By John Woodhouse

There is no general prohibition on drinking in the street but certain offences relating to alcohol may be committed in “public places” (this generally means “any place to which the public have access, whether on payment or otherwise” (the Licensing Act 1872 and subsequent Licensing Acts)).

Councils can use public spaces protection orders to restrict the consumption of alcohol in a public space where it is associated with anti-social behaviour. It is an offence to fail to comply with a request to stop drinking or to surrender alcohol in a controlled drinking area.

The police can disperse individuals engaged in anti-social behaviour where alcohol is a factor. It is an offence to fail to comply with a direction to leave an area.

Other offences include being drunk and disorderly in a public place and being drunk in any highway or other public place. This Briefing refers to the law in England and Wales.

Research Briefing. London: UK House of Commons, 2023. 11p.

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol

EU Drug Market: Amphetamine describes the European amphetamine market from production and trafficking, to distribution and use. It details the processes, materials and actors involved at different stages and levels of the market. Taking a threat assessment approach, the module identifies key issues and makes recommendations for action at EU and Member State level.

Amphetamine is the most common synthetic stimulant drug available on the European drug market and it competes with cocaine and a range of new psychoactive substances for a share of the profitable European Union (EU) stimulant drug market. The prevalence of amphetamine use is higher than methamphetamine in most EU Member States, with notable exceptions, such as Czechia and Slovakia. Illicit amphetamine products mostly consist of powders or pastes, usually mixed with other ingredients, such as lactose, dextrose or caffeine, but tablets containing amphetamine are also available. The estimated annual value of the retail market for amphetamine in the EU is at least EUR 1.1 billion, with a range of EUR 0.9 billion to EUR 1.4 billion.

The demand for amphetamine in the EU is met by European production concentrated largely in the Netherlands and Belgium, where production is complex, large-scale and based on the drug precursor BMK. BMK has some limited use in industry and can be diverted from legitimate sources or smuggled into the EU, but more frequently it is made from chemicals known as designer precursors imported from China. Some of the amphetamine produced in the EU is used to produce captagon tablets, which are mainly trafficked to consumer markets in the Middle East

Lisbon, Portugal: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, 2023. 8p.

By Stephen Whitehead, Sarah Page, Hannah Jeffery, and Fiona McCormack

Women who use drugs and alcohol have different needs than men. They face greater stigma, are more likely to carry the trauma of domestic abuse and are more likely to be caring for children. All of this taken together means that they may struggle to achieve recovery in a treatment system where they are outnumbered by men two to one.

This research set out to expand the evidence base on the needs of women who use drugs and alcohol and the ways that those needs are currently being met through a qualitative research project focused on the West Midlands, commissioned by The JABBS Foundation and the Office of the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner.

London: Centre for Justice Innovation, 2023. 45p.

By Jan van Amsterdam , Wim van den Brink

It is generally believed that the use of alcohol and cocaine alone and especially in combination elicits aggression and violent behaviour. Though there is overwhelming proof that heavy alcohol use is associated with violence, this is not the case for cocaine. Still, in the popular press and by spokesmen of the police, cocaine use is seen as a cause of violent incidents. In the current systematic review, available data from human studies on the relation between cocaine and violent behaviour is presented. In particular, we present scientific data on the acute induction of violence by cocaine alone, as well as, that by the combination of cocaine and alcohol known to be frequently used simultaneously.

Results: show that there is only weak scientific evidence for the acute induction of violent behaviour by cocaine, either when used alone or in combination with alcohol. Based on these data we were also able to refute misconceptions about the relation between cocaine and violence published in the popular press and governmental reports, because it appeared that there was hardly any empirical support for this widely shared opinion. Probably, contextual factors, including cocaine use disorder and personality disorder, may better explain the assumed association between cocaine and violence.

Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine. Volume 100, November 2023, 102597

By Ashna Arora and Panka Bencsik

In the United States, law enforcement officers serve as first responders to most health crises, allowing them to connect many more individuals to treatment services than other government actors, a fact that has come into increasing focus due to the opioid epidemic. In response, police departments across the country have begun to divert individuals that possess narcotics away from arrest and towards treatment and recovery. Evidence on whether these programs are able to engender meaningful change—initially by increasing participation in substance use treatment, and eventually by reducing the likelihood of continued drug use and criminal justice involvement—remains limited. This paper aims to shed light on the potential of these programs by exploiting the eligibility criteria for and staggered rollout of narcotics arrest diversion in Chicago between 2018 and 2020 using a difference-indifference-in-differences framework. We find that the program reaches individuals with medically diagnosed substance use disorders, increases connections with substance use treatment, and reduces subsequent arrests. We conclude that Chicago’s drug diversion program is able to simultaneously reduce the reach of the criminal justice system, expand the number of individuals with substance use disorders connected with treatment, and improve public safety.

