By John W. Ropp, Jacqueline G. Lee, Laura L. King, Lisa M. Growette Bostaph

Research continues to explore factors that contribute to high rates of attrition among sexual assault cases. Comparatively little is known, however, about prosecutorial, as opposed to police, decision-making in these cases. Using a mixed-method approach to analyze (1) 175 case files from a midsize policing agency in the West with trained sexual assault investigators and (2) detailed prosecutor notes from 52 corresponding cases, we explore patterns in three key outcomes: (a) arrest, (b) referral for prosecution, and (c) charging. Logistic regression results indicate that fewer variables predicted case outcomes compared with previous studies, suggesting that specially trained officers may be more adept at dismissing “rape myth” factors. Qualitative analysis of prosecutorial case notes, however, revealed that prosecutors tended to compare specific case elements to an envisioned “ideal” case, which frequently aligned with some pervasive rape myths prevalent in society. Prosecutors focused heavily on convictability, anticipating how a potential jury would respond to the case. Although specially trained investigators may better disregard extralegal rape-myth factors, these myths still plague decision-making at the prosecutorial stage indirectly via concerns for juror interpretation of the facts. We find strong support for the “downstream” perspective of prosecutorial decision-making.

Criminology, Volume 62, Issue 4, 2024, pages 704-738

UNITED STATES. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

From the document: "Education plays a critical role in preventing substance use and misuse. 'Drugs of Abuse, A DEA Resource Guide,' is designed to be a reliable resource on the most commonly used and misused drugs in the United States. This comprehensive guide provides important information about the harms and consequences of drug use by describing a drug's effects on the body and mind, overdose potential, origin, legal status, and other key facts. 'Drugs of Abuse' also offers a list of additional drug education and prevention resources, including the DEA websites: www.DEA.gov[;] www.JustThinkTwice.com, aimed at teenagers[;] www.GetSmartAboutDrugs.com, designed for parents, educators, and caregivers[;] www.CampusDrugPrevention.gov, for higher education[; and] www.OperationPrevention.com, for opioid curricula[.]"

UNITED STATES. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION. 2024. 117p.

By Charles C. Lanfear, David S. Kirk , Robert J. Sampson

Most homicides in the United States are committed using a handgun, but little research examines gun carrying over critical stages of the life course and changing contexts of violence. Notably, although most of the handgun homicides are committed by adults, most research on concealed gun carrying focuses on adolescents in single cohort studies. Using more than 25 years of longitudinal multi-cohort data from Chicago, 1994–2021, we show that pathways of concealed gun carrying are distinct between adolescence and adulthood. Adolescent carrying is often age-limited and responsive to direct exposure to gun violence (witnessing and victimization), while adult carrying is a persistent behavior that is less tied to direct exposure. The onset of concealed carry is also a strong predictor of later gun use (shooting or brandishing), and we find distinct patterns of gun use between individuals who first carry in adolescence versus adulthood. We discuss the implications of these dual pathways for research and policies on firearm use.

Sci. Adv. 10, 2024, 12p.

By Rohit Acharya and Rhett Morris

In 2020, the average U.S. city experienced a surge in its homicide rate of almost 30%—the fastest spike ever recorded in the country. Across the nation, more than 24,000 people were killed compared to around 19,000 the year before.

Homicides remained high in 2021 and 2022, but in 2023 they began to fall rapidly. Projections suggest the national homicide rate in 2024 is on track to return to levels close to those recorded in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet that spike in murders continues to deliver major costs in terms of the lives lost, the people incarcerated, and the perception of decreased safety across the country.

Some commentators have suggested the increase in homicides during 2020 was a response to the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer in May of that year. Others hypothesized that it was caused by a police “pull back,” in which officers chose to do less work in reaction to the protests that followed Floyd’s death.

As more information has become available, these theories appear to be less supported by evidence than some initially thought.1 The evidence indicates that the national homicide rate was already on track to reach a peak far above the previous year even before Floyd was killed.As Figure 1 demonstrates, murders began to rise rapidly in mid-April of 2020. Cell phone data show this is when residents started leaving home more often as lockdown policies eased and the weather grew warmer. During the 6-week period from April 12 to May 23 (weeks 16 to 21 in Figure 1), homicides went up by an average of 17 murders each week.

