By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Key findings • Hawala is a Money or Value Transfer Service (MVTS) that has been used for centuries, originating in the Middle East and South Asia. It is overwhelmingly used for legitimate purposes, including personal and business financial transactions and for the sending of remittances by migrants and refugees to family members. Cultural preferences, convenience, low-threshold accessibility, low processing fees, reliability, and faster value transfer services are some of the reasons for using hawala, and customers using the service come from all walks of life. • Despite being widely used for legitimate purposes, some attributes of the hawala system also make it vulnerable to use by organised crime for the purposes of transferring illicit funds and values. This includes financial transfers by drug traffickers, migrant smugglers and other criminal actors and organisations, as well as safekeeping of funds obtained from illegal activity. The 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study do not commonly ask about the source of money or the reason for sending and receiving money. Additionally, when they did have doubts about the source of the funds, over half of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they had never refused a hawala transaction. • There is no single global regulatory framework for the hawala system. However, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has produced international standards and recommendations for countries to take measures to regulate the hawala system and ensure regular monitoring and compliance. Specific regulations and monitoring regimes vary by country, but FATF recommends countries take a risk-based approach to regulating the hawala system. Of the 18 countries covered by this study, the hawala system was regulated in most of them. However, in four countries it was not regulated, and in Afghanistan – following the events of August 2021 – the current regulatory status of the hawala system is unclear as of the time of writing. • Of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this report, 43 per cent of hawaladars declared they had a license to operate. In jurisdictions where it is a requirement, 25 per cent operated without a license and 31 per cent preferred not to respond. 36 per cent of the interviewed hawaladars stated that they provided reports to the Central Bank or other relevant financial authorities about their hawala activities, while 64 per cent either had never reported or preferred not to answer the question. Licensed hawaladars collected more personal information from their customers and require identification documents, while for unlicensed hawaladars a name and contact number is sufficient to process a transaction. • Of the hawaladars interviewed in this

study, over one-third reported that they ran multiple branches within the same country and more than half of them reported having offices in other countries. Regular hawala customers are likely to receive a discount on commission charges by hawaladars. • People engaging in regular and irregular migration constitute one customer base of the hawaladars interviewed in this study. Over half of reported that they had migrants as customers. The findings of this study suggest that hawaladars – knowingly and unknowingly - facilitate irregular migration and migrant smuggling by providing multiple financial services including, but not limited to, money or value transfer, safekeeping of funds and introducing migrants and refugees to migrant smugglers. • There are multiple reasons why migrants and refugees would use hawala before, during and after traveling, and these are broadly linked to the features of the system, and, for some, lack of access to any other financial system, such as banks or mobile money services. Migrants and refugees may be directed to a hawaladar by a friend or relative, smuggler, fellow traveller, shopkeeper or accommodation provider. • The interviewed hawaladars identified the following services they provided to migrants and refugees during their journeys: guiding migrants on their journey; helping with finding work upon arrival; referring migrants to support organizations; providing temporary accommodation or referring migrants to an individual who provides temporary accommodation; and finding local medical aid, as undocumented migrants may not be able to or may be reluctant to access hospitals. • Some hawaladars also assist migrants and refugees by finding, recommending or introducing them to a smuggler; and finding or directly renting out boats and trucks for transportation. • The majority of customers using the services of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study sent funds to countries located in the Near and Middle East/ South-West Asia sub region, followed by Western and Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe subregions. Customers in the Near and Middle Eastern sub-regions frequently sent funds to hawaladars in most of the eighteen countries where interviews were conducted. Customers of the interviewed hawaladars in the countries of the North American sub-region only sent funds to hawaladars interviewed in Afghanistan, Denmark, Nigeria, Somalia, and the United Republic of Tanzania. • Hawala is widely associated with transferring money or value - this was the most common type of service provided by the sample group in this study. However, sending and receiving money is just one among several financial services hawaladars provide. Cash savings, currency exchange, short-term lending, safekeeping of funds, and trade guarantees were other services the interviewed hawaladars provided to their customers to varying degrees. Some of them safekeep customers’ funds. The amount of funds kept for safekeeping with the interviewed hawaladars ranged from US$ 20,000 to US$ 500,000. • Hawaladars often operate additional businesses alongside their hawala business. Some of the side businesses mentioned by interviewed hawaladars were grocery store, travel agency, selling mobile top-up cards, construction company and electronics shops. • A hawala transaction does not always proceed directly from country A to country B. Depending on the source and destination, sometimes a transaction is carried out through one or more intermediary hawaladars located in at least one other country. Hawaladars interviewed for this study reported that there are multiple hawala hubs located in several regions of the world where such intermediary hawaladars operate. • Hawaladars interviewed in this study reported processing both domestic and international transactions, however, nearly three out of four processed mostly international transactions. The amount of a single hawala transaction varies substantially. Transactions handled by the interviewed hawaladars ranged from as low as US$50 and as high

