UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

From the document: "The United States is an Arctic nation, and the region is critical to the defense of our homeland, the protection of U.S. national sovereignty, and our defense treaty commitments. I am issuing this 2024 Arctic Strategy to guide the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in a concerted approach to preserve the Arctic as a stable region in which the U.S. homeland remains secure and vital national interests are safeguarded. Major geopolitical changes are driving the need for this new strategic approach to the Arctic, including Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the NATO Alliance, increasing collaboration between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, and the accelerating impacts of climate change. This increasingly accessible region is becoming a venue for strategic competition, and the United States must stand ready to meet the challenge alongside Allies and partners. This new DoD strategy directs the Department to enhance its Arctic capabilities, deepen engagement with Allies and partners, and exercise our forces to build readiness for operations at high latitudes. The document supports the 2022 National Security Strategy as well as the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and its lines of effort implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy direction to adopt a 'monitor-and-respond' approach to preserving stability in the Arctic. This strategy represents prudent and measured efforts to protect U.S. interests in the face of new challenges and an evolving security environment."

Washington DC. UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 21 JUN, 2024. 28p.

KATULIS, BRIAN

From the document: "[1] The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip: [a.] Support Israel's self-defense and objective of eliminating the threat posed by Hamas; [b.] Secure the safe return of hostages; [c.] Prevent a wider regional war; [d.] Protect civilians and respond to a growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza; and [e.] Create a post-war plan for reconstruction leading to a two-state solution and wider regional normalization efforts in coordination with regional and international partners. [2] Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other."

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (WASHINGTON, D.C.). 1014. 9p.

United States. Department Of State.

From the document: "The United States seeks to work with allies, partners, and stakeholders across the globe to shape the design, development, governance, and use of cyberspace and digital technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance security and combat cybercrime; promote and protect the exercise of human rights, democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational challenges. The United States believes in the critical role that the responsible uses of digital technologies and interconnected networks play in empowering people, and that an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet enables new solutions to global challenges. Autocratic states and other actors, however, have used cyber and digital tools to threaten international peace and stability, harm others, exert malign influence, and undermine the exercise of human rights. An innovative, rights-respecting international cyberspace and digital technology policy strategy is foundational to U.S. strategic, security, economic, and foreign policy interests. Leadership in cyberspace, the digital economy, and emerging digital technologies is central to advancing the U.S. vision set forth in the October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) of a 'free, open, secure, and prosperous world.' As the lead foreign policy agency for the United States, the Department of State is advancing the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) and its objectives of forging international partnerships to build an open, resilient, defensible, and rights-respecting digital ecosystem."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 6 MAY, 2024

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

From the document: "Fulcrum represents the Department's ambitious Information Technology (IT) advancement strategy designed to leverage the power of technology to drive transformative change and serves as a tipping point for catalyzing digital modernization for the warfighter. To propel the Department forward, we must ensure continued success and relevance in the digital age. Fulcrum will enable achievement of the DoD mission and strategic objectives with unparalleled efficiency and effectiveness. [...] The DoD Chief Information Officer's (DoD CIO) mission is to 'connect', 'protect', and 'perform'. Fulcrum outlines a vision guided by four lines of effort (LOEs) representing a strategic shift that embraces technology as a mission enabler. [...] Fulcrum features the DoD CIO's IT goals and objectives for Fiscal Years (FYs) 2025-2029 that provide essential support to the priorities in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the supporting DoD Strategic Management Plan (SMP)."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 6 JUN, 2024

By Norah W. Friar, Molly Merrill-Francis, Elizabeth M. Parker, Carlos Siordia, Thomas R. Simon

Secure firearm storage might help reduce access by children and other unauthorized users and the related risk for injury or death. Information about state-specific prevalence of firearm storage practices can be used to develop secure storage messages and programs; however, such information is often unavailable. Data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, by respondent characteristics, were used to estimate prevalence of keeping firearms in or around the home and related storage practices for eight states that administered the firearm safety module in 2021 or 2022. Overall, 18.4% (California) to 50.6% (Alaska) of respondents reported that a firearm was kept in or around their home. Among those with a firearm in or around the home, 19.5% (Minnesota) to 43.8% (North Carolina) reported that a firearm was stored loaded. Across all eight states, approximately one half of those with a loaded firearm stored at least one loaded firearm unlocked. Among respondents with a child and a loaded firearm in the home, 25.2% (Ohio) to 41.4% (Alaska) reported that a loaded firearm was stored unlocked. Variability in firearm storage practices highlights the importance of local data and suggests opportunities to tailor prevention efforts to specific population groups to reduce risk for firearm handling by children without adult supervision, and other unauthorized persons.

