to be trained on and maintained.

• Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective. Training can make responses even more effective.

• Response command, control, and communications need to be improved. Alternatives to traditional, push-to-talk voice radio communications are needed.

• Security measures need more effectiveness and efficiency evaluations. The security community has growing interest in artificial intelligence (AI); evaluations of security systems with AI will be needed as these systems deploy.

Recommendations

• Find ways to deter and dissuade would-be attackers.

• Develop indicators of and education about suspicious seeking of weapons.

• Develop protocols and education for wellness checks.

• Further evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of security measures.

• Develop a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces, such as shopping malls and restaurants.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Review mass-shooting events to determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on soft targets or crowded places.

• Find ways to reduce the mass psychological effects of attacks, including societal fear and secondary trauma.

• Focus on basics, such as provision and maintenance of access control equipment and public education campaigns on what to look for and how to report it.

• Strengthen the system-based, layered security framework.

• Ensure that funding and policy priorities reflect research findings.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams and managers.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational security teams and managers.

• Fund and distribute updates of site security guidance documents and training.

• Fund access control systems

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 24p.

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to Correlation – European Harm Reduction Network (C-EHRN)

Drug consumption rooms (DCRs) are fixed or mobile spaces in which people who use drugs are provided with sterile drug use equipment and can use illicit drugs under the supervision of trained staff. They exist in several European countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico and the USA, and are usually located in areas where there is an open drug scene and injecting in public places is common. Their primary goal is to reduce morbidity and mortality by providing a safer environment for drug use and training clients in safer forms of drug use. Other explicit objectives may be providing a conduit to other care services and reducing public nuisance. A main aim of this report is to inform discussions on DCRs by examining the available evidence, as well as reviewing the various models being adopted and their characteristics. Two operational models are typically used in Europe: (1) integrated DCRs, operating within low-threshold facilities, where the supervision of drug use is just one of several services offered; and (2) specialised DCRs, which provide a narrower range of services directly related to supervised consumption. Services typically available within DCRs include: provision of a supervised environment for drug use; clean drug use equipment, including sterile syringes; and rapid interventions if overdose occurs. In addition, DCRs may offer counselling services; primary medical care; training for clients in safer forms of drug use, overdose awareness and the use of naloxone; and referral to social, healthcare and treatment services. Access to consumption facilities may be restricted to registered service users, and often certain conditions have to be met, for example minimum age and local residency. Typically, drugs used in these facilities must be obtained prior to entry. Drug dealing and drug sharing are not allowed within the facilities (staff may be required to call in the police if necessary), and staff can advise but do not directly assist clients in administering their drugs. As frontline, low-threshold services, drug consumption rooms are often among the first places where insights can be gained into new drug use patterns, and, thus, they also can have a role to play in the early identification of new and emerging trends among high-risk populations using their services. The operation and functioning of DCRs has adapted to changes in the profiles and needs of their target groups, and to new patterns of use, as well as to new types of drugs emerging on the market. DCRs may also therefore be well placed to identify and inform strategies to mitigate harms related to developments in the illicit drug market that present new health challenges.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 52p.

By Alexandra Gannoni , Alexandra Voce, Sarah Napier, Hayley Boxall and Dana Thomsen

This study reviews initiatives that aim to prevent child sexual abuse material (CSAM) offending, including evidence of effectiveness. Information was sourced via a literature search and input from an international expert advisory group. The study identified 74 initiatives in 16 countries, and 34 eligible studies measuring implementation and effectiveness.

The CSAM offending prevention initiatives identified in the study include helplines, therapeutic treatment and psychoeducation, online self-management courses, education and awareness campaigns, and other forms of support. Importantly, findings indicate that media and social media campaigns have successfully reached large numbers of offenders, both detected and undetected. While outcomes of programs are mixed, findings indicate that prevention initiatives can encourage help-seeking, reduce risk factors for offending, enhance protective factors, and reduce contact sexual offending against children. Findings also suggest that initiatives aimed at contact child sexual abuse offenders are not necessarily effective in reducing CSAM offending. Evaluations of initiatives aimed specifically at CSAM offending show promise but are limited methodologically. Further and more robust evaluations are required to determine their effect on CSAM use.

Research Report no. 28. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.2023. 125p.

By Anthony A. Braga, Cory Schnell, Brandon C. Welsh

Research Summary

Broken windows theory suggests that police can prevent serious crime by addressing social and physical disorder in neighborhoods. In many U.S. cities, recent increases in disorder, fear, and crime have initiated calls for an intensification of disorder policing efforts. Disorder policing programs can be controversial, with evaluations yielding conflicting results. Further, a growing number of descriptive analyses of aggressive order maintenance programs raise concerns over varied negative consequences, such as increased racial disparities in arrests of citizens. Systematic review and meta-analytic techniques were used to conduct an updated analysis of the effects of disorder policing on crime. Fifty-six eligible studies including 59 independent tests of disorder policing interventions were identified, representing almost twice the number included in the previous review. As part of the meta-analysis, new effect size metrics were used. The updated meta-analysis suggests that policing disorder strategies are associated with overall statistically significant crime reduction effects that spill over into surrounding areas. The strongest program effect sizes were generated by community and problem-solving interventions designed to change social and physical disorder conditions at crime hot spots. Conversely, aggressive order maintenance strategies did not generate significant crime reductions.

Policy Implications

The types of strategies used by police departments to address disorder seem to matter in controlling crime, and this holds important implications for police–community relations, justice, and crime prevention. Further research is needed to understand the key programmatic elements that maximize the capacity of these strategies to prevent crime.

Criminology & Public Policy. Early View, May 2024.

By David Weisburd, Clair V. Uding, Kiseong Kuen, and Beidi Dong 

Criminologists have long known that crime is highly concentrated—in most cities, approximately 50% of crime happens on only 5% of streets. As a result, many cities have effectively reduced crime by concentrating police resources in extremely high-crime “hot-spots.”

Despite calls for defunding the police, policing is necessary for public safety on hot-spot streets, and people who live on these streets recognize that. Indeed, in one survey in Phoenix, Arizona, the majority of residents of hot-spots streets said they wanted the amount of police on their block to be increased. But ultimately, the bedrock of social control of crime is not the police, but citizens who exercise informal social control.

The practice of community policing—which emphasizes building relationships with members of the community and allowing them to have a voice in defining which problems police should focus on—attempts to leverage this fact to enhance public safety. However, it is often assumed that high-crime hot spots are simply so chaotic and disordered that the residents are incapable of playing a key role in crime prevention.

We examined this assumption through a multiyear study of more than 300 hot-spot streets in Baltimore, Maryland (all of which were in the top 3% in rates of violent or drug crime in the city), as well as almost 50 “cold” streets, which had little to no crime, and 100 “cool” streets, which fell in the middle.

We found that common assumptions about hot spots—which we shared at the outset—are not accurate. Residents of hot-spot streets in Baltimore have strong social and network ties with their neighbors, and they exercise meaningful levels of informal social control. Even on the most crime-ridden blocks, there is potential for collaboration between residents and police.

Our findings suggest that it is time to think about how both informal and formal social control can work interactively to reduce crime. Hot-spots policing is an important first step, because the level of danger in these places can simply make it too dangerous for residents to exercise the type of informal social control that they would like. But residents of these streets, contrary to stereotypes of academics, policymakers, and practitioners, form an important resource for reducing crime on these streets through informal social control.

New York: Manhattan Institute 2024. 18p.