as US$200,000. To keep a record of these transactions, most hawaladars interviewed in this research reported that they keep a paper (ledger book) as well as an electronic (digital) record of hawala transactions and other services provided. • Hawaladars use a variety of methods to settle their accounts including through cash, reverse transaction, bank transfer or trading in goods and services. Reverse transaction was the most often used method of account settlement among the hawaladars interviewed in this study, followed by settlement through bank transfer. Misuse of the hawala service • In addition to its widespread legitimate use, hawala is vulnerable to misuse by organized crime groups and other criminal actors. More than one-third of the interviewed hawaladars judged the hawala system to be more vulnerable to illegal transactions compared to the formal banking system, while some perceived an equal vulnerability in both systems. A lack of proper oversight by national authorities, a lack of reporting by hawaladars, a lack of regulation, policy, or guidelines for hawaladars to follow, the operation of unlicensed hawaladars, and the closed nature of the hawala system are all potential reasons for vulnerability. • There are no exact estimates as to the extent to which hawaladars, knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate the misuse of their financial services for criminal purposes. Some hawaladars interviewed for this research reported the direct involvement of other hawaladars in transferring funds associated with illegal activities. Additionally, some criminal groups have hawaladars, who may be relatives, working specifically for them for the purposes of transferring funds linked to organised crime. • Several of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they do not ask the purpose of transactions from their customers. As a result, it is possible that hawaladars involved in handling transactions of illicit proceeds are not aware of the nature and source of the money they are transferring or safekeeping. This is particularly the case with hawaladars who are dealing with smaller transactions which usually do not arouse suspicions. However, some hawaladars reported that they could not refuse a transaction from customers connected with Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) due to the risk of negative consequences for themselves and their businesses. • It remains a challenge to precisely document the degree to which hawaladars are transferring illicit funds; it is also difficult to trace illicit financial flows, to separate them from licit flows, and to establish concrete financial links to criminal activities. Law enforcement agencies face challenges in investigating crimes linked to hawala systems, because of the closed nature of the business and, in some cases, the kinship ties of the actors.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. 91p.

By Global Financial Integrity, Fedesarrollo, Transparency International Kenya and ACODE

