By Kevin Petersen, David Weisburd, Sydney Fay, Elizabeth Eggins and Lorraine Mazzerole 

Police stops are associated with reductions in crime but also a broad range of negative individual-level outcomes.

Police stop interventions produce meaningful and significant reductions in crime without evidence of spatial displacement. However, people subject to stops are associated with significantly less desirable mental and physical health outcomes, attitudes toward police, and self-reported crime/delinquency. For some outcome measures, the negative effects of pedestrian stops are considerably more pronounced for youth, though the data did not permit a comparison of individual effects by race.

What is this review about?

Police stops have become one of the most controversial yet widely-used crime prevention strategies in modern policing. This intervention involves the police-initiated stop of an individual (or group of individuals) on the street, for the purpose of investigation and/or questioning. Police stops have been commonly used as a tactic to combat violent and gun-related crime.

Campbell Systematic Reviews. 2023;1

By Ranae Jabri

  Predictive policing algorithms are increasingly used by law enforcement agencies in the United States. These algorithms use past crime data to generate predictive policing boxes, specifically the highest crime risk areas where law enforcement is instructed to patrol every shift. I collect a novel dataset on predictive policing box locations, crime incidents, and arrests from a major urban jurisdiction where predictive policing is used. Using institutional features of the predictive policing policy, I isolate quasi-experimental variation to examine the causal impacts of algorithm-induced police presence. I find that algorithm-induced police presence decreases serious property and violent crime. At the same time, I also find disproportionate racial impacts on arrests for serious violent crimes as well as arrests in traffic incidents i.e. lower-level offenses where police have discretion. These results highlight that using predictive policing to target neighborhoods can generate a tradeoff between crime prevention and equity.

 Unpublished paper, 2021. 44p.  

By The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington Advisory Committee

The Washington Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights submits this briefing report regarding barriers to accountability for use of excessive force by law enforcement officers. The Committee submits this report as part of its responsibility to study and report on civil-rights issues in the state. The contents of this report are primarily based on testimony the Committee heard during public meetings held via video-conference from March to June 2021

Washington, DC: USCCR, 2022. 32p.-

By Richard A. Berk

  There are widespread concerns about the use of artificial intelligence in law enforcement. Predictive policing and risk assessment are salient examples. Worries include the accuracy of forecasts that guide both activities, the prospect of bias, and an apparent lack of operational transparency. Nearly breathless media coverage of artificial intelligence helps shape the narrative. In this review, we address these issues by first unpacking depictions of artificial intelligence. Its use in predictive policing to forecast crimes in time and space is largely an exercise in spatial statistics that in principle can make policing more effective and more surgical. Its use in criminal justice risk assessment to forecast who will commit crimes is largely an exercise in adaptive, nonparametric regression. It can in principle allow law enforcement agencies to better provide for public safety with the least restrictive means necessary, which can mean far less use of incarceration. None of this is mysterious. Nevertheless, concerns about accuracy, fairness, and transparency are real, and there are tradeoffs between them for which there can be no technical fix. You can’t have it all. Solutions will be found through political and legislative processes achieving an acceptable balance between competing priorities.  

  Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2021. 4:209–37  

By Liz Campbell, Nessa Lynch, Joe Purshouse, Marcin Betkier

  The use of automated facial recognition technology (FRT) is becoming commonplace globally and in New Zealand. FRT involves the use of an algorithm to match a facial image to one already stored in a system, is used in automated passport control and other border control measures, as a biometric identifier in the banking, security and access contexts, and on social media platforms and various other consent-based applications

  This report contributes to the understanding of how and when this rapidly emerging hnology should be used and how it should be regulated. It is centred in what has been described as the ‘second wave’ of algorithmic accountability – While the first wave of algorithmic accountability focuses on improving existing systems, a second wave of research has asked whether they should be used at all—and, if so, who gets to govern them.3 This project seeks to address the regulation gap through ascertaining how FRT can and should be regulated in New Zealand. While the benefits that might be offered by FRT surveillance are increasingly observable, its effect on civil liberties is subtler, but certainly pernicious. Given the potential for FRT to be used as a key identity and access management tool in the future, there are pertinent questions around how images are being collected and stored now by the private sector. Where are these images being stored? Who has access to this data? What else might the images be used for? Without a detailed appraisal of the benefits of state FRT surveillance, and an understanding of the ethical issues raised by its use, any framework for the regulation of this activity cannot hope to engender public confidence that its use is fair and lawful.

