By The Criminal Justice Alliance and the National Black Police Association

This joint briefing by the Criminal Justice Alliance (CJA) and the National Black Police Association (NBPA) examines the treatment of Black and racially minoritised officers in the Metropolitan Police’s misconduct processes following the Baroness Casey Review of 2023. The briefing highlights that despite the Met’s pledges to reform, systemic racial discrimination persists. It details the personal experiences of several Black officers, revealing a culture of bullying, exclusion and a lack of meaningful support within the institution. The briefing calls for substantive changes, emphasising that without significant structural reform and genuine accountability, the Met will continue to fall short of its commitment to become an anti-racist police service.

London: Criminal Justice Alliance, 2024. 19p.

By Roberto Santos and Rachel Santos   

Domestic violence is an ongoing concern for both the police and the community, given its frequency, repeated nature, and seriousness. Research shows that the ability to intervene during early stages of emotional and verbal abuse or less physically injurious violence is critical to preventing future violence (Buzawa, Buzawa, and Starke 2017; Campbell et al. 2007; Campbell and Messing 2017). Domestic violence, which is also referred to as domestic abuse or family violence, is one or a pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening, degrading, or violent behavior. Intimate partner violence (IPV) occurs between current or former spouses or intimate partners or between individuals who have a child in common. Non-IPV occurs between individuals within a domestic circle—for example, immediate family members, other relatives, or caretakers. In any of these circumstances, the key is that there is a close relationship between the offender(s) and the victim(s). As the first responders, police are uniquely poised to play a key role in assisting social service and public health efforts to prevent and reduce domestic violence. Police may see problematic relationships and families before victim advocates, doctors, and other service providers are even aware there is a problem. Importantly, when serious domestic violence crimes do occur and the results are severe, often the community and the media ask how many times the police responded to the address and what actions the police took to prevent the crime. Consequently, identifying potentially violent situations as well as connecting victims and their families to resources and victim services, including emergency housing and legal services, as early as possible is critical to preventing escalation of the violence. Domestic-related calls for service are one of the most frequent categories law enforcement agencies respond to and are one of the most dangerous calls for officers. Yet many of these calls do not constitute a domestic violence crime or trigger an arrest. In law enforcement agencies around the United States, dispatchers use a “domestic disturbance” or “domestic violence” call type to alert responding officers to potential domestic violence issues based on the brief information provided by citizens who call 911. Once an officer arrives on scene and does an initial investigation, there may be no probable cause or even an allegation of violence, so no report is required to be taken. Because of this, the reality is that many domestic-related calls are cleared by officers without taking a report.1 Because most proactive domestic violence responses are initiated by a crime report, identifying repeat occurrences of noncriminal calls for service presents an opportunity for police to respond proactively with the potential to prevent future incidents of domestic violence. . Importantly, the most dangerous time can be when victims reach out for help or take the first step to leave an abusive relationship, which might explain why they do not make direct allegations—because they  This guide provides a process for proactive police response to short-term domestic-related problems that is encompassed within a larger proactive crime reduction approach called Stratified Policing. Stratified Policing is an organizational model that includes a framework and specific processes to accomplish the institutionalization of a multidimensional set of evidence-based proactive crime reduction strategies (Santos and Santos 2020). Stratified Policing has been developed to (1) provide police leaders a clear path for implementation and institutionalization of proactive crime reduction modeled after current police processes; (2) incorporate practical theory and evidence-based practices from place-based, problem-solving, person-focused, and community-based approaches; (3) use crime analysis to identify and prioritize crime problems to be addressed realistically by different levels within the organization; (4) lay out a specific and adaptable framework for incorporating small changes by rank and division into daily activities that all contribute to the larger practical approach; (5) use time from individuals throughout the organization as a resource and become more efficient without requiring additional or specialized resources; (6) ensure that individuals and divisions within the organization contribute based on what is realistic and neither is overburdened with responsibility or the work being done; (7) incorporate multifaceted formal and informal accountability that is fair and transparent; and (8) raise the expectations for everyone in the organization to contribute to crime reduction (Santos and Santos 2020, 6). The process described here is the application of one component of Stratified Policing for the shortterm problem of repeat calls for service at residences, called domestic-related repeat incidents or DRRI. Although this guide focuses on a particular type of activity, the process can also be used for other types of repeat calls for service, such as suspicious activity, drug activity, and alarms.     

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2023. 44p.

By Haberman, C., Ruhland, E., Frank, J., Kelsay, J. & Desmond, J.

