By The U.S. Department of Justice

On May 24, 2022, a mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, shook the nation. In the aftermath of the tragedy, there was significant public criticism of the law enforcement response to the shooting. At the request of the then mayor of Uvalde, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the law enforcement response to the mass shooting. In providing a detailed accounting and critical assessment of the first responder actions in Uvalde, and the efforts since to ameliorate gaps and deficiencies in that response, this report is intended to build on the knowledge base for responding to incidents of mass violence. It also will identify generally accepted practices for an effective law enforcement response to such incidents. Finally, it is intended to help honor the victims and survivors of the Robb Elementary School tragedy. 

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2024. 610p.

By Grant Duwe

Key Points

• Despite pursuing a similar goal, the “what works” and desistance literatures have largely ignored and undervalued the contributions the other has made.

• The what works literature has been mostly quantitative and has consisted of program evaluations and meta-analyses, leading to the emergence of principles of effective correctional intervention and the risk-needs-responsivity model.

• The desistance literature has been more qualitative and has focused on persons rather than correctional programs, stressing the importance of identity transformation in the desistance process.

• Correctional systems do not provide “desistance opportunities”—programs, interventions, and services—to the extent they are needed. Programs should become more person-centered by placing a greater emphasis on identity transformation.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020. 6p

By W. Bradford Wilcox | Rafael A. Mangual | Seth Cannon | Joseph E. Price

The debate about how best to respond to urban crime—a debate that has become more important in light of recent increases in violent crime and homicide in many cities across America—has tended to focus on two perspectives. The first prioritizes tackling the “social structural factors” (unemployment, economic inequality, poverty, etc.) that are thought to be the “root causes” of crime, and violent crime, in particular. A second perspective rejects this structural approach in favor of a strategy that relies on traditional law-enforcement institutions (namely, police, prosecutors, and jails/prisons), often citing the sharp violent crime declines of the 1990s and 2000s that occurred in the wake of new policing and prosecutorial approaches—even in the face of structural realities said to be at the root of the urban crime problem.

But a third perspective seeks to understand how the fragile state of core social institutions—schools, churches, youth sports leagues, and, above all, families—in too many of our cities may also have a hand in urban crime. Princeton sociologist Patrick Sharkey, for instance, has argued that nonprofits “focused on reducing violence and building stronger communities” are linked to lower rates of violent crime in cities across the country. In a new Institute for Family Studies report, we turn our attention to the core institution of family. Drawing on the work of scholars like Harvard sociologist Robert Sampson—who found that “(f)amily structure is one of the strongest, if not the strongest, predictors of … urban violence across cities in the United States”—we explore the relationship between family structure and urban crime in the 21st century. Specifically, we address this question: How is family structure associated with crime, violent crime, and homicide rates in American cities—and with these outcomes in Chicago neighborhoods?

We find that cities are safer when two-parent families are dominant and more crime-ridden when family instability is common. The same story applies to the neighborhoods of Chicago. More specifically, we find the total crime rate is about 48% higher in cities that have above the median share of single-parent families, compared to cities that have fewer single-parent families. That difference is even larger with respect to violent crime and homicide, specifically, with cities above the median level of single parenthood experiencing 118% higher rates of violent crime and 255% higher rates of homicide. In the Windy City, relying on an analysis of census tract level data, our research indicates that neighborhoods above the median fraction of single-parent-headed households experienced 137% higher total crime rates, 226% higher violent crime rates, and 436% higher homicide rates.

When controlling for additional factors such as racial composition, poverty rates, and educational attainment levels, we find that the association between family structure and total crime rates, as well as violent crime rates, in cities across the United States remains statistically significant. However, the association between family structure and homicide in cities does not. In Chicago, the links between family structure and both violent crime and homicide rates at the neighborhood level were significant, net of controls, but not the total crime rate. In addition to the question of whether there exists a statistical relationship between family structure and crime—a question we generally answer in the affirmative—this study also offers possible answers to the question of what might explain the relationships between family instability and crime.

Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of social science research, we theorize that this relationship is likely a byproduct of some mix of the heightened risk of family instability in the socialization of young children and the role that father absence plays in providing less guidance and oversight for adolescent and young adult males.

