By  Alissa Pollitz Worden, Kaitlin Moloney, et al.

New York’s groundbreaking 2019 bail reforms aimed to curtail pretrial detention, diminish the role of finances in release decisions, and tackle racial disparities in pretrial outcomes. This study is the first to examine pretrial decision-making in New York’s under-examined Town & Village Justice Courts, addressing a knowledge gap in public understanding and serving as a companion to related research on the topic. This report was authored by DCJ’s partners at The John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety.

1.     Increased Pretrial Release Under Bail Reform:

• Higher percentage of Justice Court cases released without bail for misdemeanors (82% in 2018 vs. 93% in 2021) and nonviolent felonies (59% in 2018 vs. 71% in 2021).

2.     Absence of Racial Disparities in Release Rates:

• Release rates were similar across racial and ethnic groups throughout the study period (both pre- and post-reform).

3.     No Progress Towards Affordable Bail:

• Bail amounts did not become more affordable, and people did not become more likely to post bail, after the reforms went into effect (echoing prior Data Collaborative for Justice research on City and District Courts across the State).

4.     Justice Courts vs. City Courts from the Same Counties:

• Justice Courts released people at higher rates than City Courts both pre- and post-reform. By 2021, less than 7% of people charged with misdemeanors were detained in the Justice Courts compared to 11% in urban City Courts and 13% in small City Courts from the same counties.

Albany, NY:  John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc., 2024. 41p.

By Julius Yam 

Authoritarianism has significant implications for how judges should discharge their duties. How should judges committed to constitutionalism conduct themselves when under authoritarian pressure? To answer this question,the article proposes a two-step adjudicative framework, documents a variety of judicial strategies, and proposes how principles and strategies can and should be incorporated into the framework in different scenarios. The first step of the adjudicative framework involves judges identifying the ‘formal legal position’ while blindfolding themselves to extra-legal factors (such as potential authoritarian backlash). In the second step, depending on the level of risk incurred by maintaining the formal legal position, judges should lift the blindfold to check whether, and if so how, the formal legal position should be supplemented with or adjusted by judicial strategies. Through this analysis, the article offers a guide to judicial reasoning under authoritarianism 

Modern Law Review Limited.(2023) 00(0) MLR 

By U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance

This article provides details about Louisiana’s Orleans Reentry Court Program (ORCP), which originated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola from a desire to equip inmates with vocational, educational, and other skills that could lead to gainful employment and reduce the likelihood of recidivism. The document describes the requirements of the in-jail portion, which involves participants being mentored by other inmates, typically those who are serving life sentences; it also provides details of the probation portion of ORCP. The document notes that after ORCP had been established, one of the program founders recognized that participants suffering from opioid use disorder were lacking the necessary services to maintain their recovery and successfully complete the program. In order to address that, Orleans Parish Criminal District Court applied for and received a fiscal year 2018 Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Program grant, which introduced an enhanced substance abuse treatment aspect, including medication-assisted treatment (MAT) services, and more wraparound case management services into the existing reentry court model. The discussion of lessons learned reviews what Comprehensive Opioid, Stimulant, and Substance Abuse Program (COSSAP) covers, and the importance of strategically leveraging available resources.

Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2020. 4p.

By Lisa Bailey Vavonese and Alysha Hall

Are public defenders the answer hiding in plain sight? Imagine that you are arrested and charged with a crime. You likely have a picture in your mind of how your first interactions with the police, your attorney, and the judge should go— interactions that are fair and just and protect your rights. The picture we paint next is that story. It is simple yet, to many, unfamiliar. We could have told the version that is true for so many people charged with a crime—a story of injustice and unfairness, a story so familiar it feels unchangeable. Instead, what follows is a thought experiment, a sadly unrepresentative one.  

New York: Center for Justice Innovation, 2023. 34p.

By National Institute of Justice, Office for Access to Justice

"Two-thirds of states (34) do not have full statewide oversight of public defense, meaning they do not set standards or monitor whether people receive counsel in all cases where they have a right to it."

In collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office for Access to Justice (ATJ), the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsored a report on public defense system models in recognition of the 60th anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, which established the right to counsel to indigent persons charged with felonies in state courts. Researchers conducted a national scan of the public defense service models used in state, local, and tribal adult, trial-level, criminal cases. The report addresses the prevalence of different models, factors contributing to how jurisdictions select models, and variations in outcomes associated with each model. The report found that 16 states have a commission and/or statewide defender program overseeing public defense services, while in 34 there are gaps in state oversight. States need a mechanism for monitoring and supporting access to quality public defense counsel. States also need to ensure that the people overseeing and administering public defense do not have professional conflicts of interest. Finally, defender systems need meaningful input on practice and policy from people who have been represented by public defenders or been impacted by the criminal justice system. Recent reform efforts have resulted in more states creating oversight commissions and shifting to greater use of state funds to provide access to quality counsel and public defense delivery methods. Experts recommend states collect data on the percentage of people who enter uncounseled guilty pleas and on defendant characteristics not limited to race and ethnicity to ascertain whether equitable access to counsel is available. Findings are based on interviews with experts and a review and synthesis of publicly available material; the report is a national and current scan of public defense models and is intended to complement research based on more rigorous statistical surveys and program evaluations that may be dated or limited in coverage of jurisdictions. 

Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2023. 87p.

By Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Mission in Kosovo
Since 1999, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) Mission in Kosovo has held a pivotal role in monitoring the justice system in Kosovo for compliance with fair trial and international human rights standards. Trial monitoring is conducted by OSCE personnel in courts across Kosovo, focusing on identifying systemic issues affecting the justice system. The OSCE is concerned that the Kosovo judicial system is not adequately exercising its criminal calendaring authority. The caseload challenges facing the Basic Courts of Kosovo are staggering. During the first three months of 2023, the Basic Courts presided over 46,852 criminal cases: of those 40,707 were inherited and 6,145 cases were newly filed.1 However, only 5,833 cases were resolved leaving 41,019 pending at the end of the three month reporting period. Despite these circumstances, courts2 regularly fail to schedule criminal trials on consecutive or uninterrupted days. This practice exacerbates court backlogs, is an inefficient use of judicial resources, and ultimately creates a barrier to justice. This report analyzes the issue of criminal case backlogs and delays, which is a widespread problem in Kosovo that negatively affects access to justice and the efficient administration of justice. Specifically, the report focuses on how systemic criminal case management practices relating to scheduling trials over a prolonged period of time aggravate criminal case backlogs. The report is based on the direct field monitoring conducted by OSCE staff of criminal hearings observed in 2023. Its purpose is to make actionable recommendations to the relevant judicial system actors in order to improve criminal case management at the trial stage.
Vienna: OSCE, 2023. 16p.