This report outlines the results of surveys assessing citizens’ views of the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) and its response to shootings in Cincinnati’s Price Hill neighborhood before and after the implementation of ShotSpotter, an acoustic gunshot detection system. An acoustic gunshot detection system uses sensors to detect gun fire. For ShotSpotter, the sensors listen for gunshot noises. When gunshot-like noises are detected, the sound waves are analyzed and reviewed by technicians at ShotSpotter’s headquarters who determine if the sound was a gunshot or something else, such as fireworks. If the noise is determined to be a gunshot, then police are dispatched to the scene. The precise shooting scene is located by triangulating gunshot sounds across sensors. The time from gunshot to dispatch is roughly 60 seconds.1 ShotSpotter allows police to quickly respond to gunfire incidents, even if residents do not call 911, to make an arrest at the scene. Research suggests roughly 88% of gunshots recorded by ShotSpotter are not reported to the police by residents.2 It follows that implementing ShotSpotter may improve residents’ perceptions of CPD and its response to shootings because police are now responding to all gunfire incidents. This report assesses if that was the case when ShotSpotter was implemented in Cincinnati’s Price Hill neighborhood in July 2019.   

Cincinnati, OH: Institute of Crime Science, University of Cincinnati, 2020. 17p.

By Shima Baradaran Baughman  

In recent years, the national conversation in criminal justice has centered on police. Are police using excessive force? Should they be monitored more closely? Do technology and artificial intelligence improve policing? The implied core question across these national debates is whether police are effective at their jobs. Yet we have not explored how effective police are or determined how best to measure police effectiveness. This Article endeavors to measure how effectively police perform at their core function of crime. The metric most commonly used to measure police effectiveness at crime-solving is a "clearance rate:" the proportion of reported crimes for which police arrest a person and refer them for prosecution. But clearance rates are inadequate for many reasons, including the fact that thy are highly manipulable. This Article therefore provides a set of new metrics that have never been used systematically to study police effectiveness-referred to as "criminal accountability" metrics. Criminal accountability examines the full course of a crime to determine whether police detect and ultimately resolve the committed crime. Taking into account the prevalence and the number of crimes police solve, the proportion of crimes solved in America is dramatically lower than we realize. Only with a clearer conversation, rooted in accurate data about the effectiveness of the American police system, can we attempt a path toward increased criminal accountability and public safety. 

Alabama Law Review [Vol. 72:1:47  2020.