Particularly in light of the pre-existing literature on the role of family structure in various life outcomes, these findings may have important implications for policymakers. They suggest the need to encourage more young Americans—particularly those living in vulnerable neighborhoods with both high rates of violence and out-of-wedlock childbearing—toward forming strong and stable families in marriage.

Washington, DC: Institute for Family Studies, 2023. 21p.

By: Atheendar S. Venkataramani, MD, PhD; Elizabeth F. Bair, MS; Jacob Bor, Sc; et al

Importance: Racial disparities in sleep health may mediate the broader health outcomes of structural racism.

Objective: To assess changes in sleep duration in the Black population after officer-involved killings of unarmed Black people, a cardinal manifestation of structural racism.

Design, Setting, and Participants: Two distinct difference-in-differences analyses examined the changes in sleep duration for the US non-Hispanic Black (hereafter, Black) population before vs after exposure to officer-involved killings of unarmed Black people, using data from adult respondents in the US Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS; 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2018) and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS; 2013-2019) with data on officer-involved killings from the Mapping Police Violence database. Data analyses were conducted between September 24, 2021, and September 12, 2023.

Exposures: Occurrence of any police killing of an unarmed Black person in the state, county, or commuting zone of the survey respondent’s residence in each of the four 90-day periods prior to interview, or occurence of a highly public, nationally prominent police killing of an unarmed Black person anywhere in the US during the 90 days prior to interview.

Main Outcomes and Measures: Self-reported total sleep duration (hours), short sleep (<7 hours), and very short sleep (<6 hours).

Results: Data from 181 865 Black and 1 799 757 White respondents in the BRFSS and 9858 Black and 46 532 White respondents in the ATUS were analyzed. In the larger BRFSS, the majority of Black respondents were between the ages of 35 and 64 (99 014 [weighted 51.4%]), women (115 731 [weighted 54.1%]), and college educated (100 434 [weighted 52.3%]). Black respondents in the BRFSS reported short sleep duration at a rate of 45.9%, while White respondents reported it at a rate of 32.6%; for very short sleep, the corresponding values were 18.4% vs 10.4%, respectively. Statistically significant increases in the probability of short sleep and very short sleep were found among Black respondents when officers killed an unarmed Black person in their state of residence during the first two 90-day periods prior to interview. Magnitudes were larger in models using exposure to a nationally prominent police killing occurring anywhere in the US. Estimates were equivalent to 7% to 16% of the sample disparity between Black and White individuals in short sleep and 13% to 30% of the disparity in very short sleep.

Conclusions and Relevance: Sleep health among Black adults worsened after exposure to officer-involved killings of unarmed Black individuals. These empirical findings underscore the role of structural racism in shaping racial disparities in sleep health outcomes

JAMA Internat Medicine, online Feb. 2024.

By Matt Weidinger | Amy Simon

Key Points

• The nation’s unemployment benefits system, which was significantly expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic, suffered unprecedented losses to fraud and improper payments.

• Official—and still partial—estimates of improper payments approach $200 billion, while unofficial estimates suggest $400 billion or more may have been lost.

• There are multiple causes of these record improper payments, including historically large benefits, poor program design including eligibility self-certification in new programs, and degraded administrative systems without adequate defenses against various fraudulent schemes.

• State and federal policymakers should review the causes and consequences of these unprecedented losses and take specific steps, such as those outlined in this report, to both prevent a recurrence of the record taxpayer losses experienced during the pandemic and better establish a proactive anti-fraud posture for the unemployment insurance system.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 45p.

By Alex Brill | Scott Ganz

Recent data show a small decline in opioid-related mortality following a decade during which opioid-related mortality more than doubled to nearly 53,000 in 2018. However, the aggregate statistics mask important spatial and temporal trends in the data. This report estimates nationwide, regional, and county-level economic costs associated with the opioid crisis. The data show that, despite recent nationwide per capita opioid-related cost declines, the impact of the crisis continues to be felt across large swaths of the Northeast, Midwest, and South. We also find that opioid-related mortality tends to diffuse among nearby counties, with the local diffusion rate from illegal opioids—which are the primary cause in the current wave of the crisis—exceeding the rate from prescription opioids, which were the primary cause in earlier waves. The combination of lower aggregate mortality and faster diffusion among nearby counties points to a changed spatial distribution of economic costs as the opioid crisis evolves.

Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020.

By Daniel A. Sumner | Robin S. Goldstein

• Under US federal law, weed, also known as “marijuana” or “cannabis,” remains a Schedule I illegal narcotic, in the same category as cocaine and heroin. Production and sale of weed are federal felonies punishable by severe prison terms.

• Individual US states, in conflict with federal law, began legalizing medical weed in 1996. However, in the past decade, the US Department of Justice has agreed not to enforce federal criminal weed laws against anyone who is following state laws.

• As of 2022, 33 percent of all Americans live in states with legal recreational sales of weed, 41 percent live in states with medical legalization but no legal recreational sale, and 26 percent live in states with total weed prohibitions.

• In its early years, legally produced and sold weed has struggled to capture market share. In most places where the sale and use of weed are now legal, illegal weed—unlicensed, unregulated, and untaxed—still has a dominant market share and shows no signs of fading away.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. 7p.

By Daniel A. Sumner | Robin S. Goldstein

Key Points

• Cannabis containing more than 0.3 percent tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which the US government still calls “marijuana” but here we call “weed,” has been legalized by many state governments but is still illegal at the federal level.

• If a major goal of federal legalization is to help legal weed replace illegal weed, the best step forward for federal policy is simply to step out of the way. This would involve removing weed from the schedule of illegal narcotics, permitting states to implement cannabis policy as they see fit, and allowing cannabis to move among jurisdictions where it is legal.

• Forms of federal legalization that include more regulations and taxes on cannabis—including House and Senate bills that have been recently publicized—would almost surely do more harm than good, given the state and local policies already in place.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. 5p.

By Howard Husock

• The legalization of cannabis, rather than sidelining the black market, has fueled it, providing cover to illicit cannabis enterprises that often undercut the legal market on price and accessibility.

• State policies, such as high or complex cannabis taxes, scant issuance of licenses for legal operation, and widespread local “opt-outs,” play a key role in keeping the legal market from outcompeting illegal alternatives.

• The treatment of alcohol and cigarettes may be better models: States should allow legal retail to proliferate to minimize the advantages illicit operators now enjoy.

• At the same time, as with tobacco, public health authorities should mount education campaigns to minimize marijuana use, in light of its demonstrated dangers.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 1113p.

By Rachel E. Barkow and Mark Osler

The federal government and most American states provide for some form of clemency that allows the president or the governor to reduce a sentence or pardon a conviction. Although most US presidents and some governors have made great use of this power in the past, it has long been in decline. Diagnosing the reasons for this decline proves easier than providing solutions to reinvigorate this practice. A great deal of scholarship explores the causes and offers solutions, and this review catalogs the main lines of argument. It also explains why clemency's renewal remains urgent, even in regimes dedicated to the rule of law, to serve the best purposes of punishment and check the excesses of criminal law and punishment that are inevitable given the political process and enforcement practices.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 311 - 327

By Tim Head

Serious Violence Reduction Orders (SVROs) are a new police stop and search power, being piloted by forces in England and Wales. Introduced under the controversial Police Crime Sentencing and Courts Act (2022), SVROs are part of a broader expansion of police powers and the rolling back of safeguards and avenues for police accountability. The Home Office itself has admitted that many of the potential harmful consequences of SVROs will likely fall on people of colour, on Black people in particular. In “Against SVROs”, we review the evidence around high-discretion police powers similar to SVROs, which overwhelmingly shows that they do not work to reduce serious violence. Contrary to the government's claim that SVROs will "break the cycle of offending”, we found that high-discretion police powers and behavioural orders push people, disproportionately people of colour, into the criminal justice system. These policing interventions are clearly evidenced to harm the mental and physical health of those targeted, while reproducing deep-seated racial discrimination in the use and abuse of police powers. 

London: Runnymede Trust, 2023. 43p.

