By Kelsey S. Henderson, Christopher M. Campbell,  Brian Renauer

 This report provides the initial findings of Year 1 of a multi-year project to understand the effects of successive drug policy efforts in Oregon, with special focus given to Ballot Measure 110 (M110). In 2021, M110 decriminalized possession of controlled substance (PCS), and effectively downgraded certain quantities of PCS from a misdemeanor to a E-violation (i.e., a citation), resulting in a maximum $100 fine or a completed health assessment. In addition, M110 also earmarked roughly $300 million for local-level treatment and recovery systems. Prior to M110 other statewide changes in policy (e.g., Justice Reinvestment in 2014), law (de-felonization of PCS in 2017), and the COVID-19 lockdown also likely had important impacts on PCS enforcement, prosecution/sentencing, and public safety outcomes. Ultimately, this study will attempt to parse out the individual impacts of these unique events. In Year 1 we set out to gather officer perceptions regarding M110 and other recent policies that may impact law enforcement practices. We report on the general findings from 23 interviews/focus groups representing ten agencies (two state agencies; four Sheriff’s Departments; and four Police Departments), and six different counties (three categorized as “urban” and three categorized as “rural”). The interview data presented here represent officers’ perceptions and decision-making related to drug crimes, among other public safety issues in the state of Oregon. In addition, we include quantitative data trends to compare to officer perceptions of what’s occurring in Oregon. These data include an early examination of statewide trends in law enforcement arrests for PCS; law enforcement stops, searches, and search outcomes; and drug-related deaths. Analyzing the interviews revealed 25 codes of officer perceptions ranging from characteristics of M110 implementation and impacts to community safety and wellbeing.

Portland: Portland State University, 2023. 47p.

By Michael Vitiello   

The War on Drugs profoundly eroded the Fourth Amendment.1 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Harry T. Edwards summed it up in the midst of the War when he expressed his “growing concern about the degree to which individual rights and liberties appear to be falling victim to the Government’s ‘War on Drugs.’”2 Scholars have identified many areas where the Supreme Court cut back Fourth Amendment protections as part of the War on Drugs. For instance, the Court has treated the drug-detection dog sniff as “sui generis” and correspondingly refused to recognize such a sniff as a search at all, despite its clear purpose to detect evidence of criminal activity.3 Additionally, the Court has found that police do not engage in Fourth Amendment activity when they fly over a suspect’s property, even when that overflight allows officers to peer into areas within a home’s curtilage that the homeownersought to exclude from the public’s view.4 The Court has also upheld consent searches under circumstances that defy credibility, for example, where a defendant would be able to drive away without more than a traffic ticket, but consents to a search leading to evidence that puts him away for years in prison.5 At the height of the War on Drugs, the Court extended the scope of a vehicle search-incident-to-a-lawful arrest to the entire passenger compartment, including closed containers within the vehicle.6 While, for a time, the Court seemed ready to declare some traffic offenses so trivial that the Fourth Amendment prohibited a custodial arrest,7 the Court rejected such a rule.8 Oddly enough, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not outlaw a custodial arrest even when an officer erroneously believes that he has authority to make that arrest.9 The Court’s unwillingness to allow a defendant to inquire into whether a traffic stop was pretextual at a suppression hearing also contributes to the erosion of Fourth Amendment protections.

73 OKLA. L. REV. 285 (2021)  

By Alabama Appleseed

Report Highlights: Police in Alabama made 2,351 arrests for marijuana possession in 2016. This study analyzed demographic data about the people arrested, along with arrest locations, in addition to examining broader impacts. The report also includes an economic analysis of the cost of marijuana prohibition, conducted by two economists at Western Carolina University. The study found that: • Alabama and its municipalities spent an estimated $22 million to enforce the prohibition against marijuana possession in 2016. • Despite studies showing black and white people use marijuana at the same rates, black people were approximately four times as likely to be arrested for either misdemeanor or felony marijuana possession. • The enforcement of marijuana possession laws has created a crippling backlog at the state agency tasked with analyzing forensic evidence in all criminal cases, including violent crimes.  

