By The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

  In the aftermath of the riot and breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, among the questions that were raised was how the breach had occurred and what was known by federal law enforcement in advance of January 6 about the possibility of a violent protest that day. On January 15, 2021, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) announced its review to examine the role and activity of DOJ and its components in preparing for and responding to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Separately, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department prosecutors immediately began criminally investigating individuals who violated federal law in connection with the riot at the U.S. Capitol on January 6. The Department—through the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of Columbia (DC)— has reported that it has brought charges against over 1,500 individuals and described the January 6 investigations and prosecutions as having “moved forward at an unprecedented speed and scale.” In the public announcement of our review of the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, we took note of these ongoing criminal prosecutions, stating that the OIG was “mindful of the sensitive nature of the ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions related to the events of January 6. Consistent with longstanding OIG practice, in conducting this review, the DOJ OIG will take care to ensure that the review does not interfere with these investigations or prosecutions.” As is customary for the OIG, we coordinated closely with the Department and the DC USAO to ensure that the OIG’s investigative work did not conflict with or compromise any ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. To that end, and consistent with OIG practice, in spring 2022 the OIG paused aspects of our review. 1 Once the OIG determined last year, after consultation with federal prosecutors, that our review would no longer potentially interfere with pending prosecutions, we resumed our review. In doing so, we were cognizant of the amount of time that had passed in deference to the ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions, as well as the number of other non-DOJ OIG oversight reports that have since been publicly released regarding the January 6 events, and we therefore decided to largely focus our inquiry on an issue that has not yet been thoroughly reviewed in oversight conducted by other entities, namely the FBI’s direction and handling of its confidential human sources (CHS) in the lead-up to and on January 6, and whether the FBI exploited its CHSs and other available information to determine the nature of threats in advance of the electoral vote certification on January 6. In addition to the DOJ OIG’s oversight efforts reflected in this report, several other Inspectors General have conducted reviews of their agency’s actions in connection with the events of January 6:  The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) OIG immediately began a review to determine if the USCP, which is responsible for policing the Capitol Complex, (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate  internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations.  The Department of Defense (DoD) OIG initiated a review of the relevant events leading up to January 6, including the DoD’s review and approval of the DC government’s request for assistance from the DC National Guard; DoD’s coordination with DC and federal officials in preparation for January 6; DoD’s receipt and approval of the USCP’s request for assistance on January 6; and the planning involved for National Guard forces to help secure the Capitol in the immediate aftermath of the riot.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OIG began a review to examine the role and activity of DHS and its components in preparing for and responding to the events of January 6, 2021, including DHS’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis’s responsibility for providing intelligence to law enforcement and DHS law enforcement components’ roles, responsibilities, and actions on January 6. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS), which was responsible for protecting then Vice President Mike Pence on January 6 during his time at the U.S. Capitol, is a law enforcement component within DHS. In addition, DHS is responsible for designating an event as a national special security event (NSSE) or as a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) event, which it did not do for the electoral vote certification on January 6. 2 The FBI defines a special event as a “significant international event or a domestic event” formally designated as an NSSE event or a SEAR event, which requires the FBI “to plan, coordinate, develop, or provide FBI resources to mitigate potential threats the special event may cause to national security or threats of significant criminal activity that the FBI is responsible for identifying, preventing, investigating, or disrupting.”  The Department of Interior (DOI) OIG initiated a review of the actions of the National Park Service (NPS) and the U.S. Park Police (USPP) in preparing for and responding to the events at the Ellipse and the Capitol on January 6 and in information-sharing between the NPS, the USPP, and their law enforcement partners. The demonstration that preceded the violence at the Capitol occurred at the Ellipse, which is part of President’s Park—a national park under the control of the NPS. The USPP is a unit of the NPS authorized to conduct law enforcement in the national park system and, pursuant to local statutes, within DC generally. A further oversight effort was undertaken by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of Congress, which announced that it would conduct “a comprehensive overview of events leading up to, during, and following the January 6 attack.” The U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives also conducted oversight regarding the events of January 6. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) together with the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (RAC) announced a joint investigation on January 8, 2021, to “examine the intelligence and security failures” that led to the events of January 6. On January 12, 2021, the House of Representatives and Senate leadership were briefed by senior FBI officials about the FBI’s posture leading up to January 6, its response and investigation into the events of January 6, and the threat picture and operational posture leading into the Inauguration on January 20, 2021. Subsequently, numerous congressional committee hearings addressed how various federal agencies prepared in advance of the January 6 Electoral Certification and how they responded on January 6, with the first one being held by the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on January 26, 2021. In early March 2021, HSGAC/RAC jointly held an oversight hearing that included testimony from the FBI, Hearing Examining the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Part II, as well as from non-FBI witnesses. On June 30, 2021, the House of Representatives established a 13-member Select Committee to investigate the rioting and breaching of the Capitol on January 6, named the “House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol” (House Select Committee). The House Select Committee held 10 televised hearings beginning on June 9, 2022, and concluded the last hearing on December 19, 2022. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2024. 88p.

