By Bayar Dashpurev 

Allegations of corruption in Mongolia’s coal trade with China in late 2022 sparked public protests – and highlighted critical shortcomings in the management of the minerals sector. While the government took action to improve policies, enforcement is insufficient and there is a lack of coordination among the different agencies that exercise investigative and prosecutorial powers. Parliamentary elections in 2024 may be an opportune moment for reformers to address these gaps.

  U4 BRIEF 2024

Bergen: Anti-Corruption Resource Center (U4), Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Brief 2024:4) 2024. 24p.

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

From the webpage description: "A global reference on drug markets, trends and policy developments, the World Drug Report offers a wealth of data and analysis and in 2024 comprises several elements tailored to different audiences. The web-based Drug market patterns and trends [hyperlink] module contains the latest analysis of global, regional and subregional estimates of and trends in drug demand and supply in a user-friendly, interactive format supported by graphs, infographics and maps. The Key findings and conclusions booklet [hyperlink] provides an overview of selected findings from the analysis presented in the Drug market patterns and trends module and the thematic Contemporary issues on drugs booklet, while the Special points of interest [hyperlink] fascicle offers a framework for the main takeaways and policy implications that can be drawn from those findings. As well as providing an in-depth analysis of key developments and emerging trends in selected drug markets, the Contemporary issues on drugs booklet [hyperlink] looks at several other developments of policy relevance. [...] The World Drug Report 2024 is aimed not only at fostering greater international cooperation to counter the impact of the world drug problem on health, governance and security, but also at assisting Member States in anticipating and addressing threats posed by drug markets and mitigating their consequences."

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME. 2024

By Simon Springer

This paper proceeds as a brief intervention in response to Andrew Foxall's article "Geopolitics, genocide and the Olympic Games: Sochi 2014". I address the violence that is associated with the Olympic Games and the politics of place that are involved in site selection. In offering some reflections on how the Olympics are irrevocably tied to colonial processes, my primary contention is that it is necessary to ask critical geographical questions about the Games. Such interrogation opens up a dialogue wherein greater awareness for the legacies of violence may be established, which has the potential to interrupt its ongoing unfoldings.

ACME. 2014. 9p.

By World Athletics

World Athletics today (22 December 2023) published findings of a study conducted during the World Athletics Championships Budapest 23 focused towards identifying and addressing abusive and threatening behaviour aimed at athletes on the X and Instagram social media platforms.

Building on the past two years of implementing greater safeguarding measures in athletics, 449,209 posts and comments were analysed between 18-28 August for abusive content in 16 different languages and additional dialects, protecting 1344 athletes with 1666 active accounts across both platforms.

This included text analysis, through searches for slurs and other phrases (including emojis) that could indicate abuse. Image recognition tools were also deployed to flag potentially offensive images. These findings were then compared to results from the previous study, conducted a year earlier at the World Athletics Championships Oregon22 (15-24 July 2022).

The research once again identified clear instances of online abuse and threats, targeting athletes competing at the World Athletics Championships Budapest 23. It detected notable examples of racist and sexualised abuse, with a selection of posts extending into potential action from law enforcement.

The study revealed:

X (formerly Twitter) was the preferred channel for abusers, accounting for almost 90% of detected abuse, a 500% relative increase compared to 2022

Racist abuse made up over one third of all abuse, an increase of 14% from 2022

Male athletes faced an increase in abuse, with the gender split of abuse being 51% targeting men and 49% targeting women

Two athletes out of 1344 monitored received 44% of all accounted abuse between them\

The levels of abuse detected during Budapest were noticeably higher when compared with the previous year’s study conducted during the World Athletics Championships Oregon22. Of the instances of racist abuse detected, the vast majority came on X. The abuse was overwhelmingly targeted at black athletes, with invocations of monkey imagery and deployment of the N-word in several spellings.

This is the third study of its kind in athletics and forms part of a research project World Athletics is conducting stretching over four years to fully understand the size, scale and gravity of online abuse athletes face during major sporting events. It is the third deployment of Threat Matrix, an initiative by data science company Signify Group, supported by sports investigations company Quest.

With a fourth study due to be carried out at the Olympic Games in Paris next year, the combined research will then encompass data from two Olympic Games as well as two World Athletics Championships, with events staged across Asia, Europe and North America.