By Trisha Rhodes

In 2017, the Little Rock Police Department (LRPD) was awarded the BJA Technology Innovation for Public Safety (TIPS) grant. LRPD created the Crime Guns Intelligence Unit (CGIU) in March of 2018 with the primary goal of reducing violent gun crimes in Little Rock, particularly in a historical hotspot of gun crime. Once assigned, CGIU detectives began processing backlogs in ballistic evidence. A crime analyst assigned to the unit collected data to track case information and conducted link analysis to identify the connections between incidents, evidence, and suspects. ShotSpotter gunshot detection devices were deployed in mid-December of 2018. In addition to technological advancements, CGIU formed a working group with partner agencies to collectively examine violent gun incidents and develop solutions. Partners met monthly and discussed ways of improving evidence collection and investigation of cases to increase prosecution outcomes. Meetings allowed partners to communicate more openly and frequently to share intelligence and quickly address potential obstacles toward reaching program goals. As a result of meetings, LRPD developed new policies surrounding the collection of ballistic evidence and strengthened relationships with other agencies, including the ATF, Arkansas State Crime Lab, FBI, Pulaski County Prosecutor’s Office, and U.S. Attorney’s Office. Further, the CGIU has since expanded efforts to serve as a state Crime Guns Intelligence Center and work with surrounding police agencies and crime analysts. To assess CGIU's efforts to meet program goals, the City of Little Rock and LRPD hired a research partner from U.A. Little Rock to evaluate the CGIU program. The evaluation team collected data on violent gun crimes, processing of ballistic evidence, arrest clearance rates, and the prosecution of gun crime cases at the state and federal levels. Below is a summary of key findings from the evaluation of the LRPD CGIU program, which are covered in more detail in the report. Key Findings Violent Gun Crime Trends • Between 2017-2020, the City of Little Rock experienced a monthly average of 3 gun-involved homicides, 11 non-fatal shootings, 14 terroristic acts, 19 robberies, and 186 shots fired. o Gunshot alerts accounted for 80% of incidents. o Excluding gunshots, the following percentages1 show the breakdown of each crime type: ▪ 7% homicides ▪ 24% non-fatal shootings ▪ 29% terroristic acts ▪ 40% robberies. Within the ShotSpotter Zone2, there was an average of about 1 (0.65) gun-involved homicide, 3 non-fatal shootings, 3 terroristic acts, 2 robberies, and 46 shots fired per month between 2017-2020. o Gunshot alerts accounted for 85% of incidents. o Excluding gunshots, below are the percentages of each crime type: ▪ 8% homicides ▪ 34% non-fatal shootings ▪ 30% terroristic acts ▪ 28% robberies • In the ShotSpotter Zone, non-fatal shootings and terroristic acts accounted for more incidents. Fewer incidents were robberies compared to the city as a whole. • Year-to-date comparisons of citywide violent gun crime trends revealed differences by crime type. o The subtotal of crime incidents (excluding shots fired) decreased in 2018 from 686 to 466 and remained at 491 in 2019. However, crime generally increased late in 2019 and 2020 to 654 incidents with sharp increases in non-fatal shootings and terroristic acts. o Non-fatal shootings decreased from 141 to 103 in 2018 and stayed stable in 2019. They increased to 188 in 2020. o Gun-involved terroristic acts decreased from 180 to 135 in 2018 and held there until rising to 216 in 2020. o Gun-involved homicides remained relatively stable (higher in 2020 compared to 2018 and 2019, though about the same as in 2017). o Gun-involved robberies dropped from 320 in 2017 to 195 in 2018 and remained there through 2020. • ShotSpotter Zone year-to-date comparisons showed some similarities in trends of non-fatal shootings, terroristic acts, and total crimes; however, gun-involved homicide and robbery trends were different compared to the city. o The subtotal of incidents (excluding shots fired) decreased from 109 to 93 between 2017-2018. They decreased further to 81 in 2019. However, violent gun incidents increased to 116 in 2020, which was somewhat higher than 2017 levels. o Non-fatal shootings decreased from 37 to 29 in 2018 and held there in 2019. However, they rose to 38 in 2020  o Gun-involved terrorist acts decreased from 39 to 20 in 2018, increased slightly to 25 in 2019, and increased to 36 in 2020. o Gun-involved homicides increased from 6 to 11 in 2018, stayed about the same in 2019, and decreased to 4 in 2020. o Gun-involved robberies increased from 27 to 33 in 2018, dropped to 15 in 2019, and increased to 38 in 2020. • In addition to year-to-date comparisons, statistical analyses tested the relationships between the timing of CGIU program components and changes in gun violence trends. The evaluation team examined the moment in time when CGIU formed (March 2018) and the moment when ShotSpotter was fully deployed (January 2019). There were differences by crime type. o Across the city and within the ShotSpotter Zone, there were statistically significant reductions in violent gun crimes (homicides, non-fatal shootings, terroristic acts, and robberies) associated with the full deployment of ShotSpotter in January 2019. While no significant changes in crime were tied to the exact date CGIU was established, violent gun crimes did trend lower in 2018 and 2019 as noted above. It is possible that program effects were more gradual, rather than immediate and that other factors aside from evidence collection/processing and investigation influenced crime trends. ▪ There was a reduction of 18 incidents per month in the city and 1 incident per month in the ShotSpotter Zone immediately after ShotSpotter was implemented. o Analyses of gun-involved homicides did not provide evidence of an effect of the CGIU or ShotSpotter on homicides. The sample size of homicides was likely too small to identify a significant effect. It is also likely that other factors (both internal and external to LRPD) affected homicide trends. o Data indicated a likely short-term decrease in non-fatal shootings citywide immediately following the initiation of the CGIU but not at later time points. This pattern did not appear evident within the ShotSpotter Zone. o When looking at gun-involved terroristic acts alone, there were relatively slight changes in crime rates both citywide and in the ShotSpotter Zone that were not directly associated with the CGIU program. o Gun-involved robberies decreased following the use of ShotSpotter; however, this trend did not appear in the ShotSpotter Zone. o Gunshot reports declined before the formation of the CGIU and remained relatively stable until 2020. There was no indication that gunshots increased across the city broadly, though there was an expected uptick in gunshots in the ShotSpotter Zone in 2019. Most likely, the ShotSpotter devices were better able to detect gunshots (as opposed to relying on citizens to report them).  (continued)

Little Rock, AAR: University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Justice Research & Policy Center, 2021. 102p.  

By Human Impact Partners

The construction of police training facilities, or “Cop Cities,” is on the rise in the US, with 69 projects currently planned across 47 states. This report examines the public health impacts of these facilities, and reveals the broader and intersecting harms that militarization and policing pose to the health of all people and our planet. We highlight the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center, a controversial 85-acre, $109.65 million police training construction project in Atlanta, Georgia, known to community organizers as “Cop City,” to illustrate four key pathways by which the construction of police training facilities harms health:

1. The expansion of policing

2. The destruction of the climate

3. Undermining Indigenous sovereignty

4. State repression of resistance

Each section describes the associated public health harms, followed by evidence-based public health solutions to promote health:

1. Invest in health instead of punishment

2. Advocate for green spaces and climate justice

3. Land back for Indigenous reparations

4. Protect community power and civil rights

We also recommend critical actions for each pathway that federal, state, Tribal, and local governments can take to prevent ongoing and future harms to public health, improve accountability, and support community safety for all.  While this brief focuses on Atlanta’s Cop City and the current social justice movement there, we hope this research will support continued resistance to the construction of police training facilities across the US. 

Berkeley cA: Human Impact Partners, 2024. 42p.