By Deniz Arıtürk , Michele M. Easter , Jeffrey W. Swanson, and Marvin S. Swartz

Despite significant scholarship, research, and funding dedicated to implementing criminal diversion programs over the past two decades, persons with serious mental illness and substance use disorders remain substantially overrepresented in United States jails and prisons. Why are so many U.S. adults with behavioral health problems incarcerated instead of receiving treatment and other support to recover in the community? In this paper, we explore this persistent problem within the context of “relentless unmet need” in U.S. behavioral health (Alegría et al., 2021). 

  The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 52 (2024): 65-75 

By Peter Leasure

The current paper aimed to estimate the likelihood of an OVI (operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs) arrest across race/ethnicity and gender using data from the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP). Black and Hispanic males and females had higher probabilities of an OVI arrest than White males and females. However, males and females in the other category had lower probabilities of an OVI arrest than White males and females. For gender differences, males in all race/ethnicity categories had higher probabilities of an OVI arrest than females. 

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 886 Columbus: Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law, 2024. 11p.

By Robin M. Maher, Leah Roemer

While all eyes are on the race for U.S. President, it is local races for prosecutor, state judge, legislator, and governor that will decide whether and how the death penalty is used. The President only has jurisdiction over federal death penalty cases, which currently represent about 2% of all death row prisoners and 1% of all executions carried out in the U.S. since 1976. He or she selects the Attorney General, who determines whether to seek death sentences in eligible federal cases and how to defend existing federal death sentences. The President also has clemency power for people convicted of federal crimes, including those on federal death row. 

Washington, DC: Death Penalty Information Center, 2024. 32p.

By Diogo G. C. Britto, Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie, Paolo Pinotti, Breno Sampaio  

We study the prevalence and effects of individuals with past criminal charges among candidates and elected politicians in Brazil. Individuals with past criminal charges are twice as likely to both run for office and be elected compared to other individuals. This pattern persists across political parties and government levels, even when controlling for a broad set of observable characteristics. Randomized anti-corruption audits reduce the share of mayors with criminal records, but only when conducted in election years. Using a regression discontinuity design focusing on close elections, we demonstrate that the election of mayors with criminal backgrounds leads to higher rates of underweight births and infant mortality. Additionally, there is an increase in political patronage, particularly in the health sector, which is consistent with the negative impacts on local public health outcomes.  

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 60p.