World Athletics, 2023. 12p.

By Laura Chiang, Stephanie Miedema, Janet Saul, James Mercy, Andrew Brooks, Alexander Butchart, Gretchen Bachman, Jennifer Hegle, Daniela Ligiero, Joseph Logan, Greta Massetti

Violence against children is a pervasive global public health and human rights issue, with 1 billion children experiencing at least one form of violence annually. Extensive scientific literature shows childhood adversity, including sexual violence, to be directly and indirectly associated with a host of health and social consequences with a dose–response effect, consequential intergenerational impacts, and sizeable economic ramifications. There is a dearth of population data on the prevalence of childhood sexual violence as well as its antecedents and health and social outcomes, which has hampered violence prevention and child protection efforts globally and locally. Population data are critical, alongside administrative data systems and statistical definitions and classification schemes, for governments to adequately begin addressing violence against children. The absence of national prevalence data has resulted in limited information to guide national policies and prevention strategies, monitor trends, and evaluate prevention efforts. Globally, lack of data on the epidemiological patterns of violence against children has resulted in deficient prioritisation for preventing and responding to this critical problem. Violence Against Children and Youth Surveys (VACS) collect comprehensive data on violence and have been implemented in over 23 countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe and Latin America since 2007. VACS have also been repeated in three countries: Zimbabwe (2011; 2017), Kenya (2010; 2019) and Eswatini (2007; 2022). VACS provide extensive data on the prevalence and contexts of all forms of violence, including sexual violence, therefore allowing for targeted prevention and response efforts. VACS further provide the global research community with data to examine the epidemiological patterns of childhood sexual violence across countries and regions. VACS data have raised awareness and improved understanding of childhood sexual violence in many countries worldwide, and thereby catalysed action. This article draws on VACS reports and empirical publications, to summarise and describe patterns in childhood sexual violence across countries that have completed VACS and shed light on the global prevalence of childhood sexual violence.

BMJ Paediatr Open, 2024. 3p.

By  Avril Sharp

   Kalayaan works on the assumption that no amount of abuse should be tolerated, permitted to persist or go unchallenged. Key to this is addressing the systemic drivers of exploitation, including the legal structures that make people vulnerable to abuse. Whilst acknowledging that exploitation is multifaceted and abusive employers must be held accountable, our focus in this report is demonstrating the role and legal duty the state has to ensure that our legal systems are compatible with our positive obligations to protect and safeguard all workers. The UK Government has repeatedly acknowledged the vulnerabilities faced by migrant domestic workers over the years, but their concern has been restricted to after-the-event responses that focus measures to rescue workers who have experienced extreme abuse, rather than address the ways in which the legislative and policy framework facilitates their abuse and excludes them from certain fundamental protections as workers in their own right. Since 2012 and against the backdrop of the UK’s hostile environment for migrants, Government policy has seen domestic workers stripped of their labour law rights, immigration enforcement prioritised, and the protections of this workforce placed within a trafficking framework. This has meant workers have had to demonstrate their treatment has deteriorated to the point of slavery before they are able to seek redress. This reactive approach does nothing to prevent abuse escalating, places an evidential burden on workers and obfuscates the role the state plays in handing more control to employers. The visa changes introduced in 2012 under David Cameron formed part of that Government’s objective to reduce net immigration to the UK to under 100,000 people. It sought to achieve this by reducing the rights of migrants on various visa pathways, including domestic workers. Ultimately, this objective failed. The demand for domestic workers has remained consistent and the number of visas being issued remains equally significant. By reducing the rights of domestic workers, the Government did not remove the demand for domestic workers’ labour, and so did not achieve the aim of reducing their number. However, by using a reduction in rights as the method, the move did produce a significant increase in rates of worker exploitation. Evidence from workers, from Kalayaan and other front-line organisations has continuously demonstrated that restrictions on the ability of workers to challenge abusive employers only results in levels of abuse increasing. This evidence has been consistently disregarded for the last 12 years. This must be considered alongside the fact successive Conservative administrations have at the same time refused or rejected measures which would have provided the state with evidence and knowledge of the working conditions faced by this workforce. This report provides evidence compiled by Kalayaan of the abuse experienced by migrant domestic workers in the UK over the last 12 years. It also scrutinises and dismantles the 8 key myths that have been relied on when rejecting calls to reinstate labour law rights for workers, and demonstrates why concessions that have been introduced since 2012 have always fallen short of the unconditional protections that all workers are entitled to and were provided for under the visa regime prior to 2012. Ultimately, the report finds that the myths relied upon by Government are a smokescreen for the state’s failure to ensure our legal system does not facilitate the abuse and exploitation of this workforce. Kalayaan urges the incoming Government to consider the available evidence and reinstate the pre-2012 visa regime so that all migrant domestic workers are protected at work and able to challenge abuse when it arises. We hope this report will assist in discussions with parliamentarians and policy makers as the campaign to restore rights continues  

