By Antônio Sampaio

In the past decade, the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area has witnessed, consecutively, some of the world’s most intense clashes between criminal groups over territorial control, implemented one of the most innovative urban security strategies and, later, reverted to a classic militarized, iron-fisted approach to fighting crime. At the core of these clashes, strategies and crackdowns is a long-standing armed struggle involving criminals, militias and state forces for territorial control in the second largest city in Brazil, one of the world’s top 10 economies. In the main, the security actor that responds to criminal groups’ grip over the city’s large, densely populated hillside slums (known as favelas in Portuguese) is the military police, which has acquired a reputation for a ‘shoot-first-askquestions-later’ approach. The force is also often associated with its elite special-operations squad, BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion, translated from the Portuguese). This is a deadly force of heavily armed officers placed at the spearhead of police operations engaging with gang-controlled favelas. Its insignia is a skull perforated by two pistols and a knife. The state security forces, therefore, have been described as brutal and militarized – with good reason. Brazil’s new political leaders, sworn in in early 2019, both at the federal and state level, unleashed upon the country a vision of further repressive policies on public security without the accompanying governance and developmental approaches to the urban areas where armed criminal groups are concentrated. President Jair Bolsonaro’s security proposals have been thin on longterm solutions; he has resorted instead to deregulating gun possession and reducing penalties for police officers shooting suspects. The president’s lack of strategy to tackle the problem has not hindered his ‘tough-on-crime’ rhetoric: in August 2019 he said his proposals would make criminals ‘die in the streets like cockroaches’. Bolsonaro’s ally, the governor of the state of Rio, Wilson Witzel, has gone further. Witzel has ordered an increase in the use of snipers, deployed to shoot suspected criminals from helicopters. These kinds of policies mark a return to a long tradition of repressive security approaches in Rio (as analyzed in the second section of this report) and represent a radical reversal of previous governmental approaches focused on improving marginalized urban areas and communities where the grip of organized crime has been stronger. Despite this excessive focus on repression, the core security issue in Rio de Janeiro is not the authorities’ militarized policies on security. Rather, this, and the police, is just one part of the core issue, namely the consolidation of an illicit order in marginalized territories amid the declining legitimacy of the state. The militarization of security policies, which is part of declining state legitimacy, is a reaction that intensified and probably reinforced the core problem. Meanwhile, the rise of violent, armed non-state actors has been partially a response to the heavy-handed police crackdowns, but it is also a response to other criminal actors, one that serves the purpose of establishing, enforcing or defending the illicit order. (The term ‘illicit order’ refers to a situation in which an armed criminal actor has a permanent presence in a given urban territory, and establishes rules and punishments enforced by the threat or exercise of violence. The effectiveness and severity with which those rules are enforced may vary over time.) Another distinctive feature of Rio’s security landscape over the past decade has been experimentation with a stabilization strategy in gang strongholds, referred to locally as pacificação (‘pacification’). This strategy had been around for 10 years by 2018, showing that it is possible to reclaim areas from gangs (at least for a time). It also distinguished itself by the authorities’ attempt – successful for some time – to reconcile the use of armed force with socio-economic development initiatives, such as urban infrastructure and educational programmes. To break a vicious cycle of recurring police incursions in slums, which often resulted in intense gunfights and deaths, local authorities combined a heavily armed ‘occupation’ of slum areas with a gradual push for community policing, state-managed public-service delivery and development. In doing so, the government introduced a political element in its urban security policy, the thinking being that neither policing nor social development were sufficient by themselves to achieve the desired results. Instead, authorities recognized that urban security could be combined with a profoundly political purpose – to recover the allegiance of local residents, introduce state institutions and establish state governance. No wonder the pacification programme was compared to counterinsurgency by US diplomats and academics, given its parallels with the counterinsurgency principle of wrestling population support away from rebel groups and towards government authority. In the pursuit of this local political objective, policing, infrastructure investment, public services and social development programmes were deployed – with impressively positive results during the first five years or so of the pacification process (approximately from late 2008 to 2013). The programme marked a watershed moment in the perception of what is the goal of an urban security strategy: the transition of violent territories to stability through institutions, governance and security. An important reason why the programme has received worldwide attention as a case study on urban security is that it worked – for a time. A 2012 World Bank study, for instance, is titled ‘Bringing the state back into the favelas of Rio de Janeiro’....etc....