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Vol. 73 / No. 23 , June 13, 2024.

By Alex R. Piquero, John K. Roman

In 2020, the US experienced the largest 1-year increase in homicide since 1960. The spike began in the first few months of the year, accelerating during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency measures, the murder of George Floyd, and social protests.1 Three additional observations are relevant. First, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that the homicide increase in 2020 was due to firearm injuries. While the overall homicide rate increased 28.4%, the firearm homicide rate increased 34.6%.2 Second, the spike in violence was concentrated within certain demographic groups. CDC researchers found 19 384 victims of firearms homicide in 2020.3 Of those victims, 61% were Black individuals, and they experienced firearm homicide at 14 times the rate of White indviduals in 2020. This racial disparity does not exist for other types of violence.4 Third, the largest increases in death by firearm homicide were for Black men aged between 10 and 44 years old

JAMA Network Open. 2024;7(5):e2412946. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.12946

By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.

By Rosanna Smart

Background

Despite growing evidence about how state-level firearm regulations affect overall rates of injury and death, little is known about whether potential harms or benefits of firearm laws are evenly distributed across demographic subgroups. In this systematic review, we synthesized available evidence on the extent to which firearm policies produce differential effects by race and ethnicity on injury, recreational or defensive gun use, and gun ownership or purchasing behaviors.

Main body

We searched 13 databases for English-language studies published between 1995 and February 28, 2023 that estimated a relationship between firearm policy in the USA and one of eight outcomes, included a comparison group, evaluated time series data, and provided estimated policy effects differentiated by race or ethnicity. We used pre-specified criteria to evaluate the quality of inference and causal effect identification. By policy and outcome, we compared policy effects across studies and across racial/ethnic groups using two different ways to express effect sizes: incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and rate differences. Of 182 studies that used quasi-experimental methods to evaluate firearm policy effects, only 15 estimated policy effects differentiated by race or ethnicity. These 15 eligible studies provided 57 separate policy effect comparisons across race/ethnicity, 51 of which evaluated interpersonal violence. In IRR terms, there was little consistent evidence that policies produced significantly different effects for different racial/ethnic groups. However, because of different baseline homicide rates, similar relative effects for some policies (e.g., universal background checks) translated into significantly greater absolute differences in homicide rates among Black compared to white victims.

Conclusions

The current literature does not support strong conclusions about whether state firearm policies differentially benefit or harm particular racial/ethnic groups. This largely reflects limited attention to these questions in the literature and challenges with detecting such effects given existing data availability and statistical power. Findings also emphasize the need for additional rigorous research that adopts a more explicit focus on testing for racial differences in firearm policy effects and that assesses the quality of race/ethnicity information in firearm injury and crime datasets.

Inj Epidemiol. 2023; 10: 67.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

By Glenn L. Pierce; David Lambert; Daniel Trovato; and Peter Gagliardi

This study examines the innovative use of firearms related evidence to enhance violent crime investigations in New Jersey. This effort changed the use of firearms forensic evidence from a sole evidential focus to one that also incorporates a premonitory focus required to generate investigative leads. This project demonstrated the critical importance of fusing firearms forensic evidence such as ballistics imaging with locally available information, such as arrest and incident data on a statewide basis. This study further demonstrated the value of ballistics imaging to connect previously unconnected incidents, individuals, and weapons particularly when combined with other law enforcement data sets. This project demonstrated the critical importance of fusing firearms forensic evidence such as ballistics imaging with locally available information, such as arrest and incident data on a statewide basis. This study further demonstrated the value of ballistics imaging to connect, previously unconnected incidents, individuals, and weapons particularly when combined with other law enforcement data sets. It illustrated the critical need of information sharing across forensic, criminal intelligence (such as fusion and real time crime centers), and investigative entities across all levels of government – local, state, and federal - in supporting violent crime suppression efforts. The study is a mixed methods approach to policy analysis using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The researchers’ analyzed ballistics imaging submissions over a multi-year period in addition to examining open source and agency documents that tracked many of the crime reduction projects the New Jersey State Police incorporated into their crime gun intelligence effort.

Boston: Northeastern University, 2023. 120p.

