By The Commission of Inquiry into Queensland Police Service Responses to domestic and family violence.

The institutional culture of a police force is of vital importance to a community. A police force is numerically strong, politically influential, physically powerful, and armed. It stands at the threshold of the criminal justice system and is in effective control of the enforcement of the criminal law. Each police officer has extensive authority over all other citizens, however powerful, coupled with wide discretions concerning its exercise. Subsequent stages in the criminal justice process, including courts and prisons, are largely dependent on the activities of the Police Force, and will inevitably be affected by its deficiencies, especially any which are cultural and therefore widespread. Investment in cultural change and strong leadership will remove any last vestiges of a culture that does not value women nor understand the costs to us all of allowing domestic and family violence to continue.

The Commission of Inquiry into Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence (the Commission) was established to examine whether there are cultural issues within the QPS that negatively affect police investigations of domestic and family violence. The Commission was also tasked with investigating if any cultural issues identified contribute to the overrepresentation of First Nations peoples in the criminal justice system. It was also required to consider the adequacy of the current conduct and complaint handling process against officers. This companion report is a compilation of case studies, perspectives and experiences shared with the Commission by victim-survivors, police, and other persons. The information is intended to be a snapshot of the evidence gathered from hundreds of submissions and comments provided to the Commission. The stories and case studies about victim-survivors’ experiences have been taken from submissions from victim-survivors’ and organisation and the free text answers from the victim-survivor survey conducted by the Commission. The survey was answered by 848 people. Information and case studies from or about police members, have been taken from 365 submissions, 53 interviews of current and retired QPS members by Mark Ainsworth, free text answers from the QPS DFV-Q survey 2022 (completed by 2,733 members) and a sample of the approximately 6,200 free text responses to the Working for Qld Survey 2021. Case studies were primarily taken from police material provided under notice to produce documents. The views expressed do not profess to be the views held by all members of the QPS. They are instead a representative sample of the evidence the Commission has drawn its conclusions from. This report is intended to be read alongside A call for change (2022), which outlines the Commission’s findings and recommendations. Where names have been used, these are pseudonyms to provide anonymity. Any other identifying details have also been removed to protect the confidentiality of the people involved. Many of the extracts in this report come from submissions that were provided to the Commission on a confidential basis. In each case consent to publish the submission has been obtained from the author. To the extent possible, the Commission has sought to accurately represent the diverse views and experiences that have been shared. The Commission does not necessarily endorse or support the views outlined within this report.

Brisbane: The Commission, 2022. 56p.

By Commission of Inquiry into Queensland Police Service

The Commission of Inquiry into Queensland Police Service (QPS) responses to domestic and family violence was established as part of the Queensland Government’s response to the recommendations of the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce in Hear her voice: Report One (2021). The Commission’s terms of reference tasked it to inquire into any cultural issues within the QPS that influence the investigation of domestic and family violence, and how those cultural issues contribute to the overrepresentation of First Nations peoples in the criminal justice system. The terms of reference also required the Commission to inquire into the capability, capacity and structure of the QPS to respond to domestic and family violence, and the adequacy of the processes for dealing with complaints about police officers to ensure the community confidence in the QPS. To assist it with those inquiries, the Commission gathered information from victim-survivors, the community organisations that support them and police officers. It did this using a variety of methods including by calling for submissions, conducting surveys of victim-survivors and police officers, conducting meetings and interviews, holding public hearings and using its powers to require the production of relevant information and records, including from the QPS. The Commission also examined previous reports and reviews of QPS responses to domestic and family violence and engaged experts to inform its understanding of matters relevant to the terms of reference. The Commission was greatly assisted by the information and perspectives provided by victim-survivors and community organisations. However, what makes the work of this Commission different to previous reviews of QPS responses to domestic and family violence is the extent to which police officers provided information and views about what is working well and what needs improvement. Police officers have a lived experience of the culture of the organisation. Through the input of police officers, the Commission learned of cultural issues of sexism, misogyny and racism which impact on QPS responses to domestic and family violence. By sharing their experiences and views, police officers also informed the Commission about the impact that resourcing issues, structural limitations, and burnout and fatigue has on the QPS response. Police officers told the Commission that, although most police officers conduct themselves admirably towards their colleagues and victim-survivors, the cultural and structural issues in the organisation mean there is need for improvement in the organisation’s response. Through the information and views shared with the Commission, victim-survivors, community organisations and police officers all made a call for change and expressed a hope for improvement.

