Open Access Publisher and Free Library
03-crime prevention.jpg

CRIME PREVENTION

CRIME PREVENTION-POLICING-CRIME REDUCTION-POLITICS

Oakland Ceasefire Evaluation: Final Report to the City of Oakland

By Anthony A. Braga,  Lisa M. Barao. Gregory Zimmerman,  Rod K. Brunson,  Andrew V. Papachristos, George Wood,  Chelsea Farrell

The City of Oakland, California, has long suffered from very high levels of serious violence. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, Oakland’s homicide rate (31.8 per 100,000) was almost 6.8 times higher than the national homicide rate (4.7 per 100,000) in 2012. That year, the City of Oakland engaged the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) to help design and implement a focused deterrence program to reduce serious gun violence. The CPSC collaborated with the Oakland Police Department (OPD) on ongoing problem analysis research to understand the underlying nature of gun violence in Oakland. The OPD led an interagency Ceasefire enforcement group comprised of federal, state, and county criminal justice agencies. The broader Oakland Ceasefire Partnership included the Mayor’s Office, social service agencies led by the Human Services Department, and community leaders from local organizations such as Oakland Community Organizations (OCO). The Oakland Ceasefire program closely followed the key elements of a focused deterrence Group Violence Reduction Strategy (GVRS). Briefly, GVRS programs seek to change offender behavior by understanding underlying crime‐producing dynamics and conditions that sustain recurring crime problems, and implementing a blended strategy of law enforcement, community mobilization, and social service actions. The Oakland Ceasefire program was fully implemented in early 2013. Between 2010 and 2017, total Oakland shooting victimizations peaked at 710 in 2011 (93 gun homicide victims and 617 non-fatal shooting victims) and decreased by 52.1 percent to a low of 340 in 2017 (63 gun homicide victims and 277 non-fatal shooting victims). The impact evaluation was designed to determine whether the Ceasefire intervention was associated with this steep decline in serious gun violence and assess how Ceasefire partners and community leaders perceived the implementation of the strategy.

Unpublished report, 2019.   113p.

Critical Incident Review: Active Shooter at Robb Elementary School

 By The U.S. Department of Justice

On May 24, 2022, a mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, shook the nation. In the aftermath of the tragedy, there was significant public criticism of the law enforcement response to the shooting. At the request of the then mayor of Uvalde, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the law enforcement response to the mass shooting. In providing a detailed accounting and critical assessment of the first responder actions in Uvalde, and the efforts since to ameliorate gaps and deficiencies in that response, this report is intended to build on the knowledge base for responding to incidents of mass violence. It also will identify generally accepted practices for an effective law enforcement response to such incidents. Finally, it is intended to help honor the victims and survivors of the Robb Elementary School tragedy. 

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2024. 610p.

Implementing Change in an Ever-Evolving World: Law Enforcement’s Innovative Responses to a Constantly Changing Landscape

By Institute for Intergovernmental Research

 This publication presents abbreviated case studies of large and small law enforcement agencies that have undergone or are currently conducting change initiatives to address a wide range of pressing issues common to law enforcement, such as backlogged sexual assault cases, lack of community trust, inadequate information and intelligence sharing, and increases in violent or juvenile crime. These issues and others prompted change initiatives among the 13 agencies interviewed for this resource. In September 2022, executives from several of the case study agencies met in Washington, D.C., for a working session to provide additional insights learned through the change experience (see appendix A for a list of roundtable attendees). The experiences of these agencies are documented in this publication with the hope that law enforcement executives and managers will find the strategies, actions, and lessons learned helpful in adapting to changes in their internal and external environments.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2023. 60p.

Two Ships Passing in the Night? Bridging the Gap Between Research on Desistance and What Works

By Grant Duwe

Key Points

  • Despite pursuing a similar goal, the “what works” and desistance literatures have largely ignored and undervalued the contributions the other has made.

  • The what works literature has been mostly quantitative and has consisted of program evaluations and meta-analyses, leading to the emergence of principles of effective correctional intervention and the risk-needs-responsivity model.

  • The desistance literature has been more qualitative and has focused on persons rather than correctional programs, stressing the importance of identity transformation in the desistance process.

