By Temitope, O. Awodiji  and  John Owoyemi 

In this study, 10 communities in the North Western area of New Mexico are used to examine the efficacy of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts in urban settings. The research looks at the connection between crime rates and urban architecture in Luna by combining secondary data from the Unified Crime Report (UCR) with findings from earlier studies on topography and architectural features. It is accepted that several CPTED initiatives have limitations, such as dependence on secondary data and the need for more thorough research, even while they show promise in lowering crime and improving safety. Among the recommendations are the inclusion of primary data collecting and the consideration of socioeconomic issues. Policymakers, urban planners, and community stakeholders may establish more fair and effective methods to promote safer urban environments by considering these recommendations. By providing insights into the challenges of creating surroundings that support community safety and well-being, this study adds to the continuing conversation on crime prevention and urban planning. 

Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering Science and Technology (JMEST) ISSN: 2458-9403 Vol. 11 Issue 4, April - 2024 

By John Macdonald, Viet Nguyen Viet,  Shane T. Jensen,  and Charles C. Branas

Objective: Place-based blight remediation programs have gained popularity in recent years as a crime reduction approach. This study estimated the impact of a citywide vacant lot greening program in Philadelphia on changes in crime over multiple years, and whether the effects were moderated by nearby land uses. Methods: The vacant lot greening program was assessed using quasi-experimental and experimental designs. Entropy distance weighting was used in the quasi-experimental analysis to match control lots to be comparable to greened lots on pre-existing crime trends. Fixed-effects difference-in-differences models were used to estimate the impact of the vacant lot greening program in quasi-experimental and experimental analyses. Results: Vacant lot greening was estimated to reduce total crime and multiple subcategories in both the quasi-experimental and experimental evaluations. Remediating vacant lots had a smaller effect on reducing crime when they were located near train stations and alcohol outlets. The crime reductions from vacant lot remediations were larger when they were located near areas of active businesses. There is some suggestive evidence that the effects of vacant lot greening are larger when located in neighborhoods with higher pre-intervention levels of social cohesion. Conclusions: The findings suggest that vacant lot greening provides a sustainable approach to reducing crime in disadvantaged neighborhoods, and the effects may vary by different surrounding land uses. To better understand the mechanisms through which place-based blight remediation interventions reduce crime, future research should measure human activities and neighborly socialization in and around places before and after remediation efforts are implemented.

J Exp Criminol. 2022 September ; 18(3): 639–664.

By David Hausman and Dorothy Kronick

Critics of stop and frisk have heralded its recent demise in several large U.S. cities. Proponents of stop and frisk respond that when the practice ends, crime increases. Both groups typically assume that the end of stop-and-frisk reduces the number of police-civilian interactions. We find otherwise in Chicago: The decline in pedestrian stops coincided with an increase in traffic stops. Qualitative evidence suggests that the Chicago Police deliberately switched from pedestrian to traffic stops. Quantitative data are consistent with this hypothesis: As stop and frisk ended, Chicago Police traffic stops diverged (in quantity and composition) from those of another enforcement agency in Chicago, and the new traffic stops affected the same types of Chicagoans who were previously subject to pedestrian stops .

Sci. Adv. 9, eadh3017 (2023) 29 September 2023  

By Barry Friedman and Freya Rigterink 

This report, from The Policing Project at New York University School of Law’s Reimagining Public Safety Initiative, explores the use of alternatives to traditional policing and police response. Funded by local Chicago philanthropy, the study not only analyzes the public safety challenges facing the city, but also identifies a series of solutions. This report is based on the Policing Project’s extensive engagement both with the City of Chicago and with alternative response programs around the country. The Policing Project has been involved for five years in implementing a community policing program for Chicago. In preparing this report it conducted extensive interviews with community members and municipal stakeholders connected with Chicago government and the Chicago Police Department (CPD). This report is the fourth in a series that also included reports on Denver, San Francisco, and Tucson. The report recommends action on two facets of alternatives to traditional policing that would benefit Chicago and Chicagoans: 911 Alternative Response: By adopting alternative approaches, including sending non police responders trained to meet the needs of 911 callers, many cities are taking a load off dangerously overburdened police forces, and better meeting the needs of communities. Chicago should do the same. Community Policing: This is an important, perhaps essential, alternative to traditional policing. Over the long run, fully implementing a comprehensive community policing program is the best, if not the only, way to build trust between the Chicago Police Department and the people it serves, allowing them to address violent crime together.

2024. 56p.  

By Timothy C. Barnum, Shaina Herman, Jean-Louis van Gelder, Denis Ribeaud, Manuel Eisner, Daniel S. Nagin

Guardianship is a core tenet of routine activity theory and collective efficacy. At its outset, routine activity research assumed that the mere presence of a guardian was sufficient to disrupt many forms of crime. More recent research, however, has taken as a starting point that would-be-guardians must take on an active role for a reduction in crime to occur. Integrating research on bystander intervention and guardianship-in-action, the current study elaborates the individual-level motivations and decision processes of guardianship to answer the following questions: Who serves as a reactive guardian? How do they do so? And why? We tasked young adults (N = 1,032) included in the recent waves of the Zurich Project on the Social Development from Childhood to Adulthood (z-proso) to assess a 70-second video depicting a sexual harassment event. We examined participants’ willingness to engage in a range of intervention options as a function of their prosocial attitudes, safety considerations, socioemotional motivations, and moral considerations. Results show a complex decision process leading to whether and how a would-be guardian decides to intervene to disrupt sexual harassment, such that prosocial motivations and emotional reactions are weighed against perceptions of danger when deciding on a specific course of action.

 Criminology Volume 62, Issue 3 Aug 2024 Pages 377-618

By U.K.HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Independent Office for Police Conduct and College of Policing