Brisbane: The Commission, 2022. 412p.

By Heather Nancarrow, Kate Thomas, Valerie Ringland, Tanya Modini

When police are called to an incident of domestic and family violence (DFV), one of their tasks under DFV law is to determine whether a party is in need of protection from future harm. A concern that has arisen out of the application of DFV law is the inappropriate use of legal sanctions, in particular protection orders, against women who use violence in response to violence perpetrated against them. This often occurs where there are conflicting claims of abuse and can result in cross-applications and cross-orders for protection.

This research project focused on identifying areas of improvement in police and court practice in relation to identifying the person most in need of protection, taking account of an ongoing pattern of abuse characterised by coercive control.

Key findings:

• Women—especially Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women—are being misidentified as perpetrators on protection orders and the effects of this are far-reaching.

• Police culture impacts on the accurate identification of the aggrieved/respondent, for example, through pervasive, stereotypical assumptions about victim behaviour. Police practice also focuses on single incidents of visible or physical violence, which compromises the intent of DFV legislation to provide protection from future harm (by identifying patterns of coercive control).

• Police sometimes err on the side of caution in making applications, deferring to the magistrate to determine if an order is warranted. However, magistrates in turn may rely on the initial assessments made by police, as may prosecutors. This can create a pinball effect where each decision-maker defers to another’s assessment of the appropriateness of an order. Accordingly, this means that accountability for that assessment is unclear.

• Perpetrators use a range of tactics of systems abuse, such as making false allegations, which can result in inaccurate identification of the person most in need of protection. Once a woman has been identified as a perpetrator, this can then also be used a tool for systems abuse by perpetrators (for example, through threats to call the police).

Key recommendations:

• Create guidance for police on identifying patterns of coercive control.

• Improve processes of decision-making and accountability between police and courts.

• Create guidance for magistrates on how and when they can dismiss inappropriate applications and/or orders

Sydney: ANROWS, Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety 2020. 134p.

By Hayley Boxall, Anthony Morgan

Awareness of coercive control within the context of abusive intimate relationships is greater than ever before in Australia. However, there is limited research examining the different patterns and characteristics of abuse, particularly among large Australian samples.

This study examines the characteristics of violence and abuse reported by 1,023 Australian women who had recently experienced coercive control by their current or former partner. The most frequently reported behaviours were jealousy and suspicion of friends, constant insults, monitoring of movements and financial abuse. Over half of the respondents also reported experiencing physical forms of abuse (54%), including severe forms such as non-fatal strangulation (27%). One in three of these women also reported experiencing sexual violence during the survey period (30%). Women were much more likely to seek advice or support when they had also experienced physical or sexual forms of abuse.

Statistical Bulletin 30. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2021. 15p.

By Gemma Hamilton, Alexandra Ridgway, Anastasia Powell, Georgina Heydon

This research explores the co-occurrence of family violence and sexual harm in Victoria, shedding light on the complex nature and interconnectedness between these two forms of abuse and its impact on victim survivors.

Drawing on victim/survivor and stakeholder interviews, as well as a sector wide survey, the reports present key outcomes of a research project funded by Family Safety Victoria with particular attention towards the implications of key findings for the development of policy, intervention and support. By deepening understandings of the complex interplay between family violence and sexual harm, the research seeks to assist professionals in this space to better address the needs of victim/survivors and work together to strengthen system responses.

Melbourne: RMIT University, 2023. 59p,

By Leesa Hooker, Emma Toone, Sarah Wendt, Cathy Humphreys, Angela Taft

When it comes to recovery from the trauma and harm of intimate partner violence (IPV), the evidence base shows a need for early intervention and responses that include women and their children. This research report provides findings from a pilot evaluation project examining the effectiveness of an early intervention therapeutic model, child–parent psychotherapy (CPP), designed for young children and their mothers experiencing trauma, including IPV. This therapeutic model was developed in the United States as a model of care for mothers and their children to enhance relationships and reduce trauma. This report’s findings aim to inform future trialling and expansion of CPP nationally.