By V A Pear , J P Schleimer , A J Aubel , S Buggs , C E Knoepke , R Pallin , A B Shev , E Tomsich , G J Wintemute , N Kravitz-Wirtz

Extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs) provide a civil mechanism to temporarily remove firearm access from individuals at high risk of harming themselves or others. Evidence and theory suggest that ERPOs can prevent firearm-related harm, but the policy's impact on racial/ethnic equity is largely unknown. To examine potential inequities by race/ethnicity in public perceptions and use of California's ERPO law, we drew on two complementary data sources: 1) a 2020 state-representative survey of California adults, and 2) ERPO court documents for the first 3 years of policy implementation (2016-2018). Majorities (54-89%) of all racial/ethnic groups reported that ERPOs are at least sometimes appropriate, and 64-94% were willing to ask a judge for an ERPO for a family member. However, Black and Hispanic/Latinx survey participants less often perceived ERPOs as appropriate and were less willing to serve as petitioners, with Black participants citing lack of knowledge about ERPOs and not trusting the system to be fair as their top reasons for unwillingness. Similarly, review of ERPO court documents revealed that no family or household members served as petitioners for Black and Hispanic/Latinx ERPO respondents. Additionally, Black respondents were the least likely to have documented access to a firearm and legal representation in court. Racial/ethnic equity in ERPO use may be improved by reducing barriers to petitioning, incorporating non-law enforcement intervention professionals like behavioral health specialists into the ERPO process, providing legal assistance to respondents and petitioners, and investing in the social safety net.

Prev Med. 2022 Dec;165(Pt A):107181. doi: 10.1016/j.ypmed.2022.107181. Epub 2022 Aug 6. PMID: 35940474.

By Hillel Y. Levin & Timothy D. Lytton

In 2005, Congress passed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), granting the firearms industry sweeping immunity from civil lawsuits. However, PLCAA immunity is not absolute. This Article demonstrates that both state and federal courts have fundamentally misread PLCAA when adjudicating cases involving the scope of gun industry immunity. Properly understood, PLCAA permits lawsuits against the gun industry so long as they are based on statutory causes of action rather than common law. While broadly preempting state common law claims, PLCAA affords state legislatures autonomy in deciding how to regulate the gun industry within their borders.

Additionally, this Article addresses unresolved questions concerning constitutional limits on gun industry regulation. PLCAA explicitly strikes a balance between three constitutional principles. It safeguards the individual right to keep and bear arms by protecting the gun industry from civil litigation that would unduly curtail civilian access to firearms. It insists that the separation of powers requires that gun industry regulation should derive from legislation not common law adjudication. It affords state governments autonomy in deciding how to regulate the gun industry, recognizing that there are regional differences in attitudes about how to best reduce firearms-related violence. We counsel against interpretations of the Second Amendment’s application to gun industry regulation that would expand the right to keep and bear arms at the expense of other important constitutional principles such as the separation of powers and federalism

75 Florida Law Review 833 (2023),

By Avneet Bhullar, Jonathan Shipley, […], and Jeffry Nahmias, , et al,

Background

In January of 2019, Washington State (WA) passed Initiative 1639 making it illegal for persons <21 years-old to buy assault weapons (AWs). This study aimed to evaluate the effects of WA-1639 on firearm-related incidents involving AWs by those <21 years-old in WA, hypothesizing a decrease in incidents after WA-1639.

Methods

Retrospective (2016-2021) data on firearm violence (FV) events were gathered from the Gun Violence Archive. The rate of FV was weighted per 100,000 people. Total monthly incidents, injuries, and deaths were compared pre-law (January 2016-December 2018) vs post-law (January 2019-December 2021) implementation. Mann-Whitney U tests and Poisson’s regression were used for analysis.

Results

From 4091 FV incidents (2210 (54.02%) pre-law vs 1881 (45.98%) post-law), 50 involved AWs pre- (2.3%) and 15 (.8%) post-law. Of these, 11 were committed by subjects <21 years-old pre-law and only one occurred post-law. Total incidents of FV (z = −3.80, P < .001), AW incidents (z = −4.28, P < .001), and AW incidents involving someone <21 years-old (z = −3.01, P < .01) decreased post-law. Additionally, regression analysis demonstrated the incident rate ratio (IRR) of all FV (1.23, 95% CI [1.10-1.38], P < .001), all AW FV incidents (3.42, 95% CI [1.70-6.89], P = .001), and AW incidents by subjects <21 years-old (11.53, 95% CI [1.52-87.26], P = .02) were greater pre-law vs post-law.

Discussion

Following implementation of WA-1639, there was a significant decrease in FV incidents and those involving AWs by individuals <21 years-old. This suggests targeted firearm legislation may help curtail FV. Further studies evaluating FV after legislation implementation in other states is needed to confirm these findings.