By Chris Bath

Police forces in England and Wales carried out an estimated 145,000 voluntary interviews under caution in 2022/23, of which around one fifth were of children. Only 4.8% of adults attending a voluntary interview were recorded as meeting the criteria for appropriate adult (AA) support – around half the rate in police custody. While custody rightly attracts scrutiny, this report highlights both why and how a strategic focus should be brought to bear on voluntary interviews. Part 1 presents an analysis of quantitative data provided by police forces. Part 2 sets out the policy and practice challenges from the perspective of local appropriate adult scheme leaders.   

Ashford, Kent, UK: National Appropriate Adult Network , 2023. 29p.  

By April M. Zeoli, Jennifer Paruk, Charles C. Branas, Patrick M. Carter, Rebecca Cunningham, Justin Heinze and Daniel W. Webster

We examined petition and respondent characteristics from extreme risk protection order (ERPO) cases in Oregon for the 15 months after implementation (n = 93). Most petitions were filed by law enforcement (65%) a were more likely to be granted than petitions filed by family/household members (p < 0.001). Most ERPO respondents were reported by petitioners to have histories of suicidality (73%) or interpersonal violence (75%), with over half of death threats, suicide threats, or suicide attempts with known timing occurring within 1 week of the petition being filed. Policy Implications: ERPO petitions and orders are overwhelmingly being used as intended, that is, specifically for cases of imminent risk of harm to self or others. Greater dissemination of public information about ERPOs may increase their appropriate use and the proportion of high-risk individuals and families who may benefit. Legal aid assistance for family or household members in filling out petitions is advisable.

United States, Criminology & Public Policy. 2021, 19pg

By Srinivasan, Siddarth

From the document: "Over the last year, generative AI [artificial intelligence] tools have made the jump from research prototype to commercial product. Generative AI models like OpenAI's ChatGPT [Chat Generative Pre-trained Transformer] [hyperlink] and Google's Gemini [hyperlink] can now generate realistic text and images that are often indistinguishable from human-authored content, with generative AI for audio [hyperlink] and video [hyperlink] not far behind. Given these advances, it's no longer surprising to see AI-generated images of public figures go viral [hyperlink] or AI-generated reviews and comments on digital platforms. As such, generative AI models are raising concerns about the credibility of digital content and the ease of producing harmful content going forward. [...] There are several ideas for how to tell whether a given piece of content--be it text, image, audio, or video--originates from a machine or a human. This report explores what makes for a good AI detection tool, how the oft-touted approach of 'watermarking' fares on various technical and policy-relevant criteria, governance of watermarking protocols, what policy objectives need to be met to promote watermark-based AI detection, and how watermarking stacks up against other suggested approaches like content provenance."

Washington. DC. Brookings Institution. 2024.

By Joanna C. Schwartz

For decades, scholars have debated the extent to which financial sanctions cause government officials to improve their conduct. Yet little attention has been paid to a foundational empirical question underlying these debates: When a plaintiff recovers in a damages action against the government, who foots the bill? In prior work, I found that individual police officers virtually never pay anything toward settlements and judgments entered against them. But this finding prompts another question: Where does the money come from, if not from individual officers? The dominant view among those who have considered this question is that settlements and judgments are usually paid from jurisdictions’ general funds with no financial impact on the involved law enforcement agencies, and some have suggested that agencies would have stronger incentives to improve behavior were they required to pay settlements and judgments from their budgets. But, beyond anecdotal information about the practices in a few large agencies, there has been no empirical inquiry into the source of funds used by governments to satisfy suits involving the police.

In this Article, I report the results of the first nationwide study to examine how cities, counties, and states budget for and pay settlements and judgments in cases against law enforcement. Through public records requests, interviews, and other sources, I have collected information about litigation budgeting practices in one hundred jurisdictions across the country. Based on the practices in these one hundred jurisdictions, I make two key findings. First, settlements and judgments are not always—or even usually—paid from jurisdictions’ general funds; instead, cities, counties, and states use a wide range of budgetary arrangements to satisfy their legal liabilities. All told, half of the law enforcement agencies in my study financially contribute in some manner to the satisfaction of lawsuits brought against them.

