By Patrick Lussier and Evan McCuish

Objectives

There is empirical evidence that sexual recidivism rates have been dropping for several decades, but it remains unclear whether this drop is an artifact of changing research methodologies over the years. The current study, therefore, examines whether the sexual recidivism drop is robust while accounting for various methodological factors.

Method

The study is based on a systematic review and a quantitative meta-analysis of 468 empirical studies published between 1940 and 2019 that reported sexual recidivism rates. A total of 626 estimations (n = 388,994) of sexual recidivism were retrieved for the study period and of those, 238 were independent observations (n = 196,651). A series of sensitivity analyses were conducted using a meta-regression approach.

Results

A series of meta-regression analyses show that, even after accounting for various methodological factors (e.g., study settings, follow-up length, recidivism criteria), there has been a sexual recidivism rate drop of about 45–60% since the 1970s.

Conclusions

The study findings confirm the presence of a sexual recidivism drop while recognizing that sexual recidivism rates are sensitive to methodological details.

Journal of Criminal Justice

Volume 92, May–June 2024, 102188, p. 16

By Sandra Aguilar-Gómez and Andrea Salazar-Díaz

Every year, 245 million women are victims of intimate partner violence (IPV). Climate change is hypothesized to exacerbate this figure through its disruptive impact on household livelihoods, among other channels. However, little causal evidence exists on this aspect of the climate-gender nexus, partly due to measurement challenges that have contributed to gaps in the literature. In this paper, we use three different IPV data sources to examine the effect of drought in Mexico and the role of agricultural vulnerability in intensifying these effects. We find robust evidence of increases in all measures of IPV in response to local precipitation deficits: as unanticipated exposure to days without rain in the previous month rises, more injuries linked to IPV are recorded in the public health system, police reports increase, and more 911 calls related to IPV are made. The effects are stronger in regions highly dependent on agriculture, particularly when the shock occurs during the growing season. In a country where most agricultural income and land are controlled by men, our results align with theoretical predictions from male-backlash IPV models and extractive violence models. We also find that the impact of drought on IPV is more pronounced in municipalities with low state capacity, though potential differences in reporting behavior between IPV measures complicate comparisons. Our findings underscore the need to design gender-sensitive disaster relief policies, strengthen trust in reporting mechanisms and helplines, and reduce the social acceptability of IPV

WORKING PAPER No IDB-WP-1653, Inter-American Development Bank Gender and Diversity Division . 2025. 43p.

By Kaitlyn Rines

This report summarizes law enforcement reports of sexual assault offenses for the State of Ohio during the years 2016-2023. We also summarize characteristics of crime incidents, victims and suspects. We provide sexual assault rates throughout this report, and it is important to understand how we calculated them and what they mean. First, we calculate offense totals by counting the number of sexual assault victimizations documented within each law enforcement incident report. Sexual assault victim totals do not necessarily represent unique victims. For example, law enforcement could report that a suspect sexually assaulted an individual more than once during a single incident. Further, a suspect could assault the same individual during a different incident. Therefore, it is almost certain that the sexual assault offense total is larger than the number of individuals who were victims of sexual assaults. Next, we calculate the rate of sexual assault by dividing the sexual assault total by the population total and then multiplying the resulting number (the quotient) by 100,000. This yields a sexual assault crime rate per 100,000 persons. We provide Ohio’s overall sexual assault crime rates over time, and we also compare rates of sexual assault for Ohio’s standard demographic groups (e.g., age, sex, race). Rates can vary significantly depending on how many victimizations a group experienced as well as the size of one group versus another. For example, the sexual assault crime rate is much higher for female Ohioans than males, largely because the number of female sexual assaults is much larger than male. Further, most sexual assault victims are White females because most of Ohio is White. However, Black females have the highest victimization rate because their sexual assault total is large while their overall population size is small.

Columbus:; Ohio Department of Public Safety, Office of Criminal Justice Services. 2024. 62p.

By Jennifer McDonald

Across the country, law enforcement agencies routinely seize currency from individuals using civil forfeiture—a legal process that allows agencies to take and keep property without ever charging owners with a crime, let alone securing a conviction. Studies examining civil forfeiture have found it to be a multibillion-dollar industry that punishes people without proving they have done anything wrong. This study is the first to examine how U.S. Department of Homeland Security agencies—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard—use civil forfeiture to take and keep currency from often unsuspecting travelers at airports across the country. DHS agencies are just a few of the many government agencies that conduct airport seizures, but newly available data give fresh insight into their activity. This study, covering 2000 through 2016, quantifies just how often DHS agencies have seized currency at airports—and just how much currency has flowed into the federal government’s coffers as a result.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2020. 32p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Women

In this publication, the term “femicide” is used to refer to all types of gender-related killings of women and girls as described in the “Statistical framework for measuring the gender-related killing of women and girls (also referred to as “femicide/feminicide”)”.