Montgomery: Alabama Appleseed & Southern Poverty Law Center, 2018,   

Edited by Bradley D. Stein, Beau Kilmer, Jirka Taylor, Mary E. Vaiana

Opioids play an outsized role in America's drug problems, but they also play a critically important role in medicine. Thus, they deserve special attention. Illegally manufactured opioids (such as fentanyl) are involved in a majority of U.S. drug overdoses, but the problems are broader and deeper than drug fatalities. Depending on the drugs involved, there can be myriad physical and mental health consequences associated with having a substance use disorder. And it is not just those using drugs who suffer. Substance use and related behaviors can significantly affect individuals' families, friends, employers, and wider communities. Efforts to address problems related to opioids are insufficient and sometimes contradictory. In this 600-page report, researchers provide a nuanced assessment of America's opioid ecosystem, highlighting how leveraging system interactions can reduce addiction, overdose, suffering, and other harms. At the core of the opioid ecosystem are the individuals who use opioids and their families. Researchers also include chapters on ten major components of the opioid ecosystem: substance use disorder treatment, harm reduction, medical care, the criminal legal system, illegal supply and supply control, first responders, the child welfare system, income support and homeless services, employment, and education.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023. 618p.

By Xiguang Liu , Mendel E. Singer 

The combination of opioids and cocaine has been increasingly implicated in overdose fatalities, but it is unknown how much is intentional vs. fentanyl-adulterated drug supply. 2017–2019 data from the nationally representative National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) was used. Variables included sociodemographics, health, and 30-day drug use. Opioid use captured heroin, and prescription pain reliever use not according to own doctor. Modified Poisson regressions were used to estimate prevalence ratios (PRs) for variables associated with opioid and cocaine use. Among the 167,444 responders, 817(0.49%) reported use of opioids on a regular or daily basis. Of these, 28% used cocaine ≥1 of prior 30 days, 11% >1 day. Of 332(0.20%) who used cocaine on a regular/ daily basis, 48% used opioids ≥1 of prior 30 days, 25% >1 day. People with serious psychological distress were >6 times as likely to use both opioids and cocaine regularly/daily (PR = 6.48; 95% CI = [2.82–14.90]) and people who have never been married were 4 times as likely (PR = 4.17; 95% CI = [1.18–14.75]). Compared to those living in a small metropolitan region, people living in a large metropolitan region were >3 times as likely (PR = 3.29; 95% CI = [1.43–7.58]) and the unemployed were twice as likely (PR = 1.96; 95% CI = [1.03–3.73]). People with post-high school education were 53% less likely to use opioids and cocaine at least occasionally (PR = 0.47; 95% CI = [0.26–0.86]). People who use opioids or cocaine commonly choose to use the other. Knowing the characteristics of those most likely to use both should guide interventions for prevention and harm reduction.  

Preventive Medicine Reports 33 (2023) 102227

By Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (UK)

  Serious violence and drug abuse are major problems in England and Wales. In its Serious Violence Strategy, published in April 2018, the Government identified strong links between increases in violence and the exploitation of children and vulnerable adults by criminal drug dealers operating ‘county lines’. The strategy included a commitment that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services would carry out an inspection. Policing county lines drug offending involves three main components as follows: • The 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales. Each is responsible for policing a local area (usually a county, several counties or a metropolitan area). • A network of police-led regional organised crime units. These provide specialist policing capabilities to help the forces in their region tackle organised crime. • The National Crime Agency. This operates on a national (and international) basis, providing further specialist capabilities to support regional organised crime units and individual forces. Also, the National Crime Agency hosts the national county lines co-ordination centre (also referred to in this report as ‘the centre’), which it operates jointly with the police. For this inspection, we analysed documents and data. We visited the national county lines co-ordination centre, three regional organised crime units and ten police forces. We visited British Transport Police (which polices the rail network across Great Britain) because rail travel is a common feature of county lines offending. We interviewed relevant staff in each location. We also consulted representatives from other bodies. 

London: HMICFRS, 2020. 38p.

By Laura M. Maruschak, Todd D. Minton, and Zhen Zeng

This report provides data on the screening and treatment practices of local jail jurisdictions for opioid use disorder. It presents the prevalence of screenings among jail admissions and rates of positive screenings. It describes the prevalence of jail admissions receiving medication for opioid withdrawal and of the confined population receiving medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder. The report also details differences by jail characteristics and state rates of opioid overdose deaths.

  Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2023. 25p.  

