By Kathleen Patterson, District of Columbia Auditor and PFM Group Consulting

Over 18 months, PFM collected the most reliable data available to form its conclusions. This involved benchmarking reported crime, levels and types of agency staffing, specialized functions, and unique responsibilities with six other police agencies. The PFM team also engaged with MPD and Department of Forensics Sciences (DFS) personnel, conducted numerous interviews, and led group discussions throughout MPD to ensure a comprehensive understanding of MPD operations. The PFM team included experts in police staffing and organization with substantial experience working with other departments to develop workforce strategies, improve operations and increase department efficiencies. To review the findings, please consider the context of MPD’s staffing as of October 1, 2023. At that time, MPD had 4,000 filled and vacant sworn positions. Of these: 47.3% (2,257) of the positions were allocated to Patrol Services (PS). 11.5% (547) of the positions were allocated to the Investigations Services Bureau (ISB). The remaining 41.2% (1,196) positions were allocated to other, primarily support, sections of the Department, including Professional Development (652), Homeland Security (244), Executive Office of the Chief (60), Technical and Analytical Services (19), Youth and Family Engagement (161), and Internal Affairs (60). The study’s primary focus was on patrol services and investigations, the backbone of MPD’s operations and crucial to every community. Other sections of the Department were examined primarily for the impact of their work on PS and ISB. We found that MPD data were insufficient for a robust analysis of current and historical staffing levels by bureau, division, rank, and positions. The Study concluded that the department’s Patrol Services is adequately staffed at its current level of 1,340 officers. However, it also identified ways in which patrol personnel’s current placement and shift assignments do not align with the study’s workload-based staffing model. Additionally, the study found a shortage of 65 Investigators (primarily District Detectives) based on the workload of the Investigations Bureau. Patrol Services and Investigation Services Bureau staffing and personnel placement recommendations used PFM’s workload-based staffing model, which is based on analytical methods and peer-reviewed research developed for the U.S. Department of Justice. Additional findings include: MPD urgently needs to gather more comprehensive data on how PS and ISB personnel spend their time. Better understanding time consumed by activities such as guarding arrestees and prisoners at hospitals, performing homeland security-related duties, and engaging in various proactive policing activities could significantly improve future staffing needs assessments. MPD’s proportion of professional (non-sworn) personnel is less than that of the benchmarked agencies and comparably sized agencies tracked in the FBI data tables. Better success with civilianization could free sworn personnel to do more work that explicitly requires their skills. The Department’s time and attendance system needs improved functionality to collect, monitor, and report comprehensive information to track and analyze overtime use. This information impacts the agency’s ability to make timely and thoughtful staffing decisions. MPD’s use of officers from patrol and non-patrol assignments to fulfill special details, such as large scale events and the movement of dignitaries, impedes these personnel’s ability to do their primary jobs and merits a data-based analysis of long-term Homeland Security Bureau staffing needs. A key conclusion is that staffing decisions will inevitably change as work requirements tied to Department goals and community expectations evolve. This dynamic nature of staffing decisions underscores the need for adaptability and flexibility. In responding to the draft report MPD states that in the last five years use of overtime indicated the need for “500 or more officers to meet community needs” but included no data to support that assertion. This underscores the need for accurate and comprehensive data collection to inform future studies and to more critically assess staffing adequacy, policing effectiveness, and community satisfaction. As a result, workload-based data should be regularly reviewed and incorporated into short-, medium-, and long-term strategies and staffing plans

Washington, DC:Office of the District of Columbia Auditor , 2024. 459p.

By The Caddo Parish Task Force

For decades, the Caddo Correctional Center (CCC) in Shreveport, Louisiana has experienced severe overcrowding – at times housing several hundreds of individuals beyond the 1,070 the facility was originally constructed to hold. The overcapacity issue at the jail began in earnest after Hurricane Katrina devastated the southeast region of the state in 2005, requiring several northern jails, including the CCC, to hold displaced detainees in addition to local populations. As a result, the CCC’s operational capacity was expanded to 1,500 despite no space being added. More than 18 years later, the jail population has yet to return to its pre-emergency level. This chronic overcrowding has contributed to severe staffing shortages at the CCC, threats to safety for both staff and individuals in custody, Parish resource depletion, and substantial pressure on other parts of the system, including law enforcement agencies, district attorneys, public defenders, and the district court. In September 2022, the Sheriff of Caddo Parish called for collective action among Parish stakeholders to address the urgency of the CCC’s overcrowding. In November, the Sheriff, among other leaders in Caddo Parish requested technical assistance through the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) grant funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), a component of the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs. JRI is an intensive, data-driven approach that allows jurisdictions to address key challenges in their criminal justice systems. The purpose of the request for technical assistance was to use comprehensive data and system analyses to identify points of congestion within the system that contribute to the ongoing overcrowding and consider both short-term and long-term solutions to relieve pressure on the jail. To oversee this effort, the Parish formed the Caddo Parish Criminal Justice Task Force (“Task Force”), composed of representatives from key criminal justice agencies and partners in the Parish, including the Caddo Parish District Attorney, the Caddo Parish Public Defender’s Office, the Parish Administration, the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office (CPSO) and CCC staff, the Shreveport Police Department (SPD), the First Judicial District Court, and the Greater Shreveport Chamber of Commerce. From March to August 2023, the Task Force met four times to review analyses of jail and court data from 11 prior years (2012- 2022) and discuss potential policy solutions. CPSO provided data from the CCC, and the First Judicial District Court provided the court data. The Crime and Justice Institute (CJI) analyzed and presented all data provided with consultation by the respective agencies. 