Monash University, 2020. 118p.   

By Cameron Holley, Tariro Mutongwizo, and Clifford Shearing

  This review explores past and future shifts in policing and criminology scholarship that have shaped, and been shaped by, what is done to enhance safety within political domains. Investigating established policing conceptualizations, the review demonstrates how the ideal of state-delivered safety as a public good was challenged by a sizeable policing industry, giving rise to debates about legal context, service provision, and conceptualizations of policing and security nodal arrangements. This review argues that these understandings are now confronted by new harms and new conceptualizations of social institutional affairs. Interrogating these claims through an examination of the Anthropocene and technologies of cyberspace, we canvass debates and show that a shared focus of attention for the future of policing will be a decentralization of security and an expansion of private security governance professionals (both human and nonhuman)  

Annual Review of Criminology,  3:341-358, 2020

By Rachel Harmon

Coercive policing is conducted mostly by means of commanding officers usually cannot use force unless they have first issued an order. Yet, despite widespread concern about force and coercion in policing, commands are both underregulated and misunderstood. Officers have no clear legal authority to give many common commands, almost no departmental guidance about how or when to issue them, and almost no legal scrutiny for many commands they give. Scholars rarely study commands, and when they do, they get them wrong. As a result of vague law and inadequate analysis, basic questions about police commands—what role they play, where officers get authority to issue them, and how law regulates them—remain unanswered. Instead, officers interact with the public in a legal gray zone, a recipe for illegitimacy and conflict. This Article offers initial answers to these questions. First, it explains the constitutivecommands play in policing: Long-standing law dictates that officers usually cannot compel people, including by stop or arrest, without issuing commands that impose new legal duties. Second, it contends that although statutes sometimes authorize specific commands, officers’ authority to issue many orders comes from—and is limited by—officers’ authority to stop, search, and arrest suspects. Third, the Article argues that the legal functions commands serve—namely, generating and communicating legal duties—dictate that lawful orders must satisfy three constraints: They must be authorized by state law; they must obey constitutional limits; and they must provide adequate notice and opportunity for individuals to comply. These constraints are embedded in the law, but few avenues exist for challenging commands. Courts have therefore not defined or enforced limits on command authority well, except when commands violate constitutional rights. Courts can easily do better, and legislative and departmental action could clarify, extend, and enforce appropriate limits on police authority.

Rachel Harmon, Law and Orders, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2023).

By Amos Irwin and Betsy Pear

Today, a significant portion of 911 calls are related to quality-of-life and other low-priority incidents that may require a time-sensitive response but are better suited to civilian responders, rather than armed police officers. Some 911 calls may not require a time-sensitive response at all. Recent original analysis conducted by the Center for American Progress (CAP) and the Law Enforcement Action Partnership (LEAP) examined 911 police calls for service from eight cities and found that 23 to 39 percent of calls were low priority or nonurgent, while only 18 to 34 percent of calls were life-threatening emergencies. While many 911 calls do merit an emergency police response, unnecessarily dispatching armed officers to calls where their presence is unnecessary is more than just an ineffective use of safety resources; it can also create substantially adverse outcomes for communities of color, individuals with behavioral health disorders and disabilities, and other groups who have been disproportionately affected by the American criminal justice system.

Center for American Progress (CAP) and the Law Enforcement Action Partnership (LEAP): 2020. 33p.

