By Kyle Johnson, Felipe Botero, Mariana Botero, Andrés Aponte and Lina Asprilla

Governance by illegal armed groups and criminal actors has increasingly been identified as a serious problem for communities and states in Latin America. This is particularly true in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro’s government has implemented a policy known as “Paz Total” (“Total Peace”), which aims to negotiate with all illegal armed groups and numerous criminal organisations in the country. Contrary to initial expectations, the development of simultaneous negotiations has not progressed as quickly or effectively as anticipated, leading to the unintended consequence of increasing the capacity of armed and criminal groups to govern the territories involved in the Total Peace Process (TPP). This has prompted some think tanks, opinion leaders and experts to argue that the policy is strengthening both rebels and criminals, including enhancing their ability to govern the territories, neighbourhoods and communities where they operate. This paper explores the argument and demonstrates that this trajectory is not generic: it depends on the armed and criminal actors, the specific areas and the populations involved. Through case studies from three regions (Buenaventura, Arauca and Tumaco) where armed and criminal actors of different natures operate (including Los Shottas and Los Espartanos in Buenaventura, the Frente Domingo Laín (Domingo Laín Front) in Arauca and the Segunda Marquetalia (Second Marquetalia) in Tumaco), we provide evidence that governance models and territorial control vary significantly. These variations occur within distinct hybrid political order contexts. By examining the differences in governance between these three cases, as well as how governance has evolved over time, the paper highlights an understudied aspect of criminal and rebel governance. This comparison explores not only which aspects of life are governed, but also how they are governed. The research concludes with several key findings: criminals and rebels exercise control over different dimensions of life in their areas of influence, a capacity that has been amplified during the implementation of the TPP; ceasefires have facilitated this process; hybrid political orders have contributed to this trajectory; and the timing and sequencing of the peace process are crucial. The paper stresses the importance of considering the on-the-ground effects of initiating negotiations with the rebel and criminal actors who control these territories. By incorporating violence reduction and confidence-building measures into the incipient peace process, the research highlights potential perverse effects that need to be anticipated and mitigated. Additionally, it highlights the importance of breaking the links between criminal and rebel groups and local armed forces or state institutions to undermine criminal and rebel governance. Finally, it suggests that zones of dispute and strategic competition between illegal armed organisations should be treated differently from zones of hegemonic control in terms of public policy

SOC ACE Research Paper 34.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham , 2025. 67p.

By Maloney, William, Marcela Melendez, and Raul Morales

The report titled “Organized Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean” underscores how these issues exacerbate the region's already fragile economic landscape. Latin America and the Caribbean are projected to grow by 2.1 percent in 2025 and 2.4 percent in 2026, positioning it as the slowest-growing region globally.

The region grapples with alarmingly high levels of lethal violence linked to organized crime. Victimization rates are three times higher than the global average, with homicide rates standing at eight times the global average.

The report outlines several factors contributing to the rise in organized crime, including escalating global demand for illegal goods, government crackdowns that have reconfigured criminal networks, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which allowed these groups to solidify their power in areas where state presence is weak.

“Organized crime is rapidly proliferating across the region, transcending domestic borders and becoming a pervasive threat. This is no longer an isolated issue; it demands a regional and global dialogue to elevate solutions and mobilize our collective expertise and resources,” said Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank.

This proliferation has clear development consequences. The report outlines how it threatens public safety, stifles economic growth and erodes the integrity of public institutions. The uncertainty surrounding property rights, rampant extortion, and pervasive insecurity inflate transaction costs for businesses, undermining competitiveness. Moreover, the diversion of public security resources from essential services like health and education burden countries already facing high debt and fiscal challenges.

“Fighting organized crime is not merely a law enforcement issue; it’s a development priority. It undermines governance, distorts investment, and exacerbates inequality. We must address this issue head-on to prevent it from becoming a permanent drag on growth,” said William Maloney, Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank.

To address these challenges, the report calls for a robust agenda to enhance state capacity against organized crime, including police reform, improved prison systems, and strengthened judicial processes. Well-equipped institutions are key to achieving growth and development in the region.

Economic policies also play a crucial role in combating organized crime, promoting growth and job-creating reforms while providing youth with options through improved education and training. These initiatives raise the opportunity cost of crime, reducing its labor supply.

Finally, the report stresses the need for long-term research to inform government actions, as the absence of regular, comparable surveys hampers the development of effective policies

Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025. 92p.