This policy memo is a joint publication by GFI, Fedesarrollo, Transparency International Kenya and ACODE, organizations that are based in the United States, Colombia, Kenya and Uganda, respectively. The memo draws on the technical and regional expertise of each of the organizations, seeking to analyze the complex challenges of Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) from a truly global policy perspective. Broadly speaking, illicit financial flows (IFFs) are illegal movements of money or capital from one country to another. GFI classifies this movement as an illicit flow when funds are illegally earned, transferred, and/or utilized across an international border. The global scale of IFFs is considerable. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Africa loses US$88.6 billion annually to IFFs. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) estimates that from 2004- 2013, illicit financial outflows represented 1.8% of regional gross domestic product (GDP) and 3.1% of regional trade, with losses totalling US$765 billion for the 10-year period. Moreover, IFFs undermine institutions, contribute to insecurity, harm communities and the environment, and deprive countries of much-needed tax revenues. One of the most prevalent channels for IFFs is through the international trade system. As of 2021, GFI estimates that the annual value of trade-related IFFs in and out of developing countries amounted to, on average, about 20 percent of the value of their total trade with advanced economies. One area of particular concern is TBML, which the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illegal origin or finance illicit activities.5 As FATF notes, “the aim of TBML—unlike trade-related predicate offenses—is not the movement of goods, but rather the movement of money, which the trade transactions facilitate.”6; 7 TBML involves acts designed to conceal or disguise the true origin of criminally derived proceeds so that the unlawful proceeds appear to have been derived from legitimate origins or constitute legitimate assets. It is a highly effective way of integrating large volumes of criminal proceeds with legitimate income, and is attractive to organized crime groups because it is very hard to detect, track and investigate due to its transnational nature and the complexity of the international trade system. Recent cases have highlighted the sophisticated methods used to exploit the complex supply chains of international trade to launder criminal assets. When TBML goes unchecked, it has adverse effects on economies and societies as it perpetuates criminal activities such as illicit wildlife trade, bribery, corruption, and tax evasion. It subjects legitimate business to unfair competition in areas of goods and services due to unbalanced economies as a result of artificial manipulations. Additionally, TBML results in revenue losses, especially for developing countries struggling to meet their domestic resource mobilization targets

Global Financial Integrity, 2023. 23p.

By Jo‑Anne Kramer, Arjan A. J. Blokland·, Edward R. Kleemans, Melvin R. J. Soudijn

In order to launder large amounts of money, (drug) criminals can seek help from financial facilitators. According to the FATF, these facilitators are operating increasingly business-like and even participate in professional money laundering networks. This study examines the extent to which financial facilitators in the Netherlands exhibit business-like characteristics and the extent to which they organize themselves in money laundering networks. We further examine the relationship between business-like behavior and individual money launderers’ position in the social network. Using police intelligence data, we were able to analyze the contacts of 198 financial facilitators who were active in the Netherlands in the period 2016–2020, all having worked for drug criminals. Based on social network analysis, this research shows that financial facilitators in the Netherlands can be linked in extensive money laundering networks. Based on the facilitators’ area of expertise, roughly two main types of professional money laundering networks can be discerned. Some subnetworks operate in the real estate sector, while others primarily engage in underground banking. Furthermore, the application of regression models to predict business-like behavior using individual network measures shows that facilitators with more central positions in the net work and those who collaborate with financial facilitators from varying expertise groups tend to behave more business-like than other financial facilitators.

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:314–341

By Global Financial Integrity, FACT Coalition, and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective

Today Global Financial Integrity, in conjunction with the FACT Coalition and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective, is releasing a report with identifies 25 cases in which illegal, allegedly illicit or suspicious funds were funneled into commercial property in the United States over approximately the last 20 years. With a total value of property exceeding $2.6 billion, California, Florida and New York are some of the most favored locations for these illegal investments, but criminals stashed money across some 20 different states. This money originated from around the globe and includes suspicious funds from 14 countries, including Iran, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Russia and Mexico. As varied as the sources of funds were, so too were the types of properties involved. Hotels, shopping malls, supermarkets, a music studio and an equestrian facility in addition to more pedestrian office high-rise

