By Yannick Deepen and Sabine Kurtenbach

Non-state armed actors (NSAAs) come in a variety of shapes and sizes, including warlordled groups, insurgencies, militias, and organised-crime syndicates to name just the most prominent examples hereof. In war or lower-level armed conflict, as well as violence-prone contexts, these groups pose acute problems for peacebuilding, democratic governance, and sustainable development. They control resources and territories, as well as compete, cooperate, or align with political and economic elites both within and beyond the state to promote the unstable status quo that serves their interests. Various challenges arise when dealing with NSAAs. Prevailing strategies vary between repression, co-optation, and submission to the rule of law. This analysis maps cross-regional trends regarding NSAAs based on available datasets. On this basis we develop a typology for NSAAs and a conceptual frame for their transformation. We then apply this to three paradigmatic case studies – Colombia, Mali, the Philippines – and formulate recommendations for the designing of improved strategies vis-à-vis development cooperation and other external actors.

GIGA Working Papers, No. 337,

By Omar Ashour

How did ISIS – a widely hated, massively outnumbered and ludicrously outgunned organisation – manage to occupy over 120 cities, towns and villages from the Southern Philippines to Western Libya? Seeking to understand ISIS’s combat effectiveness, Omar Ashour analyses the military and tactical innovations of ISIS and their predecessors in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt. He shows how their capacity to mix conventional military tactics with innovative guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism strategies allowed ISIS to expand and endure beyond expectations.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021.

By Rohan Gunaratna

The conflicts in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria will have a generational impact. The 7 October 2023 attack against Israel in Gaza and its consequences have set back the prospects of a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue and may attract a new wave of foreign fighters to embark on terrorist activities like what was seen following the military debacles in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. What can be done to stem another rise of the terrorist fighters?

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 3p.

Edited by Katharina Karcher, Yordanka Dimcheva ,· Mireya Toribio Medina. Mia Parkes

This open access book sheds light on collective practices of remembering, imagining and anticipating in relation to recent acts of urban terrorism in Europe. Analysing a range of personal and collective responses to urban terrorism in contemporary Europe, this book shows that current debates on this issue are shaped by multiple co-existing and intersecting memories of political violence in the past. Moreover, despite public declarations of unity and solidarity, collective memories of urban terror in contemporary Europe are far from consensual - memory can be both a catalyst for and an impediment to social and political change. Drawing on case studies from a range of European countries and creative responses by survivors, artists, and poets, this interdisciplinary volume introduces readers to key methods (e.g. discourse analysis and (auto-)ethnography) and concepts (e.g. Lieux de Mémoire and ‘grassroots memorials’) for the study of the memorialization of terror attacks.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 317p.

By Philip J. Cook and Audrey Vil

n Durham (of which 160 died) in 1011 distinct incidents – about 200 incidents per year on average. As a result of DPD investigations, 46% of the fatal-shooting incidents resulted in at least one arrest, compared with just a 16% arrest rate for incidents in which the victim(s) survived. The arrestees were processed in the Durham courts (although a handful of cases were transferred to federal court). While most defendants were prosecuted, some had all charges dismissed for various reasons. The remaining cases -- those that have been prosecuted – represent 42% of the fatal shooting incidents and just 11% of the nonfatal shooting incidents. For all 1011 shooting incidents combined, there have been 74 with a conviction in the Durham courts, 6 that were federally indicted, and 10 that were processed as juveniles (so that we lacked access to court records). Another 62 cases were still pending as of July 2022. If we assume that all of the federal cases and the cases pending in

Durham courts eventually result in a conviction, the fraction of shooting incidents in which there was both an arrest and conviction was about 15%. Thus when there is a criminal shooting in Durham, it is unlikely (85%) that anyone will be arrested and convicted. These results are troubling, not only because the system has failed to deliver justice, but also because of the urgent need to prevent future gun violence in Durham. An increase in the arrest and conviction rates for gun violence cases would reduce future gun violence through several mechanisms: incapacitating dangerous perpetrators from engaging in subsequent violence; deterring some would-be shooters by communicating a credible threat that shooting someone will result in legal consequences; and interrupting cycles of revenge. It is also plausible that a stronger performance by the police and courts would serve to send a clear message that the authorities are determined to help improve the quality of life in violence-impacted

communities. This report is intended to provide a data-based description of gun violence and the law enforcement response since 2017. It is not intended to explain the observed patterns, or provide guidance on how performance can be improved. Our hope is that documenting outcomes of police investigations and court processing will help motivate further inquiry and action.