By Deepak Premkumar, Andrew Skelton, Magnus Lofstrom, and Sean Cremin

In April 2020, the Judicial Council of California responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by implementing an emergency bail order, sometimes called “zero bail,” to reduce viral transmission in courts and jails. The policy maintained cash bail for more severe offenses but set bail at zero dollars for most misdemeanors and felonies, sharply increasing the number of people who were immediately released after being arrested. Although the statewide mandate lasted for roughly two months, many county courts temporarily adopted similar policies, and until July 2022, most Californians lived in a county with an emergency bail order in place. California’s emergency bail orders dramatically altered the pretrial process and drew concerns that those released would commit additional crimes. This report examines the impact of these emergency bail measures on the likelihood of arrested individuals being rearrested soon after release. The disruptive nature of the pandemic was likely a key factor in the temporary increase in overall rearrests when emergency bail orders were in place. Notably, increases in felony rearrests did not subside over time or when emergency orders were revoked. While our data do not allow us to determine why this was the case, arrest, and booking rates, as well as jail populations, have stayed well below pre-pandemic levels, suggesting the possibility that some pandemic-era practices may have persisted, which could affect more recent felony rearrest rates. Because their goal was to protect public health, emergency bail orders set a unilateral policy of detention or release based on the accused offenses—a marked difference from broader bail reform efforts that have implemented tools such as assessing arrested individuals’ risk to public safety and not appearing in court, as well as monitoring and/or providing pretrial services to the accused if they are released pretrial. Our findings suggest that pretrial detention policy may benefit from a more holistic measure than the arresting offense when assessing public safety risk, and pretrial risk assessments could be a promising approach.

  San Francisco:  Public Policy Institute of California, 2024. 33p.   

By Julian V. Roberts, Lilly Crellin, Jonathan Bild and Jade Mouton

This report summarises findings from a survey of the public conducted in 2024. It contributes to the well-established and still growing literature on public opinion and imprisonment. The primary focus was upon public knowledge of prisons and prison trends in England and Wales. This survey is a follow-up to an earlier report by the Sentencing Academy on public knowledge of sentencing. Key Findings ¨ Most people acknowledge that they know little about prisons in England and Wales, with almost three-quarters of respondents stating that they knew either ‘not very much’ or ‘nothing at all’. ¨ More than nine in ten respondents significantly over-estimated the proportion of women within the prison population; 93% of respondents thought that women made up 10% or more of the prison population. The correct answer is 4%. ¨ Respondents also over-estimated the proportion of the prison population serving a sentence for a violent offence; whilst around one in three adult sentenced prisoners have been sentenced for a violent offence, 58% of respondents thought that violent offenders made up 40% or more of the prison population. ¨ Offenders who have served a short prison sentence of less than 12 months have the highest re-offending rate. However, most respondents considered that prisoners released after having served longer sentences had a higher re-offending rate. ¨ When asked to specify what they considered to be the single most important purpose of imprisonment, the most popular option, chosen by 42% of respondents, was protecting the public by removing offenders from society. Rehabilitation was the next most commonly-chosen purpose, attracting 19% of respondents. ¨ Approximately three-quarters of respondents (73%) considered prisons to be either ‘not at all’ or ‘not very’ effective at rehabilitating offenders and preventing re-offending. Whilst the perception of prisons as being effective at punishing offenders was less negative, over half of respondents (53%) thought prisons were ‘not at all’ or ‘not very’ effective in performing this function. ¨ In common with many previous surveys, a significant proportion of respondents considered prison conditions to be ‘too easy’, with 49% of respondents holding this view.  

London: Sentencing Academy, 2024. 20p.

By Oliver Kossack

In the past three decades, radical right parties had the opportunity to directly influence political developments from the highest public office in many post-communist Central and Eastern European countries. Oliver Kossack provides the first comprehensive study on government formation with radical right parties in this region. Even after the turn of the millennium, some distinct features of the post-communist context persist, such as coalitions between radical right and centre-left parties. In addition to original empirical insights, the time-sensitive approach of this study also advances the discussion about concepts and methodological approaches within the discipline.

Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2023. 392 p.

Edited by Ian Hall, Troy Lee-Brown and Rebecca Strating

This book advances a holistic conceptualization of maritime security under the term ‘Blue Security’ and situates it in states across the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific encompasses a vast space, incorporating two of the planet’s biggest oceans, the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, as well as littoral and hinterland states home to half the world’s population. Security challenges abound across the maritime Indo-Pacific, ranging from the risk of inter-state war at sea to so-called blue crimes, like piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing. Climate change and marine pollution, as well as the over-exploitation of scarce, and sometimes fragile resources, also pose threats to human security, sustainability, and biodiversity. Using the concept of ‘Blue Security’, this book assesses these various challenges and analyses the approaches to their management used by Indo-Pacific states. It argues that we should embrace a holistic understanding of maritime security, incorporating national, regional, international, human, and environmental dimensions. To that end, it explores the Blue Security strategies of 18 Indo-Pacific states, examining their changing perceptions of threat, their approaches to managing those challenges, and their capabilities. The volume makes an innovative contribution to our knowledge of a region crucial to global security and prosperity. This book will be of interest to students of maritime strategy, security studies, Asian politics, and International Relations.  