By Trevor George Gardner and Esam Al-Shareffi

This Article presents findings from an analysis of police chokehold policies enacted at the federal, state, and municipal levels of government. In addition to identifying the jurisdictions that restricted police chokeholds in the wake of George Floyd’s death on May 25, 2020, the Article conveys (via analysis of an original dataset) the considerable variance in the quality of police chokehold regulation. While many jurisdictions regulate the police chokehold, the strength of such regulations should not be taken for granted. Police chokehold policies vary by the type of chokehold barred (“air choke” and/or carotid choke), the degree of the chokehold restriction, an officer’s “duty to intervene” when observing improper police application of the chokehold, and the type of sanction attached to a chokehold policy violation (criminal and/or administrative). Following the presentation of chokehold policy variance, the authors recommend an absolute bar of both air chokes and carotid chokes. However, in contemplating such a policy, policymakers should consider whether an officer authorized to use deadly force but barred from applying the air or carotid choke will be inclined to use his firearm as a force alternative.   

112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY ONLINE 111 (2022).   

By Lakomy, Miron; Bożek, Maciej

From the document: "Researchers who study online terrorism and political violence face a broad spectrum of risks to their safety and wellbeing. Awareness of the challenges researchers face in this subdiscipline has remained relatively low for years. Since the launch of Islamic State's propaganda campaign on the internet, which skilfully deployed scenes of death and dying to influence online audiences, that awareness has increased. Subsequently, some researchers have reported that prolonged exposure to terrorist content can be harmful across many wellbeing dimensions. This research project aims to determine if exposure to terrorist propaganda may be a factor in causing trauma for researcher or their development of mood disorders. Our study is founded on two research methods: an online survey and a novel experiment. The online survey was completed by a group of recognised terrorism researchers who were asked about their opinions and experiences related to the impact of their research activities on mental health. The experiment used a biofeedback device and an eye-tracker to measure the short-term psychophysiological response of researchers to ordinary content available on the internet (Control Group) and certain types of terrorist propaganda (Experimental Group). The reactions of both groups, primarily their eye fixation and skin conductance, were subsequently compared."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (Gnet. 2023. 44P.

By 21CP Solutions.

From the Introduction: The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was established by Executive Order under then President Barack Obama on December 18, 2014. President Obama charged the task force with identi- fying best practices and offering recommendations on how policing practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust. Since the publication of the task force’s final report in May 2015, there have been more than 133 national, state, or local task forces, councils, and working groups responding to police violence in communities throughout the country.1

The nation remains in a policing crisis, and too many poor communities of color face the adverse conditions of poverty and economic exclusion that aggravate the relationship between communities and police. The 2015 report by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing remains a significant influence on policing reform, but the country still confronts police violence that undermines community trust and confidence.

Task Force on 21st Century Policing: A Renewed Call to Action. Chicago: 21CP Solutions, LLC. 2023. 40p.

By Durham, John H.

From the document: "Following Special Counsel [Robert] Mueller's report, on May 13, 2019, Attorney General [William] Barr 'directed United States Attorney John Durham to conduct a preliminary review into certain matters related to the 2016 presidential election campaigns,' and that review 'subsequently developed into a criminal investigation. [...] On October 19, 2020, the Attorney General determined that, 'in light of the extraordinary circumstances relating to these matters, the public interest warrants Mr. Durham continuing this investigation pursuant to the powers and independence afforded by the Special Counsel regulations.' [...] [This] review and investigation, in turn has focused on separate but related questions, including the following: [1] Was there adequate predication for the FBI to open the Crossfire Hurricane investigation from its inception on July 31, 2016 as a full counterintelligence and Foreign Agents Registration Act ('FARA') investigation given the requirements of 'The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Domestic Operations' and FBI policies relating to the use of the least intrusive investigative tools necessary? [2] Was the opening of Crossfire Hurricane as a full investigation on July 31, 2016 consistent with how the FBI handled other intelligence it had received prior to July 31, 2016 concerning attempts by foreign interests to influence the Clinton and other campaigns? [3] Similarly, did the FBI properly consider other highly significant intelligence it received at virtually the same time as that used to predicate Crossfire Hurricane, but which related not to the Trump campaign, but rather to a purported Clinton campaign plan 'to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by Russian security services,' which might have shed light on some of the Russia information the FBI was receiving from third parties, including the Steele Dossier, the Alfa Bank allegations and confidential human source ('CHS') reporting? [...] [4] Was there evidence that the actions of any FBI personnel or third parties relating to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation violated any federal criminal statutes, including the prohibition against making false statements to federal officials? [...] [5] Was there evidence that the actions of the FBI or Department personnel in providing false or incomplete information to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ('FISC') violated any federal criminal statutes? [...]"