  • Correctional systems do not provide “desistance opportunities”—programs, interventions, and services—to the extent they are needed. Programs should become more person-centered by placing a greater emphasis on identity transformation.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020. 6p

Optimizing the Effectiveness of Correctional Programming: The Importance of Dosage, Timing, and Sequencing

By Grant Duwe

Key Points

  • Programming dosage should be calibrated to risk, with higher-risk prisoners receiving longer, more intensive interventions.

  • As program participation increases, recidivism generally decreases. Recidivism outcomes are significantly better when prisoners participate in multiple interventions or spend much of their imprisonment in programming.

  • Back-loading programming closer to release from prison has been associated with better recidivism outcomes.

  • Program sequencing may be effective for those who participate in multiple interventions.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 6p.

Antisocial behavior in football matches: Do changes in alcohol sales policy increase violent acts?

By Marke Geisy da Silva Dantas, Luciano Menezes Bezerra Sampaio, Thadeu Gasparetto

Background: The violent behavior of football fans is constantly associated with their drinking habits. Aiming to reduce its impact, policy makers often ban the sales and consumption of alcohol beverages during matches. Nonetheless, there are few papers that empirically analyzed such relationship, and our paper aims to shed light on this question. Methods: Out dataset comprises 4,560 matches from the first and second tiers of the Brazilian League, where 245 exhibited at least one antisocial behavior from fans. Ordered logistic regressions are used as method. Results: Our empirical findings evidence that the sales of alcoholic drinks do increase the likelihood of severe antisocial behavior. We also observed a higher likelihood of violent cases when the home club loses its match as well as during crowded matches. Conclusions: We conclude that the change in the alcohol police in Brazil did show a significant association with the likelihood of antisocial behavior among football fans. However, since the magnitude of such effect is small, further research is needed to examine the potential benefits of this policy changes

International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 123, January 2024, 10427

The Comeback City: How New York City Overcame Failed Policies by Believing in People

By Robert Doar

“Given New York Today, Could Anyone Lead It?” So bemoaned a 1991 New York Times headline after decades of failure and futility.1 Crime was endemic, schools were failing, poverty was pervasive, and the economy had stagnated. From John Lindsay to David Dinkins, mayor after mayor had tried to tackle these problems. They had all failed. After three decades of policy futility, New Yorkers were giving up. In 1991, surveys indicated that more than half of New Yorkers wanted to leave.2 Political leadership had come to regard the city’s ills as intractable pathologies. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then New York senator, said at one public hearing on juvenile violence in 1993, “There is nothing you’ll do of any consequence, except start the process of change. Don’t expect it to take less than thirty years.”

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2023. 10p.

Stronger Families, Safer Streets: Exploring Links Between Family Structure and Crime

By W. Bradford Wilcox | Rafael A. Mangual | Seth Cannon | Joseph E. Price

The debate about how best to respond to urban crime—a debate that has become more important in light of recent increases in violent crime and homicide in many cities across America—has tended to focus on two perspectives. The first prioritizes tackling the “social structural factors” (unemployment, economic inequality, poverty, etc.) that are thought to be the “root causes” of crime, and violent crime, in particular. A second perspective rejects this structural approach in favor of a strategy that relies on traditional law-enforcement institutions (namely, police, prosecutors, and jails/prisons), often citing the sharp violent crime declines of the 1990s and 2000s that occurred in the wake of new policing and prosecutorial approaches—even in the face of structural realities said to be at the root of the urban crime problem.

But a third perspective seeks to understand how the fragile state of core social institutions—schools, churches, youth sports leagues, and, above all, families—in too many of our cities may also have a hand in urban crime. Princeton sociologist Patrick Sharkey, for instance, has argued that nonprofits “focused on reducing violence and building stronger communities” are linked to lower rates of violent crime in cities across the country. In a new Institute for Family Studies report, we turn our attention to the core institution of family. Drawing on the work of scholars like Harvard sociologist Robert Sampson—who found that “(f)amily structure is one of the strongest, if not the strongest, predictors of … urban violence across cities in the United States”—we explore the relationship between family structure and urban crime in the 21st century. Specifically, we address this question: How is family structure associated with crime, violent crime, and homicide rates in American cities—and with these outcomes in Chicago neighborhoods?