 London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 226p.

By The Center for Justice Innovation

This mapping report looking at the alternatives to coercive sanctions for low-level drug offences, forms part of one of the strategic priorities identified in the mid-term review of the National Drug Strategy established in 2017. As the government has shifted towards a healthy response to drug and alcohol use in Ireland, Alternatives to Coercive Sanctions (ACS) have become a recent area of increased focus. This Irish context aligns with the wider European policy shift towards a health-led approach to drug use, and this report will feed into the wider European strategy around this. The recommendations made by the Citizens Assembly on Drugs Use (CADU), established by the Oireachtas in 2023, have also been key in shifting the state’s approach towards promoting alternatives to coercive sanction for drug use. Recommendation 17 of the CADU report specifically says ‘The State should introduce a comprehensive health-led response to possession of drugs for personal use’.1 Criminalisation of drug possession has shown to be ineffective in reducing drug use while concurrently causing harm to individuals and society and placing continual pressure on justice system resources. In Ireland, drug possession continues to make up a significant proportion of drug-related crime, and the Rooney report highlights that “significant rates of offending behaviour amongst the sample were reportedly linked to both Drugs (48%) and Alcohol Misuse (53%)”.2 Alternatives to coercive sanctions on the other hand have shown promising evidence in their ability to reduce drug use and lower reoffending rates.3 As outlined in the European Commission study on ACS, despite the need for more robust evidence in the European context, “a study conducted in Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the UK found that quasi-compulsory treatment through the criminal justice system was effective in reducing crime” and “overall studies have found evidence that ACS can help reduce levels of substance use”.4 In order to identify local ACS across Ireland, we carried out a survey disseminated to relevant professionals in the sector and held follow-up remote in-depth interviews with several of them, to gain an understanding of specific existing initiatives as well as gaining insight into the appetite for different types of ACS across stakeholders. We found a total of nine relevant initiatives spanning across diverse types of ACS, including; The Garda Adult Caution Scheme, diversionary measures, The Dublin Drug Treatment Courts (DDTC), and drug treatment programmes with various criminal justice referral pathways into them. Some of these programmes have been operating for various lengths of time with the year they were established ranging from 2001 to 2023. The majority of the ACS we came across were local initiatives, with the only national one being the Garda Adult Caution Scheme. It appeared that there was no widespread knowledge about existing ACS across the country, and those interviewed about one project were often not aware of others. There also has been very limited use of the Adult Cautioning Scheme by An Garda Síochána for simple possession of cannabis or cannabis resin, as only 5,139 people were given this caution between December 2020 and February 2024, while 17,125 people were issued with a charge/ summons for this in the same period.5 This may suggest a lack of widespread awareness about the scheme. Overall, there seemed to be an appetite for ACS among those we spoke to, particularly within probation, court workers, the judiciary and the stakeholders and networks of those running local initiatives. One stakeholder mentioned there was an “aspiration to fund more successful national projects”, while another stated, “it would be easy to do this [refer to treatment] upon arrest, the difficulty would just be in setting up the electronic referral system”. The one agency that appeared to have a more varied perspective was An Garda Síochána, although this was not the case unilaterally, as the LEAR pre-court diversionary programme collaborated very successfully with local Gardaí. The findings of this report lead us to believe that at present Ireland is at the precipice of transforming how its justice system responds to drug use in a more effective and humane way. It has shown how local initiatives have identified a need for ACS and have begun to implement them throughout the country in the absence of a national ACS for possession of drugs for personal use. The innovative work undertaken across the system to support individuals with their drug use is laudable, but it is missing opportunities earlier to prevent offending and re-offending and improve health outcomes for its citizens.  