Durham, NC: Duke University, 2023. 31p.

By Benjamin Jongleux and Nicolas Florquin

Prior to the recent changes to the European Union (EU) Firearms Directive, and due to inconsistent national regulations, several types of readily convertible firearms could be purchased with few restrictions in a number of EU member states, modified into lethal weapons and trafficked within the region. This situation contributed to the growing criminal use of models that were easy to convert into lethal firearms. In response, the EU adopted a number of new regulatory measures from 2017 onwards and supported joint law enforcement operations that specifically targeted trafficking in converted firearms. Based on research undertaken by the Small Arms Survey, this paper reviews these EU efforts and the evolving dynamics of firearms conversion in Europe as a whole. It argues that while EU member states are moving towards greater harmonization of their national legislation, there have been significant delays in some countries, and that the interpretation of certain standards and procedures remains inconsistent. The paper also argues that improving the strategic intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking in Europe remains critical for measuring the success of these efforts and for detecting emerging threats.

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers , no 70, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium 2020. 16p

By Europol

This report constitutes the first of a series of analytical products complementing the Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, prepared by the UNODC Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB). The aim of the present report is to analyse illicit firearms trafficking and related forms of crime from a specific geographical angle, namely the European Union region, and to deepen the understanding of the illicit firearms trafficking situation in the region and its interconnection to the rest of the world. The report is based on the quantitative and qualitative data compiled by UNODC in the Illicit Arms Flows Dataset. To further enhance the evidence base on the phenomenon, this report complements the data from the Illicit Arms Flows Dataset with other qualitative and case-based data sources, in particular previously collected data by the Flemish Peace Institute, in addition to a review of existing literature on illicit firearms trafficking in Europe and to the information exchanged among practitioners during a cross-regional expert meeting on this topic organized by UNODC in October 2019. By analysing these data sources in a joint manner, the report aims to significantly improve the understanding of the scope, characteristics and dynamics of illicit firearms trafficking into, from and across the European Union and contribute to the evidence base required to efficiently combat this phenomenon both within the region and globally. Seizures of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition in the European Union . As for the Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, the present report is predominantly based on firearms seizure data, which can be considered the best proxy for developing estimates of the scope and value of illicit firearms trafficking. However, the currently available data on firearms seizures in Europe needs to be interpreted carefully because of shortcomings with regard to the quality and comprehensiveness of the available data as a result of poor registration procedures, the lack of a uniform collection and registration approach or the lack of firearms expertise among local law enforcement officials seizing firearms.. More fundamentally, it is crucial to keep in mind that firearms can be seized in very diverse contexts and that seized firearms are not necessarily trafficked firearms or even illegally held at the time of seizure. In addition, national differences in seizure data are not necessarily a reflection of different illicit gun markets in these countries but can also be attributed to differences in national legislation and procedures and to the different levels of priority given to combat illicit firearms trafficking in these countries. Close to 60 per cent of European Union Member States provided data on seized firearms to UNODC but with varying levels of details and completeness . In total 16 European Union Member States provided quantitative data on seized and trafficked firearms in 2016 - 2017 to UNODC via the Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire (IAFQ), a new globally standardized tool developed by UNODC for enhancing the evidence base on illicit firearms trafficking and the global understanding of the firearms trafficking phenomenon. It also serves the purpose of supporting monitoring of target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals. Through this target, Member States committed, among other objectives, to significantly reduce illicit arms flows by 2030. The completeness of data varies extensively among the reporting countries as many countries face challenges with providing data that goes beyond basic information on the amount and type of weapon seized. While 16 Member States submitted data on total number of firearms seizures disaggregated by