Stalking is a serious crime that can have a devastating effect on victims. It has been described as a crime of psychological terror which leaves victims feeling constantly unsafe and fearful. In some tragic cases stalking behaviours escalate to serious physical harm and murder. Victims and the public must be assured that reports of stalking will be treated seriously by the police. This means that the police must be able to recognise stalking and the risks associated with this crime. They must keep victims and the public safe and pursue perpetrators by investigating reports effectively and taking appropriate action to stop offending and seek justice. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust, on behalf of the National Stalking Consortium, raised serious concerns about the police response to stalking in its super-complaint. Our three organisations have jointly undertaken a comprehensive investigation into these issues. We have found clear evidence supporting the concerns they raise. We did find examples of the police taking stalking seriously, safeguarding victims well and carrying out good investigations. But in too many cases the police response was not good enough and victims were being let down. We have made recommendations that give a clear plan of action for policing to make improvements. These focus on the need for policing to take action now to make sure they are meeting the expected standards and doing the fundamentals well in their response to stalking. We also found there is a need for greater clarity in the criminal law relating to stalking. Our evidence suggests that government needs to change the law and guidance to provide a stronger foundation for the police response to stalking. We also recommend that the government makes changes to stalking protection orders to provide quicker options to safeguard victims and disrupt offenders. We were encouraged to see examples of innovative and promising practice in some forces. These include examples of forces developing hubs of expertise through multi-agency working and a promising approach to digital evidence analysis in stalking cases. We have made recommendations where we think these approaches should be considered more widely across policing. We are not the only ones calling for change and improvements. Many of the concerns we identified with poor investigations and victim care reflect the findings of other inquiries and inspections. Particularly those relating to the police response to violence against women and girls, of which stalking is a part. The V m ’ mm L has also published a report ’ to stalking. This highlighted similar findings to our investigation. Policing and its partners are responding to these calls for change. In July 2024 the NPCC and the College of Policing published a national policing statement on violence against women and girls (VAWG). This assesses the threat VAWG poses to public safety. The statement identifies stalking and harassment as one of five high-harm and high-volume threat areas that policing will focus on over the next year. This super-complaint report and our recommendations present a real opportunity for policing to build on the progress already made. Policing must now make a step-change to improve the quality of its response to this pervasive and insidious crime.   

HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Independent Office for Police Conduct and College of Policing, 2024. 158p.

By Security Insight

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology can completely transform policing; from advanced criminal analytics that reveal trends in vast amounts of data, to biometrics that allow the prompt and unique identification of criminals. With the AI and policing report, produced through the Observatory function of the Europol Innovation Lab, we aim to provide insight into the present and future capabilities that AI offers, projecting a course for a more efficient, responsive, and effective law enforcement model. This report offers an in-depth exploration of the applications and implications of AI in the field of law enforcement, underpinned by the European Union's regulatory framework. It also looks at concerns about data bias, fairness, and potential threats to privacy, accountability, human rights protection, and discrimination, which are particularly relevant in the background of the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act.

 The Hague: EUROPOL, 2024. 61p.

By  Susannah N. Tapp,  and Elizabeth J. Davis,

This report is part of a series that began in 1996 and examines the nature and frequency of contact with police reported by U.S. residents, including demographic characteristics, types of contact, and perceptions of police misconduct, threats of force, or use of nonfatal force.

Highlights:

• About 19% (49.2 million) of U.S. residents age 16 or older had contact with police in 2022.

• A smaller percentage of persons had contact with police in 2022 (19%) than in 2020 (21%).

• In 2022, males (8%) were more likely than females (7%) to experience police-initiated contact, while females (12%) were more likely than males (11%) to initiate contact with police.

• Among U.S. residents who initiated their most recent contact with police, almost half (46%) did so to report a possible crime.

Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 2024. 24p.

By James Yates

  Background In 2013, after a lengthy trial, United States District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin found that the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), violated City residents’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the City did so with deliberate indifference to NYPD officers’ “practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting unconstitutional frisks.” In addition, the Court found that the City had a “policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local crime suspect data . . . [that] resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of Blacks and Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” In a “Remedies Opinion,” a Monitor was appointed by the Court with authority to implement reforms related to training, documentation, supervision and discipline. Subsequently, the Court (Hon. Analisa Torres, D.J.) requested the preparation of an indepth, critical examination of the efficacy, fairness, and integrity of the City’s policies, practices and procedures with respect to police misconduct during stops. This Report is intended to meet the Court’s directive for a study of the NYPD disciplinary process as it relates to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment compliance in investigative encounters. Summary Description of NYPD Discipline Any recount of NYPD’s disciplinary process will aim at a moving target. Modifications in the disciplinary process utilized by or imposed upon NYPD are in constant flux. In the last five years alone, there has been a blizzard of reforms, outlined in the Report, to New York City and State laws governing discipline, not to mention a variety of changes in rules and regulations within the Department and related agencies, many of which have been, and continue to be, the subject of active litigation and modification. While it is useful, in the Report, to cite data describing or summarizing disciplinary results at various moments in time and to highlight individual disciplinary cases of note, the main thrust of the Report is not transitory data or individual case studies, but rather, as directed by the Court, a look at policies, practices and procedures. At the outset, the Report reviews processes within the police department itself. While the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) may be the most recognized venue for reviewing claims of police misconduct, the Board handles a small minority of examinations of police conduct. CCRB investigates fewer than 5,000 complaints each year. As many as 50,000 misconduct reviews are performed by other divisions or personnel within the Department. They include the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), a Force Investigation Division (“FID”), the Office of the Chief of Department (“OCD”), Borough Adjutants, Borough Investigating Units (“BIU”) and local Command Officers (“CO”). [Please note: a dictionary of acronyms used throughout the Report is attached as Appendix 2.] Police activity is also scrutinized by a variety of audits conducted by or overseen by the Quality Assurance Division (“QAD”), a unit within the Department, including audits of radio dispatch communications, arrests, and police self-inspection examinations. Separate from the Department’s disciplinary process, an Early Intervention Committee (“EIC”) reviews officer history when certain signals of potential misconduct are  triggered. Other outside agencies regularly monitor potential misconduct, including the Commission to Combat Police Corruption (“CCPC”), the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (“OIG-NYPD”), the NYC Commission on Human Rights (“CCHR”) and a state agency, the Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Misconduct Investigative Office (“LEMIO”). Finally, thousands of complaints undergo scrutiny by way of claims lodged with the New York City Comptroller’s office and lawsuits filed in state and federal court. There is no cognizable attempt to coordinate the various reviews of police misconduct. Without full coordination, cooperation and sharing of information, the mere fact of split or concurrent investigations of any given encounter can lead to confusion or delay. Civilian Complaint Review Board The CCRB is comprised of fifteen members. Five members are appointed by the City Council; five members are appointed by the Mayor; one member is appointed by the Public Advocate; a Chair is appointed jointly by the Mayor and the City Council Speaker; and three members, with law enforcement experience, are designated by the Police Commissioner. Within CCRB, panels of three of the fifteen members are assembled to review closing reports and recommendations prepared by the investigative staff. Members are assigned to panels on a rotational basis. The Board has adopted a rule, not required by law, that each decisional panel shall have one of the police designees as a member. This leads to police designees hearing a greater volume of cases than other appointees. As an adjustment, more recently, CCRB sends some cases to panels without a police designee, but, if the panel substantiates misconduct, the matter is then sent for a second review attended by a police designee. In essence, misconduct may not be substantiated unless approved by a panel with a police designee. The Report discusses the impact of that decision. Disciplinary Recommendations to the Police Commissioner Findings of officer misconduct arrive at the Police Commissioner’s desk by dint of two highways: a substantiated finding referred from a CCRB panel to the Police Commissioner or one sent after an internal police department investigation. For minor or technical infractions within the Department, local commands/precinct commanders are authorized to impose discipline directly. All other recommendations for discipline are referred to, and left to, the discretion of the Police Commissioner, who may accept or reject a finding and who will then decide whether to impose a penalty, guidance, or neither. Disciplinary proceedings are either formal or informal. Formal discipline is administered through a trial process where Charges and Specifications are served detailing the allegations of misconduct. A deputy within the Department, sitting as a trial commissioner, receives evidence and makes a recommendation of guilty or not guilty along with a recommendation for a penalty or guidance or neither. The hearing is open to the public and the officer is entitled to representation. There may be several hundred such hearings in a given year. New York State Law requires that the trial commissioner be a deputy of the Police Commissioner if the subject officer faces possible termination. An Appellate Division ruling, barring hearings before an independent administrative hearing officer, has extended that provision of law to require that all trials come before a departmental deputy as the hearing officer, even in the more usual case where termination is not sought by the prosecuting authority. Informal discipline, which is much more common, occurs at the precinct or in the Department outside the trial process, when an officer “accepts” a “command discipline” along with the recommended or negotiated outcome. Absent extraordinary circumstances, stop and frisk misconduct is addressed by informal discipline. At the conclusion of an investigation or trial, CCRB or a trial commissioner (a departmental deputy), as the case may be, will determine if an allegation is substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence. Investigations and trials are not bound by strict rules of evidence. Hearsay is admissible and may form the basis for a finding. In formal proceedings at Departmental trials a verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty is rendered by the Trial Commissioner along with a recommendation for discipline or guidance if Guilty. Whether an allegation of misconduct is substantiated by CCRB or found by a Trial Commissioner, the Police Commissioner is not constrained to follow the recommendations and may vary the finding, alter a penalty, or decide upon no disciplinary action (NDA). The variance may be based upon the Commissioner’s: (i) disagreement with the factual findings; (ii) a different understanding of the applicable law or rules; (iii) a desire to exercise lenity—imposing a lesser penalty or no penalty; or (iv) any combination thereof. While various provisions of law require an explanation by the Police Commissioner in certain cases of disagreement with the findings of CCRB or a trial commissioner, the explanatory letters are often unclear as to whether the modification is based upon disagreements with factual findings, legal conclusions, or a simple desire to modify a penalty. The unfettered reach of the Commissioner’s authority is a point of frequent public debate.   