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019. 40p.

By Andres Ham Gonzalez, Juanita Ruiz

We estimate the effects of drug-related violence on individual labor market outcomes in a transit country. Transit countries do not have enough market power to determine the global supply or demand of drugs yet must deal with the consequences of drug trafficking activities. We implement a Bartik-type instrumental variables strategy which assumes that violence in Honduran municipalities located along drug transport routes changes when coca production in Colombia grows or contracts. Our results show that drug-related violence has negative effects on extensive and intensive margin labor market outcomes for transit country workers and has greater effects on women than men.

IZA Working Paper 17126, Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, 2024. 

The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

A wastewater analysis has indicated that in Europe, cocaine from South America is now being consumed in smaller towns, as well as major urban areas.

The report, published on March 20 by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), is the institution’s latest annual overview of drug residues used to estimate cocaine consumption across participant cities in Europe. This year, the report analyzed results from approximately 90 cities and towns, though several major cities, including London, Madrid, and Berlin, did not participate.

It found that the Belgian city of Antwerp, a vital port for the arrival of drugs from Latin America to Europe, remains the continent’s cocaine consumption capital, while eastern European states — particularly the Czech Republic and Slovakia — continue to dominate in methamphetamine consumption, though that is changing slowly.

The report also looked beyond the European Union for the first time to compare residues at a global level, including cities in the United States and Brazil in its analysis.

Researchers tested the cities’ sewage systems for indications of how much cocaine the population is consuming, which they estimate in milligrams per 1,000 inhabitants per day (mg/1000p/day).

Wastewater studies measure only drugs that have been consumed, not those that were dumped, João Matias, a scientific analyst at the EMCDDA and one of the authors of the study, told InSight Crime.

“Once inside our bodies, the drug is metabolized. Once excreted to the sewage system, researchers can take samples before the water is treated. We look for the metabolites produced after the use of a specific substance,” said Matias.

Here, InSight Crime analyzes the report’s findings on the increasing prevalence of cocaine and methamphetamine outside of major cities in Europe, as well as new data from non-EU cities.

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2024. 16p.

By Robby Roks & Lieselot Bisschop & Richard Staring

As an important gateway to Europe, the Port of Rotterdam is known for its high-quality facilities and efficiency, but also attracts organised crime groups who use the transatlantic legal trade flows to traffic cocaine. Based on a qualitative study, consisting of 73 interviews with public and private actors, an analysis of 10 criminal investigations and field visits to public and private organisations in the port, this article examines how organised crime groups involved in cocaine trafficking take advantage of or adapt to the socio-spatial relations in the Port of Rotterdam. First, we pay attention to which physical spaces in the port of Rotterdam provide opportunities for cocaine trafficking. Second, we examine how the occupational and legal environment in which people, private companies and law enforcement agencies in the port work and interact provide opportunities for cocaine trafficking. Our findings demonstrate that increased security measures by both public and private actors directed at physical spaces result in a displacement to new spaces in and around the port of Rotterdam. Furthermore, the current socio-spatial relations in the port of Rotterdam also make the role of people on the inside – referring to a whole range of public and private employees – increasingly indispensable. 

Trends in Organized Crime (2021) 24:171–188 

By Kunal Madan  , Samantha Schmidt  , Raeiti Fouladi Chami  , Raymond Ho , Justin C. Lewis  , Dorie E. Apollonio