type of weapon, data on tracing requests and outcomes was submitted by only six and eight Member States, respectively. Shotguns, pistols and rifles emerge as most seized firearms within the European Union, making up almost 70 per cent of the reported seized firearms . The 16 European Union Member States that submitted seizure data via the IAFQ seized in total about 50,000 firearms in 2016 and 40,000 firearms in 2017, representing nine per cent and seven per cent of global reported seizure, respectively. Significant national differences in the number of seized firearms can be observed: while some Member States reported thousands of seized firearms annually, other Member States reported much lower seizures.

. Shotguns (30 percent) are the most widely seized firearms in these Member States, especially in Southern European countries. Also pistols (22 per cent) and rifles (15 percent) are frequently seized. Revolvers (8 per cent) and military-grade firearms (2 percent), such as machine guns and submachine guns, are seized much less frequently. In some countries, as for example in Sweden (9 per cent) and Croatia (7 per cent), the share of seized submachine guns and machine guns is however much higher and equals or surpasses the share of other types of firearms. Compared to other regions, the share of firearms seized in Europe also includes a significant proportion of pneumatic, blank-firing and gas weapons. Illicit possession ranks as number one justification for the seizure of firearms . Firearms are seized in various contexts in the European Union. In line with the findings of the UNODC Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, the most frequent legal justification for firearms seizures in the European Union in 2016-2017 is ‘illicit possession’ (34 per cent)..

The share of seizures with ‘illicit trafficking’ as legal justification fluctuated between zero - four per cent in the reporting Member States. This is believed to be an underestimate as the offence of illicit possession is generally an easier and quicker way for law enforcement and other relevant agencies to justify the prohibition of a transfer than the offence of illicit trafficking. The analysis of IAFQ data further demonstrates that most firearms seizures occur within the country’s national territory. Some Member States also report a significant share of seizures at the land border or at airports. Firearms seizures on vessels or at harbours are rather exceptional in the European Union. With 79 per cent of the seized firearms within the European Union for which related data was available uniquely marked, an important foundation for tracing and identifying the illicit origin of the seized weapon exists . Ten European Union Member States reported on the markings of seized firearms. 79 per cent of the seized firearms for which data on markings was available were uniquely marked.

. This implies national authorities generally can trace seized firearms, attempt to identify their point of diversion, analyse illicit arms flows and subsequently take appropriate measures to mitigate diversion risks and combat trafficking. Six European Union Member States reported that during the most recent reporting year they had sent a total of 301 tracing requests on a total of 1,137 firearms to other countries or regional/international organizations. Most of these tracing requests were sent to other European countries. The limited availability of data on seizures of ammunition impedes an informed analysis of related crimes . Nine European Union Member States submitted data on ammunition seizures from 2016 - 2017 to the IAFQ. In total these countries seized more than 800,000 rounds of ammunition in 2016 and about 350,000 rounds of ammunition in 2017. Strong differences between these countries can be observed in the annual number of ammunition seizures. However, the limited availability of data on seizures of ammunition hinders an in-depth analysis of crimes related to this commodity. In the European

Union, the seizures of firearms and parts and components are numerically closer to each other than in other parts of the world