By Leonardo Castro-Gonzalez

The County Lines Model (CLM) is a relatively new illicit drugs distribution method found in Great Britain. The CLM has brought modern slavery and public health issues, while challenging the law-enforcement capacity to act, as coordination between different local police forces is necessary. Our objective is to understand the territorial logic behind the line operators when establishing a connection between two places. We use three different spatial models (gravity, radiation and retail models), as each one of them understands flow from place i to j in a different way. Using public data from the Metropolitan Police of London, we train and cross-validate the models to understand which of the different physical and socio-demographic variables are considered when establishing a connection. We analyse hospital admissions by drugs, disposable household income, police presence and knife crime events, in addition to the population of a particular place and the distance and travel times between two different locations. Our results show that knife crime events and hospital admissions by misuse of drugs are the most important variables. We also find that London operators distribute to the territory known as the ‘south’ of England, as negligible presence of them is observed outside of it.

R. Soc. Open Sci. 10: 221297

By Jason Eligh

The report provides an analytical summary of meth markets that is grounded in data collected in 10 countries across the region with details of specific retail price points, commentary on domestic meth distribution systems and structures, and discussion of common structural characteristics across the region that enable and sustain these markets. Furthermore, the data generated from research undertaken for this report is intended to contribute to the broader regional objective of constructing an open-source database of time-series, country-specific illicit commodity price data, where applicable and practicable.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 104p,

By Steven Dudley, Victoria Dittmar, Sara García, Jaime López-Aranda, Annie Pforzheimer, and Ben Westhoff 

 Precursors are transported to Mexico via cargo ships or air cargo, traveling direct or via circuitous routes. Cargo is often mislabeled, camouflaging the contents, purpose, or amount of their shipment. In Mexico, brokers and independent buyers facilitate this trade, filing paperwork, creating fictitious companies, or bribing officials. The chemicals then make their way to small producers. Often referred to as “cooks,” these producers synthesize the precursors into illicit synthetic drugs that are then sold to large buyers and transport specialists. Two large criminal networks buy and move synthetic drugs in bulk: the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG). These networks are responsible for bringing this product across the most difficult part of its journey and thus charge a premium for their services. After they sell the drugs wholesale, they are largely absent, leaving the distribution and retail sales to other local criminal networks.

The precursor industry -- and the synthetic drug industry writ large -- is so challenging to disrupt precisely because it works across legal and illegal spheres, involves many layers and different criminal networks, and has many means to obtain its final objective: the sale of synthetic drugs to an increasing number of consumers. Those consumers are not just in the United States where synthetic drugs -- in particular fentanyl -- are responsible for tens of thousands of drug overdoses per year. Places like Mexico are experiencing a dramatic uptick in synthetic drug consumption, mostly methamphetamine but also fentanyl. The synthetic drug industry is also having ill effects on the environment in Mexico and is behind a surge in violence in the corridors where it is trafficked and sold on the local markets.

The problem requires governments to rethink their traditional strategies for fighting illicit drugs. In addition to developing regional and global coalitions to monitor and regulate the chemicals, governments must enlist private industry to play a much more active role in mitigating the trade and limiting the spread of these destructive substances.

Washington DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 147p.

Edited by Roy Krøvel and Mona Thowsen  

"Each year local and national economies throughout the world lose billions of dollars through so-called illicit financial flows. Conservative estimates indicate that over a billion dollars are diverted illegitimately out of countries in the Southern Hemisphere every year. This diversion of revenue reinforces poverty while facilitating the concentration of authority in the hands a select few through corruption and abuse of power. The authors’ objective with this book is to increase transparency in finance and global financial transactions. Understanding the phenomenon of illicit financial flows requires input from several disciplines including law, finance and economics, and much of what is known about illicit financial flows is thanks to whistleblowers and investigative journalists. This anthology highlights journalism about illicit, global financial activity from an interdisciplinary perspective. In conveying the experiences of whistleblowers and investigative journalists who have been involved with the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, Lux Leaks and Swiss Leaks, the contributing authors underscore the need for journalism students to also learn the basics of economics, finance and law if they are to be able to carry out investigative projects in an increasingly more globalized economy. In the first part of the book, investigative journalists describe their work to expose corruption and capital flight, and whistleblowers in some of the most significant cases tell their stories, while lawyers and accountants explain what needs to be done at the legislative level. In the second half of the book, analyses of revelations of corruption and illegitimate financial flows are presented. The authors explore themes including the value of investigative journalism, new journalistic methods, inadequate protections for whistleblowers and the education of investigative journalists. This book will be of interest to anyone concerned about illicit financial flows, but especially to journalists, journalism students and journalism instructors seeking an understanding of what it takes to reveal the mechanisms behind illicit, global flows of wealth."

Oslo:  Cappelen Damm Akademisk/NOASP. 2019. 323p.