London: The Centre for Justice Innovation (CJI) , 2024.20p.

By James A. Densley and Jillian K. Peterson

This study investigates how the COVID-19 pandemic and the civil unrest following George Floyd’s murder influenced the 2020 homicide surge, focusing on individuals already at high risk for violence. Based on life history interviews with 18 people convicted of homicide in Minnesota, the research explores how the disruptions of 2020 intensified pre-existing vulnerabilities, accelerating pathways to lethal violence. Participants reported that the breakdown of social order, loss of routine, and economic instability created conditions that rapidly escalated violence within their lives and communities. This qualitative analysis complements existing quantitative research by offering a detailed account of the micro-level experiences behind the homicide spike, revealing how large-scale societal disruptions can shape individual trajectories toward serious violence. Findings underscore the need for policies that address structural inequalities and ensure continuity of social support and mental health services during periods of widespread upheaval to prevent future escalations in violence.

JOURNAL OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 2024, AHEAD-OF-PRINT, 1-10

By J. Gormley

This new report published by the Sentencing Council is part of a biennial series reviewing the existing research into the effectiveness of sentencing commissioned to enable the Council to consider the most up-to-date evidence when developing and revising guidelines. This report updates the report published by the Sentencing Council in 2022 and reviews what ‘effectiveness’ might mean from the perspective of four key groups: offenders (specifically with regard to deterrence); the public; victims; and sentencers (judges and magistrates).

By Amy Pisani, Sara Rahman, Madeleine Griffiths and Suzanne Poynton

To determine which factors of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW), are influential in first-court bail decisions in NSW Local Courts, and the reasons why courts release adult defendants who have already been refused bail by police. METHOD We descriptively and thematically analysed a dataset combining observations of 252 first court bail hearings in the NSW Local Court between February and May 2023, and administrative data from the BOCSAR Re-offending Database (ROD) and the New South Wales (NSW) Police Force’s Computerised Operational Policing System. We supplemented these data with a thematic analysis of 40 interviews with criminal justice stakeholders involved in adult bail proceedings in NSW Local Courts. RESULTS Of the 252 observations where police had refused bail, 110 defendants (44%) were released on bail by the court, with six released unconditionally, 12% were finalised at first appearance or had their bail dispensed with, and 44% had their bail refused by the court. Similar to prosecutors and police, magistrates were most concerned with a defendant’s criminal history and the nature and seriousness of the offence, and to a lesser extent defendant vulnerabilities and needs, when determining bail. There was also general agreement between police/prosecutors and the courts regarding bail concerns, with both parties most frequently identifying reoffending and endangering the safety of victims/community as their primary concerns. Two main differences between police and court decisions emerged from the analysis. Firstly, while magistrates identified bail concerns in the majority of matters observed, they were often satisfied that these risks could be mitigated by bail conditions. The bail conditions most commonly imposed were accommodation (82%), reporting (60%), non-contact orders (47%), and place restrictions (34%). Secondly, police rarely grant bail to people charged with show cause offences, whereas 55% of defendants charged with a show cause offence, who were refused bail by police, were able to successfully demonstrate to the court why their detention was not justified. Stakeholders reported that this occurred because police prioritise community and victim safety, have limited access to information from defendants and legal representatives, and do not apply discretion when applying the show cause requirement. CONCLUSION Legal factors, such as criminal history and seriousness of offences, are the most influential factors in both the police and courts’ bail decisions. However, magistrates who are legally trained, less subject to time pressures, and can be informed by legal practitioners, are more able to thoroughly assess show cause requirements and the suitability of bail conditions at the first court bail hearing. In the absence of these factors, police are more risk-averse  

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2024. 42p.

By Lore Joplin, Justice System Partners, Maureen McDonnell, , et al.