. Ten European Union Member States reported on seizures of firearm parts and components from 2016 - 2017 to the IAFQ. In total these countries seized almost 4,800 items in 2016 and almost 1,700 items in 2017. Strong differences can be observed between these countries in the annual number of seizures of parts and components. On a global scale the average number of seized firearms was about 20 times higher than the number of seized parts and components. This ratio was less than seven times in the reporting European Union Member States. While this relatively high share of seizures of parts and components may reflect increased attention from law enforcement authorities to the phenomenon of illicit trafficking in these items, it may also be linked to the high number of converted and reactivated firearms seized in the European Union, as access to parts and components constitutes an important prerequisite to illicit firearms manufacture. Demand for illicit firearms in the European Union The demand for illicit firearms trafficking within the European Union is largely driven by criminals . Illicit firearms trafficking in the European Union is mainly driven by criminal demand given that access to firearms enables and facilitates various criminal activities. Firearms are also acquired and possessed by criminals in Europe as tools for power or as ‘trophies’ to display reputation. Ten European Union Member States reported on the number of firearms seized in connection to other suspected offences to the IAFQ. An analysis of this data shows that firearms are often seized from criminals involved in violent crime and drug trafficking. Previous studies and other data have pointed to drugs criminals, mafia organizations, outlaw motorcycle gangs, armed robbers, terrorists and various other types of criminals such as street gangs, loan sharks, criminals involved in prostitution and criminal groups specialised in assassinations as customers on illicit gun markets in the European Union. Most criminals tend to possess and use handguns, which are relatively cheap and easy to conceal. The possession and use of automatic firearms and other types of military-grade firearms by criminals is much less common in the European Union.

Vienna: UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2020. 178p.

By Mancuso Marina and Manzi Deborah

Project ECOFIT – Options for EnhanCing Operational instruments in the area of FIrearms Trafficking (www.transcrime. it/ecofit/) is a research project co-funded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund – Police (ISFP-2018-AG-OCFIRE). Project ECOFIT aims to enhance operational cooperation between Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in the fight against firearms trafficking across the 27 EU Member States (MSs) and seven non-EU SELEC MSs (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey). It analyses five operational

instruments that have been selected as indicators of international cooperation, namely: mechanisms for data collection, mechanisms for data sharing, National Firearms Focal Points (NFPs), joint criminal investigations and controlled delivery procedures. Based on the findings of the Project, it provides recommendations for the EU and guidelines for LEAs concerning how to better put into action these instruments and how to more effectively reduce, prevent and tackle illicit trafficking of firearms offences. In order to achieve its objectives, Project ECOFIT conducts five impact assessments (one for each of the operational instruments included in the analysis). The methodology utilises the Better Regulation “Toolbox” of the European Commission (European Commission 2017). Besides the definition of the problem addressed by Project ECOFIT and the methodology.

mproving the intelligence picture (collection and exchange of systematic and harmonised information between LEAs, knowledge on modi operandi, tactics, new trends, etc.); • Intensifying the pressure on criminal markets (fully operational NFPs, joint actions, etc.). The five operational instruments are strongly interrelated, as also stressed by EMPACT Firearms: having fully staffed and operational NFPs will enhance both data collection and data sharing procedures as well as facilitating the standardisation of practices amongst countries.

Milano: Transcrime – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 2021. 154p.

By Astrid De Schutter

KEY FINDINGS • Most European Union (EU) member states show relatively low and stable levels of family homicide. Nevertheless, a significant number of women are regularly and disproportionately victimized in incidents of firearm- and non-firearm-related family violence. • Firearms have certain characteristics that make them a convenient

modus operandi in some specific constellations of family violence. • Firearms can allow a family member to overpower a physically stronger opponent in family conflicts, which may explain their appeal to adolescents, women, and elderly family members. • Incidents of family gun violence involve legally held firearms more than those sourced from a criminal milieu, suggesting that firearms trafficking and the illicit gun market play a less important role in this context. The analysis of a randomized sample size of media reports in the EU further indicates that there is little evidence to suggest that these guns tend to be illegally held. • A firearm is often the weapon of choice in familicide–suicides, despite their low prevalence rate.

Brussels: Flemish Institute for Peace, 2023. 20p.

By Giovanna Maletta

Some European Union (EU) member states—as well as the EU, through Eurostat—collect and publish useful and gender-disaggregated information about violent crimes, intentional homicides, or domestic violence. In addition

to using different methodologies and definitions, however, available data does not always include information on the weapons used in the commission of such crimes, the relationship between victim and perpetrator, or the context in which the violence has occurred.