Boston: Crime and Justice Institute, 2023. 36p.

By The Task Force; Tricia Everest, Chair

On February 2, 2024, Oklahoma’s MODERN (Modernized Operations through Data and Evidence-based Restoration Now) Justice Task Force released its much-anticipated report with 15 data-driven recommendations to address jail populations, recidivism, cost-effectiveness, and public safety across the state. The report is the culmination of over a year of rigorous review of Oklahoma’s jails at the state and local level as part of a Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI). The JRI effort began in August 2022, when Governor Kevin Stitt, Senate Pro Tem Greg Treat, House Speaker Charles McCall, and Administrative Director of the Courts Jari Askins jointly requested JRI technical support from the Crime and Justice Institute (CJI). The Task Force spent months analyzing Oklahoma’s jail system using a sample of jail data provided by six counties across the state, evaluating current programs, discussing best practices and models from other states, and engaging in in-depth policy discussions. To ensure a balanced perspective, the Task Force gathered feedback from a variety of stakeholders including law enforcement officials, county leadership, behavioral health services, victims and survivors of crime, and formerly incarcerated individuals.  

Tulsa, OK: The Task Force, 2023. 43p.

By David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep , Heather Vovak , Taryn Zastrowa , Anthony A. Braga , and Brandon Turchan  

  Can police be trained to treat people in fair and respectful ways, and if so, will this influence evaluations of the police and crime? To answer these questions, we randomly allocated 120 crime hot spots to a procedural justice (PJ) and standard condition (SC) in three cities. Twenty-eight officers were randomly assigned to the conditions. The PJ condition officers received an intensive 5-d training course in the components of PJ (giving voice, showing neutrality, treating people with respect, and evidencing trustworthy motives). We used police self-report surveys to assess whether the training influenced attitudes, systematic social observations to examine impacts on police behavior in the field, and arrests to assess law enforcement actions. We conducted pre and post household surveys to assess resident attitudes toward the police. Impacts on crime were measured using crime incident and citizen-initiated crime call data. The training led to increased knowledge about PJ and more procedurally just behavior in the field as compared with the SC condition. At the same time, PJ officers made many fewer arrests than SC officers. Residents of the PJ hot spots were significantly less likely to perceive police as harassing or using unnecessary force, though we did not find significant differences between the PJ and SC hot spots in perceptions of PJ and police legitimacy. We found a significant relative 14% decline in crime incidents in the PJ hot spots during the experiment.  

Missouri: PNAS, 2022. 6p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

Mike Hough and Mike Maxfield

Join us as we delve into the evolution of crime surveying in the 21st century with a special focus on the landmark British Crime Survey. In this comprehensive exploration, we reflect on the past quarter-century of crime trends, methodologies, and societal shifts that have shaped our understanding of criminal behavior.

From the inaugural survey in 1999 to the latest data-driven analyses, this commemorative edition offers valuable insights into the complex landscape of crime detection and prevention. Uncover how technology, demographic changes, and policy initiatives have influenced the prevalence and perception of crime across the United Kingdom.

Celebrate this milestone anniversary by delving into the intricate tapestry of crime surveying, where data meets narrative to illuminate the challenges and triumphs of combating crime in the modern era.

Crime Prevention Studies Volume 22. Criminal Justice Press Monsey, NY, U.S.A.. Willan Publishing Cullomptom, Devon, U.K.. 2007. 321p.

may contain markup

Edited by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. Clarke

Business should become a central theme in criminology and crime prevention should become a core concern among business leaders.Contributors to Business and Crime Prevention include academic criminologists, representatives of the British Home Office, security industry experts, insurance data analysts, and consultants to the retail and telecommunications industries. The authors discuss crime prevention initiatives now underway in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Holland and the US.

