By Summer Walker

What happens in America often reverberates globally. The complex global emergency of COVID-19 has now met waves of uprising around anti-racism, inequality and the systems that perpetuate them. Many policing tactics deployed in communities around the world derive from policy responses to curb illicit markets. Some of the most persistent and militarized responses in communities are predicated upon fighting transnational organized crime. And these often occur in communities of colour, immigrant neighbourhoods, and marginalized and lower-income areas. These current debates about power, use of force and inequality provide a lens to examine responses to transnational organized crime. This brief uses the concept of illicit markets to examine organized crime as the systems and actors that make up these markets, including the government responses to them. Transnational illicit markets, such as the illicit drug or wildlife trade, connect a wide range of actors – from farmers and fishermen to hitmen and cartel bosses. Organized criminal groups, the most common manifestation of how organized crime is carried out, include cartels, armed militias and gangs. But they can also include members of political parties, corporations, businesses and local governments. By looking at the markets more broadly and then identifying where responses are targeted, one can see how transnational organized-crime responses create their own logic of power and exclusion, and are deployed to manage communities. This policy brief begins by discussing the current US context of BLM protests, then situates the debate within the transnational organized-crime agenda, and addresses the implications for responses that align with calls for social and economic justice.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2020. 21p.

By Martin Ewi, Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Willem Els, Richard Chelin, Yussuf Adam and Elisa Samuel Boerekamp

Collaborative research between the Institute for Security Studies and the Judicial Training Institute of Mozambique revealed that people in Cabo Delgado see the discovery and poor governance of natural resources as a cause of the insurgency. The study also found few links between the insurgency and organised crime, and that regional rather than ethnic differences play a major role in the conflict.

 Key findings: The discovery and poor governance of natural resources such as rubies and liquefied natural gas have escalated terrorism. Regional inequities, not ethnicity, are a major grievance in Cabo Delgado. Despite resentment of the elite, who are blamed for the region’s poverty, there is no evidence that people are voluntarily joining the insurgency en masse. The criminal justice sector lacks basic resources and skills to prosecute the growing number of terrorist suspects. People in Cabo Delgado are more concerned about the threat of the Mashababos (Alu-Sunnah wal Jama'ah) than the Islamic State. Recommendations Government of Mozambique: Partner with local organisations to address legitimate grievances Develop a national strategy covering all aspects of the crisis Effectively manage the amnesty programme Establish a centralised national inter-agency counter-terrorism unit, and prioritise coordination and intelligence-led military operations Strengthen the criminal justice system to prosecute terrorism, organised crime and corruption Set up a commission of inquiry into the drivers of violent extremism Strengthen intelligence sharing with neighbouring countries SADC and Mozambique’s neighbours: Assist Mozambique to tighten border security Regularly share intelligence Mosques, Islamic centres and local markets are believed to be meeting points and areas of recruitment and radicalisation. Respondents fear that the violence could easily spread to other parts of Mozambique and countries in Southern Africa. Evidence of a nexus between terrorism and organised crime is weak.  Since the deployment of foreign forces, mass recruitment has stopped as Al Sunnah evolves into a professional, well-trained group, practising guerrilla warfare.

Pretoria, South Africa, Institute for Security Studies, 2022. 52p.

By The Venezuela Investigative Unit

Ten years ago, Tren de Aragua was a little more than a prison gang, confined to the walls of the Tocorón penitentiary and largely unheard of outside its home state of Aragua in Venezuela. Today, it is one of the fastest-growing security threats in South America.

Tren de Aragua’s transnational network now stretches into Colombia, Peru, Chile, and beyond. It has established some of the most far-reaching and sophisticated migrant smuggling and sex trafficking networks seen in the region. And it has spread terror in host countries and among the Venezuelan migrant population, which it has ruthlessly exploited.

But the seizure of Tocorón by Venezuelan authorities in September 2023 directly attacked the nerve center of this network. Now, a new, more uncertain, era is beginning for Venezuela’s most notorious criminal export.