Background: As of June 2023, a majority of states had legalized the sale of cannabis, which past research has found to be associated with increased exposures. In 2018, a change in federal policy increased access to cannabidiol (CBD) and derived psychoactive cannabis products, but there has been limited study of reported exposures following this change. Methods: This observational retrospective study analyzed exposures involving synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (SCRAs) and derived cannabis products, including CBD, reported to the California Poison Control System (CPCS) from 2010 to 2022. We focused primarily on potential shifts in reported exposures before and after the implementation of the 2018 Farm Bill, which removed products derived from hemp from the Controlled Substances Act. We reviewed and hand-coded individual call records to assess reported exposures over time and their characteristics, and conducted interrupted time series analysis to assess whether exposure counts changed after policy interventions. Results: Reported CBD exposures significantly increased following the federal reclassification of hemp products. Exposure reports were most common among young children and for edibles. Exposure reports provided limited information about derived psychoactive cannabis products. Conclusions: Our findings suggest a need for improved data collection regarding derived psychoactive cannabis products, as well as potential public health value in modifying packaging regulations and in providing additional guidance to parents to help prevent CBD exposures.

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 124, February 2024, 104313

By Joseph Pergolizzi , Peter Magnusson , Jo Ann K. LeQuang , Frank Breve

The 'third wave' of the ongoing opioid overdose crisis in the United States (US) is driven in large measure by illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF), a highly potent synthetic opioid or an analog developed in clandestine laboratories primarily in China and Mexico. It is smuggled into this country either as IMF or as precursors. The southern border of the US is a frequent point of entry for smuggled IMF and the amounts are increasing year over year. IMF is also sometimes mixed in with other substances to produce counterfeit drugs and dealers as well as end-users may not be aware of IMF in their products. IMF is inexpensive to produce and when mixed with filler materials can be used to cut heroin, vastly expanding profitability. It is an attractive product for smuggling as very tiny amounts can be extremely potent and highly profitable. Drug trafficking over the border also involves the tandem epidemic of money laundering as drugs enter the country and cash payments exit. While drug smuggling in and out of the US (and other nations) has been going on for decades, the patterns are changing. Highly potent and potentially lethal IMF is a dangerous new addition to the illicit drug landscape and one with disastrous consequences. 

Cureus  Open Access Review Article 2021. 11p

By Bryce Pardo, Jirka Taylor, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Beau Kilmer, Peter Reuter, Bradley D. Stein 

  The U.S. opioid crisis worsened dramatically with the arrival of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, which are now responsible for tens of thousands of deaths annually. This crisis is far-reaching and even with prompt, targeted responses, many of the problems will persist for decades to come. RAND Corporation researchers have completed numerous opioid-related projects and have more underway for such clients and grantors as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services for Planning and Evaluation, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, and Pew Charitable Trusts. Researchers have advanced an understanding of the dimensions of the problem, some of the causes and consequences, and the effectiveness of different responses. However, no one has yet addressed the full scope of the problems associated with opioid use disorder and overdose deaths. Beginning in late 2018, the RAND Corporation initiated a comprehensive effort to understand the problem and responses to help reverse the tide of the opioid crisis. The project involves dozens of RAND experts in a variety of areas, including drug policy, substance use treatment, health care, public health, criminal justice, child welfare and other social services, education, and employment. In this work, we intend to describe the entire opioid ecosystem, identifying the components of the system and how they interact; establish concepts of success and metrics to gauge progress; and construct a simulation model of large parts of the ecosystem to permit an evaluation of the full effects  of policy responses. We dedicated project resources and communications expertise to ensure that our products and dissemination activities are optimized for reaching our primary intended audiences: policymakers and other critical decision-makers and influencers, including those in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. The project is ambitious in scope and will not be the last word on the subject, but by tackling the crisis in a comprehensive fashion, it promises to offer a unique and broad perspective in terms of the way the nation understands and responds to this urgent national problem. Ten years ago, few would have predicted that illicitly manufactured synthetic opioids from overseas would sweep through parts of Appalachia, New England, and the Midwest. As drug markets are flooded by fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, policymakers, researchers, and the public are trying to understand what to make of it and how to respond. The synthesis of heroin in the late 19th century displaced morphine and forever changed the opiate landscape, and we might again be standing at the precipice of a new era. Cheap, accessible, and mass-produced synthetic opioids could very well displace heroin, generating important and hard-to-predict consequences. As part of RAND’s project to stem the tide of the opioid crisis, this mixed-methods report offers a systematic assessment of the past, present, and possible futures of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids found in illicit drug markets in the United States. This research is rooted in secondary data analysis, literature and document reviews, international case studies, and key informant interviews. Our goal is to provide local, state, and national decision-makers who are concerned about rising overdose trends with insights that might improve their understanding of and responses to this problem. We also hope to provide new information to other researchers, media sources, and the public, who are contributing to these critical policy discussions  

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019. 265p.