With this aim in mind, the researchers tested the feasibility of CPP in the Australian context, assessed therapist fidelity to the model, and evaluated its effectiveness at improving the health and wellbeing outcomes of women and their children. The evaluation used a small-scale, multisite pilot featuring 18 mother–child dyads and 11 community-based clinical sites in both urban and regional locations in Victoria and South Australia.

The researchers found that the small-scale pilot was promising, reporting the mother–child therapy model to be feasible in the Australian context. Positive outcomes were reported for mothers and children, including increased parental warmth and improved child emotions and behaviours. Women also experienced less IPV post-intervention. Clinicians who adhered most to the model were also better able to build relationships with women and their children and convey a sense of hope. Importantly, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the overwhelming demand for evidence-based relational, child–parent, and young child-focused therapy like CPP, particularly in rural areas.

This research contributes to a better understanding of the service needs of women and children impacted by IPV, particularly the role of recovery interventions in buffering the long-term effects of IPV on families and developing children.

ANROWS - Australia's National Research Organisation for Women's Safety, 2022. 44p.

By Emma Russell, Hui Zhou, Gabriela Franich

This report documents how women experiencing domestic and family violence (DFV) are policed and criminalised. It presents findings from a research project conducted by Fitzroy Legal Service (FLS) in partnership with La Trobe University with the support of a Victorian Law Foundation Knowledge Grant (2020-21). The research aimed to identify how women who experience a range of social, economic, health and legal issues – including but not limited to DFV – become caught up in the criminal legal system.1 Investigating this point of overlap or interchange between social, financial, health or civil matters on the one hand, and criminal legal matters on the other, can help practitioners and policy strategists to explore the opportunities for systemic changes and collaborative support models that would prevent women’s criminalisation. Our use of the term women is inclusive of both cis and trans women. By using the term criminalisation, we hope to draw attention to the processes and mechanisms through which social problems come to be treated as criminal legal problems; and to highlight that there are alternatives. To investigate the relationships between criminalisation and women’s experiences of social, economic, health and/or civil legal issues, we adopted three methods of data collection and analysis: • the review and classification of 108 anonymised Fitzroy Legal Service client case files relating to women with criminal legal matters • the retrieval of publicly available statistical data on women in prison and women respondents on intervention orders • the thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with 11 legal and social service practitioners with current experience of working with criminalised women These methods generated rich quantitative and qualitative data on the policing and criminalisation of women, especially women experiencing DFV and allowed us to identify opportunities for systemic changes that would prevent criminalisation. Much of what we found has already been spoken and written about at length by women and gender diverse people with lived experience of imprisonment.2 We intend for this research to supplement their expertise and lend further evidence to their campaigns and calls for action. By triangulating the data gathered and analysed through the methods above, this report explores the following questions and main findings, outlined in Table 1

Melbourne: Fitzroy Legal Service, 2022. 44p.

By Amy Young, Jennifer Boddy, Patrick O’Leary and Paul Mazerolle

Domestic and family violence (DFV) remains one of the most challenging social problems. Approximately one in six Australian women has experienced physical or sexual violence perpetrated by a current or former intimate partner, while one in four women has experienced emotional abuse (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2019). Recent government inquiries into DFV in Queensland and Victoria have called for greater focus on intervention and justice responses for perpetrators (State of Victoria 2016; Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce 2021). Both inquiries highlight the inadequacy of programs to hold perpetrators accountable and the need to expand the range of evidence-based intervention options.

Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 676. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 16p.

By Kingsley L Madueke

Cattle rustling in Nigeria has evolved from a sustainable community practice into a significant illicit economy, delivering material profits to conflict actors and multiplying harms. Since 2011, the country has experienced a surge in the number of rustling incidents, resulting in thousands of deaths, loss of livelihoods, widespread destruction and displacement of people. This has had a debilitating impact on the country’s stability.

In Nigeria’s North-West and North-Central regions, in particular, cattle rustling has contributed to growing instability by increasing levels of violent crime. The Nigerian press is awash with stories of heavily armed groups raiding communities, killing people and stealing large herds of cattle. Also of note are the violent activities of the self-defense groups that have emerged in response. Additionally, in some of Nigeria’s most volatile regions, including Northern Plateau and Southern Kaduna, cattle rustling has fed into longstanding conflicts between farmers and herders, fuelling violence and deepening polarization.