After Floyd was killed on May 25, the national homicide rate continued to follow this trend, with additional increases during the 2 weeks around Memorial Day and the 2-week period around July 4. But even the highest point of these additional increases was less than 40 murders above the pre-existing trend. While it’s true that homicides did temporarily rise more than they were already on track to following Floyd’s death, these additional increases are unlikely to explain the 5,000 additional murders seen during the year.

This leaves us with a question: What happened that could have caused homicides to spike in 2020, remain high for 2 years, and then start to decline rapidly in 2023?

New data offers a potential explanation. In this report, we analyze thousands of police records and compare them to changes that occurred in U.S. cities just before homicides started to surge. This showed that the spike in murders during 2020 was directly connected to local unemployment and school closures in low-income areas. Cities with larger numbers of young men forced out of work and teen boys pushed out of school in low-income neighborhoods during March and early April, had greater increases in homicide from May to December that year, on average. The persistence of these changes can also explain why murders remained high in 2021 and 2022 and then fell in late 2023 and 2024.

These analyses point to new answers and offer focused solutions that civic leaders can use to prevent future spikes in murder and reduce current levels of violence. We present these findings in detail below in three main sections:

First, we review evidence from existing research that reveals a formula for how violence develops in cities.

Second, we analyze detailed administrative data from a single city with multiple spikes in murder prior to the COVID-19 pandemic to illustrate how this formula applies to local communities.

Finally, we use lessons from this analysis to offer a new explanation for the national spike in homicides in 2020 and make recommendations on how to avoid future increases in murder.

Brookings, 2024. 20p.

By the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,

Education plays a critical role in preventing substance use and misuse. Drugs of Abuse, A DEA Resource Guide, is designed to be a reliable resource on the most commonly used and misused drugs in the United States. This comprehensive guide provides important information about the harms and consequences of drug use by describing a drug’s effects on the body and mind, overdose potential, origin, legal status, and other key facts.

Washington, DC: DEA, 2024. 117p.

By Earth League International; John Jay College of Criminal Justice; State University of New York - Farmingdale

In the early twentieth century, the Totoaba fishery was the most important fishery in the Gulf of California. At its peak, in 1942, over two thousand tons of fish maw were exported to China and the Chinese communities in California. Realizing the danger the fish faced, in 1975, the Mexican government banned the fishing of the species (Martínez & Martínez, 2018). Nonetheless, this critically endangered fish remains heavily overfished today, with organized criminal networks across the country playing a pivotal role in trafficking the species (Alvarado Martinez, 2014). The swim bladder is a highly prized commodity in China, as it is believed that the bladder can be used to treat a variety of medical conditions, including infertility, circulatory issues, kidney problems, and arthritis (Yagoub, 2016). Because of this, a single bladder can fetch for significantly high prices, and one gram of totoaba fish bladder can be more expensive than one gram of cocaine (Martínez & Alonso, 2021). Totoaba swim bladders are also referred to as “money maw” (Amepou et al, 2024), as individuals buy the bladder when prices drop in hopes that fish maw prices will rise once again and can be sold for profit. The poaching of totoaba for its swim bladder has had devastating consequences not only for the species itself and the marine life in the Sea of Cortez, but also for the vaquita porpoise, the world's most endangered marine mammal. The illegal fishing methods used to catch totoaba, particularly gillnets, also ensnare and kill vaquitas as bycatch. With only a few individuals remaining, the vaquita is on the brink of extinction. The survival of this species is directly linked to the elimination of totoaba poaching and trafficking.

Using the crime script analytical technique, and the meticulously-recorded first-hand investigative materials by Earth League International, this report analyzes the intricacies involved in trafficking totoaba swim bladder from Mexico to international destinations.

Los Angeles: Earth League International (ELI), 2024. 14p.