By Kristin M. Tennyson, Charles S. Ray,  Kevin T. Maass  

This report examines the relatively new and emerging problem of fentanyl and fentanyl analogue trafficking. It summarizes the Commission’s related policy work and discusses the continuing policy-making efforts of Congress and the Department of Justice in this area. Finally, the publication presents data about fentanyl and fentanyl analogue offenses since 2005 and provides an in-depth analysis of fiscal year 2019 fentanyl and fentanyl analogue offenses and offenders.

Washington, DC; United States Sentencing Commission, 2021. 60p.

By Marie Nougier, Adrià Cots Fernández & Dania Putri

April 2021 marks the five-year anniversary of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs. This report aims to take stock of progress made on the implementation of the operational recommendations included in the UNGASS Outcome Document. Using desk-based research, and drawing on data and analysis from UN reports, academia, civil society and the community, the report focuses on six critical areas: public health, development, human rights, civil society engagement, UN agency collaboration and cooperation, and drug policy evaluation. While some progress has been undeniably made, the research gathered in this report shows that in the last five years the gap between policy commitments on paper and meaningful change on the ground has continued to widen.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2021. 115p.

By  Vanda Felbab-Brown

  This paper explores the trends, characteristics, and changes in the Mexican criminal market, in response to internal changes, government policies, and external factors. It explores the nature of violence and criminality, the behavior of criminal groups, and the effects of government responses. • Over the past two decades, criminal violence in Mexico has become highly intense, diversified, and popularized, while the deterrence capacity of Mexican law enforcement remains critically low. The outcome is an ever more complex, multipolar, and out-of-control criminal market that generates deleterious effects on Mexican society and makes it highly challenging for the Mexican state to respond effectively. • Successive Mexican administrations have failed to sustainably reduce homicides and other violent crimes. Critically, the Mexican government has failed to rebalance power in the triangular relationship between the state, criminal groups, and society, while the Mexican population has soured on the anti-cartel project. • Since 2000, Mexico has experienced extraordinarily high drug- and crime-related violence, with the murder rate in 2017 and again in 2018 breaking previous records. • The fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups is both a purposeful and inadvertent effect of high-value targeting, which is a problematic strategy because criminal groups can replace fallen leaders more easily than insurgent or terrorist groups. The policy also disrupts leadership succession, giving rise to intense internal competition and increasingly younger leaders who lack leadership skills and feel the need to prove themselves through violence. • Focusing on the middle layer of criminal groups prevents such an easy and violent regeneration of the leadership. But the Mexican government remains   deeply challenged in middle-layer targeting due to a lack of tactical and strategic intelligence arising from corruption among Mexican law enforcement and political pressures that makes it difficult to invest the necessary time to conduct thorough investigations. • In the absence of more effective state presence and rule of law, the fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups turned a multipolar criminal market of 2006 into an ever more complex multipolar criminal market. Criminal groups lack clarity about the balance of power among them, tempting them to take over one another’s territory and engage in internecine warfare. • The Mexican crime market’s proclivity toward violence is exacerbated by the government’s inability to weed out the most violent criminal groups and send a strong message that they will be prioritized in targeting......

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2019. 29p.