In January 2023, California became the first state in the nation to receive approval from the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for a Medicaid Section 1115 demonstration request to amend Medicaid’s inmate exclusion. People detained in jails and prisons have high rates of chronic and acute health needs, including physical, mental health, and substance disorders and reentry is a high-risk time. A key to addressing these reentry risks is addressing people’s health needs while they are incarcerated and building continuity of care from jail to community when they are released. California’s waiver, called California’s Advancing and Innovating Medi-Cal (CalAIM), and the specific component focused on individuals who are transitioning out of the criminal justice system, the Justice Involved (JI) initiative, will for the first time provide a targeted set of Medicaid-covered services right before someone is released from prison or jail. These services aim to smooth reentry transitions from jail and prison to the community, establish better connections to community-based providers at release, and enhance access to necessary care and support. California’s approach is designed to reduce the high risk of post- release mortality, morbidity, and other adverse outcomes, including repeat contact with the criminal justice system, by bringing Medicaid financing and coverage standards to bear. The work to implement California’s waiver and make these changes a reality is demanding, involving multiple partners at the state, county, and local level who have not previously worked together at this level of vital cross-system collaboration. Implementation of these changes is well underway, and county-level changes will roll out over the next two years, starting in October 2024. This paper highlights California’s implementation approach, focusing on the county-level impacts on jails, health care providers, and reentry processes. It also explores several implementation challenges and the steps the state and the counties have taken thus far to implement this change.

Safety and Justice Challenge. Org: 2024. 42p.

By Lindsey Linder

For the past 30 years, the number of women incarcerated in America has grown exponentially, increasing at nearly twice the rate of men’s incarceration. With only five percent of the world’s female population, the United States accounts for nearly 30 percent of the world’s incarcerated women. Texas has contributed greatly to this surge in incarcerated women, with one of the top 10 highest female incarceration rates in the country. Regarding growth over time, female incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ, the state’ corrections system) increased 908 percent from 1980– 2016, compared to an increase in the male population of 396 percent. In other words, female incarceration in Texas has increased at more than twice the rate of male incarceration over the past 40 years. Alarmingly, a more recent spike in system-involved women has occurred as Texas has lowered its population in TDCJ, and Texas now incarcerates more women by sheer number than any other state. From 2009– 2018, Texas reduced its men’s prison population by 10,179 while backfilling its prisons with 122 women.6 As of 2018, women incarcerated in TDCJ numbered 12,076, representing 8.3 percent of the incarcerated population, up from 7.7 percent in 2009. Additionally, the number of women serving 10 years or more in Texas increased over 50 percent from 2005 to 2014. And the rise in female incarceration is not exclusive to prisons. The number of women in Texas jails awaiting trial has grown 48 percent since 2011, even as the number of female arrests in Texas has decreased 20 percent over that time period.10 The issues facing incarcerated women are complex, as are the underlying causes of their incarceration. However, because women comprise only a small portion of the overall incarcerated population, their needs are largely disregarded in larger justice reform conversations. One of the predominant obstacles to reform has been the lack of data on who these women are and how they become entangled in the system. To help bridge this gap, the Texas Criminal Justice Coalition (TCJC) launched the “Justice for Women” campaign in March 2018, starting with a two-part report series on women in Texas’ justice system  These two reports, which incorporated the results of our survey of more than 430 women incarcerated in Texas prisons, explored the concerning increase in the number of justice system-involved women in Texas and examined the unique issues they face prior to and during incarceration. TCJC accompanied the reports with a webpage dedicated to women’s justice, which includes stories of women impacted by Texas’ justice system—stories that have been critical to reform  

Austin: Texas Criminal Justice Coalition 2020. 28p.

By Evarn J. Ooi

Aim

To investigate the impact of the Practice Guide for Intervention (PGI) on re-offending and imprisonment among supervised offenders serving a community-based order in New South Wales (NSW), specifically, either a good behaviour bond or a suspended sentence.