Washington DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 28p.

by Julia Stanyard

The development of transport infrastructure boosts trade and stimulates economic growth. However, this infrastructure can also benefit criminal networks, which use air transport to traffic illicit goods such as drugs, wildlife and gold. Their activities are disguised from regulatory bodies, and many act in collusion with corrupt officials. However, this can be countered by implementing effective oversight measures. This is crucial considering the substantial expansion of African air traffic in recent years, forecasts that Africa will continue to be one of the fastest-growing regions in the world for aviation, and the challenges that the aviation sector globally is facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

ENACT Africa, 2023. 18p.

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

Across the globe, the proliferation of new armed groups (including rebels, militias, criminal groups and gangs) has made conflict prevention and resolution even more complex . Armed groups are diversifying their revenues, which are increasingly based on organized crime activities . Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) often benefit from the turmoil of armed conflicts and violence. They can engage in violence to protect their illicit business, undermining national economic development and security. Furthermore, OCGs can team up with armed groups to access and control natural resources, competing with the state to provide public goods or even protection to their community. Different situations of violent conflict affect countries in the Eastern African region. Crime dynamics that emerge from instability in one country of the region can spill over into a neighbouring country, posing a threat to regional peace and security. The emergence of hybrid criminal groups engaged in transnational organized crime and in armed conflict most likely represents a relevant dimension of contemporary conflict in Eastern Africa. Yet, the knowledge on the multiple ways in which OCGs prey, or even amplify, local conflicts for their own benefit remains limited. In many instances, the scale of criminal activities in Eastern Africa contributes to an increase in the risk of conflict or in its prolongation. Organized crime thrives in conflict and other situations of violence in the region when goods and supplies are scarce, filling the demand often in association with armed groups. In some cases, revenue from criminal activities enables armed groups to finance their activities. The illicit circulation of weapons in the region from and into conflict-affected settings fuels violence and criminal activities. Information suggests that in some occasions, armed groups and OCGs collude to smuggle goods, migrants and drugs through the region and beyond. Moreover, the illicit extraction, control and taxation of natural resources in the region is often a source of revenue for armed groups and often links them with criminal actors. Information shows that livestock theft, or cattle rustling, poses a serious threat to many countries in the region and fuels the increase in the demand for small arms and light weapons in two aspects: for fighters to steal cattle and for ranchers to protect their livestock against such attacks. Higher levels of violence have been reported in cattle rustling cases affecting local economies and security. Organized violence for profit continues to affect Eastern Africa. Kidnapping for ransom, looting, threats and sexual gender-based violence are among the most reported incidents in the region. The driving factors for those crimes are sometimes difficult to discern and involve a combination of reasons such as economic gain, firearms sourcing (notably for cases of looting security forces), intention to control a community or territory. Illicit financial flows, and particularly, illicit taxation, allow OCGs and armed groups to generate revenue through commodity taxes, by imposing taxes on the community to move through certain areas or to run their business

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2021. 32p

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

In the last two decades the percentage of imprisoned women offenders is growing globally, at a faster rate than imprisoned male offenders. 1 Such global increase raises the question as to whether the same can be observed on the African continent . Information suggests that transnational organized crime (TOC) affects African women and girls differently than African men and boys. It is crucial to learn how and if men and women behave differently in TOC in Africa in order to uncover the main drivers of these differences and adapt policing methodology accordingly. While gendered data continues to be insufficiently reported upon by law enforcement authorities in Africa, the assessment suggests that African law enforcement authorities are possibly under -investigating and under -estimating the involvement of African women in TOC. African law enforcement authorities likely continue to perceive them as victims or accomplices only. They are possibly rarely seen as the criminals themselves and less so as being the organizers, leaders, traffickers or recruiters. This gap in police investigations is indeed known to be exploited to the benefit of organized crime as women are more likely to go under the radar . The assessment draws attention to the common features of African female offenders based on available data to share insights and encourage police forces to reconsider their approach.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2021. 32p.