Chicago: University of Chicago, Crime Lab, 2021. 38p.

By The National Audit Office (NAO) (UK)

The distribution, sale and consumption of illegal drugs causes significant harm to individuals, families and communities. In 2021, almost 3,000 people in England died because of drug misuse and thousands more suffered complex health problems. The government also estimated that around three million people in England and Wales take illegal drugs at a cost to society of approximately £20 billion a year. The drugs trade generates significant levels of violence and is believed to be responsible for around half of all murders in England and Wales.

Tackling the problems caused by illegal drugs is complex. It involves disrupting the organised gangs which supply and distribute drugs, and providing effective treatment and recovery services to help people with addictions. The government announced a £900 million increase in funding for 2022-23 to 2024-25 and committed to long-term targets to reduce drug use and drug-related crime and deaths. The government established the cross-government Joint Combating Drugs Unit (JCDU) to co-ordinate and oversee the development and implementation of the strategy.

t is almost two years since the government introduced its latest drugs strategy and less than 18 months remain in the current funding period to March 2025. This report examines whether the government is well positioned to achieve the strategy’s 10-year ambitions. It covers:

the development of the 2021 drugs strategy, its objectives and funding

progress in implementing the strategy

the approach to achieving the strategy’s long-term outcomes

It is too early to conclude whether the 2021 strategy will reduce the harm from illegal drugs. It will take time for new funding and interventions to address a complex set of issues, and many of the indicators used to measure progress lag behind activity. This report therefore assesses whether departments are making the planned progress in implementing the strategy, and whether the JCDU has an effective approach to understanding the impact it is having and managing the risks to achieving the strategy’s aims. It does not examine the effectiveness of interventions at the local level.

Conclusions

In 2021 the government estimated that the harm caused by illegal drugs costs society £20 billion each year. Its 2021 drugs strategy, led by the cross-government Joint Combating Drugs Unit, has provided new impetus to efforts to address these harms, and committed £900 million to 2024-25.

The strategy has established new partnerships across central and local government, and local authorities are taking steps to rebuild the workforce that was lost over the past decade. But these measures alone will not address all of the barriers to achieving a long-term reduction in drug use, deaths and related crime. The issues are complex and will require a sustained long-term response.

To inform government’s response, the JCDU and relevant departments need to develop a deeper understanding of the impacts of government spending, working closely with local service providers to understand and help address the practical challenges they face. The JCDU and departments need to be realistic about what is achievable in the first three years and assess how to adapt their approach to achieve the strategy’s 10-year outcomes.

In doing so, the JCDU should seek to provide confidence to local government: that this is a long-term commitment. It must also urgently develop a plan to reduce the demand for illegal drugs. The current lack of emphasis on preventing illegal drug use means that departments risk only addressing the consequences, rather than the causes, of harm. The government will only achieve value for money if it builds on the initial momentum of the new strategy and develops a longer-term, funded plan that delivers a joined-up, holistic response.

London: The National Audit Office (NAO), 2023. 56p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

From July 2021 to June 2023, the Mekong Australia Partnership on Transnational Crime and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) organized an expert briefing series to enhance debate and collaboration on issues related to organized crime in the Mekong.

The outcome of the two-year briefing series was the creation of opportunities for discussion, collaboration and learning. It brought together a committed set of stakeholders working at the local, regional and international levels to reduce the harms of organized crime and helped build new partnerships while strengthening existing ones. The series enhanced the knowledge base on organized crime in the Mekong and helped bridge the gap between research and policy.