By Adam I. Biener  

  Introduction The Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (APA), a non-profit organization composed of US prosecutors, conducted a survey to understand the prevalence of and factors associated with case backlogs. Backlogs occur when a large number of cases are pending before the court for a longer period than typically experienced and/or a period longer than prescribed by the court. In a survey of 50 of the largest prosecutors’ offices conducted by APA in 2020, 14 responding offices reported just under 9,000 cases awaiting trial on average. 1 Following court disruptions due to COVID-19, there was an average increase of 5,565 cases per office, a 62% increase. Case backlogs can occur when the caseload per individual prosecuting attorney rises holding all other productive capability constant. In practice, the level of staffing (measured by caseload per attorney) is extremely varied.2 Further, models of prosecution vary across offices3 and different models can require a different mix of attorney specialties.4 Despite this complexity, office staffing is very idiosyncratic and not often tied to per attorney caseloads1, which can result in significant and potentially burdensome individual caseloads.3 Excessive caseloads for individual attorneys can result in longer case processing time, a greater risk for decision-making errors, increased plea bargains and dismissals, career burnout, and employee turnover. 6 Funding shocks have likely exacerbated the size of individual attorney caseloads over the past 20 years. The great recession following the financial crisis in 2008 reduced state budgets, employment, and payroll, shrinking the resources available to meet staffing and resource requests from prosecutors’ offices,5 leading to rising prosecutor workloads and stagnating or shrinking budgets.6 The expectations of prosecutors and their obligations when working cases have evolved significantly since 2007 due to changing legal requirements and new technologies. Victims’ rights laws, which require additional engagement with victims, increase the amount of time spent on person-involved cases (e.g. CA Prop 9 in 20087 ). There are presently Open Discovery laws in 46 states, up from roughly a third of states in 2004, 8 that increase the requirements for timely evidence collection. Body-worn cameras have become more commonplace for law enforcement, as nearly 50% of 15,238 general-purpose law enforcement agencies had body-worn cameras in 2016.9 Video evidence generated by body-worn cameras are more labor-intensive to review, extending the amount of labor hours required to prepare a case. Additionally, the demand for specialized attorneys to review cases as part of conviction review/integrity units, 10 while improving the equitable administration of justice, can potentially strain limited staffing resources. All of these staffing and resource constraints were tested during the COVID-19 pandemic, which put unusual demands on offices to continue their essential functions despite health concerns and court closures. While many offices were able to adopt new technologies to maintain their functioning, these pivots did not alleviate the rising caseloads and work burdens on individual prosecutors

Washington, DC: The Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (APA) , 2024. 19p.

By Andrew Willinger

Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) are civil court orders that temporarily prohibit gun purchase and possession by people who are behaving dangerously and at risk of committing imminent violence. As of September 2023, ERPOs are available in 21 states and the District of Columbia. This Article presents an overview of ERPO laws, the rationale behind their development, and a review and analysis that considers emerging constitutional challenges to these laws (under both the Second Amendment and due process protections) in the post-Bruen era. This Article notes that the presence of multiple constitutional challenges in many ERPOrelated cases has confused judicial analysis and argues that, especially in light of Bruen’s novel text, history, and tradition test, courts should be especially careful to clarify how cumulative-rights arguments are impacting their analysis. An examination of Second Amendment court decisions concerning another type of civil protection order, Domestic Violence Protection Orders, informs the approach used to further consider ERPO rights deprivation claims and the constitutionally relevant distinctions among different civil dispossession proceedings. The Article further considers the state of ERPO law in the context of the evolving evidence documenting the uptake and impact of ERPOs on gun violence in the United States, including a review of scholarship that seeks to  understand how ERPO statutes are being implemented and to determine whether the laws prevent interpersonal gun violence and suicide. Finally, this Article concludes with a commentary and set of recommendations to inform the practice and future scholarship of ERPO as a tool for preventing gun violence in the United States, in accord with constitutional protections in the post-Bruen age.

United States, Number 1 Public Health, History, and the Future Of Gun Regulation after Bruen. 2023, 64pg

By Rainer Forst

Over the past 15 years, Rainer Forst has developed a fundamental research programme within the tradition of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. The core of this programme is a moral account of the basic right of justification that humans owe to one another as rational beings. This account is put to work by Forst in articulating - both historically and philosophically - the contexts and form of justice and of toleration. The result is a powerful theoretical framework within which to address issues such as transnational justice and multicultural toleration. In this volume, Forst sets out his ideas in an extended essay, which is responded to be influential interlocutors including: Andrea Sangiovanni, Amy Allen, Kevin Olson, Anthony Laden, Eva Erman and Simon Caney. The volume concludes with Forst's response to his interlocutors.

London: Bloomsbury Academic,  2014.  249p.