y Adam Baird , Matthew Louis Bishop , Dylan Kerrigan

The Southern Caribbean became a key hemispheric drug transhipment point in the late 1990s, to which the alarmingly high level of homicidal violence in Trinidad is often attributed. Existing research, concentrated in criminology and mainstream international relations, as well as the anti-drug policy establishment, tends to accept this correlation, framing the challenge as a typical post-Westphalian security threat. However, conventional accounts struggle to explain why murders have continued to rise even as the relative salience of narcotrafficking has actually declined. By consciously disentangling the main variables, we advance a more nuanced empirical account of how ‘the local’ is both inserted into and mediates the impact of ‘the global’. Relatively little violence can be ascribed to the drug trade directly: cocaine frequently transits through Trinidad peacefully, whereas firearms stubbornly remain within a distinctive geostrategic context we term a ‘weapons sink’. The ensuing murders are driven by the ways in which these ‘residues’ of the trade reconstitute the domestic gangscape. As guns filter inexorably into the community, they reshape the norms and practices underpinning acceptable and anticipated gang behaviour, generating specifically ‘residual’ forms of violence that are not new in genesis, but rather draw on long historical antecedents to exacerbate the homicide panorama. Our analysis emphasises the importance of taking firearms more seriously in understanding the diversity of historically constituted violences in places that appear to resemble—but differ to—the predominant Latin American cases from which the conventional wisdom about supposed ‘drug violence’ is generally distilled.

Political Geography. Volume 106, October 2023, 102966

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

From July 2021 to June 2023, the Mekong Australia Partnership on Transnational Crime and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) organized an expert briefing series to enhance debate and collaboration on issues related to organized crime in the Mekong.

The outcome of the two-year briefing series was the creation of opportunities for discussion, collaboration and learning. It brought together a committed set of stakeholders working at the local, regional and international levels to reduce the harms of organized crime and helped build new partnerships while strengthening existing ones. The series enhanced the knowledge base on organized crime in the Mekong and helped bridge the gap between research and policy.

With the support of a dynamic set of stakeholders, the series explored some of the region’s most pertinent and pressing issues and their intersections globally.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 69p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Despite minimal domestic production, gold has figured prominently in Kenya’s recent history. Many Kenyans can still vividly recall the ‘Goldenberg’ scandal of the 1990s, a gold export and foreign exchange fraud scheme that drained government coffers of a sum exceeding ten percent of Kenya’s GDP at the time.The late 1990s also saw the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in then Zaïre, followed by a devastating half-decade-long regional conflict that resulted in the loss of five million lives, mainly from war-related hunger and disease. Facing external invasion and an internal revolt, Zaïre’s successor state, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), lost control of most of the resource-rich territory in the east of the country. Since then, the smuggling of artisanally mined minerals, including gold, have fuelled an ongoing conflict that in 2022 reached an intensity not seen for a decade. Insurgent groups, pro-government militias and criminal networks all continue to benefit from the tonnes of gold smuggled out of eastern DRC each year. Kenya has long been one of the principal regional transit hubs – along with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania – for the smuggling of this conflict gold.Almost as lucrative as the smuggling of genuine gold through Kenya are the myriad scams that seek to peddle counterfeit or non-existent quantities of the precious metal to unsuspecting buyers. The targets of these scams are often foreigners travelling to Africa in search of hit-and-run riches. Gold swindles have on occasion escalated into embarrassing diplomatic rows, most notably in 2020 when both the president of Kenya and the main opposition leader were summoned to a meeting by the emir of Dubai over an Emirati company that had been victimized by Kenyan fraudsters. Dubai is by far the most popular destination for smuggled East African gold, due to its status as a tax haven as well as a key aviation hub.The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) conducted extensive interviews with a Kenyan national whose initial career in aviation logistics – specifically the charting of private jets – gradually pulled him into the gold trafficking underworld.During these interviews, this insider provided the GI-TOC with a series of unique insights based on a decade of experience in the East African illicit gold trade. These insights will be presented through several accounts of operations in which our source was involved, ranging from fictitious customs seizures to an attempt by an Israeli businessman to commandeer an aircraft, a German with ‘gold fever’, a month-long airport standoff in the UAE and a visit to an artisanal smelting facility located in the heart of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. Taken together, our source’s revelations paint a picture of an illicit economy characterized more by con artistry and double-dealing than genuine commodity trading.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 31p.