By Temitope, O. Awodiji  and  John Owoyemi 

In this study, 10 communities in the North Western area of New Mexico are used to examine the efficacy of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts in urban settings. The research looks at the connection between crime rates and urban architecture in Luna by combining secondary data from the Unified Crime Report (UCR) with findings from earlier studies on topography and architectural features. It is accepted that several CPTED initiatives have limitations, such as dependence on secondary data and the need for more thorough research, even while they show promise in lowering crime and improving safety. Among the recommendations are the inclusion of primary data collecting and the consideration of socioeconomic issues. Policymakers, urban planners, and community stakeholders may establish more fair and effective methods to promote safer urban environments by considering these recommendations. By providing insights into the challenges of creating surroundings that support community safety and well-being, this study adds to the continuing conversation on crime prevention and urban planning. 

Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering Science and Technology (JMEST) ISSN: 2458-9403 Vol. 11 Issue 4, April - 2024 

By John Macdonald, Viet Nguyen Viet,  Shane T. Jensen,  and Charles C. Branas

Objective: Place-based blight remediation programs have gained popularity in recent years as a crime reduction approach. This study estimated the impact of a citywide vacant lot greening program in Philadelphia on changes in crime over multiple years, and whether the effects were moderated by nearby land uses. Methods: The vacant lot greening program was assessed using quasi-experimental and experimental designs. Entropy distance weighting was used in the quasi-experimental analysis to match control lots to be comparable to greened lots on pre-existing crime trends. Fixed-effects difference-in-differences models were used to estimate the impact of the vacant lot greening program in quasi-experimental and experimental analyses. Results: Vacant lot greening was estimated to reduce total crime and multiple subcategories in both the quasi-experimental and experimental evaluations. Remediating vacant lots had a smaller effect on reducing crime when they were located near train stations and alcohol outlets. The crime reductions from vacant lot remediations were larger when they were located near areas of active businesses. There is some suggestive evidence that the effects of vacant lot greening are larger when located in neighborhoods with higher pre-intervention levels of social cohesion. Conclusions: The findings suggest that vacant lot greening provides a sustainable approach to reducing crime in disadvantaged neighborhoods, and the effects may vary by different surrounding land uses. To better understand the mechanisms through which place-based blight remediation interventions reduce crime, future research should measure human activities and neighborly socialization in and around places before and after remediation efforts are implemented.

J Exp Criminol. 2022 September ; 18(3): 639–664.

By David Hausman and Dorothy Kronick

Critics of stop and frisk have heralded its recent demise in several large U.S. cities. Proponents of stop and frisk respond that when the practice ends, crime increases. Both groups typically assume that the end of stop-and-frisk reduces the number of police-civilian interactions. We find otherwise in Chicago: The decline in pedestrian stops coincided with an increase in traffic stops. Qualitative evidence suggests that the Chicago Police deliberately switched from pedestrian to traffic stops. Quantitative data are consistent with this hypothesis: As stop and frisk ended, Chicago Police traffic stops diverged (in quantity and composition) from those of another enforcement agency in Chicago, and the new traffic stops affected the same types of Chicagoans who were previously subject to pedestrian stops .

Sci. Adv. 9, eadh3017 (2023) 29 September 2023  

By Barry Friedman and Freya Rigterink 

This report, from The Policing Project at New York University School of Law’s Reimagining Public Safety Initiative, explores the use of alternatives to traditional policing and police response. Funded by local Chicago philanthropy, the study not only analyzes the public safety challenges facing the city, but also identifies a series of solutions. This report is based on the Policing Project’s extensive engagement both with the City of Chicago and with alternative response programs around the country. The Policing Project has been involved for five years in implementing a community policing program for Chicago. In preparing this report it conducted extensive interviews with community members and municipal stakeholders connected with Chicago government and the Chicago Police Department (CPD). This report is the fourth in a series that also included reports on Denver, San Francisco, and Tucson. The report recommends action on two facets of alternatives to traditional policing that would benefit Chicago and Chicagoans: 911 Alternative Response: By adopting alternative approaches, including sending non police responders trained to meet the needs of 911 callers, many cities are taking a load off dangerously overburdened police forces, and better meeting the needs of communities. Chicago should do the same. Community Policing: This is an important, perhaps essential, alternative to traditional policing. Over the long run, fully implementing a comprehensive community policing program is the best, if not the only, way to build trust between the Chicago Police Department and the people it serves, allowing them to address violent crime together.

2024. 56p.  

By Timothy C. Barnum, Shaina Herman, Jean-Louis van Gelder, Denis Ribeaud, Manuel Eisner, Daniel S. Nagin

Guardianship is a core tenet of routine activity theory and collective efficacy. At its outset, routine activity research assumed that the mere presence of a guardian was sufficient to disrupt many forms of crime. More recent research, however, has taken as a starting point that would-be-guardians must take on an active role for a reduction in crime to occur. Integrating research on bystander intervention and guardianship-in-action, the current study elaborates the individual-level motivations and decision processes of guardianship to answer the following questions: Who serves as a reactive guardian? How do they do so? And why? We tasked young adults (N = 1,032) included in the recent waves of the Zurich Project on the Social Development from Childhood to Adulthood (z-proso) to assess a 70-second video depicting a sexual harassment event. We examined participants’ willingness to engage in a range of intervention options as a function of their prosocial attitudes, safety considerations, socioemotional motivations, and moral considerations. Results show a complex decision process leading to whether and how a would-be guardian decides to intervene to disrupt sexual harassment, such that prosocial motivations and emotional reactions are weighed against perceptions of danger when deciding on a specific course of action.