We find that cities are safer when two-parent families are dominant and more crime-ridden when family instability is common. The same story applies to the neighborhoods of Chicago. More specifically, we find the total crime rate is about 48% higher in cities that have above the median share of single-parent families, compared to cities that have fewer single-parent families. That difference is even larger with respect to violent crime and homicide, specifically, with cities above the median level of single parenthood experiencing 118% higher rates of violent crime and 255% higher rates of homicide. In the Windy City, relying on an analysis of census tract level data, our research indicates that neighborhoods above the median fraction of single-parent-headed households experienced 137% higher total crime rates, 226% higher violent crime rates, and 436% higher homicide rates.

When controlling for additional factors such as racial composition, poverty rates, and educational attainment levels, we find that the association between family structure and total crime rates, as well as violent crime rates, in cities across the United States remains statistically significant. However, the association between family structure and homicide in cities does not. In Chicago, the links between family structure and both violent crime and homicide rates at the neighborhood level were significant, net of controls, but not the total crime rate. In addition to the question of whether there exists a statistical relationship between family structure and crime—a question we generally answer in the affirmative—this study also offers possible answers to the question of what might explain the relationships between family instability and crime.

Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of social science research, we theorize that this relationship is likely a byproduct of some mix of the heightened risk of family instability in the socialization of young children and the role that father absence plays in providing less guidance and oversight for adolescent and young adult males.

Particularly in light of the pre-existing literature on the role of family structure in various life outcomes, these findings may have important implications for policymakers. They suggest the need to encourage more young Americans—particularly those living in vulnerable neighborhoods with both high rates of violence and out-of-wedlock childbearing—toward forming strong and stable families in marriage.

Washington, DC: Institute for Family Studies, 2023. 21p.

Officer-Involved Killings of Unarmed Black People and Racial Disparities in Sleep Health

By: Atheendar S. Venkataramani, MD, PhD; Elizabeth F. Bair, MS; Jacob Bor, Sc; et al

Importance: Racial disparities in sleep health may mediate the broader health outcomes of structural racism.

Objective: To assess changes in sleep duration in the Black population after officer-involved killings of unarmed Black people, a cardinal manifestation of structural racism.

Design, Setting, and Participants: Two distinct difference-in-differences analyses examined the changes in sleep duration for the US non-Hispanic Black (hereafter, Black) population before vs after exposure to officer-involved killings of unarmed Black people, using data from adult respondents in the US Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS; 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2018) and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS; 2013-2019) with data on officer-involved killings from the Mapping Police Violence database. Data analyses were conducted between September 24, 2021, and September 12, 2023.

Exposures: Occurrence of any police killing of an unarmed Black person in the state, county, or commuting zone of the survey respondent’s residence in each of the four 90-day periods prior to interview, or occurence of a highly public, nationally prominent police killing of an unarmed Black person anywhere in the US during the 90 days prior to interview.

Main Outcomes and Measures: Self-reported total sleep duration (hours), short sleep (<7 hours), and very short sleep (<6 hours).

Results: Data from 181 865 Black and 1 799 757 White respondents in the BRFSS and 9858 Black and 46 532 White respondents in the ATUS were analyzed. In the larger BRFSS, the majority of Black respondents were between the ages of 35 and 64 (99 014 [weighted 51.4%]), women (115 731 [weighted 54.1%]), and college educated (100 434 [weighted 52.3%]). Black respondents in the BRFSS reported short sleep duration at a rate of 45.9%, while White respondents reported it at a rate of 32.6%; for very short sleep, the corresponding values were 18.4% vs 10.4%, respectively. Statistically significant increases in the probability of short sleep and very short sleep were found among Black respondents when officers killed an unarmed Black person in their state of residence during the first two 90-day periods prior to interview. Magnitudes were larger in models using exposure to a nationally prominent police killing occurring anywhere in the US. Estimates were equivalent to 7% to 16% of the sample disparity between Black and White individuals in short sleep and 13% to 30% of the disparity in very short sleep.