By Gabriel Feltran, Isabela Vianna Pinho and Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo

Cocaine trafficking through West Africa, following the well-established route from Latin America to the European consumer market, appears to be in a phase of sharp growth. Since 2016, the majority of consignments transiting West Africa begin their journey in Brazil. The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) – the largest criminal organization in Brazil – is pivotal to understanding Brazil’s newfound importance for cocaine in West Africa.

Cocaine trafficking between Brazil and West Africa stretches back at least to the 1980s, but as cultivation in Latin America continues to increase and consumption in Europe has grown, more and more cocaine is being moved along this path. In 2018, only one West African country – Senegal – was in the top 10 destinations for cocaine seized in Brazilian ports; by 2019, after a bumper year of seizures in Brazil, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone had also pushed their way onto the list. Cultivation in Latin America reached record levels in 2021, and in the following year an unprece-dented 24 tonnes were seized across West Africa.

In this report, we focus on the flow of cocaine between Brazil and West Africa, which largely supplies the lucrative European consumer market, and in particular on the role of the PCC, which straddles various illicit supply chains.

The research for this report has drawn on various data collection techniques but rests primarily on field observations of the retail trade and transit of illegal goods in South America, West Africa and Europe between 2015 and 2022. These observations, described in detail in the authors’ field notebooks, were supplemented by formal and informal interviews with those involved in the cocaine trade, from the South American borders to the retail trade spaces of Europe, allowing us to trace the journey of cocaine through the different nodes of the value chain.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023 28p.

By Flore Berger

Cattle rustling in Mali surged in 2021 and continues at unprecedented levels, with the dominant perpetrators being violent extremist groups operating in the country. The scale of cattle rustling in Mali is the climax of a decade of growth of the practice, and cattle rustling is now a central and under-reported element of the country’s security crisis variously as a driver of conflict, as a governance and intimidation mechanism, and as a key source of revenue for non-state armed groups. This has dramatic humanitarian, social and economic effects on communities. Cattle rustling has since the very start of the crisis been at the heart of Mali’s war economy, with Tuareg rebel groups (since the 1990s) and violent extremist groups (since 2012) financing themselves by looting livestock and relying on a broader network to sell it, using its proceeds to finance their operations (e.g. buying fuel, vehicles and weapons). Cattle rustling, understood in this report to mean the whole range of livestock appropriation,1 has rarely been considered as a criminal economy, yet its impacts on communities and conflict dynamics across West Africa are arguably unrivalled by other more traditional organized markets, such as high-value narcotics. It is sustained by a complex network and supply chain, and perpetrated through ever-increasing violence. Furthermore, while a range of illicit economies have been used by violent extremist groups for resourcing – including trafficking of cigarettes, fuel and drugs; artisanal gold mining; and kidnapping for ransom – cattle rustling has proven to be a particularly resilient and broadly stable source of income. Cattle rustling also stands out regarding the degree to which it intersects with a long-standing history of frustration and resentment by pastoralist communities, and is therefore integral to understanding regional conflict. Cattle rustling, and reprisals for theft, spark cycles of violence as herders protect themselves by joining armed groups and arming themselves. Other communities then respond by creating more armed groups for self-protection, many of which become predatory. Cattle rustling also operates as a mechanism wielded by armed groups to terrorize the population and deprive them of a central element of livelihoods. Hundreds of villages have been pillaged and burnt down, and cattle looted.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 54p.

By Olwethu Majola and Darren Brookbanks

This paper uses data and analysis to assess the UNTOC's effectiveness in addressing transnational organised crime on the continent. The international community prescribed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as the treatment to slow the global spread of TOC. However, current diagnoses suggest that this has not been as effective as anticipated. This paper assesses the efficacy of the UNTOC and recommends some changes to the treatment that are likely to yield more successful results.