Available data collected at the international, regional, and national level does not allow for a comprehensive picture of the trends and dynamics of gender-based violence (GBV), including firearm violence, within the EU.

The EU is working to establish a common understanding of GBV at the EU level and among its member states, and to detail minimum standards for the criminalization of GBV against women and domestic violence—thus providing the opportunity to address the use of firearms to facilitate and commit GBV across the EU. These regulatory initiatives also have the potential to improve the availability of relevant information by promoting the collection of comparable data and the development of harmonized practices in collecting and reporting this information, which in turn will allow states to better monitor and adapt measures being taken to tackle GBV.

These EU initiatives could benefit from establishing linkages with the existing EU framework for the control of the production, trade, and possession of firearms.

KEY FINDINGS • Some European Union (EU) member states—as well as the EU, through Eurostat— collect and publish useful and gender-disaggregated information about violent crimes, intentional homicides, or domestic violence. In addition to using different methodologies and definitions, however, available data does not always include

information on the weapons used in the commission of such crimes, the relationship between victim and perpetrator, or the context in which the violence has occurred. • Available data collected at the international, regional, and national level does not allow for a comprehensive picture of the trends and dynamics of gender-based violence (GBV), including firearm violence, within the EU. • The EU is working to establish a common understanding of GBV at the EU level and among its member states, and to detail minimum standards for the criminalization of GBV against women and domestic violence—thus providing the opportunity to address the use of firearms to facilitate and commit GBV across the EU. These regulatory initiatives also have the potential to improve the availability of relevant information by promoting the collection of comparable data and the development of harmonized practices in collecting and reporting this information, which in turn will allow states to better monitor

and adapt measures being taken to tackle GBV. • These EU initiatives could benefit from establishing linkages with the existing EU framework for the control of the production, trade, and possession of firearms.

Brussels: Flemish Institute for Peace, 28p.

By Amy D. Lauger. Danielle Kaeble and Mark Motivans, etc.

The Combat Human Trafficking Act of 2015 (CHTA) (34 U.S.C. § 20709(e)) requires the director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to prepare an annual report on human trafficking. The report must include information on the following: „ arrests by state law enforcement officers for human trafficking offenses „ prosecutions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ convictions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ sentences imposed on individuals convicted in state courts for human trafficking offenses. BJS obtains information on human trafficking through several data collections, including those on victim service providers, law enforcement, prosecution and adjudication, and corrections. For each collection, these data are available for some combination of the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. The information in each data collection contributes to a general profile of human trafficking in the United States. Some differences exist across collections due to varying definitions of human trafficking, data availability, and other factors. At the federal level, human trafficking offenses are defined according to federal statutes that include peonage, slavery, forced labor, sex trafficking, sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, and transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes. The classification of human trafficking offenses varies among state and local jurisdictions. This report describes the BJS data collections and activities across various jurisdictional levels that include various offenses that may be categorized as human trafficking, and it presents the most recent statistical findings.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics , 2024. 7p.

By Graham Farrell and Toby Davies

Knife crime has become a prominent and seemingly intractable problem in England & Wales. Theory and evidence indicate that reducing crime opportunities is an effective means of crime control, including restrictions on lethal weapons. While public debate has centred on zombie and other ‘status’ knives, the most prevalent homicide weapon is a kitchen knife. Here we argue that replacing lethal pointed-tip kitchen knives with safer round-tip knives would reduce knife crime with little or no displacement. Drawing on the approach to remove fossil-fuel vehicles from roads, we propose a phased removal of lethal kitchen knives that we estimate will cut knife-related homicide in half, reduce other knife crime and criminality, and prevent thousands of non-criminal knife-related injuries

Crime Science (2024) 13:44

U.S.Court of Appeals 5th Circuit. No. 23-30033

700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (“NRA I”), this court upheld those provisions. But that decision, which was criticized at the time, see National Rifle Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (“NRA II”) (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), preceded two recent clarifying Supreme Court opinions on the methodology by which we construe gun regulations under the Second Amendment. We are now compelled to focus intently on the evidence of firearm access and ownership by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds near and at the founding, and we conclude that (1) NRA I is incompatible with the Bruen and Rahimi decisions of the Supreme Court, and (2) these provisions are inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion..