Globally, approximately 51,100 women and girls were killed by their intimate partners or other family members during 2023. Higher than the 2022 estimate of 48,800 victims, this change is not indicative of an actual increase as it is largely due to differences in data availability at the country level. The 2023 figure means that 60 per cent of the almost 85,000 women and girls killed intentionally during the year were murdered by their intimate partners or other family members. In other words, an average of 140 women and girls worldwide lost their lives every day at the hands of their partner or a close relative...

P.18 When considering possible risk factors, it should be noted that fewer victims (11 per cent) and perpetrators (20 per cent) of femicides are under the influence of alcohol than in the case of male homicides (25 and 30 per cent respectively). Some studies point to the drug intoxication of victims as a homicidal risk factor,13 but in the case of femicides in France, this does not seem to be the case, with 3 per cent of victims and 5 per cent of perpetrators of femicide being under the influence of drugs at the time of the crime.

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 36p.

By Ulla D. Berg, and Sebastian K. León

Each year the United States government detains and deports hundreds of thousands of people who prior to their removal are held in confinement for an average of 55 days. The short and long-term effects of the coronavirus pandemic on migrant detention and deportation continue to be evaluated in real time, including how we can best study it. This paper provides a timely analysis on the relationship between immigration enforcement and confinement, public health emergencies, and ethnographic methods. It makes two contributions. The first is methodological and focuses on the challenges and opportunities of ethnographic methods in carceral settings when pandemic-related protocols have raised additional challenges to conventional in-person prison ethnography. The second contribution is empirical and documents how we adapted ethnographic methods to an interdisciplinary research design and to the exigencies of the pandemic to study the spread of the coronavirus in four immigrant detention facilities in New Jersey, USA.

EthnographyVolume 25, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 314-334

By Rivke Jaffe

Rivke Jaffe explains how despite Jamaica’s “dons” are associated with crime and violence, they have become figures of political authority and seen as legitimate leaders.

Throughout Kingston, Jamaica, figures known as “dons” exercise political authority and are seen as legitimate leaders despite their associations with crime and violence. In the absence of strong government support, they provide impoverished residents with access to security, conflict resolution, and various forms of welfare through their own resources and connections to Jamaica’s political parties. In The Rule of Dons, Rivke Jaffe shows how dons’ power relies on a widespread belief in their right to rule, explaining how criminal power is legitimized through a set of aesthetic, affective, and spatial mechanisms. She argues that dons must credibly embody an outlaw persona that stands outside of the political establishment while also connecting strategically to state institutions and mobilizing democratic ideals such as freedom and equality. As such, dons represent a form of authority that involves balancing an autocratic form of rule

with an established democratic order. While donmanship represents a historically and culturally specific type of political authority, Jaffe’s analysis of this phenomenon offers insights into the entanglement of violent autocratic rule and democratic institutions far beyond Jamaica.

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2024. 217p.

By Elena Marushiakova, and Vesselin Popov

In their centuries-old history, the Roma (formerly known as Gypsies) experienced many difficult moments and cruel trials from their arrival in Europe until now. The history of the Roma in the USSR is no exception in this respect. Along with affirmative state policy towards them (at least until the end of the 1930s), they also fell victim to the massive political repressions of that time. In this book, the Roma victims of these repressions are made visible and the scale of the repressions against them is discussed. The authors describe the political repression of Roma not as an isolated historical phenomenon explicitly aimed at the Roma as a separate ethnic community but understand the events as a component of the mass terror and brutal against all Soviet citizens. In this way, the history of the Roma is inscribed in the general history of the USSR.

Leiden; Boston: Brill: 2024.

Edited by Nutmeg Hallett, Richard Whittington, Dirk Richter, Emachi Eneje

This book aims to provide a state-of-the-art overview of the contexts, causes and treatments that relate to the reduction of coercion and the prevention of violence in mental health settings. The objective of this new edition in Open Access is to integrate theoretical explanations, empirical findings and practical solutions on the topic from many countries and diverse professional contexts.