Cattle rustling deserves attention because it is among the illicit economies most clearly driving instability in Nigeria, more so than others traditionally focused on as sources of instability, such as armed robbery and drug trafficking. The relationship between cattle rustling and instability is multifaceted: not only has the phenomenon been the cause of thousands of deaths, large-scale displacement of communities and destruction of livelihoods, but it has also repeatedly operated as a significant source of financing for armed groups, including regional insurgent groups operating in north-eastern Nigeria and northern and central Mali. Cattle rustling is also interwoven with longstanding tensions between ethnicities, amplifying these and catalyzing further conflict.

This report focuses on Zamfara and Plateau states, where cattle rustling has fuelled large-scale violence and instability over the past decade. The report also explores the concerning southward diffusion of cattle rustling, with an emphasis on Kwara and Oyo states. While some underlying causes of cattle rustling cut across regions, this research highlights that local drivers of cattle rustling and instability are often distinct and therefore require context-specific responses.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,2023. 46p.

By Flore Berger

Cattle rustling in Mali surged in 2021 and continues at unprecedented levels, with the dominant perpetrators being violent extremist groups operating in the country. The scale of cattle rustling in Mali is the climax of a decade of growth of the practice, and cattle rustling is now a central and under-reported element of the country’s security crisis variously as a driver of conflict, as a governance and intimidation mechanism, and as a key source of revenue for non-state armed groups. This has dramatic humanitarian, social and economic effects on communities. Cattle rustling has since the very start of the crisis been at the heart of Mali’s war economy, with Tuareg rebel groups (since the 1990s) and violent extremist groups (since 2012) financing themselves by looting livestock and relying on a broader network to sell it, using its proceeds to finance their operations (e.g. buying fuel, vehicles and weapons). Cattle rustling, understood in this report to mean the whole range of livestock appropriation,1 has rarely been considered as a criminal economy, yet its impacts on communities and conflict dynamics across West Africa are arguably unrivalled by other more traditional organized markets, such as high-value narcotics. It is sustained by a complex network and supply chain, and perpetrated through ever-increasing violence. Furthermore, while a range of illicit economies have been used by violent extremist groups for resourcing – including trafficking of cigarettes, fuel and drugs; artisanal gold mining; and kidnapping for ransom – cattle rustling has proven to be a particularly resilient and broadly stable source of income. Cattle rustling also stands out regarding the degree to which it intersects with a long-standing history of frustration and resentment by pastoralist communities, and is therefore integral to understanding regional conflict. Cattle rustling, and reprisals for theft, spark cycles of violence as herders protect themselves by joining armed groups and arming themselves. Other communities then respond by creating more armed groups for self-protection, many of which become predatory. Cattle rustling also operates as a mechanism wielded by armed groups to terrorize the population and deprive them of a central element of livelihoods. Hundreds of villages have been pillaged and burnt down, and cattle looted.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 54p.

By Matt Herbert and Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo i

Since the turn of the millennium, organized crime has surged from a small number of locally or regionally active organizations into a plethora of syndicates operating throughout the globe. Their operations are now often transnational, either active in multiple countries or involved with illicit commodity chains that extend across borders and interlink different regions.

Organized crime players are increasingly active in criminal markets, from human trafficking to cybercrime to illicit fuel sales. Although the value of global organized crime activity is unknown – and likely unknowable with any real precision because of its nature – it is huge. Individual markets such as drug trafficking or timber extraction are estimated to generate hundreds of billions of dollars annually.

The rising prevalence and profitability of organized crime have had a substantial impact in many of the states in which networks operate. In part, this is through the corruption and/or coercion of state officials to allow criminal activity or purchasing impunity.

Such official complicity is now the most important factor enabling the spread and operations of organized crime and also a key impediment to efforts to design solutions and build resilience to it.

Criminal groups have been important sponsors of armed groups seeking to control, in full or in part, the territory of states across the world. Increasingly, organized crime actors have developed autonomous military capacity, becoming key threats to peace and security in their own right. Impacts of organized crime on governance also manifest from the bottom up, with local communities highly vulnerable to criminal actors’ attempts to violently seize de facto control, limit access to public services or establish alternative governance structures.