By Tami L. Mark; Benjamin D. Huber

IMPORTANCE: Medicaid programs have expanded coverage of substance use disorder treatment and undertaken many other initiatives to reduce drug overdoses among beneficiaries. However, to date, no information has been published that tracks overdose deaths among the Medicaid population. OBJECTIVE To determine the rate of drug overdose among Medicaid beneficiaries. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In this cross-sectional study, US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services data from 2016 to 2020 that linked enrollment and demographic data from all Medicaid beneficiaries in the US with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Death Index were used to determine the rate of drug overdose death among Medicaid beneficiaries. The Medicaid population rates were compared with those of the total US population, overall and by age and sex. EXPOSURE Participation in the Medicaid program. MAIN OUTCOME Death of a drug overdose. RESULTS In 2020, the drug overdose death rate among Medicaid beneficiaries was 54.6 per 100 000, a rate that was twice as high as the drug overdose rate among all US residents (27.9 per 100 000). In 2020, Medicaid beneficiaries comprised 25.0% of the US population but 48% of all overdose deaths (44 277 of 91 783). For each age and sex group older than 15 years, overdose deaths were higher for the Medicaid population than for the US population, with the greatest difference occurring among adults ages 45 to 64 years. From 2016 to 2020, Medicaid overdose deaths increased by 54%. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The results of this study suggest that more research is needed to understand why Medicaid beneficiaries have higher rates of drug overdoses than all US residents. Additionally, research is needed to understand how best to prevent overdoses among Medicaid beneficiaries. The federal government should s

JAMA Health Forum. 2024;5(12):e244365. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2024.4365

By The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

The most significant drug-related threat to Illinois is posed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), particularly the Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale supply of illicit opioids (fentanyl and heroin), cocaine, methamphetamine, and Mexico grown marijuana in the state.

Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Report; 2024. 6p.

By The U.S.Drug Enforcement Administration

The most significant drug-related threat to Indiana is posed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO), particularly the Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale supply of illicit opioids (both fentanyl and heroin), cocaine, methamphetamine, and Mexico-grown marijuana in the state. The opioid threat remains dire and is of grave concern.

Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Report; 2024. 7p.

By V. Boilevin, A. Crosta and S.J. Hennige

Demand for totoaba swim bladders has created a transnational illicit supply chain network. Organised crime groups are instru-mental in this process, impacting Mexico at social, environmen-tal, economic, and political levels. There are five main points within the supply chain: the poachers in the Upper Gulf ofCalifornia, the Mexican illegal traders, the Chinese illegal traders in Mexico, illegal traders and retailers in China and Hong Kong,and the consumers and investors located primarily in China.Illegal fishers in Mexico use gillnets to capture totoaba, leadingto bycatch and decline of the critically endangered vaquita.There have been significant conservation efforts by the local and international communities to reduce this bycatch, but these have been unsuccessful in addressing the continued traf-ficking of totoaba and the decline of the vaquita. Here we highlight the complexity of the totoaba supply chain and argue that totoaba illegal trade has to be viewed as organised envi-ronmental crime rather than as a conservation issue. A particu-larly enforceable point in the chain is through the Chineseorganised crime group in Mexico, which is a crucial link toonward trafficking through ports and airports. While recent efforts have been made with regard to totoaba seizures and prosecutions, to dismantle the supply chain, strong transnational collaboration is needed at multiple levels, and in particular between Mexico, the USA, and China.GRAPHICAL

Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, Volume 26, 2023 - Issue 2, 32p.

By Caroline Cox and Luke Hauser

ABSTRACT - The United Kingdom, with the introduction of the Ivory Act2018, is at the forefront of elephant protection, and it is hopedthat governmental commitments, made in the 25 YearEnvironment Plan, will see increased protection for other spe-cies at risk due to the illegal wildlife trade. However, one spe-cies that currently falls outside of the regulation of theConvention on International Trade in Endangered Species ofWild Fauna and Flora (CITES) can be directly linked to the ivorytrade: the mammoth. The woolly mammoth became extinctmore than 10,000 years ago, but the genus Mammuthus, sinceits appearance in Africa c.5 ma, was one of the most successfulmegafaunal groups, radiating into 10 species and found acrossthe Northern Hemisphere from Siberia to Crete. As the worldwarms and the permafrost melts, mammoth tusks are beinguncovered across the Northern Hemisphere, particularly inSiberia’s Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). There are close similaritiesbetween the tusks of elephants and mammoths, leading con-servationists to fear that the increase in “ice ivory” heralds anew threat to elephants and our wider understanding of the“woolly” mammoth and its world.1. IntroductionThere are no accurate figures for the value of the illegal wildlife trade.1In common with other illegal activities, dealers in illegally sourced wildlifeproducts will not exhibit the kinds of behavior associated with legal traders(such as the completion of accurate tax returns).

Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, Volume 26, Issue 1, 2023, 26p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK)

The global plastic waste trade is an environmental disaster hiding in plain sight, fuelling organised crime, working conditions that amount to human rights violations and devastation to human health and the environment.

The Environmental Investigation Agency’s (EIA’s) second instalment of our two-part Dirty Deals report pulls back the curtain on a system where misdeclared plastic waste, murky supply chains and shadowy brokers thrive, enabling millions of tonnes of waste to be dumped in countries unequipped to handle such huge volumes.

Despite the Basel Convention, which regulates the transboundary movement of hazardous and other wastes, including plastic waste, these illicit operations exploit loopholes and weak enforcement, creating a facade of ‘recycling’ while wreaking havoc on the local communities on which the Global North dumps its waste.

London: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK), 2024. 28p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency UK (EIA)

Five years after EIA first revealed a widespread European illegal trade in hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) climate super pollutant gases, a new investigation has revealed that significant levels of trafficking persist, despite the worsening climate emergency.

Commonly used in refrigeration and air-conditioning, HFCs are being phased out under the European Union (EU) F-gas Regulation. Driven by high profits and weak law enforcement, organised criminals are closely associated with this illicit trade.

EIA’s previous investigation, 2021’s Europe’s Most Chilling Crime, highlighted Romania as a key entry point for illegal HFCs arriving in the EU. In our latest investigation, we uncovered evidence of traders routing illegal HFCs (sourced primarily in Türkiye and China) from Europe’s edge – Bulgaria – across the continent to the likes of Greece, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

The investigation demonstrated that traders are becoming more sophisticated and adapting their tactics to elude detection, for example by avoiding banned disposable cylinders and disguising HFCs as less regulated hydrofluoroolefin (HFO) refrigerant alternatives.

London: by the Environmental Investigation Agency UK (EIA), 2024. 34p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK)

The long-standing illegal trade in substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

As Parties to the Montreal Protocol meet in Bangkok for the 45th Open Ended Working Group, they will also attend a workshop on strengthening the effective implementation and enforcement of the Montreal Protocol.

EIA has produced this briefing describing the long history of the illegal trade of controlled substances under the Montreal Protocol, including CFCs, HCFCs and HFCs.

It examines efforts by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to combat such trade, with consideration of potential next steps to meet the continued and growing challenge of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) and HFC climate crime. EIA has been investigating and documenting the illegal trade in ODS since the mid-1990s, providing unprecedented insights into the dynamics of this multi-million dollar environmental crime, including the shifting smuggling routes and methods used to evade detection.

London: The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK) , 2023. 16p.

By Amnesty International

Enforced disappearance is both a crime under international law and a serious human rights violation. When a person is deprived of their liberty and their fate or whereabouts concealed, the lives of their families, loved ones and communities are put on hold while they wait to learn of what has happened to them and where they are. In Colombia, as in other countries in the Americas, many of the people left waiting or searching for their loved ones after an enforced disappearance have turned uncertainty into a force for change. Firstly, to find the victims of enforced disappearance. Second, to demand truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. Third, to continue the struggle to ascertain the fate and whereabouts of other people’s loved ones and to defend human rights. Women play a leading role in this story. They are the ones who have overwhelmingly taken on the task of searching for the victims of enforced disappearance in Colombia. In doing so, not only have they raised their voices against the injustice of the enforced disappearance imposed on them, but they have also acted as searchers and human rights defenders. In Colombia, taking on these roles means exposing themselves to unacceptable risks, threats and attacks. Whether they are searching for a loved one, helping someone else to search for a loved one, or defending the rights of victims of enforced disappearance and their families, women who search face arbitrariness, impunity and violence, sometimes from the state and sometimes from non-state actors, especially state security forces and armed opposition groups. In most cases, this violence is gendered. The nature of the risks, threats and attacks that women searchers face often intersect with their gender. Among other forms of violence against women, threats relate to their bodies or to their assigned or assumed gender roles, and perpetrators disproportionately use sexual violence against women. However, women searchers not only continue their work, but also put forward proposals for action to ensure that the state respects, guarantees and protects their rights. The most recent manifestation of this driving force is the approval of Law 2364 of 2024, a proposal that emerged from a group of organizations and communities of women searchers who spoke of their own life experiences, analysed them and used them to draft a bill designed to urge the state to take appropriate measures to end this scourge. With this report, Amnesty International begins a process of documenting the situation of risks, threats and attacks faced by women searchers in Colombia and, based on this, a process of monitoring the implementation of Law 2364 of 2024, which will continue over the next few years. This first part documents the story of Yanette Bautista, Andrea Torres and the Nydia Erika Bautista Foundation (FNEB), an organization of women searchers and victims of enforced disappearance that accompanies other organizations and communities in their own cases.