By Bernadeta Lelonek-Kuleta

Despite the abandonment of the criterion of committing illegal acts in the diagnosis of pathological gambling in fifth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), research confirms the significant link between crime, gambling, and gambling addiction. In Poland, this connection is observed by psychologists working in the prison service, who simultaneously report the need for more structured interactions that would solve gambling problems among prisoners. The lack of any data on the involvement of persons committing crimes in gambling in Poland formed the basis for the implementation of a survey of gambling behaviour and gambling problems among male offenders in Polish correctional institutions. A total of 1,219 sentenced men took part in the study. The research tool included 75 questions, including queries from the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS). Based on SOGS, the prevalence rate of severe problem gambling was 29.4% over the lifetimes of the prisoners. As many as 13.1% of respondents admitted to having gambled in prison. This activity usually involved cards, bets or dice. More than 74% of incarcerated men who gambled in prison met the criteria for pathological gambling. Prisoners who gambled more in prison than at liberty made up 27.7%. As many as 69.3% of respondents declared that while in prison, they had met fellow convicts experiencing problems because of gambling. The study shows that criminals continue gambling after detention, especially those who are problem gamblers, an overall finding which implies the need to implement preventive and therapeutic interventions in correctional institutions. 

Lublin, Poland, Journal of Gambling Issues Volume 44. 2020, 18pg

By Harry Annison, Lol Burke, Nicola Carr, Matthew Millings, Gwen Robinson, Eleanor Surridge

This paper provides insights into the predominant styles of political reasoning in England and Wales that inform penal policy reform. It does so in relation to a particular development that constitutes a dramatic, perhaps even unique, wholesale reversal of a previously introduced market-based criminal justice delivery model. This is the ‘unification’ of probation services in England and Wales, which unwound the consequential privatization reforms introduced less than a decade earlier. This paper draws on in-depth interviews with senior policy makers to present a narrative reconstruction of the unification of probation services in England and Wales. Analogies with desistance literature are drawn upon in order to encapsulate the tensions posed for policy makers as they sought to enact this penal policy reform.

United Kingdom, British Journal of Criminology. Oct 2023, 18pg

By The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office

  Under District Attorney Larry Krasner, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (DAO) has moved to end mass supervision. It has primarily done so through two policies, both aimed at reducing the amount of time people spend on county and state probation and parole. The first policy was announced in February 2018, the second in March 2019. • The policies were guided by public safety considerations and research showing that long community supervision sentences are ineffective and harmful. The policies apply to all situations except two categories of cases (sexual assault and potential felonies reduced to misdemeanors for non-trial resolutions) that allow discretion to seek longer supervision in appropriate cases. • Overall, supervision lengths decreased markedly after the DAO policies were implemented: median community supervision sentence lengths decreased 25% for sentences reached through negotiated guilty pleas. • Under District Attorney Krasner, the average community supervision sentence reached through negotiated guilty plea is almost 10 months shorter than under previous DAs. • Since 2018, the number of people on county community supervision has dropped from 42,000 to fewer than 28,000. • 42% fewer years of community supervision were imposed in the first two years of the Krasner administration than in the two years prior, accounting for all DAO policies and practices since 2018, as well as changing incident and arrest patterns. We estimate that the effects of the DAO Sentencing Policies will lead to 20% fewer newly sentenced people remaining on community supervision sentences five years after reforms than if the policies hadn’t been implemented. • Community supervision lengths were dramatically reduced under the policies without a measurable change in recidivism (being charged with a new criminal offense). • These anti-racist policies reduced disparities in supervision sentence lengths between Black, Latinx, and white defendants, though sentencing disparities still exist. • The vast majority of recent pleas have been compliant with the new DAO sentencing standards: 3 of 4 negotiated guilty pleas fall within the 2019 policy’s guidelines.  

Philadelphia, United States, District Attorneys Office. 2021, 42pg

By Alana Henninger and Hung-En Sung

Efforts at combating the negative health and social consequences of substance abuse and dependence have always existed in the United States. Often swinging between the rival contexts of moralistic and positivistic discourses, these efforts have led to the articulation of the major therapeutic paradigms in the field of substance abuse treatment. The earliest interventions were grassroot interventions focusing on individuals with drinking problems whose goals shifted from moderation to abstinence over time. As the patterns of substance use and abuse quickly diversified along the processes of immigration and urbanization, a wider variety of substances and a more diverse assortment of users became targeted for an even richer array of therapeutic experiments. The gradual involvement of the state in the planning and administration of substance abuse treatment has resulted in the growing use of institutionalization and coercion to trigger and maintain the recovery process. The emerging consensus that substance addiction is a chronic and relapsing brain disease represents a redefinition of an old problem and will determine the direction of the science and art of substance abuse treatment in the years to come.

Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Edition: 1st. January 2014. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_278. 14p.

By Sixth Amendment Center and The Defender Initiative

In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Gideon v. Wainwright that it is an “obvious truth” that anyone accused of a crime who cannot afford the cost of a lawyer “cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” In the intervening 58 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel means every person who is accused of a crime is entitled to have an attorney provided at government expense to defend him in all federal and state courts whenever that person is facing the potential loss of his liberty and is unable to afford his own attorney. Moreover, the appointed lawyer needs to be more than merely a warm body with a bar card. The attorney must also be effective, the U.S. Supreme Court said again in United States v. Cronic in 1984, subjecting the prosecution’s case to “the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Under Gideon, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is an obligation of the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State of Illinois delegates to its county boards and circuit court judges most of its constitutional obligation to ensure the provision of effective assistance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants in the trial courts. Yet the state does not have any oversight structure by which to know whether each county’s indigent defense system has a sufficient number of attorneys with the necessary time, training, and resources to provide effective assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a criminal case for each and every indigent defendant. This is the first of three findings of this report. As explained in chapter I, this report is the result of a statewide evaluation of the provision of the right to counsel in adult criminal cases at the trial level, conducted at the request of the Illinois Supreme Court. Through data collection and analysis, interviews with criminal justice stakeholders, and courtroom observations, the evaluation assessed indigent defense services against national standards and Sixth Amendment caselaw that establish the hallmarks of a structurally sound indigent representation system, which include the early appointment of qualified and trained attorneys, who have sufficient time and resources to provide effective representation under independent supervision. The absence of any of these factors can show that a system is presumptively providing ineffective assistance of counsel. This evaluation focuses closely on the practices of nine counties – Champaign, Cook, DuPage, Gallatin, Hardin, LaSalle, Mercer, Schuyler, and Stephenson – which taken together illustrate the wide variations among Illinois county governments and courts in their efforts to fulfill the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The State of Illinois delegates to its counties and trial court judges the responsibility for providing and overseeing attorneys to effectively represent indigent defendants, and it delegates to its counties nearly all of the responsibility for funding the right to counsel of indigent defendants. When a state chooses to delegate its federal constitutional responsibilities to its local governments and courts, the state must guarantee not only that these local bodies are capable of providing effective representation but also that they are in fact doing so. Yet Illinois is one of just seven states that do not have any state commission, state agency, or state officer with oversight of any aspect of trial-level indigent representation services in adult criminal cases. Chapter II details the framework that Illinois has established for its county-level criminal justice systems and how that framework has been implemented in the nine sample counties. The indigent defense systems in the nine representative counties of this evaluation vary greatly. With 102 counties in the state, it is likely that any or all of those counties present even greater variations in their indigent defense systems. Without oversight, the State of Illinois cannot accurately say how many people or cases, and of what case types, require appointed counsel nor by whom the representation is being provided, if at all, and the State of Illinois cannot know how much the provision of indigent representation should cost nor how to provide it effectively in all 102 counties. Instead, policy decisions about indigent defense systems are left to anecdote, speculation, and potentially even bias. Chapters III through VII comprise the substantive assessment, which relate the basis of our second and third findings: The state’s limited framework for how county boards and circuit court judges are to establish and implement the indigent defense system in each county institutionalizes political and judicial interference with the appointed attorneys’ independence to act in the stated legal interests of their indigent clients. This lack of independence causes systemic conflicts of interest that interfere with the provision of effective assistance of counsel. 3. The indigent defense systems established in Illinois’ counties lack oversight and accountability that can result in a constructive denial of the right to counsel to at least some indigent defendants, and in some instances can result in the actual denial of the right to counsel to at least some indigent defendants. An indigent defense system’s effectiveness must be measured by the representation it provides to its appointed clients. The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Cronic that “[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel” means that the defense must put the prosecution’s case through the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” For this to occur, U.S. Supreme Court case law provides that an indigent person must be represented by a qualified and trained attorney, who is appointed early in the case, and who has sufficient time and resources to provide effective representation under independent supervision.

