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WEAPONS

WEAPONS-TRAFFICKING-CRIME-MASS SHOOTINGS

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Gun Ownership in Belgium

By Nils Duquet and Maarten Van Alstein

The Small Arms Survey … estimated civilian firearms ownership in Belgium as between 1.500.000 and 2.100.000 arms (of which 870.000 were said to be registered), an average of 17,2 firearms per 100 people. These estimates were based on a press communiqué of the Council of Ministers of Belgium (December 2005) and on articles in the Belgian press.1 Similar numbers also figured in the explanatory notes attached to the draft of a new Weapons Act which was tabled in the Belgian Federal Parliament in February 2006,2 and in a note published by the Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP) in Brussels in June 2006, in the wake of the introduction of the new Belgian Weapons Act.3 However, although the estimate of 1.500.000 to 2.000.000 weapons became commonly used and widely quoted4 , it is not without its problems. Not least, the source and the method applied to arrive at this estimate remain unclear. Moreover, policy makers, stakeholders and the media do not consistently use this figure of 1.5 to 2 million guns. In some cases the figure is used to indicate the total number of guns (both legal and illegal), while in others it is quoted to refer to the number of illegal guns in circulation. Of course, because of their illegal nature, estimating the number of illegally held guns will always be a complicated exercise. In the course of a major research project undertaken by the Flemish Peace Institute on the trade, possession and use of firearms in Belgium, we were not able to find a satisfactory method, based on the available evidence, to calculate an estimate of the total number of privately owned guns in Belgium (legally plus illegally held firearms, the latter including firearms owned by criminals and guns irregularly held by citizens). The statistical information on which to base an adequate estimate is simply not available. For the moment, the reality is that nobody knows how many firearms are privately owned in Belgium.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2019. 23p.

Armed to Kill: A comprehensive analysis of the guns used in public mass shootings in Europe

By Nils Duquet

Every year in Europe around 1,150 people are shot dead with firearms. These deaths occur in various contexts, including the relational and criminal spheres. The little available research into the weapons used during these fatal crimes suggests that different types of firearms are used in different contexts.1 In this report we focus on the weapons that were used for one specific form of deadly firearms incidents, namely “public mass shootings”. These are shooting incidents in the (semi-)public space in which the perpetrator(s) use one or more firearms and during which several people are killed and injured. Under this umbrella term we find numerous types of shooting incidents, ranging from school shootings in which a frustrated pupil murders a number of classmates and/or teachers to terrorist attacks in which groups of perpetrators attempt to spread terror in coordinated attacks. A look at recent mass shootings shows that significant differences can be observed in terms of, for example, the locations where these shootings were carried out, the number of perpetrators, the motives of the perpetrator(s), the selection of the victims and the firearms used. This report analyses one specific aspect of such shooting incidents, namely the firearms that were used.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2016. 45p.

Public Mass Shootings in Europe: How did the weapons fall into the wrong hands?

By Nils Duquet

In Europe, there were 23 public mass shootings between 2009 and 2018. They claimed the lives of a total of 341 people. That means an average of 2.3 mass shootings with a total of 34 casualties per year. Those shootings took place in 15 different European countries, including Belgium, with mass shootings at the Christmas market in Liège in December 2011 and the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014. In its report “Armed to Kill”I , the Flemish Peace Institute investigated which types of firearms were used in the 23 identified mass shootings in Europe and how the perpetrators obtained those firearms

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2019. 7p.

Forgotten Weapons? Non-regularised firearms in the European Union

By Matteo Dressler, Nils Duquet and Julia Eckelmann

Project DIVERT is an international research project to contribute to the fight against illegal firearms markets in Europe. To this end, the project has investigated various methods by which legal firearms are diverted and become illegal. Because most illicitly held firearms in the European Union have a legal history, generating a better intelligence picture on firearms diversion is critical. It can help better understand the original transition of weapons into the illegal cycle and develop effective tools to stop such spillovers. This report examines firearms diversion through non-regularisation. It is part of a three-part series exploring previously under-researched firearms diversion methods in the EU. Two additional studies deal with firearms diversion through theft and fraud. We define non-regularisation as: The act of not regularising the legal status of firearms, ammunition or firearm components, for example, by not asking for the necessary authorisation or registering them, after a change in legislation or another major event (e.g. armed conflict).

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2021. 120p.

Stealing Precious Steel: Firearms theft in the European Union

By Quitterie de Labbey, Nils Duquet and Lore Smets

Project DIVERT is an international research project to contribute to the fight against illegal firearms markets in Europe. To this end, the project has investigated various methods by which legal firearms are diverted and become illegal. Because most illicitly held firearms in the European Union have a legal history, generating a better intelligence picture on firearms diversion is critical. It can help better understand the original transition of weapons into the illegal cycle and develop effective tools to stop such spillovers. This report examines firearms diversion through theft. It is part of a three-part series exploring previously under-researched diversion methods in the EU. Two additional studies deal with firearms diversion through fraud and non-regularization. We define the theft of firearms or ammunition as the deliberate act to take and remove firearms and/or ammunition of personal property with intent to deprive the legal owner from it.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2021. 132p.