The American SurgeonTM. 2024;0(0). doi:10.1177/00031348241244644 (Online First)

By Jessica Katzenstein

Six years after the germinal United States protests against anti-Black police violence in Ferguson, MO, and months after the 2020 police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, police in mine-resistant vehicles have once again occupied both the streets and mass public attention. In 2014, images from the Ferguson protests—of snipers pointing semi automatic rifles into crowds and officers tear-gassing unarmed civilians—prompted activists and politicians to compare the St. Louis suburb to occupied Gaza, Ukraine, or Iraq.2 During the summer of 2020, as the U.S. witnessed its largest public uprisings since the 1960s, police militarization again came under scrutiny. The Department of Homeland Security flew surveillance aircraft over protests in 15 cities, as officers on the ground deployed flash-bang grenades, sound cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas against peaceful demonstrators.3 Since protests began, at least 14 local law enforcement agencies in 10 states have received free mine-resistant vehicles built for the U.S. military.4 In response, some lawmakers have revived efforts to curtail such transfers of military equipment.5 Reform groups are advocating to demilitarize the police by limiting when and how they can use armored vehicles and camouflage uniforms.6 In this moment of potential transformation, we must analyze both the deep roots and the recent upsurge of police “militarization” in order to grasp what calls for “demilitarizing” the police could mean. This paper argues that today’s high level of police militarization is one of the cruel, complex domestic costs of recent American wars abroad. Police militarization is in a sense as old as U.S. policing itself, yet it has exploded since September 11, 2001 and its intensification must be counted among the costs of this country’s post-9/11 wars.

Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute, 2020. 20p.

By Livia Wagner and Thi Hoang

   The coronavirus is not only claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, but is also causing a global economic crisis that is expected to rival or exceed that of any recession in the past 150 years. Although decisive action and containment measures are helping flatten the curve of infection, such measures inevitably deepen and lengthen the economic recession. In the worst-case scenario, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that up to 25 million people will lose their jobs worldwide. Poverty, lack of social or economic opportunity and limited labour protections are the main root causes and drivers that render people vulnerable or cause them to fall victim to human trafficking. This unprecedented crisis will likely exacerbate all of those factors and result in developments (see Figure 1) that must be noted by anti human-trafficking communities and stakeholders.  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2020, 41pg

By Rachel Martin

Gun violence is widely considered a serious public health problem in the United States, but less understood is what this means, if anything, for evolving Second Amendment doctrine. In New York Pistol & Rifle Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Supreme Court held that laws infringing Second Amendment rights can only be sustained if the government can point to sufficient historical analogues. Yet, what qualifies as sufficiently similar, a suitable number of jurisdictions, or the most important historical eras all remain unclear. Under Bruen, lower courts across the country have struck down gun laws at an alarming pace, while scholars and jurists continue debating the so-called true meaning of centuries-old firearm restrictions at times when slavery existed, women could not vote, and it took Thomas Jefferson longer to travel from Washington, D.C. to Williamsburg, VA than it currently takes to fly to the other side of the planet. This approach ignores the historical relevance of the government’s authority, if not outright duty, to respond to public health crises even if constitutional rights were implicated. The lack of historical laws related to mass shootings, large capacity magazines, and bullets designed to expand inside the body reflects the drastic evolution of gun violence rather than an impenetrable Second Amendment scope. Indeed, while state police powers to protect public health and safety preexist the Constitution, gun violence would have hardly been a priority for elected officials historically. Thus, the absence of robust, widespread gun regulations hardly reflects a consensus understanding of Second Amendment protections. Instead, examining accepted government restrictions for public health crises such as infectious diseases may provide better insight into the scope of authority to limit constitutional rights to protect the public. A public health law lens also helps to clarify that cementing policy options to emerging public health problems lacks historical pedigree.

Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2023, 20pg

By U.S. Government Accountability Office; 

  On January 6, 2021, thousands of demonstrators surrounded the U.S. Capitol Building. Demonstrators attacked and injured law enforcement officers and eventually breached the building. The Capitol Police is responsible for protecting the Congress, its Members, staff, visitors, and facilities. The Capitol Police Board oversees the Capitol Police. GAO was asked to review the Capitol Police’s physical security efforts for January 6. This report addresses the Capitol Police and the Board’s: (1) physical security planning for January 6; (2) response to that day’s events, including the procedures for obtaining outside assistance; and (3) process for assessing and mitigating physical security risks. GAO reviewed Capitol Police plans, procedures, hearing statements, timelines, and other documents related to the planning and response on January 6 and how the Capitol Police assesses security risks. GAO also interviewed officials from the Capitol Police Board, the Capitol Police, the Architect of the Capitol, and other federal, state, and local agencies. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations to the Capitol Police Board and the Capitol Police, including finalizing and documenting procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency, addressing security risks, and considering security recommendations. The Capitol Police Board did not take a position on GAO’s recommendations. The Capitol Police agreed with GAO’s recommendations.  