Because of this profusion of impacts, the international community is devoting increasing resources to counter the phenomena of rising organized crime. At a national level, this has seen greater funding of security force and criminal justice actors, an expansion that is mirrored in international aid, with heightened donor focus on security sector reform and governance, judicial sector training and programmes to build binational and multinational coordination on security challenges, including organized crime.

The international community has also sought to build arrangements for multilateral reciprocal cooperation, such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the Palermo Convention. However, these have struggled to achieve the necessary effects and are often outpaced by criminal evolution, leading many states to prefer unilateral or ad hoc initiatives to address transnational organized crime. Further, many governments are shifting their approach to organized crime, assessing it as a national security threat rather than purely as a criminal justice challenge. The result has been that, while criminal justice tools such as multilateral arrangements con-tinue to be relied upon, other approaches – involving military, financial and diplomatic tools – are becoming increasingly common. The use of targeted sanctions has emerged as part of this expanding international toolkit to address organized crime.

Such sanctions can be defined as legal authorities that prohibit certain forms of otherwise licit activity, including financial access or travel, for a specific entity in order to hamper their pursuit of a specific goal. Historically, they have mostly been used against countries whose activities were interpreted as threats to peace and security or individuals who had breached international law or norms. Despite the growing use, there has been limited tracing of why and how different international actors have converged in their use of targeted sanctions, how they have developed processes to issue and implement sanctions regimes and their impact and effectiveness. This report series focuses on the use of targeted sanctions against criminal actors. The series encompasses both global reports and country-specific and thematic studies.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 75p.

By Shehryar Fazli

The Taliban’s 3 April 2022 edict prohibiting poppy cultivation and the use and trade of all types of narcotics across Afghanistan could have grave implications for a collapsing economy. Poppy is the country’s most valuable cash crop, and its labour-intensive cultivation employs several hundred thousand people, pushing up wages and living standards of those directly and indirectly involved. Requiring little water, the poppy’s resilience in adverse agricultural conditions makes it an attractive long-term investment, especially during one of the worst droughts in decades. The new ban would affect farmers in the rural southwest region, where many Taliban leaders are from, as well as influential players across the opium and heroin supply chain. In the absence of significant financial incentives to these constituencies, the risks of a major backlash probably outweigh any benefits of enforcing a poppy ban. Providing such financial incentives would be dependent on significant foreign assistance. Some prominent experts and commentators infer that international legitimacy and funding was the Taliban’s primary motivation in announcing the edict. If so, there are no signs yet that the move will generate the desired response. Afghanistan has been politically and economically isolated since the Taliban’s August 2021 forceful seizure of power. The freezing of around $9 billion in central bank foreign reserves, held mostly in the US, triggered a collapse of the local currency and major liquidity crisis, while aid cut-offs and sanctions triggered hyper-inflation and impeded trade and other business. There are indications that the international community, led by the US, is softening its position to prevent an economic collapse affecting millions of Afghans who face starvation. Without tangible Taliban commitments to basic rights and equality, however, especially of girls and women, deeper international engagement, including on counter-narcotics, is unlikely. How willing and able the Taliban will be to enforce its edict may remain unclear for several months. The ban came amid the poppy harvest in the southwestern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, bastions of both poppy cultivation and Taliban support. Significant quantities, therefore, may have already been harvested. Transporting them up the supply chain, and to western destinations, will depend on resourceful transnational crime groups. The most important of these are arguably in Pakistan, which shares Afghanistan’s longest border and most of the routes for westward movement of illicit goods, people, and cash from Afghanistan. Criminal networks here traverse the Indian and Iranian borders, and also move their product by sea off the southern Makran coast and Karachi port, to European, African, Asian and Australian markets. These networks, and the geography in which they operate, also require close examination. By better understanding the context and trends, policy-makers will be better able to assess policy options and their implications, especially in Europe, the destination of significant volumes of heroin from Afghanistan

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 9.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 35p.