Trick and Treat: Firearms Fraud in the European Union

By Quitterie de Labbey, Nils Duquet and Diederik Cop.

Project DIVERT has analysed various methods by which legal firearms are diverted from their legal status and become illegal. Because most firearms held illicitly in the European Union (EU) were produced legally, generating a better intelligence picture of firearm diversion is critical for the development of effective measures and tools to prevent diversion. Project DIVERT focused on three previously under-researched types of diversion in the EU: (1) the theft of firearms, ammunition and components, (2) firearms fraud, and (3) the non-regularization of firearms. The Flemish Peace Institute coordinated Project DIVERT and implemented it in partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In addition, researchers from Arquebus Solutions contributed extensively to the first two research phases. Operational partners in this project were the Intelligence Centre Against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO) of the Spanish Ministry of Interior Affairs, the Central Directorate for the Combat of Organised Crime (DJSOC) of the Belgian Federal Police and the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). Project DIVERT was co-funded by the Internal Security Fund – Police of DG Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission. In the first phase of the project, we conducted desk research which resulted in 28 country mappings that explored the scope, characteristics and dynamics of firearm diversion in all the EU Member States. In the second phase of the project, we deepened our understanding of fraud and analysed the policy initiatives geared toward preventing it through in-depth analyses of eight EU Member States. This report examines firearm diversion through fraud, which is defined as ‘the unlawful acquisition or possession of or trade in firearms or ammunition by tricking others and by intentionally concealing, omitting or perverting the truth’. Two complementary reports focus on firearm diversion through non-regularisation and theft. .

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2022. 128p.

Firearms and Violent Deaths in Europe

By Nils Duquet and Maarten Van Alstein

On a regular basis, news stories appear in the media about public shootings where shooters use their guns to open fire and kill people in shopping malls or on school campuses. Mostly these stories deal with incidents in the United States. Over the last years, however, a number of European countries have experienced similar public shooting incidents. Notable cases were the shootings at Tuusula and Kauhajoki in Finland (2007 and 2008), the killings in Cumbria in the UK (2010), the Utøya attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway (2011), and the shootings at Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands and Liège in Belgium in 2011. Public shootings draw a high level of media attention. Less striking in the public eye, but not less significant – not least in quantitative terms –, are the numbers of people in Europe killed by firearms in the context of gun-related crime or in domestic shootings.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2015. 83p.

Initial Report Submitted to the Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Senate President

By The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission

For this Initial Report, the Commission emphasized two major priorities—what happened leading up to the shooting and the law enforcement response. Knowing the true and accurate facts about all the contributing variables leading up to the massacre of February 14 was critical for forming a body of knowledge about certain topics (for example active shooter policies) and enabled the Commission to have a baseline from which to make informed and deliberative recommendations. Further, this knowledge allowed the Commission to make findings that are necessary to drive change. The Commission’s effort is far from complete; all areas require further investigation and recommendations, which the Commission will continue to work on in 2019. This Initial Report establishes the facts and timeline of “what” occurred on February 14, 2018. The more complicated question of “how” it happened and how it became one of the largest school mass killing events in United States’ history is more difficult because of many varied contributing causes. The causes include Cruz’s mental and behavioral health issues, people not reporting warning signs or reporting signs that were not acted on by those to whom actionable information was reported, and how Cruz’s behavioral and discipline issues were addressed (or not addressed) by Broward County Public Schools. Also contributing, was the overall lack of adequate or effective physical site security and unenforced or non-existent security measures and policies at MSDHS, as well as the ineffective behavioral threat assessment process at MSDHS.

Tallahassee, FL: Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission 458p.

Texas House of Representatives Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting

By The Investigative Committee

This is the interim report of the Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting of the Texas House of Representatives. Conscious of the desire of the Uvalde community and the public at large to receive an accurate account of the tragedy at Robb Elementary School, the Committee has worked diligently and with care to issue this interim report of its factual findings. The Committee’s work is not complete. We do not have access to all material witnesses. Medical examiners have not yet issued any reports about their findings, and multiple other investigations remain ongoing. The Committee believes this interim report constitutes the most complete telling to date of the events of and leading to the May 24, 2022, tragedy. This Committee has prioritized factual accuracy, as will be evident from our attention to conducting our own interviews and documenting our sources of information. Still, based on the experiences of past mass-shooting events, we understand some aspects of these interim findings may be disputed or disproven in the future. The Committee issues this interim report now, believing the victims, their families, and the entire Uvalde community have already waited too long for answers and transparency.

Austin, TX: Texas House of Representatives, 2022. 82p.

Active Shooter: How to Respond

By U.S. Department of Homeland Security

An Active Shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims. Because active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes, before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation.

Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security, 2008 13p.

Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission

By The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission

On December 14, 2012, one of the most vicious and incomprehensible domestic attacks in American history occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. Within a few hours, the world understood the gravity of the attack. Lives were lost in two distinct locations: Sandy Hook Elementary School and a private residence in Newtown. The scope of the tragedy would take on international proportions, and people from around the world would grieve and mourn alongside the families of Newtown.

Hartford, CT: Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015) 277p.

Lockdown Drills: Connecting Research and Best Practices for School Administrators, Teachers, and Parents.

By Jaclyn Schildkraut

The May 24, 2022, mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, TX, where 19 fourth grade students and two of their teachers were killed and 17 others were injured, reignited a national discourse about preparing school communities for similar tragedies. Proposals ranging from armed teachers to clear backpacks were circulated, despite the lack of empirical evidence to support their efficacy in situations like Uvalde. This leaves an important question for stakeholders charged with keeping school communities safe: what is the best way to reduce the harm caused by these events that is evidence-based?.

Despite the widespread use of lockdown drills in US schools, the conversation about their efficacy remains contentious and often is not guided by empirical evidence. This brief provides an overview of the scholarly evidence surrounding lockdown drills, as well as considerations of best practices, an important foundation for policymakers tasked with keeping students and staff safe and for the public to better understand their utility in schools.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2022. 20p.

What We Know About Foiled and Failed Mass School Shootings

By Jason R. Silva and Emily A. Greene-Colozzi

This research brief will explore what we know about foiled and failed mass school shootings—referring to incidents and plots that resulted in zero victim casualties. Findings will illustrate the common mass school shooting perpetrator and incident characteristics, as well as what contributed to these attacks being thwarted. Actionable takeaways based on the research will illustrate future strategies for prevention and intervention including leakage and warning signs, as well as situational crime prevention.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2022. 24p.

Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem

By Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland)

The Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem is an authoritative guide to all aspects of the problem of small arms and light weapons. It focuses on both small arms themselves (production, transfers, stockpiles), and on the processes and impacts of their world-wide proliferation.

Specific sections deal with issues such as arms brokering, the role of small arms and light weapons in particular conflict zones, current international initiatives and projects to stem their proliferation, and with broader social and economic effects (crime, public health, development).

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied

By Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland)

The Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied presents the most complete assessment of the spread of small arms around the world and their effect on society. Stressing the link between small arms and global development, it includes special chapters examining the role of small arms in Africa (Congo), the Arab world (Yemen) and the former-Soviet Union (Georgia).

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War

By Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War is dedicated to exploring issues surrounding armed conflict, including the sourcing of weapons to conflict areas, weapons use, conflict deaths, and post-conflict disarmament initiatives.

This edition also provides an overview of small arms ammunition issues as well as new and updated information on small arms production, stockpiles, transfers, and international measures. It also presents two case studies: one exploring the concept of 'gun culture' in Kosovo, the other focusing on the Central African Republic. In addition, this volume surveys representations of small arms and armed violence in contemporary art.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business

By Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business offers new and updated information on small arms production, stockpiles, transfers, and measures, including a review of the International Tracing Instrument.

This year's thematic chapters examine issues such as the demand for weapons, small arms and security sector reform, and the economic costs of small arms use. This edition also features case studies on small arms violence in Papua New Guinea and Colombia, armed groups in West Africa, and the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. The final chapter—'Angry Young Men'—considers why young men account for the lion's share of global small arms violence.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006

Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience

By Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience presents two thematic sections. The first examines the problem of diversion as related to stockpiles, international transfers, and end-user documentation. It includes a case study on South Africa and a comic strip illustrating the potential ease by which someone with access to forged documentation can make arrangements to ship munitions virtually anywhere. The second thematic section analyses the public health approach to armed violence, scrutinizing risk and resilience factors and considering related interventions. It includes an overview of the burden of armed violence, and two case studies of armed violence in El Salvador and the United States. A chapter on light weapons production rounds out the volume.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War

By Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War contains two thematic sections. The first highlights the challenges of ensuring security after the formal end of war and comprises an overview chapter and three case studies (Aceh, Afghanistan, and Southern Lebanon). The second thematic section explores various aspects of small arms transfers, including the value of the authorized trade, national controls, and weapons tracing. Additional chapters focus on small arms measures and impacts.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Small Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets

By Geneva Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets looks at what is changing, and not changing, in relation to armed violence and small arms proliferation. Chapters on firearm homicide in Latin America and the Caribbean, drug violence in selected Latin American countries, and non-lethal violence worldwide illustrate that security is a moving target; armed violence continues to undermine security and well-being around the world. The goal of curbing small arms proliferation, embodied in the UN Programme of Action, appears similarly elusive. Chapters on illicit small arms in war zones, trade transparency, Somali piracy, and the 2011 UN Meeting of Governmental Experts highlight some of the successes and challenges in this area. Country studies examine Kazakhstan and Somaliland. The final installment of the authorized transfers project looks at the total value of exports and imports globally, including small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and parts and accessories.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2012.