By Marcela Bittar Araujo Lima andMauricio Yonamine

Counterfeiting of medicines, also known as “falsification” or “adulteration”, is the process in which the identity, origin, or history of genuine medicines are intentionally modified. Currently, counterfeit medicines are a global crisis that affects and is mostly caused by developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These countries lack strict law enforcement against this practice and have low-income populations with medicinal needs. Lately, the crisis has escalated, impacting developed countries as well, e.g., the US and the EU, mainly via the Internet. Despite this extension, some current laws aim to control and minimize the crisis’ magnitude. Falsification of medicines maintains an illegitimate supply chain that is connected to the legitimate one, both of which are extremely complex, making such falsification difficult to control. Furthermore, political and economic causes are related to the crisis’ hasty growth, causing serious consequences for individuals and public health, as well as for the economy of different countries. Recently, organizations, technologies and initiatives have been created to overcome the situation. Nevertheless, the development of more effective measures that could aggregate all the existing strategies into a large functioning network could help prevent the acquisition of counterfeit medicines and create awareness among the general population.

  Brazilian Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences, vol. 59, 2023.

By  Ruggero Scaturro

This report applies the ‘hotspots’ approach that has been used by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s (GI-TOC) Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe to analyze organized crime in the Western Balkans as well as the activities of criminal groups from the region in other parts of the world, as exposed in the earlier ‘Transnational tentacles’ report.

As in the context of the risk assessment conducted on Western Balkan ports last year, this approach examines places that are associated with organized crime (hotspots), rather than people or markets. The objective is to focus on the factors that make these locations vulnerable or attractive to organized crime; assess the internal dynamics and players; plot the locations on a map and connect the dots between them to get a clearer overview of the geography of crime in the region.

When researching hotspots of criminal activity in the Western Balkans and the activities of Balkan criminal groups abroad, it became evident that there were a growing number of police and customs operations in major international airports, particularly in Tirana (Albania), Skopje (North Macedonia) and Belgrade (Serbia). These operations merited a closer look, so it was decided that an organized crime-based security threat assessment of airports in the Western Balkans should be undertaken. Although illicit activities are also being conducted using private jets that land at minor airports and airstrips, it was beyond the scope of this study to analyze every aviation site in the Western Balkans. Rather, the focus is limited to two major airports, which are presented as case studies: Belgrade and Skopje’s international airports. These seem to be the hubs for illicit activities related to human trafficking, smuggling of migrants and goods, as well as main entry points for shipments of drugs and precursors.

Using a similar model to the research conducted for the report ‘Portholes: Exploring the maritime Balkan routes’, we developed a methodology for carrying out a risk assessment, together with airport security experts. Among the issues covered by this methodology are airport ownership; trade and passenger volumes; security measures; major illicit markets; criminal actors involved; law enforcement operations; and enabling factors of illicit activity, such as infrastructure, governance and corruption. These assessments were done at the airports of Belgrade and Skopje between November 2022 and January 2023, and involved semi-structured interviews with more than 20 airport experts, including security providers (i.e. representatives of customs, border police, state police, prosecutors’ offices and private security companies), representatives of logistics companies operating in the Western Balkans, international experts on aviation security, academics, and journalists reporting on illicit trade through airports. The findings, outlined in the two case studies, are set out in the report.

The report also provides an analytical overview of security at airports, factors of vulnerability in aviation departing from and arriving in the Western Balkans, and how these vulnerabilities are exploited for criminal purposes. In addition, the report considers how airports are part of a wider regional infrastructure that feeds into a network of trade and travel corridors, and particularly how they serve as nodes connecting Western Europe and Asia. Recommendations to help mitigate the risk of illicit flows through these aviation hotspots are given in the final section of the report.

Geneva. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023 . 47p.

By S. Elsayed

Cryptocurrency is becoming an increasingly popular tool for organised crime groups (OCGs) to conduct illicit activities. OCGs can exploit the inherent pseudonymity and decentralised nature of cryptocurrencies to conduct money laundering and other crimes related to corruption. Criminals can use cryptocurrencies instead of the formal banking system to move large sums of money which entails a potentially lower risk of being detected by law enforcement or the traditional financial institutions which are required to submit suspicious transaction reports. The development sector can play an important role in mitigating the risks associated with the criminal use of cryptocurrency. Relevant actions include coordinating the development and implementation of regulatory and legislative frameworks, educating the public about the risks of cryptocurrency use and strengthening law enforcement agencies’ capacity to dismantle criminal networks.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Issue 2023:8)

European Parliament

In July 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal to establish a new EU authority to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AMLA). This was part of a legislative package aimed at implementing the 2020 action plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The AMLA would be the centre of an integrated system composed of the authority itself and the national authorities with an AML/CFT supervisory mandate. It would also support EU financial intelligence units (FIUs) and establish a cooperation mechanism among them. The Council achieved a partial political agreement on the proposal on 29 June 2022. In the European Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The co-rapporteurs issued their joint report in May 2022. The joint committee report was voted on 28 March 2023 and the mandate to enter trilogues was granted by the plenary on 17 April 2023. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. The first edition was written by Carla Stamegna.