It should be noted that our research represents only known cases involving U.S. commercial real estate: the actual number is likely much higher. Our data definitively shows, however, that commercial property in the U.S. offers criminal syndicates, cartels, kleptocrats and fraudsters an easy path to hide and launder their ill-gotten gains. Russian oligarchs facing international sanctions have also invested in U.S. commercial real estate. Shockingly, eight of the 25 cases involve foreign government officials or their relatives, yet the links to these Politically Exposed Persons were only uncovered long after the purchases.In recent years it has become increasingly clear that the combination of complex financing schemes and a lack of transparency mean commercial real estate provides a unique opportunity for laundering huge amounts of cash with a relatively low risk of detection. Identifying who is behind the purchase of commercial property often presents a significant challenge given large financial flows from real estate investment trusts and private investment groups, in addition to funds from shell companies formed and operated by registered agents, proxies and/or attorneys. Key Findings – More than $2.6 billion in suspicious funds were invested in commercial real estate in 22 U.S. states over approximately the last 20 years. The actual figure is likely much higher.– Funds used to buy commercial real estate in the United States originated in 14 different countries including Russia (4 cases), Mexico (4 cases), China, Malaysia, Iran and Kazakhstan (see Map 2). – Of the 25 cases reviewed for this study, 14 involved either politically exposed persons or oligarchs who typically have especially close relationships with foreign government officials. – The types of properties appearing in cases fall into four broad categories: land/buildings, business facilities (e.g. music studios, health facilities), retail spaces (e.g. supermarkets, hotels) and industrial sites (e.g. steel plants). – Weak or non-existent reporting requirements by professions involved in the purchase of commercial real estate contributed to the ease with which illicit funds were laundered.Recommendations 1.FinCEN should adopt a reporting obligation for multiple real estate professionals in a cascading order to ensure the requirement falls on at least one U.S.-based entity involved in the transaction, from both the buyer and the seller. As attorneys are legally required to be part of the closing process in almost 20 states, attorneys should be included with specific reference to the function they perform in the transaction.The rule should cover transfers of ownership that do not constitute a sale. Current rules only refer to purchases of real property by a legal entity. However, numerous cases of real estate money laundering simply involve the transfer of ownership or creation of equitable interest in the property without an actual sale. FinCEN should expand the types of transactions covered to include direct/indirect transfers of ownership or creation of equitable interest in the property.The rule should cover transactions by trusts: An increasing proportion of housing is now owned by legal entities and arrangements, including trusts. In Los Angeles, for example, 23% of rental units are owned by trusts. Both foreign and some domestic trusts are excluded from the purview of the Corporate Transparency Act. We recommend that transactions by all different classes of legal entities and legal arrangements be included in any prospective rule.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2024. 21p.

By Andres Martinez-Fernandez

Key Points

• Corruption is an urgent challenge in Mexico that undermines political stability, economic development, the rule of law, efforts to combat organized crime, and the effectiveness of public services.

• Corruption in Mexico’s security forces is a key contributor to the sharp rise of organized criminal violence and severely handicaps US-Mexico security cooperation against drug cartels.

• President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s emphasis on combating money laundering and his empowerment of Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit are positive developments for the government’s anti-corruption efforts. However, an increasingly hostile stance to US-Mexico security cooperation, the politicization of investigations, neglect of independent institutions, and inattention to cartel corruption are all concerning.

• The US should use a combination of diplomatic engagement, expanded cooperation against money laundering, and unilateral enforcement actions to restore trust and the effectiveness of bilateral security and anti-corruption cooperation while pushing Mexico to address its anti-corruption blind spots.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2021. 32p.

ByThe Financial Action Task Force

he COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented global challenges, human suffering and economic disruption. It has also led to an increase in COVID-19-related crimes, including fraud, cybercrime, misdirection or exploitation of government funds or international financial assistance, which is creating new sources of proceeds for illicit actors. Using information provided to the members of the FATF Global Network on 7 and 23 April, this paper identifies challenges, good practices and policy responses to new money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities arising from the COVID-19 crisis.