London: Amnesty International, 2024. 64p.

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager., et al.

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this report, we look at teenage children’s views and experiences of the police. Here’s what we found. Opinions of the police differ according to children’s experiences. Teenagers’ views of the police shift as they get older and gain more exposure to policing. Over half (54%) of 13-17-year-olds believe the police do a good job in their local areas. Similar proportions feel the police use force appropriately (50%) and are available when needed (47%). Only 45% think the police treat everyone fairly, regardless of race or religion.

Age plays a significant role in shaping perceptions. Thirteen-year-olds consistently express the most positive views, while 16-17-year-olds are more critical of police conduct. Interestingly, Black teenagers (63%) are the most likely to agree that the police do a good job locally, compared to 54% of White children, 52% of Asian children and 50% of mixed ethnicity children. However, Black (39%) and mixed ethnicity (36%) children are far less likely to believe the police treat everyone fairly than White children (47%). When it comes to the use of force, Asian (47%), Black (42%) and mixed ethnicity (39%) children are also less likely to agree that police use force only when necessary when compared to White children (52%).

Children with direct experiences of violence tend to have more positive views of the police. For instance, 62% of children who’ve been victims of serious violence think their local police do a good job, compared to 54% of children who haven’t been a victim. Direct experiences with the police also affect perceptions, but the effect differs depending on racial background. White teenagers who’ve had contact with the police are more likely to say the police do a good job than those with no direct experience. But this is not the case for teenagers from Black, Asian and mixed ethnic backgrounds.

Children are mostly supportive of stop and search but don’t all agree it’s used fairly. Most teenagers are supportive of the police’s power to stop and search, though not all believe it’s applied fairly. Overall, 68% of 13-17-year-olds support stop and search, and 72% believe it helps prevent knife crime. However, only 56% think that stop and search is used fairly. Younger teenagers (aged 13-15) are generally more supportive of stop and search than older teenagers (aged 16-17). Racial differences also emerge, with White children more likely to view stop and search as both effective and fair than their Black, Asian and mixed ethnicity peers.

London: Youth Endowment Fund, Children, violence and vulnerability 2024 Report 4. 33p.

By Sofia Amaral, Aixa Garcia-Ramos, Selim Gulesci, Sarita Oré, Alejandra Ramos, & Maria Micaela Sviatschi

Gender-based violence (GBV) at schools is a pervasive problem that affects millions of adolescent girls worldwide. In partnership with the Ministry of Education in Mozambique, we developed an intervention to increase the capacity of key school personnel to address GBV and to improve students’ awareness as well as proactive behaviors. To understand the role of GBV on girls’ education, we randomized not only exposure to the intervention but also whether the student component was targeted to girls only, boys only, or both. Our findings indicate a reduction in sexual violence by teachers and school staff against girls, regardless of the targeted gender group, providing evidence of the role of improving the capacity of key school personnel to deter perpetrators. Using administrative records, we also find that in schools where the intervention encouraged proactive behavior by girls, there was an increase in their school enrollment, largely due to an increased propensity for GBV reporting by victims. Our findings suggest that effectively mitigating violence to improve girls’ schooling requires a dual approach: deterring potential perpetrators and fostering a proactive stance among victims, such as increased reporting.