Boston: Sixth Amendment Center, 2021. 181p.

By Russell M. Gold and Kay L. Levine

For decades police and prosecutors have controlled the public narrative about criminal law—littering the news landscape with salacious stories of violent crimes while ignoring the more mundane but far more prevalent minor cases that clog the court dockets. Defenders, faced with overwhelming caseloads and fear that speaking out may harm their clients, have largely ceded the opportunity to offer a counternarrative based on what they see every day. Defenders tell each other about overuse of pretrial detention, intensive pressure to plead guilty, overzealous prosecutors, cycles of violence, and rampant constitutional violations— all of which inflict severe harm on defendants and their loved ones. But defenders rarely show the public the world they inhabit.

That approach hasn’t stopped the carceral state from ballooning over the past fifty years; public defense budgets remain paltry, and clients suffer from too much law and too little justice in a system that disregards and dehumanizes them. This Article encourages defenders to go on the offensive, to seek transformative change toward a more just legal system. It builds on the social media literature to analyze how defenders can strategically use social networking sites to add their expertise to ongoing public debates about crime and criminal justice policy. As a few existing efforts suggest, social media enables defenders to widely share the routine injustices they observe and to engage with local grassroots organizations to build coalitions. Defenders’ strategic use of social media won’t change policies overnight, but we are hopeful that it will augment public support for defenders and their clients and build power to transform the criminal legal landscape over decades.

Gold, Russell M. and Levine, Kay L., The Public Voice of the Defender (July 14, 2023). 75 Alabama Law Review (Forthcoming), U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper #4416723, Emory Legal Studies Research Paper No. 23-4,

By Brandon L. Garrett and Gregory Mitchell

William Blackstone famously expressed the view that convicting the innocent constitutes a much more serious error than acquitting the guilty. This view is the cornerstone of due process protections for those accused of crimes, giving rise to the presumption of innocence and the high burden of proof required for criminal convictions. While most legal elites share Blackstone’s view, the citizen jurors tasked with making due process protections a reality do not share the law’s preference for false acquittals over false convictions.

Across multiple national surveys sampling more than 12,000 people, we find that a majority of Americans consider false acquittals and false convictions to be errors of equal magnitude. Contrary to Blackstone, most people are unwilling to err on the side of letting the guilty go free to avoid convicting the innocent. Indeed, a sizeable minority view false acquittals as worse than false convictions; this group is willing to convict multiple innocent persons to avoid letting one guilty person go free. These value differences translate into behavioral differences: we show in multiple studies that jury-eligible adults who reject Blackstone’s view are more accepting of prosecution evidence and are more conviction-prone than the minority of potential jurors who agree with Blackstone.

These findings have important implications for our understanding of due process and criminal justice policy. Due process currently depends on jurors faithfully following instructions on the burden of proof, but many jurors are not inclined to hold the state to its high burden. Courts should do away with the fiction that the reasonable doubt standard guarantees due process and consider protections that do not depend on jurors honoring the law’s preference for false acquittals, such as more stringent pretrial screening of criminal cases and stricter limits on prosecution evidence. Further, the fact that many people place crime control on par with, or above, the need to avoid wrongful convictions helps explain divisions in public opinion on important policy questions like bail and sentencing reform. Criminal justice proposals that emphasize deontic concerns without addressing consequentialist concerns are unlikely to garner widespread support.