Second, having a department pay money out of its budget toward settlements and judgments is neither necessary nor sufficient to impose a financial burden on that department. Some law enforcement agencies pay millions from their budgets each year toward settlements and judgments, but the particularities of their jurisdictions’ budgeting arrangements lessen or eliminate altogether the financial impact of these payments on these agencies. On the other hand, smaller agencies that pay nothing from their budgets toward lawsuits may nevertheless have their very existence threatened if liability insurers raise premiums or terminate coverage in response to large payouts.

63 UCLA L. Rev. 1144 (2016)

By City of Chicago, Office of Inspector General

The objectives of the inquiry were to determine the completeness rates of CPD response times recorded by CPD and the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC), and to identify factors contributing to missing response time data for 911 calls for CPD service.

As a result of this inquiry, OIG found that CPD’s data collection of 911 response times is incomplete; the Department fails to record timestamps for various statuses throughout the dispatch and police response for a substantial number of 911 calls. Calls for high priority emergency events had a higher rate of recorded response times for all statuses that occur during a unit’s response (Acknowledge, Enroute, and On-scene) compared to calls for events with a lower priority classification. The timepoint in the police response process that is least often recorded is the On-scene time, or the time when the responding CPD unit arrives at the location of service; this remains true regardless of call priority level or geographic location. The On-scene status is the last time point in the sequence of events before responding members engage with an emergency event, which may contribute to the low On-scene time completeness rates. Additionally, the interface of the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, which records a timestamp when CPD members enter their response status, displays the response status buttons sequentially, and is dependent on the previous status in the process being entered.

Chicago: City of Chicago, Office of Inspector General, 2023. 30p.

By: Sean E. Goodison and Connor Brooks

This report provides data on authorized equipment and techniques, body-worn cameras, and K-9 units in local police departments. It also presents tables on training, policies, and procedures. Additionally, the report describes the prevalence of community policing plans.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2023. 36p

By Tzipporah P. Dang , Bradley D. Mattan , Denise M. Barth , Grace Handley, Jasmin Cloutier, Jennifer T. Kubota

From social media to courts of law, recordings of interracial police officer-civilian interactions are now widespread and publicly available. People may be motivated to preferentially understand the dynamics of these interactions when they perceive injustice towards those whose communities experience disproportionate policing relative to others (e.g., non-White racial/ethnic groups). To explore these questions, two studies were conducted (study 1 neuroimaging n = 69 and study 2 behavioral n = 58). The fMRI study examined White participants’ neural activity when viewing real-world videos with varying degrees of aggression or conflict of White officers arresting a Black or White civilian. Activity in brain regions supporting social cognition was greater when viewing Black (vs. White) civilians involved in more aggressive police encounters. Additionally, although an independent sample of perceivers rated videos featuring Black and White civilians as similar in overall levels of aggression when civilian race was obscured, participants in the fMRI study (where race was not obscured) rated officers as more aggressive and their use of force as less legitimate when the civilian was Black. In study 2, participants who had not viewed the videos also reported that they believe police are generally more unjustly aggressive towards Black compared with White civilians. These findings inform our understanding of how perceptions of conflict with the potential for injustice shape social cognitive engagement when viewing arrests of Black and White individuals by White police officers.

NeuroImage, Volume 255, 15 July 2022, 119153

By National Police Chiefs’ Council (UK)