A large proportion of the text is concerned with practical and applied guidance for practitioners and others based on a clear understanding of conceptual and theoretical issues. Significantly enriched by the contributions of lived experience editors and co-authors, this edition brings authentic, new perspectives that deepen its relevance and impact.

There is extensive use of case studies drawn from practice and the media to enliven the discussion. The scope of the book is intended to go beyond a reductionist medical/biological orientation on coercion and violence in mental health by integrating this within broader psychological and social frameworks. It includes new relevant contributions from nursing, psychology, psychiatry and sociology. The language of the book is clear and understandable to a broad audience whilst offering new knowledge for researchers and other specialists.

Cham Springer Nature, 436p.

By William Downs

The Labour government has committed to halving knife crime in a decade.

This briefing provides an overview of legislation concerning knives and offensive weapons, and the approaches taken by the police and other agencies to prevent serious violence in England and Wales.

What are knife crime offences? It is a criminal offence to possess any knife or other bladed article in a public place, under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It is also a criminal offence to have an “offensive weapon” in any public place, under section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Both offences carry maximum penalties of up to four years’ imprisonment. It is a defence for someone to prove they have possessed a knife, bladed article or offensive weapon with “good reason or lawful authority”, though the legislation does not provide examples of what this means in practice. A court determines whether the explanation provided by a defendant amounts to lawful authority or reasonable excuse based on the specific circumstances of a case. It is also a criminal offence to possess any prohibited weapon under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended by the Offensive Weapons Act 2019). Prohibited weapons cannot be possessed anywhere, even in private, and are also illegal to hire, lend or manufacture. Like other possession offences, the maximum penalty is four years’ imprisonment. There are currently 20 prohibited weapons listed in secondary legislation under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, including a range of knives, bladed articles and other weapons. Under section 141(2) of the 1988 act, the government can introduce secondary legislation to add further weapons to this list. In 2024, the government added a new definition of “zombie-style” knives and machetes to the list, and launched a consultation on adding “ninja swords” to the list. Sentencing statistics from the Ministry of Justice shows that in the year ending March 2023, there were almost 18,500 cautions and convictions made for possession of a knife or offensive weapon. Juveniles (aged 10-17) were the offenders in around 17.3% of cases. Further data for England and Wales related to knife-related offences can be found in the Library briefing: Knife Crime Statistics: England and Wales.

London: House of Commons Library, 2025. 41p.

By Ernesto Lopez, Bobby Boxerman

Key Takeaways This study updates and supplements previous U.S. crime trends reports by the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) with data through December 2024. It examines yearly and monthly rates of reported crime for 13 violent, property, and drug offenses in 40 American cities that have consistently reported monthly data over the past six years. The 40 cities are not necessarily representative of all jurisdictions in the United States. Not all cities published data for each offense (see the Appendix for which cities reported which offenses); trends in offenses with fewer reporting cities should be viewed with caution. Not all crimes are reported to law enforcement. In addition, the data collected for this report are subject to revision by local jurisdictions. Reported levels of 12 of the 13 offenses covered in this report were lower in 2024 than in 2023; shoplifting was the only offense higher in 2024 compared to 2023. Looking at changes in violent offenses from 2023 to 2024, the number of homicides in the 29 study cities providing data for that crime was 16% lower, representing 631 fewer homicides. There were 4% fewer reported aggravated assaults, 15% fewer gun assaults, 6% fewer sexual assaults, and 4% fewer domestic violence incidents last year than in 2023. Robbery fell by 10% while carjackings (a type of robbery) decreased by 32%. Motor vehicle theft had been on the rise from the summer of 2020 through 2023, but that trend reversed last year; there were 24% fewer motor vehicle thefts in 2024 than in 2023. Reports of residential burglaries (-13%), nonresidential burglaries (-6%), larcenies (-5%), and drug offenses (-3%) all decreased in 2024 compared to 2023. But rates of reported shoplifting, a crime that has received extensive attention from the media and policymakers, increased by 14% over the same period. Examining trends over a longer timeframe, most violent crimes are at or below levels seen in 2019, the year prior to the onset of the COVID pandemic and racial justice protests of 2020. There were 6% fewer homicides in the study cities in 2024 than in 2019. Similarly, sexual assault (-26%), domestic violence (-11%), and robbery (-19%) were lower in 2024 than in 2019. In contrast, aggravated assaults (+4%), gun assaults (+5%), and carjackings (+25%) were higher in 2024 than in 2019. Homicide rates in some high-homicide cities, including Baltimore, Detroit, and St. Louis, have dropped even further, returning to the levels of 2014, when national homicide rates were at historic lows. Rates in other cities have largely returned to pre-pandemic levels. Property crime trends have been mixed over the last five years. There were fewer residential burglaries (-38%) and larcenies (-12%) in 2024 than in 2019, but more nonresidential burglaries (+12%) and shoplifting (+1%). Motor vehicle thefts were higher by half (+53%) during the timeframe. Drug offenses in 2024 were 28% below 2019 levels. While these crime reductions are promising, the United States still experiences high levels of homicide compared to other industrialized nations, and progress should not slow local, state, federal, and community efforts to adopt comprehensive, evidencebased strategies to reduce violence. Furthermore, researchers should redouble their efforts to identify how broad behavioral shifts and other societal dynamics may affect trends.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2025. 39p.