September 19, 2024. 503p.

By Brittany C. Cunningham, Bryce E. Peterson, Daniel S. Lawrence, Michael D. White, James R. Coldren, Jr., Jennifer Lafferty, Keri Richardson

Over the past decade, thousands of law enforcement agencies in the United States have adopted body‑worn cameras (BWCs) (Hyland, 2018). The rapid diffusion of these devices has been driven by several factors, most notably numerous controversial uses of force by police against community members of color and evidence suggesting that BWCs can produce a range of positive outcomes like reductions in complaints and uses of force (Braga et al., 2018; Peterson & Lawrence, 2021; Sutherland et al., 2017), added evidentiary value in investigations and downstream court proceedings (Huff et al., 2023; Todak et al., 2023), and enhanced perceptions of procedural justice and police legitimacy (Demir et al., 2020; McCluskey et al., 2019). The demand for police BWCs has continued unabated into the 2020s (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2022; White & Malm, 2020), and interest has now expanded to corrections. By 2023, at least ten state prison systems have begun the process of deploying BWCs, with many local jails following suit (Bogel-Burroughs, 2022; Brodie et al., 2020; Welsh-Huggins, 2021; Winton, 2021). Despite this expansion, there is limited research on the impact of these devices in prisons or jails. There are also fundamental differences between correctional and law enforcement settings that researchers must consider. For example, correctional officers interact with incarcerated residents on a more consistent and long-term basis than police interact with civilians. Prisons and jails also include a high concentration of vulnerable populations, including people under serious psychological distress and experiencing mental and behavioral health challenges (Maruschak et al., 2021). Another potential concern is that BWCs are redundant in prisons and jails because these environments are already saturated with stationary surveillance cameras (Allard et al., 2006). Although the stationary camera networks in many correctional facilitates are outdated and suffer from blind spots (Lawrence et al., 2022), it is not yet clear whether BWCs offer any added benefits beyond what is captured through these extant systems. For example, can BWCs provide additional evidentiary value in the investigation of misconduct incidents or staff uses of force? The current brief seeks to address this knowledge gap by examining the footage of response-to-resistance (RTR) events produced by BWCs compared to stationary closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in a correctional setting. The following sections describe the background of the current study, our approach to reviewing BWC and  stationary CCTV camera footage, and our key findings.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2023. 16p.

By The New South Wales Police Force

The NSW Police Force (NSWPF) responds to more than 60,000 mental health incidents in the community every year and this figure has increased by around 10 per cent annually since 2018. In most cases a criminal offence has not been committed, there is no threat of violence and a weapon is not involved. This report looks at the NSWPF response to mental health incidents in the community.

Purpose

• Examine the demand on the NSWPF in responding to mental health incidents in the community.

• Review the training officers receive.

• Defining the role of police in responding to mental health incidents in the community.

• Reviewing the current operational model.

• Develop potential options for alternate response models.

Findings

The report noted that while police are best equipped to respond to incidents involving criminality and public order, other health professionals are able to provide more appropriate care for people experiencing mental health crises.

It also acknowledged that police, as the primary responder, can potentially escalate a situation and that the high volume of police deployment to mental health related matters can also have flow on impacts to other community safety issues, limiting resources of police to respond to other matters.

Actions

• The NSWPF and NSW Ministry of Health have set up a working group of senior officials to consider the findings of the report and to develop options for an alternative response.

• Additionally, the NSWPF has newly established the Mental Health Command to strengthen engagement and enhance police interventions when responding to mental health incidents.

• The Command will provide oversight, strategic guidance and advice as well as engage with external stakeholders.