By Summer Walker I Mariana Botero Restrepo

The relationship between illicit economies, conflict and instability has been long debated in academic and practitioner circles, and part of the international policy agenda for some time. From the diamond trade in Sierra Leone to the heroin trade in Afghanistan, illicit economies have been shown to fund insurgencies and political actors, and to contribute to ongoing conflict.

The GI-TOC’s 2021 Global Organized Crime Index shows that of the ten highest-scoring countries for criminality, meaning those with the most pervasive criminal markets and influential criminal actors, the overwhelming majority are countries experiencing conflict or fragility.

This report considers three case studies at different stages of armed conflict to assess the dynamic relationship between criminal networks, illicit economies, and conflict actors and conditions. These three case studies offer unique perspectives in terms of duration, size of the conflict area and stage of the conflict:

• Armed insurgency in northern Mozambique

• Armed groups in Libya and Mali

• Armed groups in Colombia

While these conflicts present three distinct cases, they also share relevant similarities. In these cases, unrest is created after an armed group or groups counter the legitimacy of the state. The national response to the conflict is supplemented with regional and international responses. All situations lack a swift resolution, and the instability persists primarily in areas outside capitals, even after formal conflict resolution. In this way, these three cases are representative of sustained, localized instability deriving from armed conflict between the state and non-state armed groups.

All three conflict areas overlap with areas of established illicit economies. In these settings, the connections between armed conflict and illicit markets evolve over time. The impacts may be commodity-dependent, with different considerations for illegal mining as opposed to trafficked drugs. Illicit markets change over time, as do the power brokers and beneficiaries involved. Illicit economies contribute to long-term enabling environments for instability by prolonging conflict and eroding government responses to conflict. Through the case studies of northern Mozambique, the Sahel region and Colombia, this report identifies ten dynamics that influence illicit economies and conflict situations. These findings make a contribution to vital policy discussions for stabilization and conflict mediation in these – and other – re

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2022. 74p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Before February 2022, Russian and Ukrainian organized crime formed the strongest criminal ecosystem in Europe. Having developed along similar lines in the 1990s, Russian and Ukrainian criminal groups and networks controlled a lucrative transnational smuggling highway between Russia and Western Europe that carried gold, timber, tobacco, coal, counterfeit/untaxed goods, humans and drugs. At the more politically connected end of the spectrum, corrupt officials and criminal bosses from both countries exploited Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Russian gas to siphon off millions of dollars, while Ukraine’s oligarch class exerted a strong grip over the country’s economic, political and information spheres.

Kyiv made serious efforts to tackle organized crime and corruption after the 2014 Maidan Revolution but results were mixed, especially in the case of judicial reform; meanwhile, the conflict in the Donbas region helped bolster an array of illicit economies and criminal actors. For organized crime, business was generally good.

The Russian invasion has inflicted a profound shock to this ecosystem. With the war, collaboration between Russian and Ukrainian organized crime interests became impossible due to the political situation (which led many criminals to break such ties) and the pragmatic challenge of smuggling across what was now a violently contested and dynamic front line. Many Ukrainian crime bosses chose to leave the country, as did many oligarchs, including several accused of pro-Russian sympathies. Martial law and the curfew also initially constrained criminal activity. According to senior sources in the Ukrainian police, incidents of armed robberies declined by a factor of between three and four, and the homicide rate dropped to almost zero at the beginning of the war (although this may partly reflect the impact of the war on reporting in the early days of the war). It may be that the impact of the invasion also whittled out some less robust and resilient organized crime groups: according to data from the general prosecutor’s office, the number of organized crime groups under investigation decreased from 499 in 2021 to 395 in 2022 (although this decline alternatively could reflect dimished investigative capacity).

This report explores the changing dynamics in the political economy of Ukrainian organized crime up till December 2022 and maps how the criminal landscape has adapted to the new situation. Given the complexity of the impact of the war in Ukraine on organized crime in both parties to the conflict, the GI-TOC is producing two reports. This report concentrates on developments within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders – with the exception of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ (LDNR) in the Donbas region, which broke away from Kyiv in 2014 with Russian backing and assistance, and Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed the same year. The impact of the conflict on organized crime in these areas and on Russian organized crime more generally will be discussed in a separate report, which will assess trends in sanctions busting and money laundering, changes in trafficking flows east of Ukraine and how Russian organized crime groups have responded to the conflict.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.