By Jeffrey A. Singer

Dr. Rahul Gupta, the White House director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, stated the Biden administration would be “prioritizing harm-reduction practices because these are proven, cost-effective and evidence-based methods that work to save lives.”1 Overdose prevention centers (OPCs) are a successful harm-reduction strategy that has been saving lives in 16 developed countries—including the United States, where such facilities operate in defiance of the law. OPCs, also known as safe consumption sites or drug consumption rooms, began in Europe in the mid-1980s.2 Governments and harm-reduction organizations now operate OPCs in much of Europe, Canada, Mexico, and Australia. Unfortunately, a federal law that prosecutors and harm reduction opponents call the “crack house” statute (21 U.S.C. Section 856) makes them illegal in the United States.3 Some OPCs in the United States operate in the shadows. Underground OPCs have been providing services since at least 2014. More recently, state and local officials have been approving OPCs in defiance of federal law. This policy brief reviews how OPCs are an effective, mainstream harm-reduction strategy. Congress should stop standing in the way of local harm-reduction organizations that seek to reduce overdose deaths by establishing OPCs.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2023. 12p.

By John Walsh

More than half a century after the advent of a global drug prohibition regime and the launch of the U.S. “war on drugs,” the results have been disastrous for Latin America and the Caribbean, and for the United States itself. Even worse, prohibition’s consequences are exacerbating other grave problems—corruption and organized crime, violence perpetrated with impunity, forest loss and climate change, and displacement and migration—making solutions to these challenges even more difficult to achieve. The Biden administration’s historic embrace of harm reduction represents an enormous, lifesaving advance for U.S. drug policy. But even with harm reduction services, moves to decriminalize drug possession, and shifts underway to legally regulate recreational cannabis, the brunt of drug prohibition remains intact and the drug war rages on in the Americas. The principal victims of government repression in the name of drug control and of the predations of organized crime have always been and continue to be the most impoverished and marginalized communities. At the same time, the illegal drug trade constitutes an economic survival strategy for millions of people in Latin America and around the world—a de facto social safety net of the sort that national elites and governments themselves have proven unwilling or incapable of providing.   

Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2022. 28p.

Karen Duke, Helen Gleeson, Susanne MacGregor, Betsy Thom

This article explores the factors contributing to drug-related deaths in English and Welsh prisons between 2015 and 2020. Based on content analysis of all Prison and Probation Ombudsman ‘other non-natural’ fatal incident investigation reports, descriptive statistics were generated. Qualitative analysis explored the circumstances surrounding deaths and key risk factors. Most deaths were of men, whose mean age was 39 years. Drug toxicity was the main factor in causing death, exacerbated by underlying physical health conditions and risk-taking behaviours. A variety of substances were involved. New psychoactive substances became more important over time. A high proportion had recorded histories of substance use and mental illness. During this period, the prison system was under considerable stress creating dangerous environments for drug-related harm. This study highlights the process of complex interaction between substances used, individual characteristics, situational features and the wider environment in explaining drug-related deaths in prisons. Implications for policy and practice are discussed.

J Community Psychol. 2023;1–22

By Jason ElighBy Jason Eligh

Despite the extensive population containment and control measures put into place across the globe in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the flow of cocaine powder from Latin America to global markets appears to have been largely uninterrupted. This is despite the fact that measures to significantly reduce supply have been put in place by the governments of Colombia – a country that is still the primary cultivator of coca – and the United States, the primary progenitor of and ally in the war on drugs.

The markets and supply chains for cocaine, as well as other illicit drugs, have proven to be remarkably resilient in the face of the growing patchwork of restrictions on movement and transport since March 2020 in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The many predictions by experts of supply chain disruption to drug flows and the potentially disruptive impact of this on consumer markets have not come to pass. Cocaine distribution networks and related agents quickly found ways to bypass challenges raised by lockdowns and restrictions. Coca cultivation and potential cocaine production even expanded during the first year of the pandemic, reaching record or near-record levels in the three primary cultivation countries of the Andean production region. 

Geneva: Global Organization Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 64p.

By Len Engel, Erin Farley, and John Tilley

The drug overdose epidemic that swept through the United States over the past decade commanded the attention of public health providers, researchers, criminal justice practitioners, and policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels. Because of its severity and associated mortality rates, the epidemic became a priority among leaders across multiple sectors. As collaboration across these sectors matured, researchers and practitioners began to develop evidence-informed strategies to slow the spread of the epidemic. But the progress that was underway appears to have abruptly stopped when the COVID-19 pandemic emerged and fundamentally altered many aspects of American life.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2020. 11p.