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 6:20-CV-1438. 29p.

By Michael Jensen, Sheehan Kane, and Elena Akers

Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) is a database of 3,203 Islamist, far-left, far-right, and single-issue extremists who have radicalized to violent and non-violent extremism in the United States from 1948 through 2021. This update adds 955 subjects to the database who were charged with committing extremist crimes in the United States from 2019-2021.1 The database is freely available for download on START’s webpage at https://www.start.umd.edu/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus-keshif. The analysis for this research brief draws on the full dataset and illustrates the important differences that exist across ideological groups and highlights recent trends in the data.

College Park, MD: START , 2023. 10p.

By Michael Jensen, Sheehan Kane, and Elena Akers

Included with the current update to the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) data are a suite of variables that allow users to investigate extremist offenders who plotted to commit, or committed, mass casualty attacks in the United States from 1990-2021. A mass casualty plot is defined as an event in which the perpetrator(s) intended to kill or injure four or more victims. Unlike other data resources on mass casualty events, PIRUS allows users to investigate successful mass casualty attacks as well as unsuccessful plots where the perpetrators clearly intended to kill or injure four or more people but failed. The inclusion of failed and foiled mass casualty plots in PIRUS gives users a more accurate estimate of how often extremists plan to cause significant harm. It also allows users to compare ideological groups and offenders on measures of plot success. This research brief provides an overview of the mass casualty crimes in PIRUS, including their frequency, links to ideological and sub-ideological groups, and a comparison of their perpetrators.

College Park, MD: START (March). 2023, 4p.

By Rohan Gunaratna

SYNOPSIS As we enter the new year, armed conflicts continue to rage across the globe, destabilising nations, regions, and even the global order. Terrorist attacks and state responses create ripple effects, which not only shape the battlefields but redefine states, fragment societies, and radicalise communities. What does the terrorism threat landscape look like in 2025?

COMMENTARY Global terrorism will remain a persistent and pervasive threat to the stability and peace of the world. The Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and Iran-sponsored Shiite and Sunni militia have exacerbated instability around the globe, while geopolitical competitions have polarised and fragmented the community of nations. Unless governments work together to mitigate common security challenges, threat actors will exploit the gaps, loopholes, and weaknesses in global security systems. All nations need to be steadfast in preventing and preempting threats from taking root and facing up to threats from state and non-state actors including lone wolf attackers. In addition to disinformation operations, threat actors will attack information infrastructure. Nations will need to secure the online domain as hostile states increase their cyberattacks, sabotage infrastructure, assassinate public officials, and engage in espionage.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore 2025. 5p.

By Heidi Ellis , Alisa B. Miller , Georgios Sideridis , Rochelle Frounfelker , Diana Miconi , Saida Abdi , Farah Aw-Osman and Cecile Rousseau

Objectives: We examine the association between perceived discrimination, mental health, social support, and support for violent radicalization (VR) in young adults from three locations across two countries: Montréal and Toronto, Canada, and Boston, United States. A secondary goal is to test the moderating role of location. Methods: A total of 791 young adults between the ages of 18 and 30, drawn from the Somali Youth longitudinal study and a Canada-based study of college students, participated in the study. We used multivariate linear regression to assess the association between scores on the Radical Intentions Scale (RIS) with demographic characteristics, anxiety, depression, social support, and discrimination. Results: In the full sample, discrimination, age, and gender were associated with RIS scores. When we examined moderation effects by location, RIS scores were associated with depression only in Montréal, and with social support (negatively) and discrimination in Toronto. None of the variables were significant in Boston. Conclusion: These findings suggest that an understanding of risk and protective factors for support of VR may be context-dependent. Further research should take into consideration local/regional differences

International Journal of Public Health published: 29 March 2021, 10 p.