By Earthsight

Introduction The EU banned wood products from Russia and Belarus soon after the illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.1 The move recognised the importance of the forestry sector to the economies of the 1 Article 3i Paragraph 1 of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as inserted via COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/576 of 8 April 2022, states that “it shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, goods which generate significant revenues for Russia thereby enabling its actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as listed in Annex XXI into the Union if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia”. When initially passed in April 2022, Annex XXI included HS Code 44: Wood and articles of wood, as well as HS Codes 4705 Key Findings • An undercover investigation by Earthsight has revealed widespread laundering of Russian and Belarusian timber into the EU in breach of sanctions put in place in response to Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. ‘Blood timber’ with a retail value of over €1.5bn is estimated to have entered the EU since sanctions took effect in July 2022. Twenty container-loads continue to arrive every day. • The Russian military profits directly from timber sales, and Russia is among the largest producers of wood in the world. The EU sanctioned wood imports from Russia and its ally Belarus in recognition of the industry’s importance to their economies, and in response to appeals by civil society. • Earthsight has spent nine months investigating clandestine trade in the most valuable sanctioned product – birch plywood. Now, we reveal the actors at every stage of the supply chain, from the manufacturing giants in Russia, through the firms laundering their products in China, Kazakhstan and Turkey, to their customers in the EU. • Earthsight found evidence that goods from seven of Russia’s 10 biggest birch ply manufacturers are still being sold in the EU. These include two firms whose largest shareholders are billionaire oligarchs who met with Putin on the day Russia invaded Ukraine. One of these, Alexei Mordashov, is also on the EU’s sanctions list, while the other, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, controls Russia’s largest logging firm. Our evidence also implicates Belarusian state-owned birch ply producers. • Sanctioned plywood is making its way into a wide range of products, including kitchens, flooring, furniture and toys. Birch ply suppliers in China, Kazakhstan and Turkey claimed to Earthsight undercover investigators to be laundering sanctioned Russian wood into the EU. Buyers of birch ply from the same firms, records show, include Walltopia, the world’s largest manufacturer of artificial climbing walls. Though we have no proof these European buyers are breaching sanctions or are aware of the risk of the plywood they buy being of Russian origin, other EU firms we met with undercover were all too aware of the provenance of the birch ply in their supply chains. • Illegal, blood-stained birch plywood has entered every EU member state, our research suggests. The biggest importers at present are Poland, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Estonia and Greece. • Efforts to enforce sanctions on timber have been ill-coordinated and ineffective, with smugglers easily able to adapt and continue trading. The EU Commission and member states must take urgent, coordinated action to halt this trade, and Poland, by far the largest importer of blood-stained birch, must use its current Presidency of the EU to lead the charge

London: Earthsight, 2025. 25p.

By Sjoukje van Deuren, Marianne F. H. Hirsch Ballin, Edward R. Kleemans & Arjan A. J. Blokland

The Dutch criminal law system is based on individual liability, yet part of the crime and violence Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMCG) members commit is collective in nature. This study examines the criminal law approach towards collective criminal behavior of OMCG members. The study analyzes police files and court judgements of criminal law cases that were filed against members of Dutch OMCGs. Additionally, interviews were carried out with public prosecutors involved in these criminal cases. The results show that it is often difficult to legally address OMCGs as criminal organizations or weigh the mere symbolic contribution of fellow club members to crime, such as the use of the OMCGs’ violent reputation. Furthermore, the results suggest that in order to circumvent legal difficulties in addressing group symbolism and OMCGs as collectives via criminal law, the Dutch Public Prosecution Office has recently opted for a stronger interplay between criminal and civil law, targeting both individual OMCG members and the structural aspects of OMCGs. Future research is needed to establish which (interplays between) legal instruments are most effective in responding to collective criminal behavior.

Trends in Organized Crime (2025) 28:79–99

By Frederike Ambagtsheer

The human organ trade is proliferating globally. However, far fewer cases have been prosecuted than would be expected based on estimates of the crime. Research exploring the challenges to investigating and prosecuting organ trafficking cases is practically non-existent. Also no studies exist that explain these challenges utilizing a criminal justice framework. This article aims to explain the legal, institutional and environmental factors that affected the investigation and prosecution of two organ trafficking cases: the Netcare case, exposed in South Africa and the Medicus case, exposed in Kosovo. It analyzes these factors through a comparative, mixed-method design, utilizing a theoretical criminal justice framework. Both cases constituted globally operating criminal networks involving brokers and transplant professionals that colluded in organizing illegal transplants. Both cases contained human trafficking elements, however only the Medicus case was prosecuted as a human trafficking case. Legal uncertainty, a lack of institutional readiness and cross-border collaboration issues hampered investigation and prosecution of the Netcare case. The Medicus case also reported problems during cross-border collaboration, as well as a corrupt environment and institutional barriers, which impeded a successful case outcome. Recommendations to improve enforcement of organ trafficking include improving identification of suspicious transplant activity, streng

Trends in Organized Crime (2025) 28:51–78

By Olivia Allison David Lewis

Russia’s siege and destruction of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol from February to May 2022 turned the city into an international symbol of the brutality and destruction of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Now Russia is attempting to turn Mariupol into a showcase Russian city to legitimise its occupation of Ukrainian territory. A huge reconstruction programme is underway in the city and Russia plans to make Mariupol the centre of a new transport network, which will ensure the resupply of Russian forces on the frontline and in Crimea. This research paper investigates this Russian programme of investment in Mariupol, which has been accompanied by the illicit seizure of thousands of Ukrainian homes, businesses and assets. There have been widespread allegations of corruption, fraud and profiteering, and new Russian business networks are emerging that benefit from Russia’s wartime economy. These economic practices in many cases constitute criminal activities and may be potential war crimes. Key points • Business seizures: Russian political and corporate interests and their proxies have seized control of thousands of Ukrainian businesses, properties and assets without compensation. • Dispossession: Many Mariupol residents have lost their homes, not only in the war, but also through an illegal programme of nationalisation, and a reconstruction programme that favours local vested interests and Russian incomers. • Profiteering and corruption: Powerful Moscow-based networks are controlling much of the reconstruction programme. Well-connected companies are benefiting from Russian spending that involves the widespread use of illicit finance and corrupt practices. • International trade: Mariupol port is at the centre of an illicit international trade in Ukrainian grain, clay and other materials. • Strategic implications: The new transport networks around Mariupol have important strategic implications, consolidating Russian control. Major Russian corporations are involved in building rail, road and maritime links. Policy implications • Rethinking strategy towards the occupation: A renewed Ukrainian and international strategy could also use political, diplomatic and economic instruments, including targeted sanctions, to raise the cost of Russia’s occupation and to challenge its long-term hold on the territory. • Sanctions: Current sanctions policy by the EU, the UK, the US and other countries towards the occupied territories is often incomplete and poorly coordinated. A more coherent approach would be more effective, particularly one that seeks to raise costs on individuals and companies leading and benefitting from the Russian occupation. EU, UK, US and other sanctions authorities could consider better coordinating their sanctions towards the occupied territories to ensure maximum impact. • Restitution: Many people from the occupied territories have lost their businesses, homes and savings. The Ukrainian government and international donors could develop mechanisms to find ways to compensate them directly for losses of homes or businesses, potentially funded with the profits from frozen Russian assets.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 35.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE), 2025. 64p.