Publisher Government of New South Wales

By University of Pennsylvania Crime and Justice Policy Lab and California Partnership for Safe Communities

Violence reduction in the U.S. is benefitting from excellent research (and ongoing research agendas) into specific interventions that can be evaluated and replicated. However, more is needed. The fact that so many cities continue to struggle with serious violence despite record investments in new programs indicates that the field needs a broader approach. WHAT’S MISSING? There is a crucial gap holding back the field of violence reduction: an understanding of not just what programs or strategies to adopt, but how to manage and govern on the city level to reduce serious violence. This was the primary conclusion of a 2022 expert convening. Running a rigorous violence intervention program in a particular community is very challenging. Assembling, implementing, and sustaining an effective city-level strategy is an even more complex and difficult task. The challenge of developing successful citywide strategies is enormously important, often ignored, and a large part of why cities are failing to sustainably reduce violence. The convened group comprised several important perspectives: people who have led city violence reduction offices (Jeremy Biddle, Sasha Cotton, Reygan Cunningham), people who help cities and city partners develop their violence prevention capacity (Vaughn Crandall, Fatimah Loren Drier, David Muhammed) and academic experts (Anthony Braga, Shani Buggs, Rodrigo Canales, Daniel Webster). The group was led by the University of Pennsylvania Crime and Justice Policy Lab (CJP) and the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC), working with key leads from the White House Community Violence Intervention Collaborative and the Ballmer Community Violence Reduction Initiative (CAPS). (See Appendix A for more on the convening. This document describes the group’s conclusions and exploration of the current gap in research, implementation, governance, and ongoing management that challenges the violence reduction field, including suggestions of three areas where investment and effort could make a near-term impact: RESEARCH: Ongoing study of how cities structure, manage, and govern violence reduction efforts to establish baselines against which to assess near-term efforts and make long-term progress. Key action research questions, which could be applied to particular cities or systematically across cohorts, include: How are cities currently structuring their violence intervention efforts? Where does management and government authority for producing reductions in community violence reside? To what extent are citywide violence intervention efforts informed by basic analyses of community violence? What are the shortfalls for the ways in which cities use current analyses of their problems? How can cities build internal capacity for problem analysis and governance structures to ensure these analyses are used? What role does city government-based infrastructure play in administering and managing violence intervention strategies? What role does community-based infrastructure play in administering and managing violence intervention strategies? How are these government and community efforts resourced—monetarily, administratively, in terms of personnel, and over time? What key management capacities can be identified that correlate with success, or lack thereof, in producing and sustaining city level reductions in community violence? TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: Using action research and existing evidence to help cities develop effective strategies and strengthen political governance, management, and key capacities. At present, technical assistance providers are filling capacity gaps at the local level—while technical assistance will likely always be needed to help cities get started or course-correct as they go, the field needs useful frameworks for improving city-level systems aimed at reducing community violence. POLICY: Engaging the field on how to sustain and enhance violence reduction efforts through policy development, governance, and management. Mayoral offices or statewide offices of violence prevention, strong community-based intermediaries, and other governing entities may be better able to provide structural support to violence reduction strategies when those offices and entities are supported by strong standards of practice  

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 13p.   

By Anthony A.Braga, John M.MacDonald,  Stephen Douglas,  Brian Wade,  Benjamin Struh

The evaluation literature suggests that focused deterrence strategies are effective in reducing gun violence. However, focused deterrence is notoriously difficult to implement and sustain. The history of focused deterrence implementation failure raises questions about its viability as a gun violence prevention strategy. Stockton, California, implemented focused deterrence three times during the past 25 years. In its most recent version, Stockton officials explicitly designed the strategy to be a permanent feature of the city’s violence prevention portfolio. Although program caseloads diminished over the course of the COVID-19 pandemicandthestrategyfacedleadershipandresource challenges, Stockton’s efforts prevented the program from being discontinued and, for those gang members who did receive treatment, delivered a robust gun violence prevention strategy. A quasi-experimental evaluation showsthattreated gang members wireless likely to be shot and reduced their violent offending relative to similar untreated gang members. The focused deterrence impacts also appear to spill over to gang members who were socially connected to treated gang members. 

Criminology & Public Policy, 2024. 

By  Elizabeth Carlson and Charles Wheeler

During his first administration, former President Trump adopted aggressive anti-immigrant policies, which included family separation, a ban on individuals from Muslim-majority countries, stringent border policies like the Remain in Mexico and Title 42, and attempted terminations of programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for several national groups. Attorneys and representatives for immigrants had some success in pushing back against the administration’s most extreme measures through litigation and advocacy. Should they return to the White House, Trump and his supporters have promised to enact an even more draconian anti-immigrant agenda, including a commitment to conducting the largest mass deportation in U.S. history, ending birthright citizenship (which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment), and revoking humanitarian protections for those already in the United States. Many of these efforts, of course, will be challenged in court. This article summarizes 10 likely immigration initiatives under a second Trump administration. It seeks to educate members of the public who value the crucial role and myriad contributions of immigrants and refugees — past and present — in the United States. It will also outline how advocates can fight to protect their clients from these measures.

Journal on Migration and Human Security 1–15 © 2024.

By H. Douglas Ott and Alysson Gatens

The nature of police work may at times involve stressful situations such as the threat of, and actual, physical harm and witnessing the human toll of violence. The stress of the job combined with organizational stressors may severely impact police officers and their work. Stress can lead to substance misuse and disorders, trauma, and suicide. Police departments can address officer stress through interventions, such as counseling, peer support groups, and stress management training. This article summarizes literature on the effects of police officer stress and trauma. Police officers that embrace active coping styles may be better able to handle stress  

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information. Authority 2022. 14p.