Conclusions and Relevance: Sleep health among Black adults worsened after exposure to officer-involved killings of unarmed Black individuals. These empirical findings underscore the role of structural racism in shaping racial disparities in sleep health outcomes

JAMA Internat Medicine, online Feb. 2024.

Pandemic Unemployment Fraud in Context: Causes, Costs, and Solutions

By Matt Weidinger | Amy Simon

Key Points

  • The nation’s unemployment benefits system, which was significantly expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic, suffered unprecedented losses to fraud and improper payments.

  • Official—and still partial—estimates of improper payments approach $200 billion, while unofficial estimates suggest $400 billion or more may have been lost.

  • There are multiple causes of these record improper payments, including historically large benefits, poor program design including eligibility self-certification in new programs, and degraded administrative systems without adequate defenses against various fraudulent schemes.

  • State and federal policymakers should review the causes and consequences of these unprecedented losses and take specific steps, such as those outlined in this report, to both prevent a recurrence of the record taxpayer losses experienced during the pandemic and better establish a proactive anti-fraud posture for the unemployment insurance system.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 45p.

The Economic Cost and Spatial Diffusion of the Opioid Crisis, 2009–18

By Alex Brill | Scott Ganz

Recent data show a small decline in opioid-related mortality following a decade during which opioid-related mortality more than doubled to nearly 53,000 in 2018. However, the aggregate statistics mask important spatial and temporal trends in the data. This report estimates nationwide, regional, and county-level economic costs associated with the opioid crisis. The data show that, despite recent nationwide per capita opioid-related cost declines, the impact of the crisis continues to be felt across large swaths of the Northeast, Midwest, and South. We also find that opioid-related mortality tends to diffuse among nearby counties, with the local diffusion rate from illegal opioids—which are the primary cause in the current wave of the crisis—exceeding the rate from prescription opioids, which were the primary cause in earlier waves. The combination of lower aggregate mortality and faster diffusion among nearby counties points to a changed spatial distribution of economic costs as the opioid crisis evolves.

Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020.

Blunt Realities of Weed Economics: The National Patchwork of Legalization

By Daniel A. Sumner | Robin S. Goldstein

  • Under US federal law, weed, also known as “marijuana” or “cannabis,” remains a Schedule I illegal narcotic, in the same category as cocaine and heroin. Production and sale of weed are federal felonies punishable by severe prison terms.

  • Individual US states, in conflict with federal law, began legalizing medical weed in 1996. However, in the past decade, the US Department of Justice has agreed not to enforce federal criminal weed laws against anyone who is following state laws.

  • As of 2022, 33 percent of all Americans live in states with legal recreational sales of weed, 41 percent live in states with medical legalization but no legal recreational sale, and 26 percent live in states with total weed prohibitions.

  • In its early years, legally produced and sold weed has struggled to capture market share. In most places where the sale and use of weed are now legal, illegal weed—unlicensed, unregulated, and untaxed—still has a dominant market share and shows no signs of fading away.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. 7p.

Federal Weed Legalization: Less Is More

By Daniel A. Sumner | Robin S. Goldstein

Key Points

  • Cannabis containing more than 0.3 percent tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which the US government still calls “marijuana” but here we call “weed,” has been legalized by many state governments but is still illegal at the federal level.

  • If a major goal of federal legalization is to help legal weed replace illegal weed, the best step forward for federal policy is simply to step out of the way. This would involve removing weed from the schedule of illegal narcotics, permitting states to implement cannabis policy as they see fit, and allowing cannabis to move among jurisdictions where it is legal.

  • Forms of federal legalization that include more regulations and taxes on cannabis—including House and Senate bills that have been recently publicized—would almost surely do more harm than good, given the state and local policies already in place.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. 5p.

How Should State and Local Governments Respond to Illegal Retail Cannabis?

By Howard Husock

  • The legalization of cannabis, rather than sidelining the black market, has fueled it, providing cover to illicit cannabis enterprises that often undercut the legal market on price and accessibility.

  • State policies, such as high or complex cannabis taxes, scant issuance of licenses for legal operation, and widespread local “opt-outs,” play a key role in keeping the legal market from outcompeting illegal alternatives.