Criminal Justice Press, Jan 1, 1997 , 293 pages

By Ralph Rector, David Muhlhausen and Dexter Ingram

One of President Bill Clinton's priorities when taking office was to put 100,000 additional police officers on America's streets to help fight crime. On September 13, 1994, the President signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322), authorizing the Attorney General to implement a six-year, $8.8 billion grant program to enable state and local law enforcement agencies to hire or redeploy 100,000 additional officers for community policing efforts.11 Attorney General Janet Reno announced the establishment of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) in October 1994 to administer these grants. Since then, the COPS program has developed into a set of different federal grants that had cost American taxpayers $7.5 billion by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2000.12 It is reasonable for policymakers, community leaders, and taxpayers to question how effective the COPS program has been in meeting its objective of placing 100,000 additional police officers on the street.13 As recently as August 14, 2000, President Clinton reaffirmed this objective and then took credit for having succeeded in placing "more than 100,000 new community police officers" on the streets14 (though in congressional testimony, the COPS Office sometimes redefines the objective of the program to be the funding of 100,000 officers).15 This objective has been closely tied to the overarching goal of reducing crime.16 To meet this objective, it is reasonable to expect COPS grants to be targeted to the communities most plagued by violent crime. At a fundamental level, the issue of whether or not the COPS program has indeed achieved its goals can be addressed by analyzing two assertions: 1. More Police. Many of the supporters of the COPS initiative assert that its grants are responsible for adding 100,000 police officers to community patrols. To test for the accuracy of this assertion, Heritage analysts estimated the number of new police. 2. Lower Crime. Supporters also assert that the COPS program awarded grants to the communities with the greatest need. Heritage analysts tested the accuracy of this assertion by examining awards in terms of per capita population and crime rates. Confounding the goal of putting 100,000 additional police officers on the street is the possibility that recipients will supplant the funds--substitute funds from one source for another. In the case of COPS grants, supplanting occurs when state and local governments use program funds to hire officers they would have hired using their own money if the COPS program did not exist.17 In the 1994 Crime Act, Congress specifically prohibited states and local governments from using federal funds to supplant local funds.18 Determining whether supplanting has in fact occurred is necessary for the effectiveness of the program to be evaluated accurately. How well the Justice Department has allocated the COPS funding can be discerned by analyzing crime rates and population sizes for communities that received the grants, as well as by observing the concentration of grants among law enforcement agencies. Thus, determining whether the COPS grants went primarily to communities that have high violent crime rates, rather than to safer communities, is important to the analysis. To answer these questions, Heritage analysts first combined U.S. Department of Justice data on the COPS grants that have been awarded to police agencies across the country with data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports on violent crime, officer employment, and population. This merged micro-database makes possible an analysis of crime rates and COPS grants on an agency-by-agency basis.

Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2000, 28p.

By Hannah D. McManus,. Murat Yildrim, Nicholas Corsaro, Robin S. Engel,

This study documents a multi-faceted examination of incidents of residential burglary and individual robbery reported to the KPD from 2013 to 2017, including descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses. The goals of this research are four-fold: (1) describe trends in reported residential burglary/individual robbery incidents over time, (2) describe case characteristics in reported residential burglary/individual robbery incidents, (3) identify case-level characteristics of residential burglary/individual robbery incidents that predict case clearance rates, and (4) identify neighborhood-level characteristics that predict case clearance.  

Cincinnati, International Association of Chief of Police (IACP) / University of Cincinnati (UC) Center for Police Research and Policy 2020. 47p.

By City of Chicago, Office of Inspector General

The objectives of the inquiry were to determine the completeness rates of CPD response times recorded by CPD and the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC), and to identify factors contributing to missing response time data for 911 calls for CPD service.

As a result of this inquiry, OIG found that CPD’s data collection of 911 response times is incomplete; the Department fails to record timestamps for various statuses throughout the dispatch and police response for a substantial number of 911 calls. Calls for high priority emergency events had a higher rate of recorded response times for all statuses that occur during a unit’s response (Acknowledge, Enroute, and On-scene) compared to calls for events with a lower priority classification. The timepoint in the police response process that is least often recorded is the On-scene time, or the time when the responding CPD unit arrives at the location of service; this remains true regardless of call priority level or geographic location. The On-scene status is the last time point in the sequence of events before responding members engage with an emergency event, which may contribute to the low On-scene time completeness rates. Additionally, the interface of the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, which records a timestamp when CPD members enter their response status, displays the response status buttons sequentially, and is dependent on the previous status in the process being entered.

Chicago: City of Chicago, Office of Inspector General, 2023. 30p.