By Citygate Associates, LLC

The City of Berkeley (City) retained Citygate Associates, LLC (Citygate) to conduct a Workload Organizational Study of the Police Department (Department). This assessment includes a review of the adequacy of current and future deployment systems, staffing levels throughout the Department, sustainable alternatives, beat structure, overtime, and organizational structure. The methodology utilized in this study can be found in Section 1 of this report. Citygate’s review includes a detailed analysis of the data that drives staffing recommendations including data related to police unit response times, crime, calls for service, and overtime. The review also includes a staffing analysis of supervision, management, and support functions within each division of the Department. Our work was combined with a review of the City’s ongoing efforts related to alternative response methods to non-police or low-level emergencies and other care needs in the City. This transition is already underway to provide appropriate alternative services to the community when a traditional 9-1-1 police patrol response is not necessary. Citygate’s assessment encompasses recommendations to support the Department’s success over the next five to seven years. Overall, this report contains 74 key findings and 54 specific, actionable recommendations. Findings and recommendations are presented in their narrative context in Sections 2 through Section 7. A comprehensive list of all findings and recommendations is presented sequentially in Section 8. Recommendations are also presented in Table 1 of this Executive Summary. POLICY CHOICES FRAMEWORK Currently, there are no mandatory federal or state regulations directing the level of police field service staffing, response times, and necessary outcomes. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) recommend methods for determining appropriate staffing levels based on local priorities. The National Emergency Number Association (NENA) provides standards for 9-1-1 call answering, and the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International (APCO) and the International Academies of Emergency Dispatching (IAED) provide best practices that illuminate staffing needs for communications centers providing dispatch services. Using a data-driven framework as advocated in this report—and already embraced and practiced by the Department—the City can continue to engage the community in adapting future public safety services to utilize alternative and community-focused, non-police officer strategies to address community-wide, neighborhood, and social issues. Personnel costs are often the most significant cost center in any department budget. One of the City Council’s greatest challenges is managing scarce fiscal resources and allocating them wisely across the vast needs of municipal government public safety operations. The recommendations in this Workload Organizational Study are made based on best practices, Citygate’s experience, and guidelines established by professional industry organizations. The City’s fiscal capabilities and non-9-1-1 alternative services delivery measures must be considered when weighing these recommendations. GENERAL SUMMARY OF CITYGATE’S ASSESSMENT Citygate commends the Department and the City for its many innovative, forward-looking, and community-focused programs, including its Transparency Hub; the Mental Health Division’s Mobile Crisis Unit; the Specialized Care Unit, which provides crisis service with no police involvement; the prioritization of employee wellness; the Community Services Bureau (CSB) and its community liaisons; and the Bike Team. Residents can call 9-1-1 for life-threatening emergencies and can ask dispatchers for mental health support. All Mobile Crisis Team (MCT) calls may be accompanied by firefighter-paramedics or police officers, who ensure safety at the scene while allowing the MCT to assist. If such calls are made when MCT members are off duty, City police officers have extensive experience helping people through mental health and substance abuse crises, and regularly utilize de-escalation and crisis intervention strategies. Further, the City’s Specialized Care Unit (SCU) is a partnership program with Bonita House, Inc. Staff assigned to the SCU will respond to those undergoing a mental health- or substance-use-related crisis without police involvement. The Chief of Police has also recently created a new Deputy Chief’s position and a new unit: the Office of Strategic Planning and Accountability (OSPA). The Office of Strategic Planning and Accountability will report directly to the Chief and will serve as a pivotal entity in enhancing data driven approaches in policing performance, Departmental accountability, risk management, and oversight—as well as addressing community and external stakeholder needs. Throughout Citygate’s assessment, Citygate found a department with high professionalism at all levels and a staff willing to implement new ideas and technologies to improve policing in the City. The members of the Department are extremely dedicated to the community they serve. No organization is perfect, and many of the findings and recommendations in this report are items the Department is aware of and is already taking steps to implement. Some changes will take time and require resources as part of the Department’s normal budgeting process. All of the City’s work to date and the issues researched for this study present two policy challenges for the Council and community to work together on—not to the exclusion of one or the other. Both challenges require resources because, if one set of services falls short, other services and overall public well-being can be negatively impacted. 

Challenge #1 Maintain Emergency and Needed Police Services Commensurate to Current Demands  Citygate found that many sections of the Department—especially Patrol and the Communications Center (Dispatch)—suffer from a shortage in staffing, which frequently necessitates overtime or diverting staff from other units to fill vacancies in Patrol.  Many sworn members, particularly those with supervisory responsibilities, are responsible for several ancillary duties and often find themselves spending increasingly more time on administrative tasks apart from their primary duties, which include leadership and supervision in the field.  The Department also faces hurdles in recruiting, hiring, and training new staff while keeping pace with attrition as the public perception of the law enforcement profession evolves. To heighten the focus on recruiting, the Chief has recently assigned a full-time Recruitment Officer.  Overall, from 9-1-1 call receipt to the arrival of the right resource in response to a specific incident—whether Patrol, Investigations, Traffic, Mobile Crisis Team, etc.—there are multiple current limitations adversely affecting the Department’s efforts to meet the high volume of calls for assistance received every hour.  Staffing shortages and technical limitations affect morale, overtime, recruitment, and retention. Challenge #2 Grow Non-9-1-1 Services to Support Berkeley’s Compassionate and Caring Human Services The City is actively working on reimagining public safety, a process initiated in 2021. City goals emphasize a more holistic, integrated, and community-centered approach to society’s needs that do not require an emergent police/fire/ambulance response. The City’s goals, and the work the City has already started, aim to address these needs by incorporating a range of professionals and response strategies.  Alternatives to a police patrol response require the programs to be developed and non-sworn personnel to be hired—such as Community Service Officers (CSOs) and specialists for response to people experiencing homelessness-related issues or mental health crisis.  Building the desired enhanced programs requires planning, mid-managers, recruitment, training, and quality of care oversight—all of which the Department is strained to provide currently.  The Specialized Care Unit (SCU) is an innovative partnership program between the City of Berkeley and Bonita House, Inc. The SCU currently operates 24 hours per day Sunday through Wednesday. The SCU also operates from 6:00 am to 4:00 pm Thursday through Saturday. When someone calls 9-1-1, they can ask public safety dispatchers for support related to mental health or substance-use issues, which may also come in the form of the Mental Health Division’s Mobile Crisis Unit. Firefighter-paramedics or police officers may also accompany all Mobile Crisis Unit calls, while an SCU response is one with no police involvement. The SCU can be reached directly if someone is undergoing a mental health- or substance-use-related crisis and needs assistance.  The Vision Zero Action Plan is a strategy to eliminate all traffic fatalities and severe injuries while increasing safe, healthy, and equitable mobility for all. It is, first and foremost, an engineering strategy that aims to design and build Berkeley streets to eliminate severe and fatal traffic injuries. Equity-driven Vision Zero traffic enforcement utilizes the best possible data and is focused on areas of the City where engineering and education efforts have already been implemented.  The Berkeley Police Department’s online Transparency Hub shares Police Department policies, actions, and data with City partners and community stakeholders. This data includes police stop data to ensure fair and impartial policing through an analysis of calls for service, use of force, and current trends.  The Department’s four Area Coordinators serve as community liaisons for the Department. They can help with long-term problems such as persistent issues with illegal dumping or abandoned vehicles. CITYGATE’S RECOMMENDATIONS AND GOALS Throughout this assessment, Citygate provides recommendations to serve the Department in its efforts to achieve the following six goals: 1. Increasing staffing in some areas and deploying and redeploying staff where and when they are most needed based on accurate and timely data and analysis. 2. 3. In the context of employee wellness and accountability, carefully evaluating the various collateral duties many employees are assigned, giving particular attention to supervisors who are often being pulled from their supervisory roles. Continuing efforts to track and manage overtime and limiting its use to when it is necessary. 4. 5. 6. Continuing the Department’s strong and creative efforts related to data analysis to drive performance and continuous improvement. Continuing the Department’s strong focus on employee wellness. A focus on wellbeing not only benefits individual employees but also promotes a healthier work environment, reducing the risk of fatigue and enhancing Departmental morale. Improving employee retention and prioritizing employee morale. The benefits of improving police morale are many, including better service for the community, more community trust in the Department, and a motivated, purposeful workforce. Citygate analyzed current capabilities to project future needs for the Department, with actionable recommendations and strategies provided for implementation based on the growth and development of the City. If this study’s recommendations are implemented over several fiscal years:  The Department will be well positioned to deepen its ability to provide proactive policing.  The community will be able to increase interaction with partners in the Department to foster joint crime prevention strategies.  The prevention of crime and disorder and the closure of investigations of serious incidents will increase.  When the public interacts with Berkeley police, they will know them and trust them to be fair—and will not assume they are representative of what is wrong with policing elsewhere in America. SUMMARY OF POLICE SERVICES FINDINGS BY TOPIC Organizational Summary At the time of Citygate’s analysis, the Department was operating with an authorized (budgeted) total staffing level of 313.20 employees, which includes 181 total authorized sworn staff. The Department is currently organized into four major divisions—Operations, Investigations, Professional Standards, and Support Services—each commanded by a Police Captain. The Chief of Police recently informed staff of a planned Departmental reorganization that will result in the creation of a new Deputy Chief’s position and a new Office of Strategic Planning and Accountability (OSPA). The reorganization will also entail a Captain being promoted to Deputy Chief, and units within the current Professional Standards Division being transferred to other Departmental offices or divisions. ....continued....    