 Criminology Volume 62, Issue 3 Aug 2024 Pages 377-618

By U.K.HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Independent Office for Police Conduct and College of Policing

Stalking is a serious crime that can have a devastating effect on victims. It has been described as a crime of psychological terror which leaves victims feeling constantly unsafe and fearful. In some tragic cases stalking behaviours escalate to serious physical harm and murder. Victims and the public must be assured that reports of stalking will be treated seriously by the police. This means that the police must be able to recognise stalking and the risks associated with this crime. They must keep victims and the public safe and pursue perpetrators by investigating reports effectively and taking appropriate action to stop offending and seek justice. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust, on behalf of the National Stalking Consortium, raised serious concerns about the police response to stalking in its super-complaint. Our three organisations have jointly undertaken a comprehensive investigation into these issues. We have found clear evidence supporting the concerns they raise. We did find examples of the police taking stalking seriously, safeguarding victims well and carrying out good investigations. But in too many cases the police response was not good enough and victims were being let down. We have made recommendations that give a clear plan of action for policing to make improvements. These focus on the need for policing to take action now to make sure they are meeting the expected standards and doing the fundamentals well in their response to stalking. We also found there is a need for greater clarity in the criminal law relating to stalking. Our evidence suggests that government needs to change the law and guidance to provide a stronger foundation for the police response to stalking. We also recommend that the government makes changes to stalking protection orders to provide quicker options to safeguard victims and disrupt offenders. We were encouraged to see examples of innovative and promising practice in some forces. These include examples of forces developing hubs of expertise through multi-agency working and a promising approach to digital evidence analysis in stalking cases. We have made recommendations where we think these approaches should be considered more widely across policing. We are not the only ones calling for change and improvements. Many of the concerns we identified with poor investigations and victim care reflect the findings of other inquiries and inspections. Particularly those relating to the police response to violence against women and girls, of which stalking is a part. The V m ’ mm L has also published a report ’ to stalking. This highlighted similar findings to our investigation. Policing and its partners are responding to these calls for change. In July 2024 the NPCC and the College of Policing published a national policing statement on violence against women and girls (VAWG). This assesses the threat VAWG poses to public safety. The statement identifies stalking and harassment as one of five high-harm and high-volume threat areas that policing will focus on over the next year. This super-complaint report and our recommendations present a real opportunity for policing to build on the progress already made. Policing must now make a step-change to improve the quality of its response to this pervasive and insidious crime.   

HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Independent Office for Police Conduct and College of Policing, 2024. 158p.

By Security Insight

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology can completely transform policing; from advanced criminal analytics that reveal trends in vast amounts of data, to biometrics that allow the prompt and unique identification of criminals. With the AI and policing report, produced through the Observatory function of the Europol Innovation Lab, we aim to provide insight into the present and future capabilities that AI offers, projecting a course for a more efficient, responsive, and effective law enforcement model. This report offers an in-depth exploration of the applications and implications of AI in the field of law enforcement, underpinned by the European Union's regulatory framework. It also looks at concerns about data bias, fairness, and potential threats to privacy, accountability, human rights protection, and discrimination, which are particularly relevant in the background of the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act.

 The Hague: EUROPOL, 2024. 61p.

By  Susannah N. Tapp,  and Elizabeth J. Davis,

This report is part of a series that began in 1996 and examines the nature and frequency of contact with police reported by U.S. residents, including demographic characteristics, types of contact, and perceptions of police misconduct, threats of force, or use of nonfatal force.

Highlights:

• About 19% (49.2 million) of U.S. residents age 16 or older had contact with police in 2022.

• A smaller percentage of persons had contact with police in 2022 (19%) than in 2020 (21%).

• In 2022, males (8%) were more likely than females (7%) to experience police-initiated contact, while females (12%) were more likely than males (11%) to initiate contact with police.

• Among U.S. residents who initiated their most recent contact with police, almost half (46%) did so to report a possible crime.

Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 2024. 24p.

