By Olwethu Majola and Darren Brookbanks

This paper uses data and analysis to assess the UNTOC's effectiveness in addressing transnational organised crime on the continent. The international community prescribed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as the treatment to slow the global spread of TOC. However, current diagnoses suggest that this has not been as effective as anticipated. This paper assesses the efficacy of the UNTOC and recommends some changes to the treatment that are likely to yield more successful results.

ENACT-Africa, 2023. 32p,

By Kathryn Westmore

It has long been difficult for prosecutors in the UK to hold corporates to account for criminal behaviour and, in particular, for economic crime-related misconduct. The ‘identification doctrine’ requires that only the acts of the person who represents the company’s ‘directing mind and will’ can be attributed to a company. At the same time, it is recognised that there are certain types of criminal behaviour that can only be carried out within a corporate structure, and which are carried out for the benefit of that corporate entity. Therefore, it is inherently problematic that it is difficult to bring corporate criminal prosecutions. The introduction of ‘failure to prevent’ offences are an attempt to overcome these difficulties. The basis of a failure to prevent offence is simple – to have any defence, an organisation needs to prove that it had ‘reasonable’ or ‘adequate’ procedures in place to prevent an individual associated with it from carrying out a criminal activity. The first failure to prevent offence was introduced in relation to bribery in 2010; two further failure to prevent offences followed in the Criminal Finances Act 2017 related to the facilitation of tax evasion....  

London:  Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 2022. 19P.

By Angel Rabasa, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Peter Chalk, Douglas Farah, Gregory Midgette, Howard J. Shatz

In July 2011, President Barack Obama promulgated the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In the letter presenting the strategy, the president stated that the expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance represent one of the most significant challenges of the 21st century. Through an analysis of transnational criminal networks originating in South America, this report develops a more refined understanding of the operational characteristics of these networks; the strategic alliances that they have established with state and other nonstate actors; and the multiple threats that they pose to U.S. interests and to the stability of the countries where they operate. It identifies U.S. government policies and programs to counter these networks; the roles of the Department of Defense, the geographic combatant commands, component commands, and task forces; and examines how U.S. Army assets and capabilities can contribute to U.S. government efforts to counter these networks. The report also recommends reconsidering the way in which nontraditional national security threats are classified; updating statutory authorities; providing adequate budgets for the counternetwork mission; and improving interagency coordination.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 214p.

Edited by Ernesto U. Savona and Giulia Berlusconi

This research is an exploratory study on the infiltration of organised crime groups (OCGs) in legal businesses. Infiltration occurs in every case in which a natural person belonging to a criminal organisation or acting on its behalf, or an already infiltrated legal person, invests financial and/or human resources to participate in the decision-making process of a legitimate business. The main output of the research is a list of risk factors of OCG infiltration in legal businesses, i.e. factors that facilitate or promote infiltration. Risk factors are derived from an unprecedented cross-national comparative analysis of the vulnerabilities of territories and business sectors, criminal groups’ modi operan

Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 2015. 135p.

By Hernando Zuleta González

The increase in the area cultivated with coca in Colombia has cast doubt on the country’s anti-drug strategy and has encouraged skepticism about the possibility of a complete and definitive peace. Furthermore, this perception of failure has given rise to policy proposals based on the idea that illicit crops are a criminal issue, not a development one. This paper is a complete review of the available evidence and aims at organizing the information related to this debate and shedding light on the convenience or inconvenience of certain policies. There are six highly relevant facts: (i) With respect to reducing cocaine supply, the efforts in seizures and destruction of infrastructure are more efficient than the efforts in eradication. (ii) Seizures and destruction of infrastructure may help in reducing coca plantations. (iii) There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the consumption of cocaine in Colombia has increased. (iv) Most regions of the country have seen a decrease in the amount of coca crops. However, at least one armed group is present in the regions where the cultivated area has increased. (v) Coca growing municipalities are, on average, poorer than the rest of the country. These municipalities have a low tax revenue, and reduced levels of connectivity and institutional development. (vi) The increase in the consumption of cocaine in the United States is concentrated in a specific age group and in certain states. This fact makes it difficult to relate the increase in consumption to an exogenous increase in the supply.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2019. 40p.

By Philip Keefer, Norman V. Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares

This paper reviews the unintended consequences of the war on drugs, particularly for developing countries, and weighs them against the evidence regarding the efficacy of prohibition to curb drug use and trade. It reviews the available evidence and presents new results that indicate that prohibition has limited effects on drug prevalence and prices, most likely indicating a combination of inelastic drug demand (due to its addictive properties) and elastic supply responses (due to black markets). This should turn the focus to the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. First, the large demand for drugs, particularly in developed countries, generates the possibility of massive profits to potential drug providers. This leads to the formation of organized crime groups, which use violence and corruption as their means of survival and expansion and which, in severe cases, challenge the state and seriously compromise public stability and safety. Second, prohibition and its derived illegal market impose greater costs on farmers than on drug traffickers. In many instances, this entails the transfer of wealth from poor peasants to rich (and ruthless) traders. Third, criminalization can exacerbate the net health effects of drug use. These consequences are so pernicious that they call for a fundamental review of drug policy around the world.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 36p.