By Siobhan Lawler

As gatekeepers to restorative justice (RJ) programs for domestic and family violence (DFV) and sexual violence, stakeholders in referring agencies perform the critical role of assessing the suitability of cases for entry into these programs. This article draws on interviews with 47 stakeholders in an RJ program for DFV and sexual violence in the Australian Capital Territory to better understand stakeholder decision-making about referrals. Findings show stakeholders’ decisions around which matters to refer to RJ centre on assessments of victim‑survivors’ safety and offender accountability. Many stakeholders are risk averse when deciding whether to make a referral, which may inadvertently reduce opportunities for victim-survivors to benefit and achieve their justice goals.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 707, Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 15p.

By Aaron Chalfin, Benjamin Hansen, Jason Lerner, and Lucie Parker

This paper offers experimental evidence that crime can be successfully reduced by changing the situational environment that potential victims and offenders face. We focus on a ubiquitous but surprisingly understudied feature of the urban landscape – street lighting – and report the first experimental evidence on the effect of street lighting on crime. Through a unique public partnership in New York City, temporary streetlights were randomly allocated to public housing developments from March through August 2016. We find evidence that communities that were assigned more lighting experienced sizable reductions in crime. After accounting for potential spatial spillovers, we find that the provision of street lights led, at a minimum, to a 36 percent reduction in nighttime outdoor index crimes.

NBER Working Paper No. 25798 Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019 45p.

By Cherrell Green

While Black males are disproportionately impacted by gun homicide, they are also grossly impacted by non -fatal shootings. The impact of gun violence extends far beyond the immediate physical harm inflicted by bullets; this harm can permeate and disrupt personal relationships, create lasting psychological distress, and undermine a sense of safety within communities. However, the needs of injured Black men are often overlooked in public discourse. Despitethe prevalenceofthesetraumaticexperiencesinthe livesoflow-incomeBlackmen,theirresponseto trauma is often treated as pathology, with fewer resources devoted to addressing the adverse consequences associated with these experiences. This policy brief summarizes key findings from a study involving 18 in-person semi-structured interviews with Black men across the United States who have sustained a gunshot injury. The findings highlight the individual and institutional harm Black men with gunshot wounds (GSWs) experience at the hands of both police officers and health care providers. Consequently, this brief proposes changes designed to positively impact the lives of Black men affected by gun violence throughout the continuum of care.

San Diego: University of San Diego, Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice, 2024. 27p.

Shocking videos surfaced in late August of gun-wielding Venezuelan migrants storming an apartment building in the suburban city of Aurora, Colorado. One of the migrants, a 20-year-old, confessed that he is part of a Venezuelan gang called Tren de Aragua (TdA, or “Train from Aragua”). The Aurora police department is now beefing up its budget to confront the increased crime spilling over from the sanctuary city next door in Denver.Aurora was just the beginning. In the past 11 months, there have been increasing reports of TdA activity in no fewer than 30 major cities across America. At least 100 federal investigations involving the TdA are underway, catching most of the U.S. law enforcement community by surprise. Shooting two New York City