Berkeley, CA: Citygate Associates, 2024. 155p.

By Minnesota Independent Evaluator, Judge Karen Janisch

In compliance with paragraph 407 of the Settlement Agreement and Order (“Agreement”) dated July 13, 2023, in the matter captioned State of Minnesota by Rebecca Lucero, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, plaintiff vs. City of Minneapolis, Court File No. 27-cv-23-4177 (Judge Karen Janisch), the Independent Evaluator (“IE”) submits this Implementation Progress Evaluation Plan (the “Plan”).1 The Agreement identifies what the City of Minneapolis (“the City”) and the Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”) must achieve to comply with the Agreement but not necessarily how to do it, or in what sequence. In other words, the Agreement is a requirements document not a planning document. Moreover, the Agreement contains many overlapping requirements. For example, some of the Agreement’s sections, captioned as Parts, are devoted to overarching practices such as policies and training, but other Parts that address practices also include policy and training requirements. Similarly, supervision requirements are embedded throughout various Parts of the Agreement. The overarching purpose of this Plan is to align the Parties and the IE Team on the processes, sequence, and requirements the IE Team will be considering when evaluating the implementation of the Agreement and how implementation and compliance will be measured. This Plan is based on the IE Team’s 90-day assessment of the City's and MPD’s operations related to the Agreement, including the progress they have made implementing the Agreement. Recognizing, however, the inherent limitations on forecasting a four-year implementation process, the IE Team reserves the right to modify this Plan in response to changed or unforeseen information, conditions, or developments, in consultation with the Parties. The IE Team will report any such changes to the Plan to the public.2 On behalf of the Implementation Team, we look forward to partnering with the City, the MPD, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (“MDHR”), and the Minneapolis public to achieve the Agreement’s eagerly anticipated and laudable goals.   

Minneapolis: The Independent Evaluation Team, 2024. 88p,

Edited by Nazmia E.A. Comrie and Shanetta Y. Cutlar   

The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), is excited to celebrate 30 years of advancing community policing. Reflecting on the work of the COPS Office over the last three decades calls to mind the changes in crime-fighting techniques, accountability measures, and technology and the evolving role of police in civil society in that time. Throughout all these changes, the COPS Office has continued to support reducing crime and building trust between law enforcement and the communities served. When the conversations began about how we could best document this COPS Office milestone, we wanted to push the boundaries by creating a resource that went beyond a retro spective—not just looking back at the last 30 years but also looking forward to the next 30. We recognize that this COPS Office achievement is a shared accomplishment and wanted to include the field in the celebration. With these goals in mind, we created American Policing 2054: Advancing Community Policing over the Next 30 Years. This publication is designed to be a companion to the COPS Office’s previous milestone publication, American Policing in 2022: Essays on the Future of a Profession, envisioned and edited by COPS Office staff members Debra R. Cohen McCullough and Deborah L. Spence. While that publication asked contributors to consider what policing would look like in 10 years, this one expands its scope to include a vision for the next 30 years. The concept - We used the framework created by our colleagues in 2012 to compile a list of leaders in law enforcement, public safety research, and civil rights, as well as community members, to contribute to this publication. Knowing that there are so many more thought leaders, perspectives, and voices than we could fit in this publication, we especially considered contributors to the 2022 publication as well as thought leaders from all ranks and agency types. We curated our list to ensure we had diversity in thought, experiences, and voices. The interest and excitement from the field in response to our invitation was remarkable. We asked contributors to think as boldly and as broadly as they liked. We encouraged innovation and assured contributors they were limited only by their informed imagination about the future of law enforcement in the United States. Most importantly, we told contributors that there were no wrong answers for their vision of the future of policing. The COPS Office received essays from current and former law enforcement leaders and officers, researchers, practitioners, and civic and civil rights leaders, and these contributors did not disappoint.   Essay themes Contributors covered topics such as technology, community engagement, crime-reduction strategies, training, accountability, and transparency. Some of the contributors envisioned drastic changes in the future, while others saw more subtle refinements to policing. The majority of the essays converged on the importance of technology and the need for technology policies and procedures that balance privacy and accountability. In the end, all of the articles touched on one or more principles of community policing—organizational change, problem solving, and partnerships. As such, we used those principles to create the themes for this publication.

 Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services., 2024. 124p.  