By Huma Haider

Organised crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Policymakers and practitioners have in some cases engaged in a strategic trade-off – accepting organised crime as part of the political settlement to achieve short-term stability. However, the relationship between illicit markets and conflict can deepen over time, entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state. As Kemp and Shaw (2014, p. 16) argue, ‘failure to integrate issues of organised crime into mediation strategies and peace processes will leave the international community with a potentially dangerous blind spot.’ Negotiating with organised crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. There is, however, limited research on negotiating with criminal actors in peace processes. In seeking to address this gap, this paper reviews scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. 1 Key findings from this evidence review include: • Confrontation approaches have failed to resolve the problem of serious organised crime (SOC) and, in some cases, have fuelled more violence and criminality. • Organised crime groups that have strong internal cohesion and hierarchical leadership are more likely to be considered potential partners in negotiation. • Negotiation can be a necessary approach when criminal groups have strong territorial control – serving as de facto authorities that fill governance gaps. • Socio-economic and financial opportunities, and legal leniency, can encourage criminal actors to come to the negotiating table and agree on a deal. • A criminal group’s demand for legal leniency tends to be higher when they are expected to make larger concessions, such as to disarm and demobilise. • It is challenging to determine an ‘end state’ to a criminal group and to achieve complete resolution of the criminal agenda. • Lack of political will, inadequate resources, and weak long-term planning constrain positive outcomes of negotiation processes and deal implementation. • Negotiators and mediators need to mitigate the risks of moral hazard and strengthening of criminal groups. • The lack of broad public support for negotiating with SOC actors can undermine and destroy such processes. • A balance is needed between satisfying the interests of victims and of perpetrators to avoid alienating victims and producing public backlash for negotiated deals. • Many negotiations tend to occur in secret, yet lack of transparency can undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of outcomes. This review demonstrates the importance of creating a framework for engaging with criminality and organised crime groups that extends beyond confrontation – allowing for accommodation and incorporating a wider societal change agenda through transformation. This requires an understanding of when to address SOC and engage criminal groups in peace processes; how to motivate actors to negotiate, conclude and implement deals; how to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes; and how to mitigate risks associated with negotiation. Drawing on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to provide insights into these crucial questions. The case studies illustrate key themes and findings from this review (see Appendix 1). In El Salvador, ineffective confrontation, the internal cohesion of gangs, and an opportune moment contributed to the the successful conclusion of a gang truce. It ultimately failed, however, due in large part to public outrage that translated into political pullback. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC2 produced an innovative transitional justice mechanism that, alongside security guarantees, served as an effective inducement for disarmament. In contrast, the absence of a requirement to disarm and demobilise was a key criticism of negotiations with gangs in Jamaica, where violence has continued. In Mali and in Kosovo, international actors were initially hesitant to address organised crime in peace processes, yet this was subsequently recognised as contributing to longer-term instability, resulting in new strategies to address SOC actors.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 3.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2023. 88p.

By Matthew R. Redhead

Over the past decade, Western countries have faced an apparently rising tide of hostile activities perpetrated by state actors and their partners, many of which sit in the “grey” or “liminal” zone between peace and war, using hybrid or unusual methods as vectors of attack (Kilcullen, 2020). This body of activities has become known by a variety of terms, such as “state threats”, “hostile state activity” and “hostile activity by states”. However, much of the current discourse around state threats has been poorly and loosely defined, and has tended to focus more on the topic’s military than civilian aspects. Much research has also failed to ask a variety of basic questions about why the issue of state threats is so important now, both as a phenomenon, and also as a subject of policymaking for Western governments. Many of the activities that fall under the broad umbrella of state threats are well-known covert and clandestine activities such as espionage, sabotage and subversion. There are natural questions of how novel or significant state threats truly are, and indeed, how much Western governments care about them as a result. This research seeks to address these concerns, looking to provide firmer definitional boundaries, and, within them, to explore the scale, scope and character of modern state threats, especially – but not exclusively – from a Western perspective. The research notes that besides the apparent explosion in the volume and range of hostile activities, there is much that is “new” about them, from the combination of traditional intelligence tradecraft with new technologies, attempts to innovate, a willingness to take greater risks, and a growing willingness to contract out violent and/or dangerous clandestine and covert activities to both licit and illicit non-state actors – especially organised crime groups. It is also clear that many hostile activities take advantage of new vulnerabilities in society that have never existed before, such as the ubiquity of social media and societal reliance on technology. Overall, the research shows how state threats have become more important as tools of policy due to “geopolitical climate change”. Perceived changes in global power balances and receding agreement on international norms of behaviour are permitting and encouraging more states – non-aligned and Western, as well as authoritarian opponents of the West – to use hostile acts that mostly fall short of war to achieve their political ends. Although current evidence suggests that the results of these kinds of activities are mixed at best, their relative cheapness and apparent lack of political risk are likely to make them an attractive form of coercive statecraft in the medium term. While this might be bearable for highly resilient states in the short term, this is unlikely to be the case for less stable societies, and if sustained over the long term, could even have more severe effects on open societies that have robust protections in place.   

SOC ACE Research Paper 32. University of Birmingham. 2025. 223p.