121 Mich. L. Rev. 707 (2023).

By Ronald Wright and Jenny Roberts

This review collects and critiques the academic literature on criminal defense lawyering, with an emphasis on empirical work. Research on criminal defense attorneys in the United States has traditionally emphasized scarcity of resources: too many people facing criminal charges who are “too poor to pay” for counsel and not enough funding to pay for the constitutionally mandated lawyers. Scholars have focused on the capacity of different delivery systems, such as public defender offices, to change the ultimate outcomes in criminal cases within their tight budgetary constraints. Over the decades, however, theoretical understandings of the defense attorney’s work have expanded to include client interests outside the criminal courtroom, reaching the broader social conditions connected to the alleged criminal act. Researchers have responded by asking a broader range of questions about the effectiveness of defense counsel outside the courtroom and by using improved data to study the effectiveness of lawyers at discrete procedural stages.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2023. 6:241–64

By SE Duhart Clarke

The right to an attorney in criminal cases is a constitutional right covered under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and is considered fundamental to a fair trial. Over two-thirds of criminal court defendants in the United States are unable to afford their own counsel and thus have an attorney given to them by the court (i.e., indigent defendants). Many legal scholars have debated the effectiveness of indigent defense counsel compared to privately retained counsel. However, in the absence of synthesized data on outcomes for indigent defendants, legal scholars commonly cite the pragmatic and theoretical mechanisms for publicly funded defenders’ limitations or strengths to support their arguments about the effectiveness of indigent defense counsel. When empirical evidence on outcomes for indigent defendants is used to support an argument, the research cited is often limited to studies conducted in specific jurisdictions on a specific step in court case processing. Consequently, our overall understanding of outcomes experienced by indigent defendants is limited and disjointed, underscoring the need for a systematic evaluation of the current empirical literature. The goal of the study in this dissertation was to conduct a systematic literature review and meta-analysis on outcomes for defendants with public defenders, defendants with assigned counsel, and defendants with retained attorneys to better understand what (if any) discrepancies exist in criminal justice-related outcomes as a function of indigent defense status. Specifically, this study examined the current empirical literature on pretrial outcomes, case outcomes, sentencing outcomes, and post-case outcomes for indigent defendants compared to defendants with private/retained attorneys and/or public defenders compared to assigned counsel.

 Raleigh NC: North Carolina State University, 2021.112p.