police officers, building sex trafficking rings in Louisiana, and murdering the Georgia nursing student Laken Riley and 12-year-old Jocelyn Nungaray in Houston are just some of the high- profile violent crimes carried out by the TdA. Moreover, given that the Venezuelan government does not cooperate or provide any data on suspected criminals coming from their country into the United States, some law enforcement officers have dubbed the TdA as “ghost criminals” with little to identify them other than confessions and/ or tattoos. The Tren de Aragua has been around for more than a decade, first as a Venezuelan prison gang, then as a transnational criminal organization (TCO) spreading throughout Latin America, and now as a major street gang terrorizing cities in at least 20 states throughout America—and growing. Many comparisons have been drawn between the TdA and the transnational Salvadoran gang, La Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). The TdA, however, is expanding much more quickly, likely due to its unique origin and state sponsorship in Venezuela. Unlike MS-13, which was born in Los Angeles in the 1980s, the TdA is foreign-born and was virtually nonexistent in America until 2021, distinct from other major TCOs such as MS-13 or the Mexican cartels. The TdA’s rapid expansion in the United States is a direct consequence of the Biden–Harris Administration’s failed immigration policies and lack of border enforcement.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The TdA’s goal is to establish territorial control and impose a criminal economy that connects illicit networks to penitentiaries in or near those neighborhoods. The new Trump Administration should work with Latin American partners to dismantle the TdA throughout the Western Hemisphere.

BACKGROUNDER No. 3876 | December 5, 2024

Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, the Douglas ans Sarah Alison Center for National Security, 2024. 18p.

By Godwin Omokhagbo Emmanuel, Folahanmi Tomiwa Akinsolu , Olunike Rebecca Abodunrin,

Oliver Chukwujekwu Ezechi

ntroduction

Substance use is a growing public health concern in West Africa, contributing to significant morbidity, mortality, and socioeconomic challenges. Despite the increasing prevalence, comprehensive data on the patterns and factors influencing substance use in the region remain limited. This systematic review and meta-analysis aim to synthesize existing research on the prevalence and patterns of substance use in West Africa, providing critical insights for developing targeted interventions and policies.

Methodology

This study followed the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses [PRISMA] guidelines. A systematic search was performed across four major databases [PubMed, Web of Science, CINAHL, and Scopus] from January 2000 to June 2024. A total of 22 studies involving 43,145 participants met the inclusion criteria. Multiple reviewers performed data extraction and quality assessment independently, and a random-effects meta-analysis was used to estimate the pooled prevalence of various substances. Sensitivity analysis was conducted using a leave-one-out approach to evaluate the influence of individual studies on the overall prevalence.

Results

The meta-analysis revealed the pooled prevalence rates of alcohol [44%], cannabis [6%], tramadol [30%], codeine [11%], and kolanut [39%]. The analysis identified high heterogeneity across studies [I2 = 98– 99%], reflecting diverse substance use patterns and influencing factors, including peer influence, availability of substances, socioeconomic conditions, and demographic characteristics. Sensitivity analysis indicated that no single study significantly impacted the overall prevalence estimates, confirming the robustness of the findings.

Conclusion

Substance use in West Africa is widespread and influenced by complex factors. The high prevalence of alcohol and tramadol use highlights the urgent need for targeted public health interventions, including stricter regulatory frameworks, community-based prevention programs, and comprehensive public education campaigns. This study provides a critical foundation for developing effective strategies to mitigate the escalating substance use crisis in the region.

PLOS Glob Public Health 4(12): e0004019. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pgph.0004019

By Matthew F. Garnett and Arialdi M. Miniño

Drug overdoses are one of the leading causes of injury death in adults and have risen over the past several decades in the United States (1–3). Overdoses involving synthetic opioids (fentanyl, for example) and stimulants (cocaine and methamphetamine, for example) have also risen in the past few years (1). This report presents rates of drug overdose deaths from the National Vital Statistics System over a 20-year period by demographic group and by the type of drugs involved, specifically, opioids and stimulants, with a focus on changes from 2022 to 2023. Key findings Data from the National Vital Statistics System ● The age-adjusted rate of drug overdose deaths increased from 8.9deaths per 100,000 standard population in 2003 to 32.6 in 2022; however, the rate decreased to 31.3 in 2023. ● Rates decreased between 2022 and 2023 for people ages 15–54 and increased for adults age 55 and older. ● From 2022 to 2023, rates decreased for White non-Hispanic people, while rates for other race and Hispanic-origin groups generally stayed the same or increased. ● Between 2022 and 2023, rates declined for deaths involving synthetic opioids other than methadone, heroin, and natural and semisynthetic opioids, while the rate for methadone remained the same. ● From 2022 to 2023, rates increased for deaths involving cocaine by 4.9% (from 8.2 to 8.6) and psychostimulants with abuse potential by 1.9% (10.4 to 10.6)

NCHS Data Brief No. 522, December 2024. 12p.
Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2024. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15620/cdc/170565.