With the support of a dynamic set of stakeholders, the series explored some of the region’s most pertinent and pressing issues and their intersections globally.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 69p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Despite minimal domestic production, gold has figured prominently in Kenya’s recent history. Many Kenyans can still vividly recall the ‘Goldenberg’ scandal of the 1990s, a gold export and foreign exchange fraud scheme that drained government coffers of a sum exceeding ten percent of Kenya’s GDP at the time.The late 1990s also saw the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in then Zaïre, followed by a devastating half-decade-long regional conflict that resulted in the loss of five million lives, mainly from war-related hunger and disease. Facing external invasion and an internal revolt, Zaïre’s successor state, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), lost control of most of the resource-rich territory in the east of the country. Since then, the smuggling of artisanally mined minerals, including gold, have fuelled an ongoing conflict that in 2022 reached an intensity not seen for a decade. Insurgent groups, pro-government militias and criminal networks all continue to benefit from the tonnes of gold smuggled out of eastern DRC each year. Kenya has long been one of the principal regional transit hubs – along with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania – for the smuggling of this conflict gold.Almost as lucrative as the smuggling of genuine gold through Kenya are the myriad scams that seek to peddle counterfeit or non-existent quantities of the precious metal to unsuspecting buyers. The targets of these scams are often foreigners travelling to Africa in search of hit-and-run riches. Gold swindles have on occasion escalated into embarrassing diplomatic rows, most notably in 2020 when both the president of Kenya and the main opposition leader were summoned to a meeting by the emir of Dubai over an Emirati company that had been victimized by Kenyan fraudsters. Dubai is by far the most popular destination for smuggled East African gold, due to its status as a tax haven as well as a key aviation hub.The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) conducted extensive interviews with a Kenyan national whose initial career in aviation logistics – specifically the charting of private jets – gradually pulled him into the gold trafficking underworld.During these interviews, this insider provided the GI-TOC with a series of unique insights based on a decade of experience in the East African illicit gold trade. These insights will be presented through several accounts of operations in which our source was involved, ranging from fictitious customs seizures to an attempt by an Israeli businessman to commandeer an aircraft, a German with ‘gold fever’, a month-long airport standoff in the UAE and a visit to an artisanal smelting facility located in the heart of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. Taken together, our source’s revelations paint a picture of an illicit economy characterized more by con artistry and double-dealing than genuine commodity trading.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 31p.

By Tihomir Bezlov | Atanas Rusev | Dardan Koçani

The war in Ukraine has spurred the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. According to EU border and coastguard agency Frontex, by the end of 2022, 15 million Ukrainian citizens had fled to Europe since the beginning of the war, with roughly 3 million choosing to stay.

While the unforeseen scale of the refugee crisis meant that much of the border authorities’ efforts and resources were occupied, people smuggling networks took advantage of the situation, and the number of irregular migrants from the Middle East travelling along the Western Balkan route soared. There are many contributing factors to this trend, but migrant smuggling has indeed resurfaced as the fastest-growing market for organized crime in the Balkan region. At the start of September 2022, Frontex reported that they had documented the highest number of irregular entries since 2016, with a 75% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. Thus, in 2022, the Western Balkan route became the most active European migration route, surpassing the Central and Western Mediterranean routes.

This paper assesses the factors that contributed to the emergence of the Western Balkan route as the most critical for irregular migration to the EU during 2022, focusing in particular on the impact of the war in Ukraine on refugee flows from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and its implications for the future. It analyzes how, if anything, refugee flows from Ukraine have affected pre-existing movements of migrants from MENA countries on the Western Balkan route indirectly, exacerbating dynamics and network operations. It also estimates the overall number of irregular migrants smuggled along the Western Balkan route since 2016, describes the evolution of smuggling networks in 2022 and assesses the implications for South Eastern Europe.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 3p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Odesa is a city of immense importance to Ukraine. Its port is the gateway through which most of Ukraine’s trade with the world is conducted, but it also holds a deeply symbolic place in the country’s heart – the so-called ‘Jewel of the Black Sea.’

It has also long been one of the most criminalized cities in Ukraine, both in terms of illicit flows through its port (including drugs, weapons, and contraband) and the high levels of corruption around the construction industry, law enforcement, the criminal justice system, and the customs agency. The city itself was also a stronghold of pro-Russian sentiment, even after the 2014 Maidan Revolution, which ousted President Viktor Yanukovych (who was politically close to Moscow), the conflict in the Donbas, and Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. At the same time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine dealt a severe blow to organized crime in Odesa.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 48p.