By Christopher Blattman

International drug trafficking dominates the conversation on organized crime, but equally common and serious are urban systems of organized crime—criminal groups focused not on exports or transshipment, but on dominating local markets, neighborhoods, and politics. When policymakers do pay attention to this problem, they consistently make the same mistake—believing there are best practices. But systems of organized crime are not all alike. There is no one blueprint or general solution, and so following the latest fad is unlikely to deliver the desired result. Instead of trying to copy the quasi-mythological success of a Giuliani or Bukele, policymakers need to understand what kind of organized crime problem they have, what capabilities their city possesses, and what tools are appropriate to the circumstances. This paper looks in-depth at how organized crime is organized in three cities: Chicago, Medellín, and San Salvador. It also considers New York, Bogotá, and Port-au-Prince. I argue that the primary driver of their organization and incentives is their source of criminal revenues. A second major driver of behavior is the degree of criminal political organization, which broadly-speaking takes three forms: atomized individuals, fragmented groups, and competing confederations. These forms are not just the product of their revenues, but are also the result of decades of competition with the state and one another. What policy tools will work hinges on this diagnosis. I look at the evidence for a range of standard policies—from crackdowns to street outreach—and explain why we can expect them to have wildly different impacts depending on the context

Prepared for 2024 IMF & IDB Conference Crime in Latin America , 2024. 48p.

By Richard Matzopoulos, Sarah Truen, and Ian Neethling,

Violence as a health priority impacts low- to middle-income countries (LMICs) disproportionately, which experience mortality rates almost 2.5 times greater than in high-income countries.

South Africa is among the LMICs most affected by violence with homicide rates six times global averages and among the world’s highest rates of gender-based violence, including rape and intimate partner violence. Several historical drivers have contributed, including colonialism, apartheid race-based social control policies, civil unrest and armed struggle, and the violent oppression of social justice movements. Some social drivers have endured, and income inequality—which still largely follows the apartheid-era race profiles and geography—has continued to be entrenched within society.

Within this milieu, certain progressive policies such as the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy and the 2020 National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide have sought to holistically address South Africa’s problem. However, uptake has been sub-optimal and violence has become so normalized that the extent of its harm to society is no longer fully recognized.

The authors in this study present evidence for the prevention of violence including examples from South Africa, and document the enormous toll of violence in terms of both its health impact on mortality and morbidity and its economic cost. In doing so, the study illustrates the costs of prevention are not prohibitive and emphasizes the urgent need to implement effective policies and interventions.

Recommendations in this study include highlighting the urgent need to provide financial and technical support for intersectoral collaboration, multilateral research cooperation, and research capacity to address violence, which in South Africa imposes a significant threat to development. Key aspects to support this agenda include: an integrated violence prevention approach to prevent violence at a societal level; and research to improve the evidence base for violence prevention and the quality of future costing studies.

New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2023. 54p.

By Li Li, Anke Hoeffler, and Teresa Artho

Background: Switzerland is a high-income country with low rates of fatal and nonfatal violence. Possibly due to these low prevalence rates, the costs of violence to Swiss society have received relatively little attention. Objective: This report aims to establish the prevalence rates of homicide and assaults (both physical and sexual) in Switzerland and assess their related tangible and intangible costs. Furthermore, it aims to estimate the economic cost of violence in Switzerland while specifically delving into the economic impact of domestic violence and intimate partner violence (IPV). Methods: We employ a comprehensive approach to categorize violence-related costs into three categories: (1) tangible direct costs; (2) tangible indirect costs; and (3) intangible costs. Within each category, we further classify costs based on the outcome of injuries, distinguishing between fatal and nonfatal violence. To estimate these costs, we use official crime data from the Federal Statistical Office for homicide and assaults. Recognizing the issue of underreporting in physical and sexual assault offenses, victimization surveys are employed to estimate the number of unreported cases. In the absence of Swiss data on the cost of injuries, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides estimates on medical costs, work loss costs, and the value of a statistical life (VSL)/quality of life loss costs. To ensure comparability, violence types are mapped, and costs are adjusted for purchasing power parity between the US and Switzerland. We also make adjustments to reflect the relative size of medical spending between the two countries. For comparison, we use prevalence rates of physical assault from Gallup. Using the same methodology, we also estimate the costs of domestic violence and IPV. Results: Our estimates suggest that the economic cost of violence in Switzerland is about USD 66.3 billion, equivalent to 8.3 percent of the country’s GDP, according to Swiss data. However, the costs could be as high as USD 73.4 billion, representing 9.2 percent of GDP, based on the Gallup World Poll data. Further, domestic violence alone accounts for at least 4.4 percent of Swiss GDP, while IPV accounts for at least 3.2 percent. Conclusions: Despite low Swiss prevalence rates of violence, the estimated costs of said violence are high. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding our estimates due to missing Swiss data on medical and criminal justice costs, as well as the severity of injuries due to assault.

New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2023. 36p

By Perez-Vincent, Santiago M.; Puebla, David; Alvarado, Nathalie; Mejía, Luis Fernando; Cadena, Ximena; Higuera, Sebastián; Niño, José David

