By

Sarah Charman

,

Jemma Tyson

Record numbers of police officers are voluntarily resigning in England and Wales yet there is a lack of research which analyses why. Findings from an analysis of 62 interviews with police leavers who voluntarily resigned from the police service within England and Wales between January 2021 and June 2022 suggest that officers are leaving primarily due to perceptions of organizational injustice which focus upon: a lack of voice; concerns about promotion/progression; poor leadership; and a lack of organizational flexibility. This paper takes this latter reason—organizational flexibility—as its focus and through an inductive analysis of these leavers’ voices, aims to both enrich the scarce qualitative academic literature on police workforce resignations and retention but also to offer significant evidence for future consideration of workforce optimization. The findings indicate that although sympathetic to operational policing complexities, participants were frustrated by organizational inflexibility. Three key areas were identified where the police service was perceived to be unsupportive or unreceptive—(a) dealing with additional needs, disabilities, or health issues of officers, (b) conflicts with non-work commitments, primarily those associated with childcare/parental responsibilities, and (c) supporting officers transitioning to part-time working. These structural barriers to effective workplace functioning were exacerbated by the cultural norms of overwork and ‘fitting in’ and were additionally particularly experienced by female resigners. The authors call for a challenge to the cultural barriers towards flexible working, the modelling of flexible working at all levels of the organization, and a focus on reciprocal flexibility between employer and employee. Until this issue can be tackled, it is argued that retention will continue to be an underestimated but significant site of inequality within policing.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Volume 18, 2024, paad104,

By Jonathan S. Masur, Aurélie Ouss, John Rappaport

We document and discuss the implications of a striking feature of modern American policing: the stasis of police labor forces. Using an original employment dataset assembled through public records requests, we show that, after the first few years on a job, officers rarely change employers, and intermediate officer ranks are filled almost exclusively through promotion rather than lateral hiring. Policing is like a sports league, if you removed trades and free agency and left only the draft in place. We identify both nonlegal and legal causes of this phenomenon—ranging from geographic monopolies to statutory and collectively bargained rules about pensions, rank, and seniority—and discuss its normative implications. On the one hand, job stability may encourage investment in training and expertise by agencies and officers alike; it may also attract some high-quality candidates, including candidates from underrepresented backgrounds, to the profession. On the other hand, low labor mobility can foster sclerosis in police departments, entrenching old ways of policing. Limited outside options may lead officers to stay in positions that suit them poorly, decreasing morale and productivity and potentially contributing to the scale of policing harms. In turn, the lack of labor mobility makes it all the more important to police officers to retain the jobs they have. This encourages them to insist on extensive labor protections and to enforce norms like the “blue wall of silence,” which exacerbate the problem of police misconduct. We suggest reforms designed to confer the advantages of labor mobility while ameliorating its costs..

Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper. Chicago: University of Chicago School of Law, Chicago Unbound, 2023. 60p.