U.S. Department of Justice. 2023. 316p

By John Comiskey

Abstract: This study identified and analyzed the utilization of theory in college homeland security curricula in the United States. Faculty and program directors with diverse academic and professional backgrounds actively teach theory from multiple fields and disciplines to help prepare students for the field, address homeland security problems, and to grow and mature the field. The most prevalent theories which are taught as part of college homeland security curricula constellate around leadership, risk management, security, social identity, and terrorism themes. Homeland security, however, lacks a grand theory or overarching framework. Essentially, homeland security is an eclectic discipline or field of study that seeks to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risks to the Nation.

Journal of Homeland Security Education. Volume 7 (2018). 17p.

By United States. Department Of Homeland Security

From the document: "This Report reaffirms the five enduring homeland security missions as articulated in the first two QHSR [Quadrennial Homeland Security Review] Reports issued in 2010 and 2014 and focuses on how the Department must adapt and evolve to accomplish them. It also introduces a new homeland security mission, 'Combatting Crimes of Exploitation and Protecting Victims,' reflecting the overriding urgency of supporting victims and stopping perpetrators of such heinous crimes as human trafficking, labor exploitation, and child exploitation, the importance of engaging the public, and the heroic work of the DHS workforce and our homeland security enterprise partners in this mission space. DHS investigates crimes of exploitation, supports victims, trains law enforcement partners, and enforces trade laws related to human trafficking, and we will continue to advocate for additional resources to execute on these lines of effort at an ever-increasing level. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement initiated more than 6,000 child exploitation cases and U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized 3,605 shipments valued at $816.5 million due to forced labor concerns in fiscal year 2022. By elevating this work as a new mission, we are laying the groundwork for further growth in our commitment and capabilities, including planning, increased budget requests, operational cohesion, and partnerships."

United States. Department of Homeland Security. 2023. 92p

By Pradhi Aggarwal, Alec Brandon, Ariel Goldszmidt, Justin Holz, John A. List, Ian Muir, Gregory Sun, Thomas Yu

Given news reporting in recent years, many readers are likely familiar with research which finds that, conditional on an encounter, police officers are more likely to enforce a law, conduct a search, or use force when a civilian belongs to a racial minority group. In other words, once they are stopped, minorities are more likely to face some police action. However, what research has yet to show is whether minorities are stopped more in the first place.

This new paper addresses the issue of minority status and the likelihood of police encounters by reviewing driving data from Lyft records in Florida from August 2017 to August 2020, totaling over 40 billion observations. These data allow the authors to explore whether minority drivers, because they are minorities, are more likely to be stopped and to be issued a citation. To examine this question, the authors focus on citations for speeding.

Becker Friedman Institute for Economics, University of Chicago: Working Paper, 2022. 27p.

By The Halifax Regional Municipality, Mass Casualty Commission

Policing and public safety in HRM is very dynamic and uncertain. This is a complex and dynamic period of time for policing in Nova Scotia. The policing model in HRM and Nova Scotia more broadly is garnering significant attention from the public. There is pressure to transform the way policing services are delivered and costs are increasing at rates that exceed the Consumer Price Index. Taxpayers are facing increasing concerns about affordability. Notably, this study has occurred in parallel with the ongoing Mass Casualty Commission (the Commission) which is conducting an independent public inquiry to examine the April 18-19, 2020 Mass Casualty Incident in Nova Scotia. The findings of the Commission are unknown at this time but will likely have significant implications for policing in HRM and Nova Scotia. At the same time, the Department of Justice is completing a review of the province’s policing standards. That process is also likely to impact the policing operations and requirements in HRM. The HRM Public Safety Strategy is also under renewal. The renewed Strategy is focused on community based approaches to safety and reimagining responses to health and social services. The relationship between the HRP and RCMP is being challenged. It has been noted consistently in this study and the proceedings of the Mass Casualty Commission that the relationship between the RCMP and the Halifax Regional Police (HRP) is becoming increasingly strained resulting in an increasing safety risk profile. The proceedings of the Commission and stakeholder interviews completed as a part of this study have clearly highlighted that collaboration, integration, and the strength of the relationship between the RCMP and HRP is deteriorating. The events of the Mass Casualty Incident on April 20, 2020 and the subsequent proceedings have likely contributed to additional strain between the two services. The current policing model is not integrated. Despite what might be commonly perceived in the community - the HRP and RCMP do not operate in an integrated policing model. HRM currently has a dual policing model, meaning two services operating in parallel as discrete service providers.