  • The treatment of alcohol and cigarettes may be better models: States should allow legal retail to proliferate to minimize the advantages illicit operators now enjoy.

  • At the same time, as with tobacco, public health authorities should mount education campaigns to minimize marijuana use, in light of its demonstrated dangers.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 1113p.

Responding to the Trauma That Is Endemic to the Criminal Legal System:Many Opportunities for Juvenile Prevention, Intervention, and Rehabilitation   

By Micere Keels

There is increasing pressure for the juvenile criminal legal system to address trauma; this is in response to advances in the science of trauma and adversity, evidence from interventions showing promising outcomes for juveniles coping with trauma, and development of systemic frameworks for providing trauma-informed care. This review details how exposure to potentially traumatic events can create primary, secondary, and tertiary effects that are relevant to how the criminal legal system engages with juveniles coping with trauma. Associations that could be dismissed on methodological challenges can no longer be ignored as an increasingly sophisticated body of prospective studies replicate previous cross-sectional and retrospective studies, which found a higher prevalence of trauma among system-involved juveniles and show that exposure to potentially traumatic events and trauma symptoms play causal roles in engaging in behaviors that can be classified as criminal offending. Additionally, several examples are used to illustrate how racialized exposure to systemic trauma across generations underlies racialized disparities in persistent criminal offending—over exposure to potentially traumatic events and underexposure to coping resources. A broad range of developmental and criminological research is drawn upon to provide frameworks for implementing trauma-informed care as a systemic intervention aimed at minimizing retraumatization and using every interaction that juveniles have with the criminal legal system to contribute to recovery and prevent recidivism.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 329 - 355

Clemency

By Rachel E. Barkow and Mark Osler

The federal government and most American states provide for some form of clemency that allows the president or the governor to reduce a sentence or pardon a conviction. Although most US presidents and some governors have made great use of this power in the past, it has long been in decline. Diagnosing the reasons for this decline proves easier than providing solutions to reinvigorate this practice. A great deal of scholarship explores the causes and offers solutions, and this review catalogs the main lines of argument. It also explains why clemency's renewal remains urgent, even in regimes dedicated to the rule of law, to serve the best purposes of punishment and check the excesses of criminal law and punishment that are inevitable given the political process and enforcement practices.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 311 - 327

Investigation of Cases of Competition Manipulation: A Practical Guide

By United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

The exponential growth of the sports business market, extensive media coverage and the global growth of real-time online betting have created an environment in which many individuals and organizations have a direct or indirect financial interest in the course or the outcome of sports competitions. Such an environment can incentives those seeking to exploit sport for illicit gain. The nature of competition manipulation involves criminal acts that are not unique to sport, including fraud and money-laundering as well as the involvement of organized crime. It is viewed as an attractive area to infiltrate because of the opportunity to make large profits with limited risk of detection and sanction as a result of a lack or non-uniformity of laws and regulations around the world.

The implication is that sports organizations cannot deal with this issue on their own and cooperation with law enforcement agencies and criminal justice authorities can only strengthen the fight against competition manipulation. Sport organizations only have the power to take disciplinary measures, while criminal justice authorities and law enforcement agencies have a wider range of measures at their disposal. Because of the complex and transnational nature of competition manipulation, the investigation of offenses can be challenging for a wide range of stakeholders and jurisdictions. Effective and timely investigations play a crucial role in prevention strategies. At the same time, the failure to investigate or ineffective investigations can embolden would-be offenders.

At the national, regional and international levels, there is growing recognition that more needs to be done to tackle these threats effectively, including the allocation of more resources. This has been highlighted at the international level, including by the Conference of the States Parties (the main policymaking body of the United Nations Convention against Corruption), the General Assembly and the Group of 20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, and by the entry into force on 1 September 2019 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, the only legally binding international instrument solely dealing with the issue of competition manipulation.

Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. 71p.