Crime and violence have plagued Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) for decades. For the region’s inhabitants, living amid violence disrupts everyday life, while also complicating the operations of the State and private companies, and reducing societal well-being in multiple ways. The fear and experience of being a victim of crime can affect people’s physical and mental health, lower productivity, and shape fundamental decisions, such as where to live and how to pursue academic and professional development. For the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB) Group, the leading development institution in LAC, the high levels of crime and violence in the region pose a serious obstacle to achieving its strategic objectives of strengthening sustainable economic growth, reducing poverty and inequality, and addressing climate change. Quantifying the cost of crime is fundamental to understanding the gravity of the situation and aligning the dialogue to find concrete actions to remedy it. However, doing so is not a simple task. Measuring the cost of crime requires estimating what the lives of LAC citizens would be like if they were not exposed to crime and violence, and comparing this alternative scenario with the current situation. The complexity of the phenomenon of crime and violence—which affects and is affected by multiple individual and social factors—makes such a comparison difficult. The lack of accurate, up-to-date, and comparable data on crime and victimization in most countries in the region further complicates the task. Moreover, crime generates costs not only from the occurrence of criminal acts but also from the anticipation and fear of them, underscoring the importance of incorporating perceptions of insecurity in analyses of its costs and in shaping public policies. The response to crime also implies a reorientation of resources. Thus, these analyses should also include a review of the allocation and efficiency of public spending on security. Despite these difficulties, but mindful of them, the IDB has promoted a series of publications to aid in quantifying the cost of crime and violence in LAC. The most recent of these publications (Jaitman et al. , 2017) estimated that the direct costs of crime (in terms of (i) human capital lost due to homicides, reported non-lethal crimes, and deprivation of liberty; (ii) expenditures by private firms to prevent crime; and (iii) public spending to respond to and prevent crime) averaged between 3 and 3.5 percent of GDP in 17 countries in the region in 2014. This publication continues that line of research. Prepared in partnership with Fedesarrollo, the document expands, updates, and refines the estimates of these three direct costs of crime and violence. The updated results—covering 22 countries in the region—show that the costs of crime remain high, at around 3.4 percent of GDP in 2022. This is roughly equivalent to 78 percent of the public budget for education, twice the public budget for social assistance, and 12 times the budget for research and development in these countries. The new estimates also show the evolution of these costs over time. In addition to updating the estimates for these three direct costs, this new publication explores the indirect costs of crime and violence (i.e., dimensions affected by fear or by the experience of being a victim of crime or violence). It summarizes recent advances in the academic literature focused on quantifying the impact of crime and violence on various dimensions of development. The evidence, much of it from our region, reveals that crime and violence directly affect the objectives of the IDB Group’s new Institutional Strategy. They impact business and investment, reducing economic growth. They affect human capital accumulation and the health at birth of the most vulnerable populations, deepening poverty and inequality. And they are linked to the unrestricted exploitation of natural resources and ecosystem degradation, thus contributing to climate change. The study concludes with the analysis of three complementary studies, carried out within the framework of this publication, that seek to show how crime imposes costs on our region, affecting tourism activity, migration, and business productivity. Together, the analyses presented in both parts of the paper complement each other to provide a comprehensive look at the costs that crime and violence impose on LAC societies. However, much remains to be learned. Emerging dynamics, such as cybercrime, and complex ones, such as organized crime, pose challenges with likely profound impacts for the LAC region. These issues are evolving in a worrisome way. Organized criminal groups, which account for 50 percent of homicides in the Americas (UNODC, 2023), are increasing their presence and influence, raising concerns about rising violence across the region. In LAC, 54 percent of households report the presence of local criminal groups (Uribe et al. , 2022), and between 20 and 50 percent consider organized crime to be the greatest threat to their security (LAPOP, 2012, 2014, 2019). Improving the measurement of these phenomena and the quantification of their impacts should be an essential part of efforts to achieve an effective public policy approach. The IDB seeks to promote sound public sector institutions and policies that translate into more effective, efficient, and transparent governments that serve the needs of the people and foster sustainable and inclusive growth. The main objective of this publication is to provide information to support these objectives by raising awareness of the magnitude and variety of the impacts of crime and violence in our region. We also hope that it will promote debate and the development of new studies to deepen this complex but urgent research agenda.

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank (“IDB”) 2024. 170p.

By Paul M Bisca, Vu Chau, Paolo Dudine, Raphael A Espinoza, Jean-Marc Fournier, Pierre Guérin, Niels-Jakob H Hansen, and Jorge Salas

Violent crime and insecurity remain major barriers to prosperity in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). With just 8 percent of the global population, LAC accounts for a third of the world’s homicides. Building on the existing literature, this paper aims to support economic policymakers and development partners by exploring the interplay between insecurity and macroeconomic outcomes, with emphasis on the relationship between violent crime and growth, the business climate, and public finances. The analysis shows that national-level crime indicators mask huge internal disparities, and that municipalities with 10 percent higher homicide rates have lower economic activity by around 4 percent. The paper develops an innovative measure of insecurity—the share of crime-related news—and shows its association with lower industrial production. Using firm-level data, it also estimates that the direct costs of crime, for firms, are around 7 percent of annual sales, and these are much higher when gangs and drug-trafficking organizations are present. Violent crime rises with macroeconomic instability, inequality, and governance problems. Using a large cross-country panel, the analysis finds that homicides increase when a country is affected by negative growth, high inflation, or a worsening of inequality. Victimization surveys indicate that where populations are concerned with the rule of law—impunity and police corruption—only one in five victims file their case with the police. Lack of trust and crime can be mutually reinforcing. Finally, the paper documents the fiscal burden of security provision and finds that spending tends to be inelastic to crime and that spending efficiency could be improved. The paper concludes with policy lessons and areas for additional collaboration between national authorities, international partners, and key stakeholders. These focus on data collection and analysis, economic policies that may address the root causes and manifestations of crime, strengthening rule of law institutions, and intensifying regional exchanges on security and public finance issues.

Washington, DC: : International Monetary Fund. 2024. 60p.