Edited by Francesca Galli, Anne Weyembergh

Criminal law has undergone tremendous changes in the past decades. A number of new trends have been challenging the traditional features of “modern criminal law” as founded by Cesare Beccaria in the 18th century and developed thereafter. Some authors describe a process of “disengagement” from the fundamental principles upon which “modern criminal law” is based. They point to its corollary, the rise of the ideology of pragmatism, which, in the name of efficiency, is gradually transforming the whole philosophy underpinning the criminal justice system. Some of them thus refer to the “post-modernisation” of criminal law . Among the new trends affecting criminal justice systems, one of them has attracted considerable academic attention in the last few years. This is the so-called “Europeanisation process”, which is the result of the growing intervention of the EU in the area of criminal law. Criminal law and criminal procedure are deeply rooted in national sovereignty and had therefore been developed at national level only. However, since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has taken a lead in the approximation of criminal legislation and has developed new and closer cooperation mechanisms based on principles such as the mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters . With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s scope for intervention in this field has been considerably broadened and its supranational nature strengthened, thereby challenging the narrow and profound link between criminal law and the nation state even more. Another new trend which criminal law and other legal disciplines are facing is the increasingly blurred dividing lines between legal categories. Several authors have highlighted the existence of a general blur . Various dimensions of this blur have been identified in legal literature . As will be highlighted by other authors in this book , the verb and the noun “blur” have rather negative connotations. As a verb, it is defined as the action of making or becoming vague or less distinct, of making less clear, of smearing or smudging. As a noun, “blur” means vague, hazy or indistinct . Law and lawyers are not at ease when faced with vagueness and lack of clarity. This is especially true for criminal law and criminal lawyers, as is demonstrated by the well-known principle of legality in its substantive dimension. As will be underlined by some authors in the following contributions, these blurred dividing lines can, however, also have a positive impact or at least give rise to a multitude of consequences that cannot all be categorised as negative. This is clear, for instance, when one thinks of the application of criminal procedural guarantees by administrative law or of the so-called Engel line of case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). A growing blur can be observed between criminal and administrative law. Both fields of law have received numerous different definitions . The dividing line between them has never been clear . Their respective scope and/or the criteria dividing their respective jurisdiction can vary depending on the country concerned and on the “approach” followed. The criminal nature of proceedings and of penalties can indeed be considered in a formal or substantial manner. As it is well known in its above-mentioned Engel ruling, the ECtHR follows the second approach when considering whether national proceedings constitute a criminal charge in the sense of Article 6 ECHR . The blur between criminal and administrative law has different manifestations and has a wide variety of origins. The scope of both administrative and criminal law tends to expand. Criminal law is being introduced in fields in which the legislator traditionally adopted administrative measures and vice versa. Fields such as terrorism or trafficking in human beings, which have traditionally been governed by criminal law, are increasingly sprinkled with administrative measures or are becoming fields where administrative actors are increasingly involved. In some domains, a double enforcement/sanctioning system (administrative/criminal) has developed. However, by themselves, these trends do not necessarily result in a blur. A blur occurs when the scope of intervention and the division of functions between both kinds of measures, systems, actors or frameworks are not clear enough; when the two sets of applicable rules become indistinct and/or when there is cross-contamination whereby the interactions between both types of measures, actors or frameworks is not organised and overlaps are neither avoided nor regulated. So, in order to identify a blur, the following questions are of key importance: Are there clear criteria setting out when one or the other actor/framework, or both, should be involved? Are the rules applicable to one or the other framework/actor clearly defined and is there some kind of approximation between them? Is a system of double administrative and penal repression foreseen? Reflecting on the reasons for the growing blur between administrative and criminal law is quite interesting. As will be highlighted in the different contributions to this book, various factors arise, including the advantages of each of the different regimes , the need to find an effective way of dealing with certain kinds of crime that are becoming ever more complex, the need to develop a multidisciplinary/holistic approach towards some crimes, particularly trafficking in human beings, and the will and/or need to prevent crime, especially terrorism, etc. The purpose of this book is to study the combination of both of the abovementioned trends affecting criminal justice systems. The blur between administrative and criminal law has, of course, been around for a while and exists independently of the European Union. It is, for instance, embodied in the blurred line between measures belonging to punitive administrative law and criminal law measures . Up until now, this trend has mainly been analysed at the national level. However, it is interesting to reflect on the interaction between the Europeanisation of criminal law on the one hand and the increasingly blurred line between administrative and criminal law on the other hand. In this regard, the main question that arises is whether and to what extent the EU contributes to the blurred line; if it tries to limit it, control it and/or organise it.

Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014. 259p.

Edited by Douglas Edlin

Are judges supposed to be objective? Citizens, scholars, and legal professionals commonly assume that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites, with the corollary that subjectivity is a vice and objectivity is a virtue. These assumptions underlie passionate debates over adherence to original intent and judicial activism.

In Common Law Judging, Douglas Edlin challenges these widely held assumptions by reorienting the entire discussion. Rather than analyze judging in terms of objectivity and truth, he argues that we should instead approach the role of a judge's individual perspective in terms of intersubjectivity and validity. Drawing upon Kantian aesthetic theory as well as case law, legal theory, and constitutional theory, Edlin develops a new conceptual framework for the respective roles of the individual judge and of the judiciary as an institution, as well as the relationship between them, as integral parts of the broader legal and political community. Specifically, Edlin situates a judge's subjective responses within a form of legal reasoning and reflective judgment that must be communicated to different audiences.

Edlin concludes that the individual values and perspectives of judges are indispensable both to their judgments in specific cases and to the independence of the courts. According to the common law tradition, judicial subjectivity is a virtue, not a vice.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016. 281p.