Combating corruption in the European Union

By Piotr Bakowski

Corruption is a major challenge for the European Union (EU), with all its Member States affected by the problem to some extent. Its scale, however, is difficult to measure both in Europe and elsewhere. Surveys on the perception of corruption among citizens and experts – such as the Global Corruption Barometer and Eurobarometer surveys – are the principal measurement tool. Since the 1990s, countries around the world have joined efforts to address corruption collectively. This has led to the emergence of widely recognised international laws and standards, adopted in particular by the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations. Mechanisms, such as the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), have been developed to monitor implementation of these rules. The EU has gradually adopted laws addressing a range of corruption-related issues. These include a Directive on the Fight against Fraud to the Union's Financial Interests, as well as directives on public procurement, whistleblowers and money-laundering. However, the legal framework thus created remains patchy, the lack of minimum rules on the definition of criminal offense and sanctions in the area of corruption being one important missing element. The EU has also developed its own tool for monitoring anti-corruption efforts – the EU anti-corruption report – only to abandon it after having issued its first edition. Recently, corruption-related issues have been addressed almost exclusively within the EU rule of law framework, a development criticised by various stakeholders, including the European Parliament. The latter has adopted numerous resolutions on corruption addressing, among other things, the impact of COVID 19, as well as systemic challenges to rule of law and deficiencies in the EU's fight against corruption. This briefing updates an earlier one published in 2022, which built on a study by 00 and Sofija Voronova, published in 2017.

Brussels: European Parliament, 2023. 11p.

Methods of Preventing Corruption: A Review and Analysis Of Select Approaches

By Bradley Sauve, Jessica Woodley, Natalie J. Jones, & Seena Akhtari

This literature review provides a comprehensive summary of methods commonly used to prevent corruption in both the private and public sectors and where possible, provides insight on which preventative methods have empirical value and demonstrated effectiveness.

Several key findings were identified, including:

·  Four main approaches to preventing corruption are highlighted. Namely, these include: 1) value-based approaches; 2) compliance-based approaches; 3) risk management approaches; and, 4) awareness and participation-based approaches. Within these four approaches, 18 specific corruption prevention methods are examined and assessed;

·     Findings demonstrate wide variability in the empirical effectiveness of existing prevention methods;

·     Findings demonstrate: 1) the tone at the top principle 2) ethics training programs; 3) top-down auditing; 4) merit-based recruitment; 5) E-government; and, 6) freedom of the press all show signs of empirical effectiveness;

·     The literature demonstrates mixed results regarding: 1) intrinsic motivations; 2) extrinsic motivations; 3) bottom-up monitoring; 4) public awareness campaigns; and, 5) freedom of information laws;

·     The four-eyes principle was the only method found to be effective, with the remaining methods lacking sufficient evidence to support their use; and

·     Analysis of the finding points towards the conclusion that organizations should seek to develop compliance programs and anti-corruption strategies that: 1) involve multiple evidence-based methods; 2) tailor prevention methods to meet the specific needs and context of the organization.

 Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2023. 63p.

Frequently Asked Questions: How to address bribery and corruption risks in mineral supply chains

By Luca Maiotti and Rashad Abelson

This booklet provides practical answers to frequently asked questions relating to how companies can identify, prevent, mitigate and report on risks of contributing to bribery and corruption through their mineral sourcing. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“the Minerals Guidance”) provides due diligence recommendations on how all companies along mineral supply chains, from the miner to the final product manufacturer, should combat bribery and corruption linked to minerals production and trade (OECD, 2016a). The following FAQs do not represent new or additional guidance but aim to explain in simple terms the recommendations already set out in the Minerals Guidance and other OECD standards and best practice. Note, this booklet does not aspire to be an exhaustive stocktaking of all corruption issues and possible mitigation responses. This booklet provides practical answers to frequently asked questions relating to how companies can identify, prevent, mitigate and report on risks of contributing to bribery and corruption through their mineral sourcing. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“the Minerals Guidance”) provides due diligence recommendations on how all companies along mineral supply chains, from the miner to the final product manufacturer, should combat bribery and corruption linked to minerals production and trade (OECD, 2016a). The following FAQs do not represent new or additional guidance but aim to explain in simple terms the recommendations already set out in the Minerals Guidance and other OECD standards and best practice. Note, this booklet does not aspire to be an exhaustive stocktaking of all corruption issues and possible mitigation responses. 

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , OECD,  2021. 32p