Brussels: European Parliament, 2020. 10p.

By Saša Đorđević

  Organized crime and corruption in the Western Balkans have been on the rise since the 1990s, following the war in former Yugoslavia in 1995 and the political-economic crisis triggered by the collapse of pyramid schemes in Albania in 1997. Accordingly, popular, journalistic and academic research on organized crime in these states – namely, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – has also increased. In 1996, for example, the head of Belgrade’s criminal police, Marko Nicović, published the book Droga: Carstvo zla (Drugs: Evil Empire) about the history of organized drug trade and the current fight to curtail it. In 2001, the Serbian Interior Ministry mapped and systematically identified 118 organized criminal groups for the first time in the White Book.  In 2002, journalist Jelena Bjelica wrote a study on human trafficking in Europe and the Balkans. In 2005, journalist Miloš Vasić published an in-depth profile of the Zemun Clan, which he described as one of the most powerful criminal organizations in the Balkans during their heyday between 1999 and 2003. One of the first regional projects on the impact of organized crime on peace-building in the region was launched in 2006. Organized crime in the region also sparked interest among international scholars, such as Misha Glenny, who, in 2018, published McMafia, about the global rise in organized crime since the 1980s. Despite the surge in research on organized crime in the Western Balkans, the findings are still insufficient and lacking in certain respects. These works reflect three main trends of illicit economies in the Western Balkans. First, the geography of organized crime has advanced from heroin smuggling through the Balkan route to cocaine trafficking from Latin America to Western Europe, and to the region being a source of particular illicit goods such as weapons and cannabis.6 Second, the politics of illicit economies in the region has evolved from being an ecosystem of political protection for crime facilitators to organized corruption that enriches and shields those with power. Third, following the end of communism and regional wars, the lack of institutional capacity to provide tangible societal improvements resulted in only partial reforms in criminal justice systems across the region. This is despite the 1999 reforms in justice and home affairs fostered by the EU through the Stabilization and Association Process. The objective of this study prepared by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) is to systematically and strategically identify gaps in the current understanding of organized crime in the Western Balkans, and to suggest future areas of work that could help close these gaps and better understand illicit practices. This gap analysis maps existing knowledge, identifies  trends and emerging issues, and reveals the under-researched aspects of illicit economies in the region. With this approach, this study aims to better understand areas of uncertainty and initiate new studies more quickly. Identifying blind spots in the existing literature is a necessary step for creating a new research agenda, establishing strategic and funding priorities and designing research projects that can build the knowledge base, enhance analysis and contribute to evidence-based policymaking.10 Ultimately, this research agenda should aid in the prevention and disruption of organized crime both in the Western Balkans or perpetrated by criminals from the region. After first describing the methodology and data collection techniques of the gap analysis, the paper explains the scale, scope and impact of organized crime and corruption research in the Western Balkans. It then examines the main thematic focus of research on organized crime in the region – namely, criminal markets, criminal actors, and the resilience of state and non-state actors to organized crime and corruption. The third part lays out recommendations and further steps to better understand and increase knowledge of the illicit economies in the Western Balkans.   

 Geneva:  The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 38p. 

By Stephanie G. Stahlberg

Brazilian prison gangs have spilled out to the outside world and become criminal enterprises. The expansion of São Paulo’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Rio de Janeiro’s Comando Vermelho into all regions and most states in Brazil signifies a major security concern for the country. A third player, Família do Norte (FDN), poses a challenge to the other organized criminal groups (OCGs), especially in the North region, where the FDN fights to retain control of the lucrative drug trading route through the Amazon. Although organized crime is believed to play a significant role in the violence level in Brazil, no study has been able to measure their presence and activity levels beyond one city or state. This dissertation develops a novel methodology for tracking criminal groups, by using the number of Google searches about each OCG in a given state and year. This method creates a proxy for the OCGs' presence and activity level, which is also used to generate a competition index. The analysis shows that OCG presence by itself does not explain homicide rates well; in fact, some states with high levels of OCG activity have relatively low homicide rates. However, in combination with a highly competitive scenario, the strong presence of these groups can translate into high levels of violence. When all three OCGs are present, the homicide rate is on average five points higher than when there are fewer OCGs present. In places where there is dominance of a single OCG, violence levels are lower. Findings from the data analysis and expert interviews reveal that the homicide reduction occurs because of higher levels of criminal market monopolization and criminal governance. Powerful OCGs replace the state and regulate violence in these communities, and are strong and threatening enough to prevent the state from challenging them directly. This study shows that a decrease in the homicide rate in the presence of OCGs should not be seen as a clear success, but rather as a warning sign that criminality may be more united and stronger.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2021. 176p.