By David Macdonald

Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium and heroin. This book explores the devastating impact that the drugs trade has had on the Afghan people. Author David Macdonald has worked as a drugs advisor to the UN. Based on his extensive experience, this book breaks down the myths surrounding the cultivation and consumption of drugs, providing a detailed analysis of the history of drug use within the country. He examines the impact of over 25 years of continuous conflict, and shows how poverty and instability has led to an increase in drugs consumption. He also considers the recent rise in the use of pharmaceutical drugs, resulting in dangerous chemical cocktails and analyses the effect of Afghanistan's drug trade on neighbouring countries.

London: Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007. 320p.

By Jason Eligh

The purpose of this report is to examine the existing retail markets for meth across several countries in eastern and southern Africa. This will be achieved through an analysis of meth availability, retail meth prices, distribution systems and domestic marketplaces. The report provides an analytical summary of meth markets that is grounded in data collected in 10 countries across the region with details of specific retail price points, commentary on domestic meth distribution systems and structures, and discussion of common structural characteristics across the region that enable and sustain these markets. Furthermore, the data generated from research undertaken for this report is intended to contribute to the broader regional objective of constructing an open-source database of time-series, country-specific illicit commodity price data, where applicable and practicable.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020. 104p.

By Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie, Federico Masera

The opioid epidemic and migration along the US–Mexico border are two of the most-debated policy issues in recent US politics. We show how these two topics are interlinked: the US opioid epidemic generated large Mexican migration flows. We exploit the fact that in 2010, a series of reforms to the US health care system resulted in a shift in demand from legal opiates to heroin. This demand shock had considerable effects on Mexico, the main supplier of heroin consumed in the US. Violence and conflicts increased in Mexican municipalities suitable for opium production, as they became highly valuable to drug cartels. People migrated out of these municipalities to escape this violence, mostly to areas close to the US border and into the US. The rise in US demand for heroin increased internal migration by an estimated 90,000 individuals and migration across the border at least by 12,000

BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 2020-141, 2020. 60p.

By Harvey Slade

Drug-related deaths fell after the reform of Portugal’s drug policy, and have remained below the EU average since 2001 The proportion of the prison population sentenced for drug offences has fallen from over 40% to 15% Rates of drug use have remained consistently below the EU average Portugal has gone from accounting for over 50% of yearly HIV diagnoses linked to injecting drug use in the EU to 1.7%

London: Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2021. 10p.

By Geoff Ramsey and David Smilde

While corruption and organized crime are thriving amid Venezuela’s political and economic crisis, previously unpublished U.S. government drug trade monitoring data suggests that Venezuela is not a primary transit country for U.S.-bound cocaine. In “Beyond the Narcostate Narrative,” the authors assess the implications of official U.S. drug control data for prospects at advancing a peaceful, negotiated return to democracy in Venezuela.  When U.S. policymakers talk about Venezuela’s crisis, the flow of cocaine through the country is a frequent talking point. And there is no question that organized crime and corruption have flourished in the midst of Venezuela’s crisis. Yet the true extent of drug trafficking is often magnified by actors who suggest that a negotiated, democratic solution in Venezuela is impossible. The authors have heard some version of “you can’t negotiate with a narcostate” countless times in recent years.

• More.....

  This paper uses the U.S. government’s own best estimates of transnational illegal cocaine shipments to gauge the scale and relative importance of Venezuela’s role as a transit country. In particular, we draw on recent data from the U.S. interagency Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB), a multi-source collection of global illegal drug trafficking events that is gathered from intelligence data such as detection and surveillance, as well as interdiction and law enforcement data. According to the Department of Defense, “The CCDB event-based estimates are the best available authoritative source for estimating known illicit drug flow through the Transit Zone. All the event data contained in the CCDB is deemed to be high confidence (accurate, complete and unbiased in presentation and substance as possible).” We have supplemented CCDB estimates with public statements and presentations made by officials at the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Defense, and Department of State regarding drug trafficking trends in the Americas. 

Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2020. 20p.