As the world is focusing on responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is impacting on the ability of government and the private sector to implement anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) obligations in areas including supervision, regulation and policy reform, suspicious transaction reporting and international cooperation. This could lead to emerging risks and vulnerabilities that could result in criminals finding ways to:

• Bypass customer due diligence measures;

• Increase misuse of online financial services and virtual assets to move and conceal illicit funds;

• Exploit economic stimulus measures and insolvency schemes as a means for natural and legal persons to conceal and launder illicit proceeds;

• Increase use of the unregulated financial sector, creating additional opportunities for criminals to launder illicit funds;

• Misuse and misappropriation of domestic and international financial aid and emergency funding;

• Exploit COVID-19 and the associated economic downturn to move into new cash-intensive and high-liquidity lines of business in developing countries.

AML/CFT policy responses can help support the swift and effective implementation of measures to respond to COVID-19, while managing new risks and vulnerabilities. This paper provides examples of such responses, which include:

• Domestic coordination to assess the impact of COVID-19 on AML/CFT risks and systems;

• Strengthened communication with the private sector;

• Encouraging the full use of a risk-based approach to customer due diligence;

• Supporting electronic and digital payment options.

Paris: FATF, 2020. 34p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented global challenges, human suffering and economic hardship. The pandemic has also spawned a range of COVID-19-related crimes, which are creating new sources of income for criminal networks. In May, the FATF highlighted the COVID-19-related money laundering and terrorist financing risks and policy responses.

Today, the FATF releases an Update-COVID-19-Related-Money-Laundering-and-Terrorist-Financing-Risks

The paper confirms the concerns expressed by the FATF in May, including:

• Changing financial behaviours - especially significant increases in online purchases due to widespread lockdowns and temporary closures of most physical bank branches, with services transitioning online.

• Increased financial volatility and economic contraction - largely caused by the losses of millions of jobs, closures of thousands of companies and a looming global economic crisis.

To respond to these evolving risks, authorities and the private sector need to take a risk-based approach, as required by the FATF Standards. This means mitigating the money laundering and terrorist financing risks without disrupting essential and legitimate financial services and without driving financial activities towards unregulated service providers.

Supervisors should also clearly communicate about the national risk situations and regulatory expectations. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. However, the FATF’s report on risks and policy responses provides guidance on how jurisdictions should address these issues.

Paris: FATF, 2020. 34;p.

By G. Herbert

This review provides a summary of the evidence on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) between China and developing countries in Africa and Asia. Specifically, it looks at the evidence on how IFFs to and from China impact on developing countries, as well as on the drivers of IFFs and of how flows are facilitated. The review draws upon a combination of academic and grey literature sources, though it is not exhaustive and only draws upon English language sources. IFFs involving China have attracted particular attention, due to estimates suggesting it is responsible for the largest IFFs by value globally. However, little has been published to date specifically on IFFs between China and developing countries. This paper attempts to help address this gap. Section 2 provides some background information on the debates and uncertainties around IFFs, including conceptual issues, difficulties in measuring these flows, and their potential impacts, as well as attempts to quantify China’s overall IFFs. Section 3 focuses on trade-related IFFs between China and developing countries in Asia and Africa. Discrepancies indicative of potential IFFs are identified using trade data from 2018 and an attempt is made to determine the scale of the revenue consequences of trade is-invoicing for China’s developing country partners. Section 4 considers IFFs-related to corrupt business practices, focusing largely on Chinese investment in Africa. Section 5 moves on to consider IFFs that relate to the trade in illegal products, including illegal narcotics, human trafficking, the illegal arms trade, the illegal wildlife trade, the illegal organ trade, and the trade-in counterfeit products. Finally, Section 6 discusses enabling environment factors relevant to IFFs between China and developing countries.

K4D Helpdesk Report.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 2020. 37p.