By  Vanda Felbab-Brown

  This paper explores the trends, characteristics, and changes in the Mexican criminal market, in response to internal changes, government policies, and external factors. It explores the nature of violence and criminality, the behavior of criminal groups, and the effects of government responses. • Over the past two decades, criminal violence in Mexico has become highly intense, diversified, and popularized, while the deterrence capacity of Mexican law enforcement remains critically low. The outcome is an ever more complex, multipolar, and out-of-control criminal market that generates deleterious effects on Mexican society and makes it highly challenging for the Mexican state to respond effectively. • Successive Mexican administrations have failed to sustainably reduce homicides and other violent crimes. Critically, the Mexican government has failed to rebalance power in the triangular relationship between the state, criminal groups, and society, while the Mexican population has soured on the anti-cartel project. • Since 2000, Mexico has experienced extraordinarily high drug- and crime-related violence, with the murder rate in 2017 and again in 2018 breaking previous records. • The fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups is both a purposeful and inadvertent effect of high-value targeting, which is a problematic strategy because criminal groups can replace fallen leaders more easily than insurgent or terrorist groups. The policy also disrupts leadership succession, giving rise to intense internal competition and increasingly younger leaders who lack leadership skills and feel the need to prove themselves through violence. • Focusing on the middle layer of criminal groups prevents such an easy and violent regeneration of the leadership. But the Mexican government remains   deeply challenged in middle-layer targeting due to a lack of tactical and strategic intelligence arising from corruption among Mexican law enforcement and political pressures that makes it difficult to invest the necessary time to conduct thorough investigations. • In the absence of more effective state presence and rule of law, the fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups turned a multipolar criminal market of 2006 into an ever more complex multipolar criminal market. Criminal groups lack clarity about the balance of power among them, tempting them to take over one another’s territory and engage in internecine warfare. • The Mexican crime market’s proclivity toward violence is exacerbated by the government’s inability to weed out the most violent criminal groups and send a strong message that they will be prioritized in targeting......

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2019. 29p.

By Yvon Dandurand, Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo, Kingsley Madueke and Oumar Zombre  

  State-centric approaches to building resilience to organised crime must be complemented with community-based, context-specific responses that challenge organised crime and violence at a local level. Local communities are key elements of the necessary response to the destabilising impacts of organised crime in conflict as well as post-conflict settings. There remains a gap in stakeholder understanding of the elements of community resilience to organised crime, particularly in unstable settings. This report starts to address this gap, by analysing key drivers of community resilience – identified as social capital, community capacity, the role of women, economic capital and infrastructure – in four communities in Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau and Burkina Faso.   

Institute for Security Studies,  2022. 44p.

ByScott Duxbury and Dana L. Haynie

Physical, technological, and social networks are often at risk of intentional attack. Despite the wide-spanning importance of network vulnerability, very little is known about how criminal networks respond to attacks or whether intentional attacks affect criminal activity in the long-run. To assess criminal network responsiveness, we designed an empirically-grounded agent-based simulation using population-level network data on 16,847 illicit drug exchanges between 7,295 users of an active darknet drug market and statistical methods for simulation analysis. We consider three attack strategies: targeted attacks that delete structurally integral vertices, weak link attacks that delete large numbers of weakly connected vertices, and signal attacks that saturate the network with noisy signals. Results reveal that, while targeted attacks are effective when conducted at a large-scale, weak link and signal attacks deter more potential drug transactions and buyers when only a small portion of the network is attacked. We also find that intentional attacks affect network behavior. When networks are attacked, actors grow more cautious about forging ties, connecting less frequently and only to trustworthy alters. Operating in tandem, these two processes undermine long-term network robustness and increase network vulnerability to future attacks.

  PLoS ONE 15(9):  2020.