By Gregorio Gimenez, Liubov Tkacheva, Katarína Svitková and Beatriz Barrado

The world’s urban population is booming; by 2050, six and a half billion people will be living in urban areas (World Bank, 2011a). On the one hand cities are significant population, infrastructure and economy hubs, as well as centers of political power; on the other hand, according to a time-proved assumption provided by the social sciences, the growth of cities tends to lead to disruption and crime (Shaw and McKay, 1942). The focus of this study on the city level is in line with the gradual transformation of governance and the growing importance of urban political economies (Sassen, 2006). In a public policy domain, the urban lens is useful for addressing site-specific issues – especially in the field of security (UN-Habitat, 2012; Jaitman and Guerrero, 2015). Crime rates tend to reveal geographic patterns, with higher concentration in urban areas (Eck and Weisburd, 2015; Johnson et al., 2007; Curman, Andersen and Brantingham, 2015; Gill, Wooditch and Weisburd, 2017). Understanding the degree to which urban concentration affects crime incidents is a fundamental issue to better plan crime prevention strategies and reduce violence. Focusing on the urban dimension of violent crime, the main aim of this study is to examine the relationship between the degree of urban concentration and the number of serious offenses, particularly homicides. Most existing research is focused on developed countries1 and often has methodological problems, mostly due to the use of databases with poor data quality. This problem is especially acute in developing countries, where crime statistics are usually fragmented, inconsistent, and aggregated only to the most macro levels. The lack of information and the weak national statistical systems are an important challenge for conducting rigorous research. It is important to emphasize that our contribution is not only in terms of providing additional evidence, but also in terms of the type of context that we analyze. As Ajzenman and Jaitman (2016:9) remark, providing empirical evidence from developing countries is crucial, given that “developing and developed countries are different in many dimensions, and also because crime levels tend to be much higher in the developing world and, in particular, in Latin America”. Specifically in Latin America, one of the main characteristics of the phenomenon of crime and violence is the degree of geographic concentration. Urban homicide rates are much higher than the average homicide rate, and almost half of all homicides are concentrated in 10% of municipalities (IDB, 2017). Violence in cities is not only homicidal and includes all types of crimes. Among the main causes associated with the concentration of crimes in urban areas, Alvarado and Muggah (2018) highlight those linked to the existence of large poor and peripheral neighbourhoods, the presence of disorderly urbanization and youth unemployment. Regarding our case study, Costa Rica, Vilalta Perdomo, Castillo and Torres (2016) highlight a series of specificities in the link between urbanization and delinquency. They point out that the Costa Rican population is largely concentrated around so-called Gran Área Metropolitana (GAM). They remark that, according to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), in 2011 this area occupied 4% of the national territory and concentrated 53% of the population. Most of the country’s crimes take place in this area, which is characterized by higher unemployment, but also higher education and income levels. Higher education is related to higher earnings, which means that there are more potential victims for crimes against property. The authors also indicate that, within the GAM, San Jose is considered the most important zone of the country for the cocaine trade. Consequently, the GAM as a whole, and San Jose in particular, present the greatest challenges for public policies, especially in relation to urban development and public safety. Our in-depth econometric analysis of Costa Rica – a country of the Global South with significant urbanization and inequality rates – uses highly disaggregated socioeconomic data. It focuses on a wide range of types of crimes, in combination with econometric techniques which test for the presence of endogeineity, which constitutes a significant empirical contribution to the existing literature. The article is organized as follows. The next section presents a literature review in the field of urban violence in Latin America and Costa Rica. Its main objective is to provide a general context of citizen insecurity in the region and, particularly, the country, before presenting the case study in the third section. This empirical part develops an econometric model in order to demonstrate the connection between urban concentration and crime, particularly homicides.

DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.64 (1): e20190127, 2021, 35p.

By Andrés Fernández Arauz , and Camelie Ilie

Costa Rica faces an unprecedented challenge in the form of escalating violence concentrated within specific regions of the country. This report delves into the country's administrative divisions, shedding light on its eighty-two cantons, where critical security data is localized. Recent statistics up to September 2023 underline a concerning situation. While violence in Costa Rica remains lower than the regional average for Latin America, it is the country in the region where violence has grown the most since 1995. Levels of intentional homicide have surpassed the threshold of 10 per 100,000 people, which makes it an epidemic in the country according to the World Health Organization’s classification. Moreover, while violence remains a localized issue, the number of cantons surpassing ten homicides per 100,000 inhabitants has increased, especially in coastal and border regions Much of this increase can be attributed to organized crime and the proliferation of illegal weapons, which is made clear by the fact that the cantons that saw the most increase in violence are territories through which the entry and transit of drugs occur in the region. Beyond homicide, non-lethal assault and intimate partner violence are issues that have their own effects in society. While official statistics put the rate of assault at less than one percent, survey data shows the number to be close to 4 percent, and evenly spread between men and women. Intimate partner violence affects 7 percent of adult women, and has increased over the last few years. These statistics add to a diminishing perception of safety, with 65 percent of the population reporting feeling that the country is not safe. For women, the feeling of unsafety is even higher, with 73 percent of female respondents expressing that they feel a high likelihood of being assaulted, compared to 57 percent of male respondents. Specific recommendations are delineated to counter these challenges. First, a thorough reevaluation and update of previous social programs is imperative. This evaluation should delve deep into identifying flaws in the existing programs. Such scrutiny enables timely corrections and reveals valuable lessons to be gleaned from previous work. Second, a regional focus for targeted interventions is proposed. By channeling efforts into the six cantons witnessing the steepest rise in homicides, particularly those strategically located along coasts and borders, Costa Rica can address the problems at their source. These areas often serve as primary entry points for drug trafficking, requiring concentrated and specialized interventions. Finally, an integrated strategy involving local, national, and international stakeholders is emphasized. Present programs often lack alignment and coordination to address recent violence patterns, emphasizing the need for cohesive collaboration. This strategy should foster a cooperative spirit between local governments, ensuring harmonized and effective efforts. These joint initiatives can significantly curb violence in specific cantons by integrating local insights with national expertise

New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2023. 46p.