By Frankie Wunschel and Daniel Bodah

The 911 emergency call line was first implemented in 1968, in Halleyville, Alabama, as a fire emergency number.1 The scope of 911 expanded over the years to include police and emergency medical responses. As the world and the 911 system have changed throughout the past 52 years, the goal of 911—to enhance public safety—has not. Although extensive changes have been made in the technological infrastructure of the 911 system (such as adding GPS, Computer Aided Dispatch [CAD], and the Enhanced and Next Generation 911 applications), there have been few advances in the call-taking and dispatching aspects of the system. Modernization is needed if 911 is to provide fully effective service. In recent years, a few alternative approaches to call taking and information processing have surfaced. One of these alternative approaches is known as Criteria Based Dispatch (CBD). CBD was developed in King Country, Washington, in 1989 and was initially developed for emergency medical services.2 Whereas the traditional 911 approach involves the call taker collecting as much information as possible—what is happening, as well as why—CBD focuses on “here and now” questions.3 CBD was constructed as a central triage guideline system focusing on two key areas to understand this here-and now framework: 1. The necessary level of care 2. The urgency of the need for care.4 CBD systems categorize multiple call types together and supply a list of corresponding questions for use during the call-taking process.5 These questions and prompts are guidance suggestions for the call taker, ultimately trusting that the call taker will exercise discretion to use them appropriately.6 The system was initially developed for medical emergency-based calls and utilizing symptom criteria similar to those utilized in medical offices and hospitals.7 CBD has since expanded and been used in multiple departments for fire-related calls as well. Although readily used for medical and fire emergencies, CBD has been introduced in only a handful of jurisdictions for police calls.8 As a movement across the country has begun demanding changes to policing and public safety, the need to revisit 911 call-taking and dispatching methods has become urgent. As discussed below, CBD has revolutionized the  call-taking process for medical and fire calls to 911. This review of the literature on CBD frames how this approach could also lead to improvements in the policing space. Research on CBD is limited. The bulk of research has focused on understanding the structural components of the system and how they affect traditional 911 success metrics such as diagnosis accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, and over- or under-triage.9 CBD research is practically nonexistent in the context of its use in the United States, so international research must be used to fill this gap. CBD processes in the United States and Europe are largely the same, although European CBD has adopted a three-level urgency approach that is less robust than the U.S. version.10 In exploring the landscape of CBD literature, researchers at the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) searched numerous academic databases, as well as the Internet, to identify academic, professional, and nonprofit reports and studies of CBD. The identified publications consisted of field explorations, scientific evaluation studies, training guides, news publications, and promotional materials. A wide range of literature types was used in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the field and supplement the limited amount of formal research available. This literature review explores the literature on CBD with a focus on reviewing the potential benefits of CBD seen by those working in the public safety response sector. The literature review also highlights strengths and weaknesses of CBD, maps the comparative research on CBD with that on competing dispatch system Medical Priority Dispatch (MPD), and finishes with a discussion of the potential for using CBD to improve responses in the policing space and support appropriate diversion of 911 calls to nonenforcement responses.  

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2020. 12p.

By p.S. Rebecca Neusteter, Megan O’Toole, Mawia Khogali, Abdul Rad, Frankie Wunschel, Sarah Scaffidi, Marilyn Sinkewicz, Maris Mapolski, Paul DeGrandis, Daniel Bodah, and Henessy Pineda