By Michael Wolfowicz, Yael Litmanovitz, David Weisburd, and Badi Hasisi

Abstract Background: Two of the most central questions in radicalization research are, (1)why do some individuals radicalize when most of those from the same groups or exposed to similar conditions do not? and (2) why do radicalized individuals turn to radical violence while the majority remain inert? It has been suggested that the answer to both questions lie in the cumulative and interactive effects of a range of risk factors. While risk assessment and counter‐radicalization take a risk‐protectivefactor approach, there is widespread debate as to what these factors are and which are most important.Objectives: This review has two primary objectives.1) To identify what the putative risk and protective factors for different radica-lization outcomes are, without any predeterminations.2) To synthesize the evidence and identify the relative magnitude of the effects of different factors.The review's secondary objectives are to:1) Identify consistencies in the estimates of factors across different radicalizationoutcomes.2) Identify whether any significant heterogeneity exists within factors between(a) geographic regions, and (b) strains of radicalizing ideologies.Search Methods: Over 20 databases were searched for both published and gray literature. In order to provide a more comprehensive review, supplementary sear-ches were conducted in two German and one Dutch database. Reference harvesting was conducted from previous reviews and contact was made with leading researchers to identify and acquire missing or unpublished studies.Selection Criteria: The review included observational studies assessing the out-comes of radical attitudes, intentions, and/or radical behaviors in OECD countries and which provided sufficient data to calculate effect sizes for individual‐level risk and protective factors.Data Collection and Analysis: One‐hundred and twenty‐seven studies, containing 206 samples met the inclusion criteria and provided 1302 effect sizes pertaining to over 100 different factors. Random effects meta‐analyses were carried out for each factor, and meta‐regression and moderator analysis were used to explore differ-ences across studies.Results: Studies were primarily cross‐sectional, with samples representing 20 OECD countries. Most studies examined no specific radicalizing ideology, while others focussed on specific ideologies (e.g., Islamist, right‐wing, and left‐wing ideologies). The studies generally demonstrated low risk of bias and utilized validated or widely acceptable measures for both indicators and outcomes.With some exceptions, sociodemographic factors tend to have the smallest estimates, with larger estimates for experiential and attitudinal factors, followed by traditional criminogenic and psychological factors.Authors' Conclusions: While sociodemographic factors are the most commonly examined factors (selective availability), they also tend to have the smallest es-timates. So too, attitudinal and even experiential factors, do not have effect sizes of the magnitude that could lead to significant reductions in risk through tar-geting by interventions. Conversely, traditional criminogenic factors, as well as psychological factors tend to display the largest estimates. These findings suggest the need to broaden the scope of factors considered in both risk assessment and intervention, and this review provides much needed evidence for guiding the selection of factors

Campbell Systematic Reviews: Volume 17, Issue 3 September 2021, 90 p.

By Europol

  The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (EU TE-SAT) 2024 is a situational overview, presenting figures, major developments and trends in the terrorism landscape in the EU in 2023. The report is based on qualitative and quantitative data provided by the Member States on terrorist attacks, arrests and convictions and penalties for terrorist offences. Additionally, Europol’s cooperation partners provided valuable qualitative information and assessments, to facilitate reflection on developments beyond the EU that affect the security of the Union and its citizens. Information on convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences, as well as on amendments to national legislation on terrorism provided by Eurojust and based on data shared by Member States, complements the report. According to EU Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism , which Member States had an obligation to transpose into their national legislation by 8 September 2018, terrorist offences are criminal acts carried out with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. The EU TE-SAT identifies and elaborates on various forms of terrorism motivated by specific ideologies . These include jihadist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, and other forms of terrorism. Notwithstanding the existence of different legislative frameworks at the national level, Directive (EU) 2017/541 establishes minimum EU rules concerning the definitions of offences and related sanctions in counter-terrorism and provides a harmonised definition of terrorist offences. On this basis, the EU TE-SAT provides statistical data on terrorist attacks, arrests and convictions in Member States. At a national level, the legislation pertaining to terrorism varies within the limits set by the aforementioned Directive, as Member States are afforded a certain degree of flexibility in their legislative processes. Consequently, the quantitative analysis presented in the EU TE-SAT reflects Member States’ definitions of terrorist offences according to their national legislation. It should be noted that these definitions may be broader in scope than the definitions set out in Directive (EU) 2017/541, although they cannot have a narrower scope. While the primary scope of the EU TE-SAT is to present the situational picture on terrorism, the report also presents specific violent extremist incidents, acts, activities and developments, reported by the Member States. While the quantitative overview of terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties does not include instances of violent extremism, the latter is included in the report for contextualisation purposes and to provide a more comprehensive picture of the security threats to the Union.   