By Julia Stanyard | Thierry Vircoulon | Julian Rademeyer

Russia has rapidly increased its engagement in Africa in recent years, both politically and economically, as it seeks to expand its influence on the continent. However, Russia’s activities in Africa are subject to controversy. Our new report sheds light on the Wagner Group, a private military company rapidly becoming the most effective form of Russian engagement in Africa.

The group comprises a network of political influence operations and economic entities such as mining companies. It has been accused of using whatever means necessary to achieve its aims, including criminal activity. The US government recently designated Wagner as a ‘transnational criminal organization,’ allowing for broader sanctions against Wagner and its enablers.

The report argues that the Wagner Group is unique as an organization in the breadth, scale, and boldness of its activities. However, the study also shows that Wagner did not emerge in a vacuum: The group’s activities and characteristics reflect broader trends in the evolution of Russia’s oligarchs and organized crime groups, their respective relationships with the Russian state, and their activities in Africa.

By focusing on case studies in several African countries, the report helps to shed light on the complex dynamics between Russia, its oligarchs, and its criminal networks and how they interact with African governments, businesses, and populations. This report draws on research conducted since July 2022, as well as other sources from across the continent, providing a comprehensive overview of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa. The report provides important insights into the evolving relationship between Russia and Africa and how this is shaping politics and economics on the continent, serving as a resource for journalists, policymakers, and researchers seeking to understand the complex dynamics of Russian engagement in Africa.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023.92p.

By Ruggero Scaturro

Recent studies conducted by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) show that the war in Ukraine may displace existing drug trafficking routes from and through Ukraine and exacerbate the instability that enables drug trafficking and manufacturing, including in areas not directly connected or exposed to hostilities.

Trauma derived from the conflict might also have an impact on current and future drug use patterns in communities affected by the war, which could create new opportunities for both local and foreign drug traffickers to meet this growing demand. This becomes particularly relevant when analyzing flows of traditional opioids as well as new psychoactive substances (NPS), and stimulants used by both civilians and soldiers at the front line. Neighbouring Ukraine, the South Eastern Europe region represents a relatively small market for drug consumption and accounts for only a small amount of drug production and supply (primarily cannabis) to EU markets. However, its strategic location between East and West – and its proximity to the Ukraine conflict – might mean that it is particularly exposed to the effects of the war on traffickers’ modus operandi and trafficking routes through the region.

Since February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused the progressive displacement and movement of traditional drug production and trafficking hubs in southern and eastern Ukraine towards the west, around the borders with Poland, Slovakia and Romania. Similarly, in the context of criminal mobility, overwhelmed border security management between Ukraine and its neighbouring countries to the west leads to opportunities for both Ukrainian and Russian criminals to operate and manage their businesses from South Eastern Europe, thanks to the possibility to forge documents and receive ‘golden’ passports due to their investments in countries in the region.

This report assesses whether the war in Ukraine and its resulting disruption are having a significant impact on drug flows through South Eastern Europe. The research is based on the assumption that, because of an intensified military presence in Eastern Europe, traditional flows of drugs have been, at least temporarily, disrupted. This includes the northern route of opioids from Afghanistan, which supplies large markets across Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Furthermore, other drug routes, such as for cocaine from Latin America to the port of Odesa, have atrophied. Conversely, flows along alternative routes, such as the Balkan route, appear to have intensified.

In view of these shifts, this report offers an assessment of emerging trends in drugs flows and provides an overview of data on seizures in South Eastern Europe. It also assesses the impact that the Ukraine war is having on wholesale and retail drug prices and, where assessment is possible, on levels of purity and the perceived quality of substances.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023. 28p.