By James Yates

  Background In 2013, after a lengthy trial, United States District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin found that the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), violated City residents’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the City did so with deliberate indifference to NYPD officers’ “practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting unconstitutional frisks.” In addition, the Court found that the City had a “policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local crime suspect data . . . [that] resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of Blacks and Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” In a “Remedies Opinion,” a Monitor was appointed by the Court with authority to implement reforms related to training, documentation, supervision and discipline. Subsequently, the Court (Hon. Analisa Torres, D.J.) requested the preparation of an indepth, critical examination of the efficacy, fairness, and integrity of the City’s policies, practices and procedures with respect to police misconduct during stops. This Report is intended to meet the Court’s directive for a study of the NYPD disciplinary process as it relates to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment compliance in investigative encounters. Summary Description of NYPD Discipline Any recount of NYPD’s disciplinary process will aim at a moving target. Modifications in the disciplinary process utilized by or imposed upon NYPD are in constant flux. In the last five years alone, there has been a blizzard of reforms, outlined in the Report, to New York City and State laws governing discipline, not to mention a variety of changes in rules and regulations within the Department and related agencies, many of which have been, and continue to be, the subject of active litigation and modification. While it is useful, in the Report, to cite data describing or summarizing disciplinary results at various moments in time and to highlight individual disciplinary cases of note, the main thrust of the Report is not transitory data or individual case studies, but rather, as directed by the Court, a look at policies, practices and procedures. At the outset, the Report reviews processes within the police department itself. While the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) may be the most recognized venue for reviewing claims of police misconduct, the Board handles a small minority of examinations of police conduct. CCRB investigates fewer than 5,000 complaints each year. As many as 50,000 misconduct reviews are performed by other divisions or personnel within the Department. They include the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), a Force Investigation Division (“FID”), the Office of the Chief of Department (“OCD”), Borough Adjutants, Borough Investigating Units (“BIU”) and local Command Officers (“CO”). [Please note: a dictionary of acronyms used throughout the Report is attached as Appendix 2.] Police activity is also scrutinized by a variety of audits conducted by or overseen by the Quality Assurance Division (“QAD”), a unit within the Department, including audits of radio dispatch communications, arrests, and police self-inspection examinations. Separate from the Department’s disciplinary process, an Early Intervention Committee (“EIC”) reviews officer history when certain signals of potential misconduct are  triggered. Other outside agencies regularly monitor potential misconduct, including the Commission to Combat Police Corruption (“CCPC”), the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (“OIG-NYPD”), the NYC Commission on Human Rights (“CCHR”) and a state agency, the Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Misconduct Investigative Office (“LEMIO”). Finally, thousands of complaints undergo scrutiny by way of claims lodged with the New York City Comptroller’s office and lawsuits filed in state and federal court. There is no cognizable attempt to coordinate the various reviews of police misconduct. Without full coordination, cooperation and sharing of information, the mere fact of split or concurrent investigations of any given encounter can lead to confusion or delay. Civilian Complaint Review Board The CCRB is comprised of fifteen members. Five members are appointed by the City Council; five members are appointed by the Mayor; one member is appointed by the Public Advocate; a Chair is appointed jointly by the Mayor and the City Council Speaker; and three members, with law enforcement experience, are designated by the Police Commissioner. Within CCRB, panels of three of the fifteen members are assembled to review closing reports and recommendations prepared by the investigative staff. Members are assigned to panels on a rotational basis. The Board has adopted a rule, not required by law, that each decisional panel shall have one of the police designees as a member. This leads to police designees hearing a greater volume of cases than other appointees. As an adjustment, more recently, CCRB sends some cases to panels without a police designee, but, if the panel substantiates misconduct, the matter is then sent for a second review attended by a police designee. In essence, misconduct may not be substantiated unless approved by a panel with a police designee. The Report discusses the impact of that decision. Disciplinary Recommendations to the Police Commissioner Findings of officer misconduct arrive at the Police Commissioner’s desk by dint of two highways: a substantiated finding referred from a CCRB panel to the Police Commissioner or one sent after an internal police department investigation. For minor or technical infractions within the Department, local commands/precinct commanders are authorized to impose discipline directly. All other recommendations for discipline are referred to, and left to, the discretion of the Police Commissioner, who may accept or reject a finding and who will then decide whether to impose a penalty, guidance, or neither. Disciplinary proceedings are either formal or informal. Formal discipline is administered through a trial process where Charges and Specifications are served detailing the allegations of misconduct. A deputy within the Department, sitting as a trial commissioner, receives evidence and makes a recommendation of guilty or not guilty along with a recommendation for a penalty or guidance or neither. The hearing is open to the public and the officer is entitled to representation. There may be several hundred such hearings in a given year. New York State Law requires that the trial commissioner be a deputy of the Police Commissioner if the subject officer faces possible termination. An Appellate Division ruling, barring hearings before an independent administrative hearing officer, has extended that provision of law to require that all trials come before a departmental deputy as the hearing officer, even in the more usual case where termination is not sought by the prosecuting authority. Informal discipline, which is much more common, occurs at the precinct or in the Department outside the trial process, when an officer “accepts” a “command discipline” along with the recommended or negotiated outcome. Absent extraordinary circumstances, stop and frisk misconduct is addressed by informal discipline. At the conclusion of an investigation or trial, CCRB or a trial commissioner (a departmental deputy), as the case may be, will determine if an allegation is substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence. Investigations and trials are not bound by strict rules of evidence. Hearsay is admissible and may form the basis for a finding. In formal proceedings at Departmental trials a verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty is rendered by the Trial Commissioner along with a recommendation for discipline or guidance if Guilty. Whether an allegation of misconduct is substantiated by CCRB or found by a Trial Commissioner, the Police Commissioner is not constrained to follow the recommendations and may vary the finding, alter a penalty, or decide upon no disciplinary action (NDA). The variance may be based upon the Commissioner’s: (i) disagreement with the factual findings; (ii) a different understanding of the applicable law or rules; (iii) a desire to exercise lenity—imposing a lesser penalty or no penalty; or (iv) any combination thereof. While various provisions of law require an explanation by the Police Commissioner in certain cases of disagreement with the findings of CCRB or a trial commissioner, the explanatory letters are often unclear as to whether the modification is based upon disagreements with factual findings, legal conclusions, or a simple desire to modify a penalty. The unfettered reach of the Commissioner’s authority is a point of frequent public debate.   