By Paul Michael Gilmour

Purpose – Money laundering poses significant challenges for policymakers and law-enforcement authorities. The money-laundering phenomenon is often acknowledged as a type of “serious and organised crime” yet has traditionally been described as a complicated three-stage process, involving the “placement, layering and integration” of criminal proceeds. This article aims to reexamine the money-laundering concept within the realm of organised crime and critique its legal underpinnings. Design/methodology/approach – This paper explores how criminal actors collude in organised money laundering schemes to circumvent laws and frustrate the efforts of officials, while advancing the regulatory-spatial paradigms of which organised money launderers operate. In doing so, it reframes the debate towards the “who” and “where” of money laundering. Findings – This paper argues that authorities’ efforts to combat money laundering relies on rigid legal definitions and flawed ideals that fail to address the money-laundering problem. Originality/value – There has been little scholarly debate that questions the fundamental approach to conceptualising money laundering. This paper proposes a new approach to combating money laundering that better incorporates the actors involved in money laundering and the spaces in which it occurs.

Journal of Financial Crime , 2022

By Michael Levi

Money laundering has ascended the enforcement and criminological agenda in the course of this century, and has been accompanied by an increased focus on legal professionals as ‘enablers’ of crime. This article explores the dynamics of this enforcement, media and political agenda, and how the legal profession has responded in the UK and elsewhere, within the context of ignoring the difficulties of judging the effectiveness of anti money laundering. It concludes that legal responses are a function of their lobbying power, the determination of governments to clamp down on the toxic impacts of legal structures, and different legal cultures. However, it remains unclear what the effects on the levels and organization of serious crimes for gain are of controls on the professions.

Trends in Organized Crime volume 24, pages96–110 (2021)

Austin F. Cullen, Commissioner, et al.

This Commission was established in the wake of significant public concern about money laundering in British Columbia. The public was rightfully disturbed by the prospect of criminals laundering their cash and parking their illicit proceeds in this province. I was given a broad mandate to inquire into and report on money laundering in British Columbia, including: • the extent, growth, evolution, and methods of money laundering in various sectors of the economy; • the acts or omissions of responsible regulatory agencies and individuals that contributed to money laundering in the province; • the effectiveness of the anti–money laundering efforts by these agencies and individuals; and • barriers to effective law enforcement.

Vancouver: Province of British Columbia 2022. 1831p.

By Julia Yansura

Proceeds from extortion in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador amount to more than US$1.1 billion annually according to a new study by Global Financial Integrity (GFI). The report, which examined data for individuals and businesses, also reveals that an estimated 330,000 people in the Northern Triangle region of Central America fall victim to extortion each year. Extortion against individuals is estimated at US$40 million – $57 million a year in Guatemala, US$190 million – $245 million a year in El Salvador, and $30 million – $50 million a year in Honduras. Data on extortion paid by businesses is not comparable across countries due to significant gaps in data availability. The report, titled Extortion in the Northern Triangle of Central America: Following the Money, assesses the value of this activity and seeks to better understand how the proceeds of extortion are used and laundered. It also considers whether anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) strategies are being effectively utilized to combat extortion.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2022. 39p.

By David Soud, Ian Ralby and Rohini Ralby: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Gold flows within Venezuela can be categorized under two broad headings: centralised and dispersed. The centralised flows carry a portion of production from the country’s myriad small mining operations to the government-monitored trading hubs. Centralised flows reportedly include gold transfers from the Venezuelan Central Bank to foreign governments and other entities in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and elsewhere. While these flows of gold out of Venezuela might be considered legal, companies are still expected to carry out enhanced due diligence to ascertain whether conditions of extraction and trade are associated with actual or potential risks of severe human rights abuses, conflict financing and other financial crimes as per the OECD Guidance, as well as environmental harm.