Method

Introduced in June 2016, PGI led to a substantial overhaul in the delivery of supervision services by NSW Community Corrections Officers (CCOs). Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy, we compare re-offending (imprisonment) between supervised and unsupervised offenders serving a good behaviour bond (suspended sentence) before and after the introduction of PGI. Re-offending (imprisonment) is measured as the probability of committing a new and proven offence (being imprisoned) within 12 months of index court finalisation. The pre-PGI period includes offenders with a finalised court appearance between June and December 2014. There are two post-PGI periods. The first post-PGI period includes offenders with a finalised court appearance between June and December 2016 (the first six months after PGI was introduced). The second post-PGI period includes offenders with a finalised court appearance between June and December 2017, when the use of PGI across NSW was approaching its peak.

Results

Among supervised offenders serving a good behaviour bond, the DiD estimates indicate a small 1 to 2 percentage point increase in re-offending after the introduction of PGI compared with unsupervised offenders. However, the difference is not statistically significant. For supervised offenders sentenced to a suspended sentence, we also find a slight increase in the probability of imprisonment, but the increase is not statistically significant.

 Conclusion

Overall, we do not find evidence that the introduction of PGI led to a reduction in re-offending among supervised offenders sentenced to a good behaviour bond, nor do we find a reduction in the probability of imprisonment among supervised offenders serving a suspended sentence.

(Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 229). Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 2020. 27p.

By Fionnuala Ratcliffe

Our criminal justice system in its current form is unsustainable. Long court backlogs, few crimes resolved, probation staff shortages. An ever-rising prison population despite prisons costing a disproportionate amount of taxpayer money and not working to reduce reoffending. One problem is that our criminal justice services - prisons, probation, courts, prosecution, and to some extent policing - are incredibly centralized. There is a lack of local ownership for crime prevention and reducing reoffending. Local agencies go cap in hand with the central government for funding, rather than fostering and supporting innovative solutions locally. Another issue is that many of the levers to prevent crime and reoffending - including health, employment, education, and housing - lie outside the criminal justice system. Local actors are not financially incentivized to tackle these drivers and invest to solve problems upstream. Public services work in silos rather than together toward common goals. We can reduce crime and make our communities safer by giving local leaders the right levers and incentives to tackle crime at a local level – by localizing justice services and budgets. What would localized justice services look like? — Delegation of justice budgets for prison places, magistrates’ courts’ administration, policing, prosecution, and probation to police and crime commissioners or mayors — Pooling of criminal justice resources so that local services work together towards a shared aim and share any savings made — Financially incentivizing local services to shift investment upstream from enforcement to prevention, by allowing them to benefit from the savings from investment — Local management of probation and of the administration of magistrates’ courts and the CPS. Prisons and Crown Courts continue to be managed nationally  Prosecutorial and judicial independence are maintained through the continued use of nationally agreed prosecution and sentencing guidelines. — Standards monitored through inspectorate, effective community scrutiny, and a newly created interdepartmental board This paper sets out how localizing criminal justice services will: — Reduce crime — Reduce waste in criminal justice system spending — Increase trust and confidence in the criminal justice system — Improve the experience of victims

2023. 13p.

By Christopher Herring and  Sandra Susan Smith 

Nationwide, 36 states and over 150 cities and counties have adopted what is widely known as “Ban the Box” (BtB) (NELP 2020). These policies require employers to remove conviction and arrest history questions from job applications and delay background checks until after a conditional offer has been made. The policy is designed to encourage employers to consider a job candidate’s qualifications first – without the stigma of a criminal record – in the hopes of reducing barriers to employment that justice-involved individuals face. We imagine two ways that BtB might work. The first is by changing employers’ hiring practices. Existing research on the former indicates the policy does increase callback and hiring rates for people with criminal records (Agan and Starr 2016; Atkinson and Lockwood 2014; Berracasa et al. 2016; Shoag and Veuger 2016), but effects appear highly contingent on the race of the job seeker and on the employment sector. The second way that BtB might reduce barriers to employment is by altering whether and how individuals with criminal records search for work. No research to date, however, has examined whether individuals with criminal records know about BtB, their perception of how efficacious it is, and what impacts the policy’s implementation has had on justice-involved individuals’ job search patterns. To address the latter shortcoming, we surveyed 351 probationers in the San Francisco Bay Area and conducted in-depth interviews with a subset of 43. We learned that three major barriers continue to limit individuals’ ability to benefit from the policy. First, few of our survey respondents knew about BtB at all, much less that it had been implemented. Second, whether they knew about BtB or not, the majority perceived that they had recently been discriminated against because they had criminal records, with a significant minority to a majority reporting discrimination at each stage of the hiring process. Third, our Black respondents also perceived that employers continue to discriminate against Black applicants, making finding and keeping work extremely difficult. In this brief, we elaborate on these three points in the hopes that our findings will inform the development not only of fair chance policies aimed at increasing employment opportunities for justice-involved individuals but also of a broader set of policies on employment and re-entry.  In 14 states, the policy applies to both the public and private sectors. In 22 states the policy applies only to public sector jobs and government contractors. Three-fourths of the US population lives in a jurisdiction that has banned the box (NELP 2020).  In the private sector, for instance, BtB reduces the likelihood that employers will call back or hire young Black and Latinx men (Agan and Starr 2016; Doleac and Hansen 2016; see Holzer et al. 2007, for a pre-BtB discussion about how access to information about individuals’ criminal records shaped employers’ hiring patterns differently by race). 