September 19, 2024. 503p.

By Brittany C. Cunningham, Bryce E. Peterson, Daniel S. Lawrence, Michael D. White, James R. Coldren, Jr., Jennifer Lafferty, Keri Richardson

Over the past decade, thousands of law enforcement agencies in the United States have adopted body‑worn cameras (BWCs) (Hyland, 2018). The rapid diffusion of these devices has been driven by several factors, most notably numerous controversial uses of force by police against community members of color and evidence suggesting that BWCs can produce a range of positive outcomes like reductions in complaints and uses of force (Braga et al., 2018; Peterson & Lawrence, 2021; Sutherland et al., 2017), added evidentiary value in investigations and downstream court proceedings (Huff et al., 2023; Todak et al., 2023), and enhanced perceptions of procedural justice and police legitimacy (Demir et al., 2020; McCluskey et al., 2019). The demand for police BWCs has continued unabated into the 2020s (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2022; White & Malm, 2020), and interest has now expanded to corrections. By 2023, at least ten state prison systems have begun the process of deploying BWCs, with many local jails following suit (Bogel-Burroughs, 2022; Brodie et al., 2020; Welsh-Huggins, 2021; Winton, 2021). Despite this expansion, there is limited research on the impact of these devices in prisons or jails. There are also fundamental differences between correctional and law enforcement settings that researchers must consider. For example, correctional officers interact with incarcerated residents on a more consistent and long-term basis than police interact with civilians. Prisons and jails also include a high concentration of vulnerable populations, including people under serious psychological distress and experiencing mental and behavioral health challenges (Maruschak et al., 2021). Another potential concern is that BWCs are redundant in prisons and jails because these environments are already saturated with stationary surveillance cameras (Allard et al., 2006). Although the stationary camera networks in many correctional facilitates are outdated and suffer from blind spots (Lawrence et al., 2022), it is not yet clear whether BWCs offer any added benefits beyond what is captured through these extant systems. For example, can BWCs provide additional evidentiary value in the investigation of misconduct incidents or staff uses of force? The current brief seeks to address this knowledge gap by examining the footage of response-to-resistance (RTR) events produced by BWCs compared to stationary closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in a correctional setting. The following sections describe the background of the current study, our approach to reviewing BWC and  stationary CCTV camera footage, and our key findings.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2023. 16p.

By The New South Wales Police Force

The NSW Police Force (NSWPF) responds to more than 60,000 mental health incidents in the community every year and this figure has increased by around 10 per cent annually since 2018. In most cases a criminal offence has not been committed, there is no threat of violence and a weapon is not involved. This report looks at the NSWPF response to mental health incidents in the community.

Purpose

• Examine the demand on the NSWPF in responding to mental health incidents in the community.

• Review the training officers receive.

• Defining the role of police in responding to mental health incidents in the community.

• Reviewing the current operational model.

• Develop potential options for alternate response models.

Findings

The report noted that while police are best equipped to respond to incidents involving criminality and public order, other health professionals are able to provide more appropriate care for people experiencing mental health crises.

It also acknowledged that police, as the primary responder, can potentially escalate a situation and that the high volume of police deployment to mental health related matters can also have flow on impacts to other community safety issues, limiting resources of police to respond to other matters.

Actions

• The NSWPF and NSW Ministry of Health have set up a working group of senior officials to consider the findings of the report and to develop options for an alternative response.

• Additionally, the NSWPF has newly established the Mental Health Command to strengthen engagement and enhance police interventions when responding to mental health incidents.

• The Command will provide oversight, strategic guidance and advice as well as engage with external stakeholders.