By Center for Strategic and International Studies; By Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Rubi Bledsoe & Andrea Michelle Cerén

In 2020, Western and Central Europe comprised 21 percent of the global demand of cocaine. The drug is now the second most consumed illicit drug on the entire continent behind cannabis. Europe has become an attractive destination for drug traffickers seeking higher profits and lower risks. This is due to higher market prices and lesser legal penalties for possession and consumption than in the United States. While a kilogram of cocaine is priced at around $28,000 in the United States, the same kilogram is priced at around $40,000 in places like France and Spain—and a staggering $219,454 in Estonia. Furthermore, European interdiction efforts in Europe and the Caribbean territories do not match U.S. disruption efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Available data suggests the European Union spends only $3-4 billion on supply-side reduction in comparison to $17.4 billion for the United States. According to European officials, this allows border security forces to interdict only around 10–12 percent of the total flow of cocaine into the continent. Without a multipronged approach to curb Europe’s cocaine demand through higher legal penalities and transatlantic interdiction efforts, the cocaine market there will continue to boom—and with it, drug violence and health threats.

Washington, DC: CSIS, 2023.

By Irwin, Véronique; Wang, Ke; Cui, Jiashan; Thompson, Alexandra (Statistician)

From the document: "'Report on Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2022' provides the most recent national indicators on school crime and safety. The information presented in this report serves as a reference for policymakers and practitioners so that they can develop effective programs and policies aimed at violence and school crime prevention. Accurate information about the nature, extent, and scope of the problem being addressed is essential for developing effective programs and policies. This is the 25th edition of Indicators of School Crime and Safety, a joint effort of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). This report provides summary statistics to inform the nation about current aspects of crime and safety in schools. 'Report on Indicators of School Crime and Safety' includes the most recent available data at the time of its development, compiled from a number of statistical data sources supported by the federal government. Such sources include results from the School-Associated Violent Death Surveillance System, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); the National Vital Statistics System, sponsored by CDC; the School Shooting Safety Compendium, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense; the Studies of Active Shooter Incidents, sponsored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the National Crime Victimization Survey and School Crime Supplement to that survey, sponsored by BJS and NCES, respectively; the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System, sponsored by CDC; the School Survey on Crime and Safety, Fast Response Survey System, ED'Facts', and National Teacher and Principal Survey, all sponsored by NCES; and the Campus Safety and Security Survey, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education. Some of these data are collected annually, while others are collected less frequently."

Washington D.D. National Center For Education Statistics; United States. Bureau Of Justice Statistics. 2023.. 38p.

Edited by Tzanetakis, Meropi and South, Nigel

The ebook edition of this title is Open Access and freely available to read online. Transnational illicit markets have been transformed by the digital revolution. They take advantage of encryption technologies, smartphones, social media applications and cryptocurrencies that protect the digital traces of buyers and sellers, posing new challenges to drug control policies and public health alike. Digital Transformations of Illicit Drug Markets: Reconfiguration and Continuity considers how the digital revolution has changed the selling and buying of illicit substances through increased convenience and anonymisation. Providing a uniquely interdisciplinary perspective, chapters show how the digital transformation of illicit drug markets combines a reconfiguration of how sellers and buyers interact in new markets. Emphasising that illicit digital markets are embedded in societal structures and power relations in general, contributors also recognise the importance of critical perspectives on inequalities between the Global North and South as well as issues of gender. Digital Transformations of Illicit Drug Markets: Reconfiguration and Continuity challenges the field of criminology to recognise the limits of its traditional knowledge and move beyond the preoccupations that restrict crime to certain fixed spaces in order to develop new explanations.

Bingley: Emerald, 2023. 198p.

Edited by Susanna Johansson · Kari Stefansen Elisiv Bakketeig · Anna Kaldal

This edited collection explores the background and implementation of the Nordic Barnahus (or 'Children's House') model - recognised as one of the most important reforms related to children who are the victims of crime in the Nordic region. This book discusses both its potential to affect change and the challenges facing it. The model was introduced as a response to a growing recognition of the need for more integrated and child-centred services for children exposed to violence and sexual abuse. In the Barnahus structure, different professions work together to ensure that victimized children receive help and treatment and that their legal rights are met. This original study is organised into four broad themes: child-friendliness, support and treatment; the forensic child investigative interview; children's rights perspectives; and interagency collaboration and professional autonomy. Each themed section includes in-depth chapters from different Nordic countries, outlining and analysing the practice and outcomes of the collaborative work engaged in by Barnahus from different perspectives. The introductory and concluding chapters offer a comparative lens useful for policy and practice implementation within the Nordic welfare state context and beyond, ensuring this book has global academic and practical appeal. This work was published by Saint Philip Street Press pursuant to

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 402p.