By Joseph Friedman, jofriedman@health.uDaniel Ciccarone

Synthetic illicit drugs, such as nitazenes and fentanyls, are becoming commonplace in countries around the world, including in Europe, Australia, and Latin America, which raises concern for overdose crises like those seen in North America. An important dimension of the risk represented by synthetic drugs is the fact that they are increasingly packaged in counterfeit pill form. These pills—often indistinguishable from authentic pharmaceuticals—have substantially widened the scope of populations susceptible to synthetic drug overdose in North America (eg, among adolescents experimenting with pills or tourists from the USA seeking psychoactive medications from pharmacies in Mexico). The non-medical use of diverted prescription medications is relatively more common, and less stigmatised, than the use of powder drugs. Many consumers of counterfeit pills are unaware that they contain synthetic illicit drugs, believe them to be authentic pharmaceuticals, and would be unlikely to consume those drugs knowingly or if in powder form. Given these issues, we recommend the expansion of educational and awareness campaigns, pill testing programmes to help consumers shift demand to safer products, increased monitoring in routine clinical scenarios and overdose death toxicology, and expanding medically managed safer alternatives to counterfeit pill use.\

The Lancet Public Health, Volume 10, Issue 1, e58 - e62 2025.

By The Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921

A mob destroyed 35-square-blocks of the African Amer i can Community during the eve - ning of May 31, through the afternoon of June 1, 1921. It was a tragic, infamous moment in Oklahoma and the nation’s history. The worst civil disturbance since the Civil War. In the aftermath of the death and destruction the people of our state suffered from a fatigue of faith — some still search for a statute of limitation on morality, attempting to forget the longevity of the residue of injustice that at best can leave little room for the healing of the heart. Perhaps this report, and subsequent humanitarian recovery events by the governments and the good people of the state will extract us from the guilt and confirm the commandment of a good and just God — leaving the deadly deeds of 1921 buried in the call for redemption, historical correctness, and re pair. Then we can proudly sing together: “We know we belong to this land. “And the land we belong to is grand, and when we say, ay yippy yi ki yea, “We’re only saying, you’re doing fine Oklahoma.” “Oklahoma, you’re O-K-L-A-H-O-M-A, Oklahoma OK.”

Oklahoma Historical Society, [Oklahoma City], 2001, 200p.

By VERED ANDRE’EV, OMAR MOHAMMED, LARA PORTNOY

Often referred to as the “world’s oldest hatred”, antisemitism, Jew-hatred, or Judeophobia has led to mass expulsions, pogroms, massacres, and the largest genocide in human history – the Holocaust. Hatred against the Jewish people can be traced across history and geography, evolving with global events, trends, and local cultures. Today, antisemitism is experiencing a worldwide revival, with the events of October 7th, 2023, and the resulting Israel-Hamas war serving as an impetus to major spikes in hateful rhetoric and violent action. Antisemitic incidents were already at historic highs; they have increased further. Antisemitism is an issue of serious concern that requires public attention and policy response. As stated in November 2022 by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), “antisemitic incidents and hate crimes violate fundamental rights, especially the right to human dignity, the right to equality of treatment and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. According to the Anti-Defamation League’s Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2023, “In 2023, ADL tabulated 8,873 antisemitic incidents across the United States. This represents a 140% increase from the 3,698 incidents recorded in 2022 and is the highest number on record since ADL began tracking antisemitic incidents in 1979.” When assessing antisemitism in Arabic-speaking countries, the situation is even more disturbing. The ADL’s Global 100 survey, first launched in 2014, measures antisemitic beliefs across 100 countries, revealing notably high levels in Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with index scores reaching 74% in Saudi Arabia and 93% in the West Bank and Gaza (Weiberg, 2020). Antisemitism in the Arab world has deep historical roots, intensified by figures like Muhammad Rashid Rida in the early 20th century, who used antisemitic rhetoric in response to political Zionism. This hatred has been embedded in Arab political discourse for over a century, often framed in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, where conspiracy theories portray Jews as a global malevolent force. Islamist movements, emerging in the 1920s, have perpetuated these antisemitic views, depicting Jews as historical enemies and untrustworthy partners in peace. The legacy of antisemitism includes influential texts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which were widely disseminated in the Arab world and continue to influence perceptions today (Winter & Link, 2024).

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University , 2025. 35p.