This Review was established to ‘identify ways in which forces across England and Wales can be more productive, improving outcomes’1 . In the three fnancial years to March 2023, Government funded the recruitment of an additional 20,000 police ofcers. This – together with additional resources provided by precept - is a considerable investment into policing. As new recruits build up experience and capabilities, we would expect to see its impact in terms of public safety. Compared to 2007, ofcer numbers have increased seven per cent whilst the population has increased by about 12 per cent (and with it, demand). However, like-for-like comparisons are not necessarily helpful: technology for example should have made police forces more productive since then. But to a large extent we have found that if the uplift has helped fll the most urgent capacity gaps (and improve performance), it has not taken away the need to prioritise and task resources effectively. A productivity drive is as necessary now as it was in the years of officer reduction. An environment of budget pressures suggests difficult choices ahead for public sector investment. Public agencies will need to evidence, more than ever, that they are providing value for money and becoming more productive. Pouring additional resources into a service might create more outputs but it does not per se increase productivity if these resources are not used wisely. Neither do officer numbers guarantee reduced crime2. Effective resource allocation is essential to deliver the greatest gains. Coordinated planning and multi-agency collaboration are vital to maximise the chances of better public outcomes. In this context, as a prerequisite to further investment demands and to strengthening public legitimacy, it is imperative that the policing sector is able to demonstrate how it is making best use of its resources and what direct benefits its activity delivers to the public. THE OPERATING LANDSCAPE OF POLICING IS SHIFTING Policing demand has changed. Since the mid-1990s, there have been long-term falls in overall crime levels but since 2014, offences have risen again (while still 20 per cent below their 2002/03 level). New technologies have created new criminal opportunities: the Office for National Statistics (ONS) reports 3.8 million fraud offences and cyber-enabled, or cyber-dependent crimes, and even across “traditional” crimes, the Metropolitan Police Service assesses that two ffths of robberies and 70 percent of theft are for mobile phones. Technological advances can also give rise to investigative opportunities, and policing productivity (and its perceived effectiveness in using technology) can act as a deterrent to criminality. Some patterns of crime are less easy to read. Violent offences recorded by police increased, but the Crime Survey for England and Wales suggests a decrease. Recorded sexual offences have markedly increased . More victims are fnding the courage to come forward and report crimes such as rape, domestic abuse and the sexual exploitation of children. The recognition of vulnerability in victimisation has become a powerful element shaping policing since the death of Fiona Pilkington and her daughter in 2007. Because of these changes, policing today requires a very different skillset. In 2003, armed with a knowledge of three crime types (burglary, theft and criminal damage), a constable knew how to approach 80 per cent of the demand coming their way. In 2023, in order to manage the same proportion of their work, this constable has to be competent across six disparate and wider categories of crime: theft, fraud (including online), violence with injury, stalking and harassment, public order and violence without injury. Non crime demand on officers equally broadened in scope during that time.

London: Home Office, 2023., 85p.

By Thiago R. Oliviera

This thesis draws on procedural justice theory and work into legal socialisation and legal cynicism to investigate the dynamics of public perceptions of trustworthiness and legitimacy of legal authority over time. Illustrating how longitudinal data can be theoretically fruitful in studies on public-police relations, I rely upon several analytic strategies that exploit panel data to examine attitudinal change over time. To examine the development of legitimacy judgements during adolescence, the mutual reproduction of different aspects of police trustworthiness over time, and the degree to which police contact leads to attitudinal change, I draw on data from three longitudinal surveys, which are representative of the adult population living in selected neighbourhoods in S˜ao Paulo, Brazil, adolescents who live in S˜ao Paulo, and the adult population living in Australia. At the heart of the thesis are four empirical papers. The first paper suggests that perceptions of overpolicing and underpolicing undermine legitimacy judgements and mutually reproduce each other over time, with implications for people’s recognition of the ruling power of the law. The second paper focuses on the development of legitimacy judgements among adolescents, and shows that exposure to neighbourhood and police violence may damage the process of healthy legal socialisation. The third paper examines whether police-citizen encounters are teachable moments, with the potential of leading to either positive or negative attitudinal change depending upon the perceived appropriateness of the interaction. The fourth paper addresses the issue of causality – an important gap in the procedural justice literature. Analysis suggests that aggressive police stops (e.g., at gunpoint) have a shortterm effect on perceived police fairness and a long-term effect on perceived overpolicing. Overall, results indicate that reliance on coercive policing strategies have several social costs, including public detachment and alienation from from the law. Adolescents who witness cases of police brutality show diminished development in legitimacy judgements, and the experience or expectation that police officers repeatedly intrude in the lives of people (overpolicing) and fail to ensure public safety (underpolicing) undermine people’s recognition of the state’s monopoly of violence. Yet, there is room for improvement. Perceptions of procedural fairness seem to enhance police trustworthiness and legitimacy. In sum, results indicate that people develop legal attitudes throughout the life course, but police (mis)conduct can lead to attitudinal change over time.

London: London School of Economics, 2022. 276p.