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 11506, Nov 2024, 64p.

By Elodie Rolls, Yasmin Youle and Charlotte Hartwright

Domestic abuse (DA) is a widespread crime. According to the Crime Survey for England and Wales, about 4.4% of people aged 16 and over experienced DA in a single 12-month period. This means approximately 2.1 million people were victims of DA in just one year (Office for National Statistics, 2023). The Government’s plan to tackle DA, announced in 2022, included the establishment of interventions for perpetrators, such as electronic monitoring (EM) for high-risk individuals. The Domestic Abuse Perpetrators on Licence (DAPOL) scheme was launched in August 2023 in two probation regions, the East Midlands and the West Midlands. DAPOL requires adult offenders at risk of committing DA to wear an electronic tag upon leaving prison, if deemed necessary and proportionate as part of the formal licence planning process. The scheme aims to strengthen offender management, help victims feel safe following the release of the abuser, and help prevent further offending. An evaluation of DAPOL was commissioned by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). It will involve three types of evaluation: process, impact, and economic. This report presents findings from a process evaluation conducted during the first few months of delivery. The findings can be used to inform expansion of the scheme, prior to assessing impacts. 1.1 Evaluation Objectives The research was undertaken during the first six months of delivering the DAPOL scheme. The evaluation aimed to address four objectives: • To gather evidence that describes the context in which DAPOL was delivered (see Sections 4 and 8). • To collect evidence on how DAPOL was used by practitioners (see Section 5). • To provide a descriptive analysis of compliance and any early perceived impacts (see Sections 6 and 7). • To identify facilitators and barriers to the implementation of DAPOL (see Section 8). These objectives centred on understanding early implementation of the DAPOL pilot. This ensured that lessons learned could be embedded prior to any expansion and assessment of impact. The research comprised three strands: primary data collection through interviews and surveys with people on probation and staff working with EM or DA, an analysis of management information (quantitative) data, and qualitative analysis of probation case management records. By triangulating findings across these data sources, the research team aimed to capture the complexity surrounding the implementation of DAPOL. 1.2 Key Findings There were 442 DAPOL orders during the six-month evaluation period. Key findings are summarised below: • The scheme was used to manage high risk individuals with complex criminogenic needs. Probation practitioners typically used DAPOL with prison leavers who had a history of violent offending, stalking and harassment, and those with an elevated risk of perpetrating DA. People supervised under the scheme often had attitudinal and psychosocial risks relating to relationships, thinking and behaviour, and pro-criminality. EM was used alongside other licence conditions such as alcohol monitoring, freedom of movement, non-contact, supervised contact, disclosure of information and (notification of) relationships. The profile of people on the scheme was consistent with established predictors of DA perpetration (e.g., Costa et al., 2015), suggesting that DAPOL was applied with reasoned professional judgement around DA risk. • To gather evidence that describes the context in which DAPOL was delivered (see Sections 4 and 8). • To collect evidence on how DAPOL was used by practitioners (see Section 5). • To provide a descriptive analysis of compliance and any early perceived impacts (see Sections 6 and 7). • To identify facilitators and barriers to the implementation of DAPOL (see Section 8). These objectives centred on understanding early implementation of the DAPOL pilot. This ensured that lessons learned could be embedded prior to any expansion and assessment of impact. The research comprised three strands: primary data collection through interviews and surveys with people on probation and staff working with EM or DA, an analysis of management information (quantitative) data, and qualitative analysis of probation case management records. By triangulating findings across these data sources, the research team aimed to capture the complexity surrounding the implementation of DAPOL. 1.2 Key Findings There were 442 DAPOL orders during the six-month evaluation period. Key findings are summarised below: • The scheme was used to manage high risk individuals with complex criminogenic needs. Probation practitioners typically used DAPOL with prison leavers who had a history of violent offending, stalking and harassment, and those with an elevated risk of perpetrating DA. People supervised under the scheme often had attitudinal and psychosocial risks relating to relationships, thinking and behaviour, and pro-criminality. EM was used alongside other licence conditions such as alcohol monitoring, freedom of movement, non-contact, supervised contact, disclosure of information and (notification of) relationships. The profile of people on the scheme was consistent with established predictors of DA perpetration (e.g., Costa et al., 2015), suggesting that DAPOL was applied with reasoned professional judgement around DA risk. the early stages of this scheme, it is likely that demand will increase with further expansion of DAPOL. This may result in more demand for GPS tagging equipment. This report also found qualitative evidence that location monitoring was more time consuming to manage. Therefore, the potential for a greater time cost to supervise DAPOL cases should also be considered.

Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, London: UK Ministry of Justice, 2024. 77p.

By Leila Pereira, Rafael Pucci, Rodrigo R. Soares

We study a Force-down/Shoot-down intervention in Brazil that led cocaine traffickers to shift from air to river routes. Using data on cocaine production, homicides, and the network of rivers in the Amazon, we provide evidence that violence increased in municipalities along river routes originating from Andean producing countries after the policy. We also show that, during the same period, violence in these municipalities became more responsive to cocaine production in origin countries. We document an instance of crime displacement over the three-dimensional space, involving sophisticated adaptations from criminals regarding transportation technologies, with dramatic side-effects for local populations.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 55p.

By Claire Provost,

U.S. leads global drug war

The role of the United States in exporting the destructive war on drugs to other countries is unparalleled. Since 1971, the U.S. has spent more than a trillion dollars on the war on drugs, prioritising law enforcement responses and fuelling mass incarceration within its borders. It has also played a leading role in pushing and funding punitive responses to drugs internationally. This has continued despite clear evidence that such approaches don’t work to achieve their stated aims (ending drug use and sales) while having devastating effects on rights and health, including mass criminalisation, disease transmission, repression and displacement.

This report demonstrates how U.S. assistance has supported and expanded destructive and deadly anti-drug responses in low- and middle-income countries around the world. It also presents new follow-the-money data analysis on U.S. international drug control spending by various government departments and budgets. This includes official development assistance (ODA) intended to support poverty reduction and other global development goals; and three case studies – Colombia, Mexico, and the Philippines – to reveal the damage done by this spending.

Vast and complex global network

The 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the U.S. State Department described a “whole of government approach” to drug control and a strategy of deep collaboration and “capacity building” with counterparts in other countries. A vast and complex global network of U.S. government agencies, programs, and activities has been developed in the ongoing “war on drugs.”

U.S. support for drug enforcement internationally includes financial, material and technical assistance. The U.S. drug war bureaucracy is expansive, involving numerous agencies of the government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department, Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as the infamous Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), under the Department of Justice (DOJ). By 2023, the DEA had 93 foreign offices in 69 countries.

Follow the money

Over the decade between 2015-2024, a total of almost $13 billion of U.S. taxpayer money was allocated to “counternarcotics” activities internationally.

For fiscal year 2025, the President requested $1 billion for international “counternarcotics” activities. Almost half of this request was to be received and spent by the DEA ($480 million); the second largest planned intermediary for this spending was to be the State Department’s INL bureau (about $350 million).

Separate budget documents from the involved departments contain further detail on where and how international drug control funding is to be spent. For instance, the U.S. Department of State’s 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) showed that Latin America was budgeted to receive more than half ($225 million) of the total $375 million for “counternarcotics” requested by the department and its agencies (including INL and USAID). Colombia was to be the largest single country recipient ($115 million).

Aid donors (led by the U.S.) spent almost $1 billion of their ODA on “narcotics control” projects in dozens of low- and middle-income countries over the decade 2013-2022. No donor contributed more to these “narcotics control” budgets than the U.S.

Controversially, the U.S. has been increasingly classifying drug control spending as ODA: in 2020, it counted just over $30 million like this; in 2021 that figure was $309 million (and while it dropped to $106 million in 2022, this was still higher than earlier years).

Profit-making companies are also benefiting from this ODA spending on “narcotics control.” The top “channel” for this spending has been private companies (“private sector institutions,” receiving $244 million over the decade) followed by the governments of countries funded ($202 million), and then multilateral organisations such as UNODC ($77 million).

Harm Reduction International | Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 47p.