At least 240 million calls to 911 are made each year.1 Responding to these calls takes up a sizable amount of police officers’ time, even though relatively few calls stem from crimes in progress. Despite their prevalence in police work, little research about the nature of 911 calls or how police respond is available. Basic information, such as the number of calls and reasons they are made, how call volumes vary across different call types, and what happens from the time a call is placed to when an officer arrives on the scene, is unknown. The 911 call system plays a critical role in policing practice and should be studied, not only to measure performance but also to aid in decision-making processes, inform strategic decisions, and understand opportunities to advance call processing and alternative responses.2 The current study was designed to define the landscape of 911 calls for police service and answer fundamental questions about how communications personnel and police respond to them. To begin, the study explores 911 call processing by examining what happens when 911 calls are answered and what training, protocols, standards, and management possibilities exist at each stage of 911 call processing. The study also examines how accurately 911 calls are categorized and handled when received by public safety personnel. Questions about the overall volume and rate of 911 calls for service, typical response time, and ordinary duration of responses to 911 calls, as well as how these vary by the call type, time, and location are also considered. To understand how characteristics of 911 calls impact police officers in the field, the study analyzes what proportion of officers’ activities represent responses to 911 calls versus those proactively initiated by officers. The study examines how 911 calls are resolved by identifying the categories of dispositions and their frequency, as well as how they vary by call volume, type, time, and location. The ultimate outcomes of police contacts initiated by 911 calls are also reviewed to understand what factors have the greatest contribution to 911 call responses. In addition, the current research examines communications systems among call-takers, dispatchers, and police officers in the field to determine whether all information relevant to outcomes is being effectively conveyed. The study further explores whether it is possible to improve outcomes for police and civilians by  identifying 911 calls that may be handled more appropriately by a response other than sending sworn officers. The following research activities provided details about the 911 landscape to address these questions: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) an examination of prior research on 911 calls in the policing context; an analysis of 911 call and computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data to identify 911 call types, processing, and outcomes in Camden County (NJ) and Tucson (AZ) police and public safety communications departments; the development of a system processing map to trace calls from receipt through closure, which was achieved using data from focus groups, interviews, audio analysis of a sample of 911 calls, and field observations in Camden County Police Department (CCPD), Camden County Communications Center (CCCC), Tucson Police Department (TPD), and Tucson Public Safety Communications Division (PSCD); an examination of publicly available 911 call and CAD data from Detroit, New Orleans, and Seattle; and a convening of police, emergency communications practitioners, and other stakeholders to contextualize these findings and explore alternatives to sworn police response. The Vera Institute of Justice’s (Vera’s) review of the existing literature on 911 calls for service (detailed in Chapter 2) reveals a need for innovation in this space, as well as more research exploring key features of the system (such as call volumes, types, and outcomes at the national, state, and local levels). Since the birth of 911 in the late 1960s and its congressionally mandated national deployment in 1999, the emergency communications field has become professionalized and transformed by new technologies, such as Enhanced 911 (E911) and Next Generation 911 (NG911).3 However, much remains to be learned about how 911 calls are processed, how personnel are trained, and where opportunities for alternative responses need development or can be expanded. As a first step toward understanding how 911 calls are processed, Vera created a system processing map. This map (given in Chapter 3) shows that, when a community member calls 911, the caller relays information to a call-taker at a public safety communications center. The call-taker gathers relevant information from the caller; determines whether the call requires a response by fire, police, medical personnel, or a combination thereof; enters information and categorizes the call using a CAD system; and may give the caller instructions about what to expect or actions to take. The information the call-taker enters into the CAD system is sent to the appropriate dispatcher for further action. The dispatcher assigns officers to respond to the call based on the priority level of the reported incident, the narrative information entered in the CAD system by the call-taker, and available police resources. The dispatcher may, during this process, reclassify the call type or priority level. The assigned patrol officers then respond to the location given in the call, where they may take a report, provide instructions, resolve conditions found there, call for other resources, or take law enforcement action. Vera’s analysis of Camden and Tucson data shows that, with slight variations, this core set of actors and actions defines the landscape of 911 call processing. Within this system, call codes, training, and standards exist to guide the actions of call-takers and dispatchers; however, codes, training, and standards are not uniform across 911 call systems, and opportunities exist to improve outcomes by diverting appropriate calls to non-law enforcement responders. Vera’s detailed analysis of CAD data and 911 audio recordings from Camden and Tucson sheds further light on how the 911 system operates (presented in Chapters 4 and 5). • As many as half of CAD records may be of limited reliability due to lack of call type specificity and other call information omitted from the narrative. • Officers spend a substantial proportion of their time responding to calls for service, few of which are related to crimes in progress, let alone serious crime in progress. • Most calls do not relate to serious or violent crime; instead, the most frequent calls involve nuisance complaints and low-level crimes. • Trends across the departments differed. In 2016 and 2017, TPD officers spent most of their time responding to 911 calls for service, whereas CCPD officers engaged primarily in proactive police activity. (As explained in chapter 5, this finding may be a function of differences in departmental record keeping.) These observations of Camden and Tucson are further supported through the findings from the open data sites—Detroit, New Orleans, and Seattle. Highlights from the five-city analysis demonstrate the following: • The most frequent incident type was noncriminal in nature. In four of the five sites, the most frequent incident type was some variation of a complaint or request for an officer to perform a welfare check. Across all sites, the most common priority types were nonemergency. • The five sites have a wide range of dispatcher and officer response times. The two sites (Detroit and New Orleans) that have response time available by priority level show that response times are faster in emergency incidents. Among call types, the fastest response times for dispatchers and officers were behavioral health incidents, medical emergencies, traffic stops, officer requests for help, area checks, and alarms. • Examining CAD events generated through 911 calls for service and those that are officer-initiated reveals that, in Tucson and New Orleans, 911 calls were most prevalent in the CAD system. However, in both Camden and Seattle, officer-initiated events accounted for most CAD entries. In Detroit, the proportions of CAD entries varied across the study period, shifting from being mostly 911 responses to mostly officer-initiated events. The findings across all sites suggest the need for future research and local conversations about whether certain types of 911 calls for service require responses by police. There are critical gaps in knowledge regarding the underlying needs, causes, and consequences for these resource intensive calls for service that do not involve a crime. The current research also produced initial empirical evidence of how data collected by call takers and dispatchers relates to officer activity on the ground (discussed in Chapter 6). In both Camden and Tucson, incidents labeled as violent were more likely to result in arrest than those labeled nonviolent. However, incidents categorized as nonviolent were more likely to result in arrest when initiated by police than when originating from a 911 call, revealing a divergence that suggests the need for additional research. To a large extent, mental health and medical incidents were diverted from criminal justice enforcement, potentially indicating that the focus on mental health awareness has the potential to pay dividends. Vera’s analysis also revealed the potential for gathering additional data in the 911 call context to advance broader insights, such as how to improve call-taker and dispatcher operations to support improvements in criminal justice outcomes and the integration of additional variables to permit more varied and appropriate responses to 911 calls. The research also sought to test the viability of data science methods known as Natural Language Processing (NLP) in order to understand if data contained within CAD narrative fields (which makes up much of the CAD data) appears frequently enough to merit developing mechanisms to capture and analyze this information in a more structured manner (e.g., to develop new structured CAD codes). Several key findings emerged from applying the NLP approach, methods, and techniques to Camden and Tucson’s 911 data (described in Chapter 7). The high-level results include the following: • The narrative fields in the CAD entries are essential to making accurate policing decisions. • Subjective bias can be injected into the narrative fields by call-takers, dispatchers, and officers. • Additional research is needed to understand why this detectable difference between the narrative field and the structured data exists; how call-takers, dispatchers, and officers use the narrative field; and how much cognitive load is placed on officers when consuming the narrative data as opposed to the structured data. This inquiry would require researchers to review the data manually and identify another method to compare structured and unstructured data fields prior to employing a computational/algorithmic approach. To further explore the empirical findings that resulted from the research activities, Vera hosted a national convening of law enforcement leaders and system stakeholders (summarized in Chapter 8). At the convening, researchers presented their findings, explored alternatives to enforcement, and collaborated to identify opportunities for reform. This convening was held in partnership with Arnold Ventures and George Mason University’s Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP). Both research teams (Vera and CEBCP) presented their findings to explore implications of the research and spark innovations, particularly around alternatives to enforcement. Participants from 40 organizations across the country were in attendance, including representatives from 10 police departments, five public safety communications agencies, and 10 research organizations. The room was full and engaged. The convening’s energy and insights provided clear evidence that additional conversation and collaboration on the topic is both needed and wanted. This report concludes with a number of key policy recommendations and practitioner innovations (presented in Chapter 9), ranging from developing new protocols for how and if police departments should respond to unverified burglar alarms to providing de-escalation tactics trainings to 911 call-takers and dispatchers. Clear needs have emerged for better call taking and recording practices, as well as standardized codes and procedures, with the goal of improving procedural justice, customer service, and the safety and wellbeing of officers, community members, call-takers, and dispatchers. Many practical solutions exist, some of which are currently being implemented and tested and others that are on the cutting edge. One effort that is feasible and valuable in the immediate term is developing a national coalition to advance thinking, practice, research, and standardization. This can be achieved through the roundtable model that has successfully mobilized reform in many other areas of the justice system for the past several decades.4 Alternatives to police response and collaborative community responses have shown great promise for integration into 911 call processing. Additional investments in this research and practice can help inform taking them to scale in local jurisdictions nationally. Many opportunities exist, and needs abound—this research makes clear that the 911 system is both massive and neglected. Though much was accomplished through the course of this current research effort, in most places the 911 call-taking, dispatching, and police response continuum continues to operate as a ‘black box,’ and there is a pressing need for further investment and research. Myriad opportunities exist to further develop this work, including continued and expanded analysis of the data already in hand. Other opportunities to expand the national conversation with roundtables about national standards, best practices, and building coalitions for understanding practice and moving it forward present an immediate first step in continuing to meaningfully advance this work. The goal of this and future work is to enhance public safety, promote meaningful alternatives to 911, and eliminate unnecessary police response and enforcement.   

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2020. 316[.