By Gabriel Feltran, Isabela Vianna Pinho and Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo

Cocaine trafficking through West Africa, following the well-established route from Latin America to the European consumer market, appears to be in a phase of sharp growth. Since 2016, the majority of consignments transiting West Africa begin their journey in Brazil. The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) – the largest criminal organization in Brazil – is pivotal to understanding Brazil’s newfound importance for cocaine in West Africa.

Cocaine trafficking between Brazil and West Africa stretches back at least to the 1980s, but as cultivation in Latin America continues to increase and consumption in Europe has grown, more and more cocaine is being moved along this path. In 2018, only one West African country – Senegal – was in the top 10 destinations for cocaine seized in Brazilian ports; by 2019, after a bumper year of seizures in Brazil, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone had also pushed their way onto the list. Cultivation in Latin America reached record levels in 2021, and in the following year an unprece-dented 24 tonnes were seized across West Africa.

In this report, we focus on the flow of cocaine between Brazil and West Africa, which largely supplies the lucrative European consumer market, and in particular on the role of the PCC, which straddles various illicit supply chains.

The research for this report has drawn on various data collection techniques but rests primarily on field observations of the retail trade and transit of illegal goods in South America, West Africa and Europe between 2015 and 2022. These observations, described in detail in the authors’ field notebooks, were supplemented by formal and informal interviews with those involved in the cocaine trade, from the South American borders to the retail trade spaces of Europe, allowing us to trace the journey of cocaine through the different nodes of the value chain.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023 28p.

By Saša Đorđević

Fuel smuggling is the illegal transport, sale or purchase of petroleum products such as crude oil, petrol, diesel and other refined petroleum products. It has been a persistent illicit trade in the Balkans for over three decades.

In 2022, police and customs of the seven Balkan countries seized more than 3 000 tonnes of illegal fuel, with a retail value of €4.3 million – almost four times more than the value of fuel seized in all of 2021. Fuels are goods subject to high excise and customs duties that smugglers try to avoid paying. Alternatively, smugglers seek to profit by evading embargoes on oil imports and exports. From this perspective, the Balkan countries’ public funds lost at least €1.2 million in 2022 as a result of fuel smuggling.

However, relying solely on seizure data to evaluate the illicit fuel market may lead to misleading conclusions because of law enforcement’s inherent challenge in substantiating the unlawful provenance of fuel. This discrepancy becomes more apparent when considering the estimated scale of the issue. In Bulgaria alone, for example, the projected value of illegal fuel in 2019 reached approximately €0.5 billion, resulting in significant budget losses of €250 million.

In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Libyan electoral crisis, both of which involved major oil-producing countries, the UN extended measures to combat illicit petroleum exports from Libya in July 2022. The EU also imposed bans on Russian oil in December 2022 and again in February 2023, as part of its response to the war in Ukraine. At the same time, the Balkans became the focus for licit and illicit fuel manoeuvres.This report analyzes the mechanisms of fuel smuggling during times of crisis and instability in the Balkans, considering both internal and external factors that contribute to the overall landscape. It identifies lessons learned from fuel smuggling in the early 1990s and then moves to explain the evolution of this activity with reference to trafficking methods, actors and routes through to 2022. The report also identifies countries in the Balkans at particular risk from fuel smuggling, as well as hotspots that allow illicit trade, particularly on rivers and seas. The report, furthermore, assesses the typical profile of criminal actors active in fuel smuggling. The research is limited to cross-border fuel smuggling operations rather than illegal distribution within a specific country.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 34p.