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 2024. 72p.

By Emily Thompson and Galen Lamphere-Englund

Violent extremist, terrorist, and targeted hate actors have been actively exploiting video games to propagandise, recruit and fundraise for more than 30 years. This report presents an analysis of that history using a unique dataset, the Extremist and Terrorist Games Database (ETGD), developed by the authors. It contains 155 reviewed entries of standalone games, modifications for existing games (mods) and browser‑based games dating from 1982 to 2024. The titles analysed appear across the ideological spectrum: far right (101 titles), jihadist (24), far left (1) and other forms of extremism and targeted hate (29), including school‑massacre ideation (12). They span platforms ranging from simple standalone games for Atari in the 1980s to sophisticated mods for some of today’s most popular games. The number of titles has increased year on year – in line with global conflict and extremist ideological trends, and revealing a continued push by malicious actors to exploit gaming. Meanwhile, the means of distribution have shifted from violent extremist organisations and marketplaces – such as white supremacist, neo‑Nazi and jihadist organisations – to distributed repositories of extremist games hosted on internet archives, Ethereum‑hosted file‑sharing, Telegram and with subtly coded titles on mainstream platforms like Steam. While most of the titles in the ETGD are available for free, several that have been sold (often at symbolic prices like $14.88 or $17.76) appear to have generated revenue for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the National Alliance, an American neo‑Nazi group. Through new analysis of Steam data, we also show that a small number of extremist and targeted hate titles have generated almost an estimated $600,000 in revenue for small publishers on the platform. Far from being a comprehensive analysis of the ETGD, we intend this preliminary launch report to form a basis for future research of the dataset and a framework for continued contributions to the ETGD from Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) members. Above all, we seek to contribute to sensible policymaking to prevent violent extremism that situates games as part of a wider contested and exploited information space, which deserves far more attention from those working towards peaceful ends.

Complete recommendations are provided in the conclusion section of this report, but include the following: 1. Prohibit and prevent violent extremist exploitation: Gaming platforms should explicitly prohibit violent extremist and terrorist behaviours and content. Leadership exists here from Twitch, Discord, Microsoft/Xbox and the affiliated Activision‑Blizzard. a. Audio and video platforms, such as Spotify, Apple Music and YouTube should seek to identify extremist gaming content currently available under misleading titles and tags. b. Flag and remove extremist titles across platforms: Hashing and preventing outlinking to ETGD games and links should be a priority across platforms. 2. Improve reporting mechanisms: Platforms must improve reporting mechanisms to make it easier for players to report violative content found in games and in‑game conduct. 3. Understand and take down distributed repositories: Larger repositories of extremist gaming content readily available on the surface web accelerate user exposure. 4. Collaborate across sectors: Addressing the spread of extremist games requires a collaborative effort between tech companies, government agencies and civil society organisations. 5. Educate across sectors: Programmes supporting educators and frontline community moderators should be developed. 6. Support research and innovation: Including cross‑sector initiatives like the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) and EGRN, which produced this database. 7. Enhance regulatory frameworks: Governments should update regulatory frameworks applying to digital platforms, recognising the nuances of gaming platforms and complying with human rights. 8. Encourage positive community engagement: Thoughtful, well designed community guidelines, moderation policies and reporting mechanisms can support community‑building.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). 2024. 40p.