Publisher Government of New South Wales

By University of Pennsylvania Crime and Justice Policy Lab and California Partnership for Safe Communities

Violence reduction in the U.S. is benefitting from excellent research (and ongoing research agendas) into specific interventions that can be evaluated and replicated. However, more is needed. The fact that so many cities continue to struggle with serious violence despite record investments in new programs indicates that the field needs a broader approach. WHAT’S MISSING? There is a crucial gap holding back the field of violence reduction: an understanding of not just what programs or strategies to adopt, but how to manage and govern on the city level to reduce serious violence. This was the primary conclusion of a 2022 expert convening. Running a rigorous violence intervention program in a particular community is very challenging. Assembling, implementing, and sustaining an effective city-level strategy is an even more complex and difficult task. The challenge of developing successful citywide strategies is enormously important, often ignored, and a large part of why cities are failing to sustainably reduce violence. The convened group comprised several important perspectives: people who have led city violence reduction offices (Jeremy Biddle, Sasha Cotton, Reygan Cunningham), people who help cities and city partners develop their violence prevention capacity (Vaughn Crandall, Fatimah Loren Drier, David Muhammed) and academic experts (Anthony Braga, Shani Buggs, Rodrigo Canales, Daniel Webster). The group was led by the University of Pennsylvania Crime and Justice Policy Lab (CJP) and the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC), working with key leads from the White House Community Violence Intervention Collaborative and the Ballmer Community Violence Reduction Initiative (CAPS). (See Appendix A for more on the convening. This document describes the group’s conclusions and exploration of the current gap in research, implementation, governance, and ongoing management that challenges the violence reduction field, including suggestions of three areas where investment and effort could make a near-term impact: RESEARCH: Ongoing study of how cities structure, manage, and govern violence reduction efforts to establish baselines against which to assess near-term efforts and make long-term progress. Key action research questions, which could be applied to particular cities or systematically across cohorts, include: How are cities currently structuring their violence intervention efforts? Where does management and government authority for producing reductions in community violence reside? To what extent are citywide violence intervention efforts informed by basic analyses of community violence? What are the shortfalls for the ways in which cities use current analyses of their problems? How can cities build internal capacity for problem analysis and governance structures to ensure these analyses are used? What role does city government-based infrastructure play in administering and managing violence intervention strategies? What role does community-based infrastructure play in administering and managing violence intervention strategies? How are these government and community efforts resourced—monetarily, administratively, in terms of personnel, and over time? What key management capacities can be identified that correlate with success, or lack thereof, in producing and sustaining city level reductions in community violence? TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: Using action research and existing evidence to help cities develop effective strategies and strengthen political governance, management, and key capacities. At present, technical assistance providers are filling capacity gaps at the local level—while technical assistance will likely always be needed to help cities get started or course-correct as they go, the field needs useful frameworks for improving city-level systems aimed at reducing community violence. POLICY: Engaging the field on how to sustain and enhance violence reduction efforts through policy development, governance, and management. Mayoral offices or statewide offices of violence prevention, strong community-based intermediaries, and other governing entities may be better able to provide structural support to violence reduction strategies when those offices and entities are supported by strong standards of practice  

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 13p.   

By Anthony A.Braga, John M.MacDonald,  Stephen Douglas,  Brian Wade,  Benjamin Struh

The evaluation literature suggests that focused deterrence strategies are effective in reducing gun violence. However, focused deterrence is notoriously difficult to implement and sustain. The history of focused deterrence implementation failure raises questions about its viability as a gun violence prevention strategy. Stockton, California, implemented focused deterrence three times during the past 25 years. In its most recent version, Stockton officials explicitly designed the strategy to be a permanent feature of the city’s violence prevention portfolio. Although program caseloads diminished over the course of the COVID-19 pandemicandthestrategyfacedleadershipandresource challenges, Stockton’s efforts prevented the program from being discontinued and, for those gang members who did receive treatment, delivered a robust gun violence prevention strategy. A quasi-experimental evaluation showsthattreated gang members wireless likely to be shot and reduced their violent offending relative to similar untreated gang members. The focused deterrence impacts also appear to spill over to gang members who were socially connected to treated gang members. 

Criminology & Public Policy, 2024. 

By  Elizabeth Carlson and Charles Wheeler

During his first administration, former President Trump adopted aggressive anti-immigrant policies, which included family separation, a ban on individuals from Muslim-majority countries, stringent border policies like the Remain in Mexico and Title 42, and attempted terminations of programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for several national groups. Attorneys and representatives for immigrants had some success in pushing back against the administration’s most extreme measures through litigation and advocacy. Should they return to the White House, Trump and his supporters have promised to enact an even more draconian anti-immigrant agenda, including a commitment to conducting the largest mass deportation in U.S. history, ending birthright citizenship (which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment), and revoking humanitarian protections for those already in the United States. Many of these efforts, of course, will be challenged in court. This article summarizes 10 likely immigration initiatives under a second Trump administration. It seeks to educate members of the public who value the crucial role and myriad contributions of immigrants and refugees — past and present — in the United States. It will also outline how advocates can fight to protect their clients from these measures.

Journal on Migration and Human Security 1–15 © 2024.