In contrast, dispersed flows are those that leave the country from mining areas by various other routes. The Venezuelan military and political elites, Colombian militant groups, and domestic gangs are reported to be key actors in both categories of domestic gold flows. Gold from dispersed flows departing Venezuela appears to be laundered primarily within the Latin America and Caribbean region, mainly in one or more key regional transit hubs. Laundering networks can, however, extend across the globe and actors connected in other continents. Since many of the high-risk gold flows out of Venezuela involve regional transit hubs as well as distant transit countries and destination markets, any approach to mitigating the risks tied to Venezuelan gold should include regional and international coordination among both government and industry actors. This consideration is heightened by the evident involvement of transnational criminal organisations and designated terrorist groups in exploiting mining communities, extracting gold and laundering it into the legitimate supply chain. The resulting picture is preliminary but also revealing. The role of the maritime space in high-risk gold flows needs more attention; so does the role played by Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in facilitating gold flows and related financial crimes. A few recommendations on how best to address the risks that characterise Venezuelan gold flows conclude the report.

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2021. 68p.

European Parliament

In July 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal to establish a new EU authority to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AMLA). This was part of a legislative package aimed at implementing the 2020 action plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The AMLA would be the centre of an integrated system composed of the authority itself and the national authorities with an AML/CFT supervisory mandate. It would also support EU financial intelligence units (FIUs) and establish a cooperation mechanism among them. The Council achieved a partial political agreement on the proposal on 29 June 2022. In the European Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The co-rapporteurs issued their joint report in May 2022. The joint committee report was voted on 28 March 2023 and the mandate to enter trilogues was granted by the plenary on 17 April 2023. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. The first edition was written by Carla Stamegna.

Brussels: European Parliament, 2020. 10p.

By Walter Kemp, Kristina Amerhauser and Ruggero Scaturro

The Western Balkans is a crossroads for the trafficking of many illicit commodities, and a geographical hub for the smuggling of migrants who are trying to enter Western Europe. While these facts are well known, information on the size of the markets and the potential profits is less evident. And while the Western Balkans has a bad reputation for laundering illicit proceeds, there is not much information on cities or sectors where it is a problem. This report sheds light on the dark numbers of mixed migrant flows through the Western Balkans, the prices that they pay to be smuggled, as well as the cost of drugs in the region. To do this, it uses an approach pioneered in two previous Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) reports on organized crime in the Western Balkans, namely pinpointing and looking at what is going on in selected hotspots, especially high-volume entry and exit routes through which migrants are smuggled, and key drug trafficking nodes. Focusing on illicit activity in these hotspots provides a close-up look at the drivers and enablers of organized crime. At the same time, an analysis of these hotspots in a regional context gives an indication of the volume of illicit trade and the potential profits being made.

• More.....

  After looking at the amounts of money being made in these hotspots and showing where and how the smuggling of migrants and drugs is taking place, the report looks at a third flow – money. The third section of the report explains how money laundering works in the region both in terms of cleaning small amounts in the informal economy as well as bigger volumes generated by serious organized crime and large-scale corruption. It identifies sectors and industries as well as particular hotpots in the Western Balkans that are particularly vulnerable to money laundering. This report contains a wealth of information that was gathered in the fourth quarter of 2020 – despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The findings are based on field research and interviews carried out with current and former law enforcement officials; investigative journalists; researchers; local officials; asylum seekers and migrants; drug users; humanitarian agencies; international organizations; and representatives of civil society in the hotspots. It also draws on secondary sources, such as analytical and media reports, and official government information. To make this information more user-friendly, a number of maps and graphics have been specially produced for this report.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2021. 88p.

Edited by Frank Bovenkerk and Michael Levi

In his social investigative writings on "the serious crime community" which describes the loose merger of corporate interests, organized crime and political crime, professor Alan A. Block of Penn State University has proven to be one of the most inspiring criminologists in the field. An international group of pupils and friends dedicate this book to him which contains original contributions on the troubled concept of organized crime, the social history of crime groups in the United States, corruption in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq, the struggle against identity fraud, the world of drugs and the adverse consequences of criminalization, the money-laundering control movement, International Tribunals against war crimes and a Jewish studies chapter on the role of bystanders during the Holocaust.

New York: Springer, 2007. 246p.