By James Byrne and Joe Byrne

North Korea relies on the outside world to import fuel.26 With no demonstrated oil reserves and limited domestic refinery capacity, imports of refined petroleum products are vital to the regime’s stability and survival. As in all modern economies, energy—predicated on a constant flow of fuel into the country—underpins North Korea’s domestic and export economy, as well as Pyongyang’s capacity to train and field armed forces and develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The international community’s efforts to cap North Korea’s oil and petroleum products imports in 2017 forced Pyongyang to adapt its fuel-procurement strategy. This report finds that North Korea has been engaging organized criminal networks and participating in a regional fuel smuggling market in violation of international sanctions, and that the nation is demonstrating increasingly sophisticated and previously unseen tactics to evade detection. Even by conservative estimates, Pyongyang appears to have successfully bypassed fuel sanctions and exceeded the cap imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) each year since the introduction of the limit.27 Despite the challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic and by North Korea’s restrictions on port traffic, analysis of highresolution satellite imagery of oil terminals and import facilities suggests North Korea has once again breached the import cap in 2020. Through analysis of AIS data and satellite imagery, the authors found that the proportion of fuel deliveries to North Korean ports by foreign-flagged tankers is significant and has been increasing.28 This phenomenon raises important questions about the entities behind these sanctions violations, and it calls for scrutiny of how smugglers continue to evade detection and identification while transporting fuel within some of the most heavily monitored waters in the world. In this investigation we find the following: North Korea has tapped into an existing fuel smuggling economy in East Asia to procure fuel at volume. Different national-level regulatory and pricing regimes for fuel in the region create arbitrage opportunities that smugglers have long exploited to generate immense profit. These smugglers divert fuel from the licit market to sell to various customers, one of which is North Korea. Taiwan appears to be a key locus in this regional black market for fuel. The country’s preferential fuel policies price refined petroleum products lower than those of its neighbors, creating opportunities for arbitrage and offering smugglers a cheap and readily available source of fuel. Additionally, several of the networks and entities engaged in DPRK–related fuel smuggling operate from or out of addresses or ports in Taiwan. The country’s waters are also being exploited by illicit actors conducting DPRK-related, ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of fuel in a multilayered shuttle system that bisects both “dirty” vessels traveling directly to North Korea and “clean” vessels discreetly supplying those direct-delivery tankers with fuel on the high seas. North Korea’s illicit fuel supply chain has links to organized crime. Several of the key actors in North Korea’s fuel procurement originate from, and maintain connections to, Fujian province, China and, in particular, the city of Shishi. Shishi and the nearby coastal cities of Fujian province have long been a regional smuggling hub for illicit goods, such as cigarettes, wildlife products, drugs, and fuel. These actors appear to constitute a loose criminal federation whose interests and activities intersect to smuggle fuel to North Korea. A key node in this DPRK fuel procurement network appears to be the Winson Group, a major regional oil trader. The Winson Group is headquartered in Singapore and has offices across East Asia; it has links to several shipping and oil trading companies in the region, as well as businesses registered in secrecy jurisdictions, through which it has connections to possible STS transfers of fuel that ultimately end up in North Korea. The founder of the Winson Group also has a documented history of cigarette and fuel smuggling and alleged connections to illicit DPRK-related commercial activities. This report finds that North Korea’s shipping and maritime sanctions evasion tactics are highly adaptive and growing increasingly sophisticated in response to pressure from and enforcement by the international community. While these outcomes indicate the sanctions regime has complicated and increased the cost of illicit business for North Korea, the demonstrated adaptability of the country’s maritime trade networks also underscores, in dramatic fashion, the growing cost of monitoring, detection, and enforcement. This report also highlights the need for authorities to better explore the connections between North Korea, underground economies, and transnational organized crime, and it adds to the existing but underexplored literature of the country’s links to organized criminal networks. Relying on sanctions to block North Korea’s licit avenues of procurement creates a supply-and-demand dynamic between providers of illicit goods and services—often criminal organizations—and Pyongyang. To stay abreast of North Korea’s evolving tactics for evading sanctions, this report recommends that international, government, and civil regulators proactively monitor criminal networks that provide the country with contraband goods and services, while closing regulatory loopholes in the international sanctions regime, rather than reactively investigating instances of sanctions evasion.

Washington, DC: c4ads, 2021. 84p.

By Mohamed Daghar, Willis Okumu and Tadesse Simie Metekia

This study explores links between cattle rustling in East Africa’s Karamoja Cluster and the flow of illicit arms into this ungoverned space.

This study looks at the links between cattle rustling in East Africa’s Karamoja Cluster and the flow of illicit arms into this ungoverned space. It looks at the actors involved in the illicit arms trade, the sources of the weapons, and the need for responses other than civilian disarmament exercises, which so far have been unsuccessful.

ENACT Africa, 2023. 20p.

By Ken Opala

Despite the August 2022 elections proceeding relatively smoothly, there is still a clear nexus between politics and crime in the country.

Election violence remains a major problem in Kenya despite attempts by the state and other actors to tackle it. Ahead of the country’s fifth general election, held on 9 August 2022, state agencies, the media and civil society predicted the re-emergence of gangs and militias keen to influence its outcome. Although the elections went off relatively smoothly there is still a clear nexus between politics and crime.