By:Natalie Butler

The Washington/Baltimore HIDTA Information Bulletin by Butler et al. highlights the emergence of Bis(2,2,6,6-tetramethyl-4-piperidyl) sebacate (BTMPS), or Tinuvin 770, in Maryland’s illicit drug supply. BTMPS, an industrial UV stabilizer not approved for human use, was found in 0.7% of drug-positive samples (Jan–Mar 2025), often alongside fentanyl, heroin, and xylazine. It acts as a potent L-type calcium channel blocker and non-competitive antagonist at nicotinic receptors and does not respond to naloxone. First detected in 2024, BTMPS has since spread to at least 11 states. In New Mexico, it appeared in counterfeit M30 tablets with reports of severe withdrawal. Individuals who have used it describe BTMPS as smelling like bug spray or burning plastic.

Washington/Baltimore HIDTA Investigative Support Center , 2025. 3p.

By Diana Moldafsky

Drug overdose deaths in the U.S., including from synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, surged during the past 25 years, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Congress appropriated approximately $1.33 billion dollars for the National Guard Counterdrug Program during fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024. This program supports federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement with drug interdiction activities in 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and U.S. Virgin Islands. The joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review certain DOD and National Guard Bureau counterdrug instructions and examine whether they limit support for counterdrug efforts under the law. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD and National Guard Bureau align their counterdrug policies with applicable federal counterdrug laws; and (2) DOD’s changes in guidance during fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024 clarified how counterdrug activities could be conducted. GAO identified and reviewed federal counterdrug laws; evaluated relevant DOD and National Guard Bureau policies; and reviewed changes in DOD policies and guidance related to the implementation of domestic counterdrug activities during the past 6 fiscal years. GAO also interviewed DOD, federal law enforcement, and state National Guard officials. GAO also conducted site visits to locations in California and Texas.

Drug overdose deaths in the U.S., including those from fentanyl, surged over the past 25 years.

To reduce drug trafficking and criminal activity, the Department of Defense and the National Guard help support federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement. The counterdrug support services they offer include information analysis, translation and transcription, and air and ground surveillance.

DOD and the National Guard Bureau work to ensure their counterdrug policies match up with the activities described in federal laws. DOD periodically updates its guidance to further clarify what counterdrug activities can be conducted.

Washington DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025. 35p.

By Hale Utar

This paper examines how firms in an emerging economy are affected by violence due to drug trafficking. Employing rich longitudinal plant-level data covering all of Mexico from 2005–2010, and using an instrumental variable strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous spatiotemporal variation in the homicide rate during the outbreak of drug-trade related violence in Mexico, I show that violence has a significant negative impact on plant output, product scope, employment, and capacity utilization. Resilience to violence differs widely across different types of employment within firms and across firms with different characteristics. Employment decline is driven by blue collar employment only. Dissecting within- and cross-plant heterogeneity points to a local labor supply channel where particularly plants utilizing low-wage, female, blue-collar workers are impacted. Consistent with a blue-collar labor supply shock, the results show a positive impact on average blue-collar wages and a negative impact on average white-collar wages at the firm level. Output elasticity of violence is also shown to be larger among low-wage, female-intensive but also domestically buying and selling plants. These findings show the rise of drug violence has significant distortive effects on domestic industrial development in Mexico and shed light on the characteristics of the most affected firms and the channels through which they are affected.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2022. 121p.

By Kathleen J. Frydl

According to a joint study conducted by Stanford University and the medical journal The Lancet, the opioid crisis is on track to claim 1.2 million U.S. lives in this decade. To better respond to this first-order public health crisis, this white paper proposes an alternative approach to international supply-side counternarcotics policy designed to reduce fentanyl-related overdose deaths. A new target for counternarcotics policy As Thomas R. Dye argues, policy models should “identify what is significant.”  This is the most crucial of all stages, Dye explains, given that “deciding what will be the problems is even more important than deciding what will be the solutions.” This white paper nominates the regulatory and other failures of governance that facilitate the traffic in illegally manufactured fentanyl as the appropriate target for U.S. supply-side counternarcotics policy. Most crucially, countries without established and enforced drug-production rules that fail to govern chemically similar “analogues,” and without established and enforced “know-your-customer” provisions for the transport of drugs or their precursors, tolerate deficits in governance which render them susceptible to large-scale traffic in illegally manufactured fentanyl. The international counternarcotics treaties currently relied upon as a basis for drug policy either do not address, or do not adequately respond to, these failures of governance. .A counternarcotics policy directed at governments differs markedly from the current approach to international supply-side policy, which assigns responsibility to Mexican criminal organizations and relies on law enforcement as the appropriate response. Notably, as several impartial reviews conducted by the Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service observe, counternarcotics policy premised on enforcement against criminal targets has gone without an evaluation “measuring impact, not output.” Equally significant, empirical analyses of drug enforcement suggest that drug traffickers respond to these interventions with competitive adaptation, leaving their networks more resilient and, in some cases, more autonomous. The counternarcotics framework offered here also differs from proposals put forward by drug policy reformers who identify demand for illicit drugs as most significant and, in response, propose a variety of interventions to diminish or more safely satisfy that demand, measuring the effects of these interventions on the reduction of overdose deaths. These crucial interventions notwithstanding, drug supply remains an urgent question for counternarcotics policy. Contrary to a standard narrative, illegally manufactured fentanyl did not appear in U.S. markets in response to demand among opioid users. Although Chinese and Mexican officials remonstrate their American counterparts by insisting that the demand for drugs lies at the heart of the opioid epidemic, research demonstrates that the market for fentanyl specifically is “supply-led”:  that is, users would prefer an opioid other than fentanyl.   Fentanyl is an efficiency gain for traffickers and a highly unreliable and dangerous product for its users. Additionally, the harm-reduction efforts supported by many drug reformers do little to reduce drug exposure, another key driver of overdose deaths. The model set forward here adopts elements of both current counternarcotics policy and the agenda of drug reformers:Supply matters, and so too does the crucial outcome of reducing overdose deaths.       