Halifax, NS: Halifax Regional Municipality, 2023. 424p.

Edited by Ronald V. Clarke

Situational prevention originated in Great Britain, but its development was soon influenced by policy research in the United States. Research over the last 10 years has demonstrated the usefulness of situational prevention in dealing with a broad range of crime problems. Situational prevention requires design or modification of the immediate environment to reduce opportunities for crime by increasing the efforts and risks and decreasing the rewards as perceived by a wide range of offenders. Its 12 techniques include target hardening, access control, deflecting offenders, control of factors that facilitate crime, entry and exit screening, formal surveillance, surveillance by employees, natural surveillance, target removal, property identification, removal of inducements, and rule setting. Many of these measures are unobtrusive, others actually reduce fear of crime, and others increase convenience while increasing security. The case studies describe the use and outcomes of situational prevention focused on specific crimes in the United States, England, Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

NY. Harrow and Heston. 1992. 289p.

By United States. Government Accountability Office

From the document: "Critical infrastructure provides essential functions--such as supplying water, generating energy, and producing food--that underpin American society. Disruption or destruction of the nation's critical infrastructure could have debilitating effects. CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] is the national coordinator for infrastructure protection. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes a provision for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to report on the effectiveness of sector risk management agencies in carrying out responsibilities set forth in the act. This report addresses (1) how the act changed agencies' responsibilities, and the actions agencies have reported taking to address them; and (2) the extent to which CISA has identified and undertaken efforts to help agencies implement their responsibilities set forth in the act. GAO analyzed the act and relevant policy directives, collected written responses from all 16 sectors using a standardized information collection tool, reviewed other DHS documents, and interviewed CISA officials."

Wasginton D.C. United States. Government Accountability Office. 2023.

By Klare, Michael T.,

From the document: "Increasingly in recent years, advanced military powers have begun to incorporate and rely on new kinds or new applications of advanced technologies in their arsenals, such as artificial intelligence, robotics, cyber, and hypersonics, among others. The weaponization of these technologies may potentially carry far-ranging, dangerous consequences that expand into the nuclear realm by running up the escalation ladder or by blurring the distinction between a conventional and nuclear attack. Arms control, therefore, emerges as a tool to slow the pace of weaponizing these technologies and to adopt meaningful restraints on their use. This report examines four particular new kinds or new applications of technologies-- autonomous weapons systems, hypersonic weapons, cyberattacks, and automated battlefield decision-making--and proposes a framework strategy aimed at advancing an array of measures that all contribute to the larger goal of preventing unintended escalation and enhancing strategic stability."

Washington, D.C.. Arms Control Association. 2023. 76p.

By Macdonald, Bruce W.; Freeman, Carla P. (Carla Park), 1962-; Mcfarland, Alison

From the document: "Strategic competition between the United States and China is intensifying in the domain of outer space. [...] This report spotlights three sources of instability in space that merit immediate attention because of the growing risks they pose to space security specifically and to global security more broadly[.] [...] The report is organized as follows: It begins with a discussion of how the space environment is changing and the ways in which global space governance has failed to keep pace with those changes. It then considers China's activities in this evolving environment and key dimensions of US-China competition in space, along with the risks that attendant dynamics pose to global stability. The report looks in turn at each of the three drivers of instability in this context. The report concludes with recommendations geared toward US policymakers for actions that can be taken unilaterally, as well as in cooperation with other space powers, to strengthen space governance and mitigate the risks of a congested, debris-strewn, or entangled space environment."

United States Institute Of Peace . 2023. 28p.