Berkeley, CA:  Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, 2022. 11p.

By  Mia Bird, Omair Gill, Johanna Lacoe, Molly Pickard, Steven Raphael and Alissa Skog

Sentence enhancements are used to add time to an individual’s base sentence. California uses over 100 unique enhancements. This report analyzes data from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to understand the role of sentence enhancements in California’s corrections system. It finds that enhancements lengthen average sentences and are more likely to impact the sentences of men and Black and American Indian people who are sentenced to prison, application varies by county, and that enhancements contribute to the overall size of the state prison population. KEY FINDINGS • Prevalence: Roughly 40% of individual prison admissions since 2015 have sentences lengthened by a sentence enhancement. Among the currently incarcerated, the prevalence of enhanced sentences is much higher, impacting the sentences of approximately 70% of people incarcerated as of 2022. • Sentence length: Sentence enhancements increase the average sentence by roughly 1.9 years (or 48%) for all admissions. The impact is larger for people receiving longer sentences. • Four enhancement types account for 80% of sentence years added since 2015. Those four enhancements include the state’s Three Strikes law, firearm enhancements, the nickel prior (which adds five years for a prior serious offense), and gang enhancements. • Racial, ethnic, and sex disparities: Sentence enhancements are more likely to be applied to men. Black people and American Indian individuals are the most likely to receive enhanced sentences, followed by Hispanic people, White people, and Asian or Pacific Islander people. • Potential drivers of disparities: Most, but not all, of the inter-racial and inter-sex disparities in the use of enhancements can be explained by group-based differences in case characteristics observable in CDCR data, including the number of prior prison commitments, the number of conviction charges, the most serious conviction offense, and the county of sentencing. • County variation: Enhancements are applied unevenly across California counties, with the lowest application rates in Bay Area counties and Southern California coastal counties, and the highest rates among far Northern counties, the counties in the Central Valley, and Inland Empire counties.   

Los Angeles: California Policy Lab, 2023, 57p.

By Cody Zoschak and Cosima von Moltke

This policy brief discusses the need to implement disengagement and reintegration programming for ISIS arrestees in the US penal system, a need that is particularly urgent given the number of such convicts that are expected to be released in the coming years. The brief examines six case studies of recently released ISIS arrestees to highlight the lack of disengagement from extremist ideology. The report explores deradicalization frameworks, existing programs, and limitations, and provides policy recommendations to improve reintegration. The six cases include Yousef Ramadan, Ali Shukri Amin, Sebastian Gregerson, Charlton LaChase, Mohammed Hamzah Khan, and Islam Natsheh; all of whom were released and promptly reincarcerated, either on new charges or for violating their parole. The policy recommendations emphasize programs inside federal and state penal systems, collaboration between law enforcement and civil society actors, and post-release support outside the scope of probation. The suggested policies are built to mitigate the risk of recidivism and are needed for the dozens of ISIS convicts who are scheduled to be released in the coming 3-5 years. 

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024), 19p.