Washington DC: GAO. 2022, 68pg

By Holger Anders

  This Briefing Paper looks at sources and pathways through which al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-linked extremists in Mali obtain their arms, ammunition, and explosives. This review includes an analysis of the materiel’s origins, types, and ages. The Briefing Paper presents the author’s assessment of some 800 arms and 12,000 ammunition casings that national and international authorities recovered and granted access to following extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022. Introduction -  By 2022, Mali had faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by violent extremists. Since 2015, this violence has also spread from northern to central and southern parts of Mali, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. This Briefing Paper investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used by al-Qaeda- and IslamicState linked extremists (‘extremists’) as ‘tools of violence’ used in their attacks from 2015 to 2022. It provides an update on findings previously published by the Small Arms Survey concerning the proliferation and trafficking of illicit materiel in northern Mali prior to 2015. Specifically, this Briefing Paper focuses on military materiel legally produced and transferred by state actors before being diverted to extremist use in Mali.2 In so doing, the Briefing Paper examines three topics: 1. continuity in extremist procurement of their ‘tools of violence’; 2. changes in illicitly trafficked materiel and their sources; and 3. extremist network connections identified by the monitoring of this material. A confidential database maintained by the author provides the basis for the technical information concerning extremist-used arms and other material in this Briefing Paper.3 That database contains information about some 400 extremist attacks occurring across Mali between 2015 and 2022 from sites in which national and international authorities recovered extremist-used materiel that was made available for inspection by the author. The database also contains some 200 entries of extremist propaganda claims—documented in videos and texts on social media—relating to extremist attacks in Mali from 2012 to 2022. Interviewees included in this Briefing Paper are not uniformly identified for reasons of security and confidentiality. All information presented in graphs, illustrative maps, and tables is based on the author’s work and information contained within the database. The Briefing Paper first looks at security developments in Mali since 2015.5 It then looks at extremist-held armaments in Mali prior to 2015 and at continuity and change in these armaments after that. The discussion is supplemented with insights into network connections between extremist groups in Mali.6 Key findings Extremists continue to have access to arms and other materiel—including material of recent production— through capture from armed forces and illicit trafficking from the subregion. Libya remains a prominent source for illicitly trafficking military materiel to Mali; however, other sub-regional sources exist. These sources include components for commercial explosives used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mali. Established extremist groups use materiel to support the creation of new cells, which is a key mechanism in the spread of violent extremism in Mali.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey. 2024, 16pg

By F. Lee Francis

This article is the culmination of a yearlong research project, and it is the first to address addiction and drug use in the area of Second Amendment Law. I argue that addicts may be disarmed, if they are dangerous. My dangerousness test centers on illicit use and imminent danger. That is, do the facts and circumstances prove that an individual is in fact a danger. To put it another way, disarmament is appropriate when there exists demonstrable evidence that a person poses a significant and imminent risk of causing public injury. The article develops and expands upon some themes and arguments that were first sketched out in my articles, Armed and Under the Influence: The Second Amendment and the Intoxicant Rule After Bruen (Forthcoming in the Marquette Law Review (2024) and Defining Dangerousness: When Disarmament is Appropriate (Forthcoming Texas Tech Law Review 2024).

There is growing confusion within the lower courts regarding when an individual, particularly those who have a history of drug use or addiction, may have their Second Amendment rights restricted. This paper intends to clarify the appropriate standard. The goal of this article is to aid in determining when an individual should be permanently disarmed.

Part I surveys the history of addiction. This section examines the commonness of addiction around the time of the founding to the early twentieth century. Furthermore, Part I also reviews the relevant legislative action relating to firearm possession, use, and control and addiction. The essential claim of Part I contends that modern laws restricting the possession of a firearm due to addiction are unconstitutional. Following an examination of the relevant history and legislation, Part II considers the arguments in favor of prohibiting addicts from possessing firearms. Part III focuses on the modern and developing controversies surrounding criminalizing the possession of firearms because of an individual’s history of addiction. Part IV, then, examines when an addict may be disarmed.

Francis, F. Lee, The Addiction Restriction: Addiction and the Right to Bear Arms. 2024, 48pg