ENACT-Africa, 2023. 32p,

By Cecilia Farfán-Méndez , Romain Le Cour Grandmaison , Nathaniel Morris

Despite the well-documented human costs of the war on drugs, and the growing evidence of the environmental impacts of illicit economies, the militarized repression of the illicit drug trade remains a central hemispheric security and cooperation strategy in Northern and Central American countries. Through a multi-disciplinary dialogue that combines history, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science, this Special Issue critically interrogates why despite these failures the war on drug endures. Together, the contributors challenge explanations focused on state absence, weakening of the state, and ungoverned spaces and instead propose a research agenda that sheds light on the long-lasting, structural effects of the capitalistic integration of the region within the economy of illicit drugs. In particular, the Special Issue contributes to three existing and interconnected debates: First: the role of drug economies and illicitness on state formation, social inequalities, and development in Mexico and Central America. Second: the impact of illicit economies on local populations, and the connections between the licit and the illicit, margins and centers, and political orders and violence. Third: the variety of stakeholders that benefit from the war on drugs and that link the United States, Mexico, and Central America in licit and illicit fashions.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development 4(2):102-112, 2022

Edited by Mangai Natarajan

International crime and justice is an emerging field that covers crime and justice from a global perspective. 'This book introduces the nature of internationaland transnational crimes; theoretical foundations to understanding the relationship between social change and the waxing and waning of the crime opportunity structure; globalization; migration; culture conflicts and the emerging legal frameworks for their prevention and control. tI presents the challenges involved in delivering justice and international cooperative efforts to deter, detect, and respond to international and transnational crimes, and the need for international research and data resources to go beyond anecdote and impres- sionistic accounts to testing and developing theories to build the discipline that bring tangible improvements to the peace, security, and well-being of the globalizing world. 'This books is a timely analysis of the complex subject ofinternational crime and justice for students, scholars, policy makers, and advocates who strive for the pursuit of justice for millions of victims.

Cambridge England and NY.. Cambridge University Press. 2019. 560p.

By Channing Mavrellis and John Cassara

The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) plays an extremely impactful role as a source, transit and/or demand country in many of the most widespread and serious transnational crimes. The country is unique in that the government itself engages in certain types of criminal activity—specifically forced labor and intellectual property (IP) rights violations. In addition, the country’s political, economic, and social policies have extensive repercussions on the presence and prevalence of these crimes, both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, the country’s willingness to cooperate and act on these crimes within the global context has been relatively limited. Two important factors to consider when evaluating China’s response to transnational crime are its dynamic, and somewhat forceful, pursuit of development and its authoritarianism. While China has claimed that they have no interest in becoming a global hegemon, there has been no ambiguity about China’s desire to become a geopolitical and economic powerhouse. The country has invested heavily in social and economic development, at home and abroad, and has crafted policies to aggressively support and protect important issues and sectors. At times it has sacrificed potential avenues for improving the efficacy of its fight against different transnational crimes in order to avoid any knock-on impacts that may negatively impact its interests. China is an authoritarian state, and the Chinese Communist Party has significant control over what happens in the country. While there will obviously be actors, such as…..

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  criminals, criminal organizations, and the corrupt, that compete against Beijing’s interests, the government has a monopoly over a fair amount of what happens in the country and the agency to quickly, and severely, respond to undesired actors, activities, and flows, especially in comparison to democratic states. The report’s authors, Channing Mavrellis and John Cassara, scrutinize China’s role in four different transnational crimes—drug trafficking, counterfeiting and IP theft, human trafficking and wildlife trafficking—as well as the illicit financial flows (IFFs) associated with these crimes. It explores the dynamics of these crimes as they relate to China both domestically and internationally; the political, economic, social, and cultural drivers and facilitators to these crimes; laws and regulations related to these crimes; and how the Chinese government has responded to these crimes and IFFs. Finally, the paper provides some focused recommendations for China to improve its response to transnational crimes and IFFs as well as for the U.S. 

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2022. 113p.

Edited by Tuesday Reitano, Sasha Jesperson and Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo

This edited volume examines the use of militarised responses to different forms of criminal activity, discussing the outcomes and unintended consequences. Politicians and policymakers frequently use militarised responses to look tough on crime. The deployment of armies, navies, military assets and militarised approaches can send a powerful message, but have produced mixed results. While they generate the perception that governments are actively engaged on issues of concern to the public, and in some cases have resulted in notable successes, on the downside they have frequently also increased the loss of life, exacerbated the humanitarian consequences of a particular crime and entrenched divides between security and state institutions and the criminal proponents, narrowing the possibilities for future negotiated solutions. By focusing on four different areas of criminality – wildlife crime, piracy, migration and drug trafficking – the book allows context and evidence-based conclusions to be drawn on the strategic value and commonality of responses and their outcomes.

Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. 353p

Edited by Philip L. Reichel and Jay S. Albanese

Transnational crime and justice will characterize the 21st century in the same way that traditional street crimes dominated the 20th century. In the <strong>Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice, Philip Reichel and Jay Albanese bring together top scholars from around the world to offer perspectives on the laws, crimes, and criminal justice responses to transnational crime. This concise, reader-friendly handbook is organized logically around four major themes: the problem of transnational crime; analysis of specific transnational crimes; approaches to its control; and regional geographical analyses. Each comprehensive chapter is designed to be explored as a stand-alone topic, making this handbook an important textbook and reference tool for students and practitioners alike.

Los Angeles, SAGE, 2014. 576p.

By Tom J. Farer

The most destructive forces in the Americas today is not El Nino - it is the criminal enterprises that recognise no geographic, legal or moral boundaries. This book exposes the main characteristics and effects of criminal enterprises in the Americas and considers realistic strategies for combating them. Looking at how crime penetrates private business, government and the everyday lives of the people, this collection examines the impact of criminal enterprises on the legitimate economy and the ability of states to promote the rule of law. It compares criminal enterprises in the Americas with other regions, and considers the foreign policy concerns of the US. With a recent upsurge in the scope, sophistication and cooperation among groups, this book is an essential tool for understanding omne of the greatest challenges to security, peace and democracy in the Americas.

New York: Routledge, 1999. 256p.

By Eve de Coning

The study posed the questions whether there is transnational organized crime and other criminal activity in the fishing industry and, if so, what the vulnerabilities of the fishing industry are to transnational organized crime or other criminal activity. The research took the form of a six-month desk review of available literature, supplemented by ad hoc consultations and a two-day expert consultation held in Vienna, Austria. Importantly the study did not set out to tarnish the fishing industry. Rather, the study sought to determine whether criminal activities take place within the fishing industry to the detriment of law-abiding fishers, the legitimate fishing industry, local fishing communities, and the general public alike. The study considered the involvement of the fishing industry or the use of fishing vessels in trafficking in persons (Chapter 2); smuggling of migrants (Chapter 3); illicit traffic in drugs (Chapter 4); and other forms of crime such as marine living resource crime, corruption, and piracy and other security related crimes (Chapter 5).

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011. 144p.

By Summer Walker, Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano.

Through stark images and charts, this report gives a graphic illustration of how the global illicit economy has boomed in the past 20 years and how it poses a serious threat to security, development and justice. With so many major challenges in our world today, it may seem that tackling transnational organized crime is a lower priority than addressing climate change, pandemics, inequality or migration. But organized crime is a common denominator to all of these challenges: it enables them, and it profits from them. As a result, organized crime is a driver of unsustainable development. This report is impressionistic. It is designed to show the inter-relationships and interdependence between global mega-trends and the trajectories of organized crime since 2000, the year the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was adopted. It is written from the perspective of civil society, drawing on consultations with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s secretariat, its Network of Experts, and recipients of the Global Initiative Resilience Fund, including nine consultations held in five regions. It is based on data that is in the public domain that has been gathered through research and analysis. We hope this report can bring fresh approaches and different perspectives to intergovernmental processes. Furthermore, we hope it can stimulate new thinking and be a catalytic resource for more effective responses to organized crime. We appreciate the opportunities available for us to do this, for example through the review mechanism of the UNTOC Conference of Parties as well as the UN Crime Congress. As this report shows, organized crime is harming so many aspects of life on our planet. Left unchecked, the shadows of the future look even more sinister. We need to change the trajectory. We hope this report can raise awareness and provoke debate. Most importantly, we hope that it can stimulate action to strengthen local resilience and lead to a global strategy against organized crime.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 118p.