By Steven S. Dudley

The U.S. Government estimates that 90 percent of the illicit drugs entering its borders passes through the Central American Isthmus and Mexico. Of this, close to half goes through Central America.1 Functioning as a transshipment point has had devastating consequences for Central America, including spikes in violent crime, drug use and the corroding of government institutions. Mexico receives most of the media attention and the bulk of U.S. aid, but the Northern Triangle – Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras – have combined murder rates roughly double that of Mexico. While Mexico is having some limited success dealing with its spiraling conflict, vulnerable States in Central America are struggling to keep the organized criminal groups at bay, even while they face other challenges such as widespread gang activity. U.S. and Mexican efforts to combat the drug cartels in Mexico seem to have exacerbated the problems for Central America, evidenced by ever increasing homicide rates. 2 “As Mexico and Colombia continue to apply pressure on drug traffickers, the countries of Central America are increasingly targeted for trafficking, which is creating serious challenges for the region,” the State Department says in its recently released narcotics control strategy report.3 Problems are particularly acute in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, three States with vast coastlines, large ungoverned spaces and the greatest proximity to Mexico. However, geography is only part of the problem. Armed conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador and parts of Honduras between 1960 and the mid-1990s laid the foundations for the weapons trafficking, money laundering and contraband traffic that we are witnessing today. Peace accords in Guatemala and El Salvador, and police and military reform, only partially resolved deep-seeded socio-economic and security issues, and, in some cases, may have accelerated a process by which drug traffickers could penetrate relatively new, untested government institutions. Despite the gravity of the problem, Central America has had little regional or international cooperation to combat it. Examples of cross-border investigations are few. Communication between law enforcement is still mostly done on an ad-hoc basis. Efforts to create a centralized crime database have failed. Local officials are equally frustrated by the lack of international engagement and policies that often undermine their ability to control crime, especially as it relates to alleged gang members.

Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars; Trans-Border Institute, San Diego: University of San Diego; 2010. 30p.

By Rolando Navarro Gómez

Authorized to Steal: Organized Crime Networks Launder Illegal Timber from the Peruvian Amazon reveals the extent to which public officials systematically enable criminal networks to illegally harvest timber in Peru. It identifies by name 34 Peruvian government officials who have been complicit in laundering timber from harvest to sale. In addition, it elaborates the administrative, civil, and criminal penalties officials could face for their role in enabling illegal logging and explores how the failure to enforce these penalties allows the continued proliferation of illegal practices in Peru’s logging sector.

Washington, DC: Center for International Criminal Law, 2019. 54p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The COVID-19 pandemic has swept across the world, killing hundreds of thousands of people, and testing public healthcare systems to a breaking point. Many areas of economic activity have either been shut down by governments to halt the spread of the virus or have seen demand collapse. In many countries where organized criminal groups are prevalent, struggling private businesses – many unable to access enough public funds to keep them afloat – are more likely to seek out loans on the illicit market than they would be at other times. Businesses in the transport, hospitality, arts, retail, and beauty sectors are particularly vulnerable to infiltration by organized criminal groups (OCGs). As these businesses begin to reopen, some will find themselves either in the debt of OCGs, or directly controlled by them. The OCGs can seize control either through exchange of money for buying shares or by directly taking over operations. This generates more opportunities for criminal activity, including money laundering and trafficking activities, enabling OCGs to further expand their control and power over the licit economy.

Vienna: UNODC, 2020. 37p.

By InSight Crime

This detailed study traces connections between wealthy and political elites in Honduras, and organized crime. For Honduran transnational elites, the state’s role is simple: to create and enforce rules that favour their continued power over key industries and the capital accumulation that accompanies it. Currently, all the elites seem to be facing the same dilemma: align their interests with the narco-powers surging in the country, or stand by as they assume control of the country’s most important economic and political levers. The dirty money provided by illicit criminal groups and businesses has become the difference that makes the difference in survival for the elite classes

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 95p.