ENACT Africa, 2023. 24p.

By Olwethu Majola and Darren Brookbanks

This paper uses data and analysis to assess the UNTOC's effectiveness in addressing transnational organised crime on the continent.

The international community prescribed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as the treatment to slow the global spread of TOC. However, current diagnoses suggest that this has not been as effective as anticipated. This paper assesses the efficacy of the UNTOC and recommends some changes to the treatment that are likely to yield more successful results.

ENACT Africa, 2023. 32p.

By Gina Bou Serhal, Kristian Alexander and Rahaf Alkhazraji

This issue brief delves into the changing landscape of Italian organized crime, focusing on the ‘Ndrangheta, a potent criminal group originating from Calabria. It explores how the ‘Ndrangheta has diversified its criminal activities, including drug trafficking and environmental crimes, and its alleged connections with international criminal and terrorist organizations. The brief also sheds light on the emergence of the youthful “Baby Mafia,” or Camorra in Naples, known for its decentralized structure and social media presence glamorizing criminal life. It emphasizes Italy’s efforts to combat organized crime and the necessity for a united European approach to address the mafia’s global influence and adaptability across borders.

Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2023. 6p.

By Matthew P. J. Ashby

The COVID-19 pandemic led to substantial changes in the daily activities of millions of Americans, with many businesses and schools closed, public events cancelled and states introducing stay-at-home orders. This article used police-recorded open crime data to understand how the frequency of common types of crime changed in 16 large cities across the United States in the early months of 2020. Seasonal auto-regressive integrated moving average (SARIMA) models of crime in previous years were used to forecast the expected frequency of crime in 2020 in the absence of the pandemic. The forecasts from these models were then compared to the actual frequency of crime during the early months of the pandemic. There were no significant changes in the frequency of serious assaults in public or (contrary to the concerns of policy makers) any change to the frequency of serious assaults in residences. In some cities, there were reductions in residential burglary but little change in non-residential burglary. Thefts of motor vehicles decreased in some cities while there were diverging patterns of thefts from motor vehicles. These results are used to make suggestions for future research into the relationships between the coronavirus pandemic and different crimes.

Crime Science 2020 9:6

By Eric Halford, Anthony Dixon, Graham Farrell, Nicolas Malleson and Nick Tilley

Governments around the world restricted movement of people, using social distancing and lockdowns, to help stem the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. We examine crime effects for one UK police force area in comparison to 5-year averages. There is variation in the onset of change by crime type, some declining from the WHO ‘global pandemic’ announcement of 11 March, others later. By 1 week after the 23 March lockdown, all recorded crime had declined 41%, with variation: shoplifting (−62%), theft (−52%), domestic abuse (−45%), theft from vehicle (−43%), assault (−36%), burglary dwelling (−25%) and burglary non-dwelling (−25%). We use Google Covid-19 Community Mobility Reports to calculate the mobility elasticity of crime for four crime types, finding shoplifting and other theft inelastic but responsive to reduced retail sector mobility (MEC=0.84, 0.71 respectively), burglary dwelling elastic to increases in residential area mobility (−1), with assault inelastic but responsive to reduced workplace mobility (0.56). We theorise that crime rate changes were primarily caused by those in mobility, suggesting a mobility theory of crime change in the pandemic. We identify implications for crime theory, policy and future research

Crime Science 2020 9:11

By Manne Gerell, Johan Kardell and Johanna Kindgren

The covid-19 disease has a large impact on life across the globe, and this could potentially include impacts on crime. The present study describes how crime has changed in Sweden during ten weeks after the government started to implement interventions to reduce spread of the disease. Sweden has undertaken smaller interventions than many other countries and is therefore a particularly interesting case to study. The first major interventions in Sweden were implemented in the end of week 11 (March 12th) in the year 2020, and we analyze police reported crimes through week 21 (ending May 24th). Descriptive statistics are provided relative to expected levels with 95% confidence intervals for eight crime types. We found that total crime, assaults, pickpocketing and burglary have decreased significantly, personal robberies and narcotics crime are unchanged. Vandalism possibly increased somewhat but is hard to draw any frm conclusions on. The reductions are fairly small for most crime types, in the 5–20% range, with pickpocketing being the biggest exception noting a 59% drop relative to expected levels.

Crime Science 2020 9:19