At the Niskanen Center, we believe policy should be informed by strong causal evidence. Sometimes, though, we encounter promising ideas that are so big or novel that no government has yet tried them, and so scant evidence of their effectiveness exists. Such is the case with the use of trade policy to limit deaths from fentanyl and its analogs in the United States. To begin to fill in the blank spaces around this issue, we asked the political historian Kathleen Frydl to explore the history and potential of trade policy as a shield against an unprecedented public health crisis. 

Trade policy once formed the basis for U.S. counternarcotics efforts, a time when Treasury Department officials threatened and used drastic sanctions like embargoes, along with subtler tools such as slower customs inspections. Over the past year, the President has threatened and implemented tariffs against our most prolific suppliers of illegally manufactured fentanyl. A tariff is a broad-stroke intervention, a direct tax on imports meant to protect a domestic industry. It punishes both domestic firms and foreign exporters, and it generates collateral damage, including supply chain disruptions and retaliation, without punishing specific bad actors. For these reasons, tariffs serve better as threats at the negotiating table than as tools of policy. To achieve a targeted outcome, a more targeted approach may deliver more–while disrupting less. 

A less-known alternative, border adjustments, might accomplish many of the same goals as tariffs – compelling other countries to pick up the tab for negative externalities they generate – but can be deployed within the existing framework of international trade agreements, making them an attractive option to address specific threats to public health and national security. A border adjustment levels the trade playing field, imposing costs on imports from other countries to account for costs borne by Americans. To quote from this paper, border adjustments “balance rather than bias trade.” 

That fentanyl has blown apart the old drug enforcement paradigm is widely noted among drug policy analysts. Produced in laboratories, often from legal and regulated substances, the drug is difficult to snuff out at its point of origin, and its potency and physical innocuousness make it hard to detect at customs checkpoints. In fact, most fentanyl seems to enter the country not on the backs of undocumented migrants, but nestled within freight or the luggage of seemingly legitimate commercial travelers. Meanwhile, evidence-based interventions meant to reduce demand work best to mitigate the harms of chronic opioid abuse but do little to reduce the danger of exposure to fentanyl, including unintentional consumption.

Border adjustments target the failures of governments that allow criminal activities to flourish. Placing governments in the target frame seems a logical way to incentivize the large-scale reforms needed to stem the flow of fentanyl. Criminals shift tactics and their organizations evolve; U.S. counternarcotics policy should be pegged to meaningful outcomes that will reduce overdose deaths, regardless of the current face of drug traffic. And, if governments refuse to implement needed reforms, at least border adjustments generate revenue to offset the high costs of harm reduction and drug treatment now borne by US taxpayers, insurers, and philanthropies.

We do not believe there is any one answer to the overdose epidemic. Synthetic opioid analogs are moving targets, changing almost daily in chemical composition and psychological effect. The drug trafficking organizations that distribute them and the chemical producers who supply their ingredients are sophisticated, often complex conglomerates. Threats of tariffs may satisfy an understandable urge to punch back at a foreign menace, but their effects on the human misery opioids cause is essentially untestable. This paper explores a more measured approach that may better serve the objectives of supply-side counternarcotics.

Washington, DC: Niskanen Center, 2025. 46p.

By The Drug Enforcement Administration

Mexican cartels’ production, trafficking, and distribution of powerful illicit synthetic drugs, chiefly fentanyla and methamphetamine, represent a dire threat to public health, the rule of law, and national security in the United States. The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels (CJNG), together with their procurement, distribution, and financial support networks stretching across Latin America, China, and other key global nodes, remain the dominant threats for the trafficking of these and other drugs into the United States. In the 12-month period ending in October 2024, 84,076 Americans died from a drug overdose, according to the most recent available provisional statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), underscoring the devastating effect these cartels have on our country. Although these numbers show a 25 percent decline since the same 12-month period last year – when the country lost 112,910 people to drug poisonings – demonstrating positive momentum in the fight against these drugs and the organizations trafficking them, the threat remains grave. The trend is hopeful, however. October 2024 was the eleventh consecutive month in which CDC reported a reduction, and the current statistics represent the largest 12-month reduction in drug overdose deaths ever recorded. Fentanyl and other synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine, are the primary drivers of fatal drug overdose deaths nationwide, while other illicit drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, and diverted prescription opioids still contribute meaningfully to the drug threat landscape in the United States. However, overdose and poisoning deaths involving fentanyl and other synthetic opioids caused more deaths than all other categories of drugs. This exceptionally deadly drug – often pressed into pills resembling legitimate medications and presented as authentic to customers or mixed into other drugs – creates a heightened risk of fatal overdose for unsuspecting or otherwise opioid-naïve users. The production and trafficking of drugs by Mexican cartels has fundamentally altered the drug and criminal landscapes in North America. The cartels capitalize on the relative ease of synthetic drug production compared to the physical and environmental limitations of traditional plant-based drug production to generate immense revenues. The cartels maintain steady supply chains for obtaining the precursor chemicals, primarily from China and India, necessary to produce these synthetic drugs. The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels, in particular, control clandestine production sites in Mexico, smuggling routes into the United States, and distribution hubs in key U.S. cities. The cartels work with U.S. drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and violent gangs to distribute drugs throughout the country, all exploiting social media and messaging applications to extend their reach to a larger and younger customer base. The cartels’ extensive, complex, and adaptable networks present formidable challenges across the U.S. law enforcement, national security, regulatory, financial, and health and wellness sectors.  

Washington, DC: DEA, 2025. 80p.