London: Kalayaan, 2024. 48p.

By European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

The purpose of the current report is to provide an overview and summary of the European drug situation up to the end of 2023. All grouping, aggregates and labels therefore reflect the situation based on the available data in 2023 in respect to the composition of the European Union and the countries participating in EMCDDA reporting exercises. However, not all data will cover the full period. Due to the time needed to compile and submit data, many of the annual national data sets included here are from the reference year January to December 2022. Analysis of trends is based only on those countries providing sufficient data to describe changes over the period specified. The reader should also be aware that monitoring patterns and trends in a hidden and stigmatised behaviour such as drug use is both practically and methodologically challenging. For this reason, multiple sources of data are used for the purposes of analysis in this report. Although considerable improvements can be noted, both nationally and in respect to what is possible to achieve in a European-level analysis, the methodological difficulties in this area must be acknowledged. Caution is therefore required in interpretation, in particular when countries are compared on any single measure. Caveats relating to the data are to be found in the online Statistical Bulletin 2024, which contains detailed information on methodology, qualifications on analysis and comments on the limitations in the information set available. Information is also available there on the methods and data used for European-level estimates, where interpolation may be used.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2024. 

By National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.), United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States. Department of Homeland Security

 "This resource is provided to inform law enforcement, terrorism prevention practitioners, other first responders, community leaders, as well as the general public about both threats of violence and contextual behaviors that suggest an individual is mobilizing to violence. While some violent extremists may make direct, indirect, or vague threats of violence, others may plot violent action while avoiding such overt threats to maintain operational security--underscoring the need to consider both threats of violence and contextual behaviors. We have incorporated 'unusual' into many of the indicators because we are looking for behavior that is different enough from the individual's normal behavior to cause concern. The indicators included in this booklet are intended to aid law enforcement and first responder investigative and detection efforts, not to be a substitute for their expertise and experience. In addition, we continue to see that members of the community--such as family members and peers--are often best positioned to witness signs of mobilization to violence. Such community members almost always are the first to detect hints that an individual may be considering violent action in the United States or overseas. This booklet is provided to aid interpretation of their observations. This booklet was first published in 2015 and updated in 2017 and 2019."

Washington, DC: The Authors, 2021. 

By Smriti Sharma and Naveen Sunder

 
It has been demonstrated that violent crime has profound effects on a number of socioeconomic outcomes. But, does day-to-day crime also shape human capital accumulation? We answer this question in the Indian context by combining multiple years of district-level data on the incidence of various types of crime with a nationally representative survey on learning achievement of school-aged children. Our empirical strategy leverages the within-district across-year variation in crime to estimate the crime-learning gradient. We show that an increase in violent crime is associated with lower achievement in reading and math, while non-violent crimes have no discernible correlation with learning outcomes. The effects are short-lived, driven by contemporaneous crime, and are similar for boys and girls. Additionally, we find that violent crimes impose greater costs on learning of children from socioeconomically disadvantaged households. We find evidence that both household-level factors (reduced child mobility and poorer mental health) and school-level factors (lower availability of teachers) are possible mechanisms underpinning these findings.

   IZA DP No. 17037

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2024. 51p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

   The illegal wildlife trade (henceforth IWT) is one of the world’s most lucrative criminal activitiesand much of the trade takes place online. The phenomenon has tremendously harmful effects on biodiversity and animal welfare, while it also exacerbates the risk of spreading zoonic diseases.2 Most online IWT occurs in the open online space – on e-commerce platforms, social media and messenger services such as WhatsApp – where sellers freely showcase wildlife or wildlife products to potential buyers. The ease with which illegal advertisements can be found online reflects the high level of impunity (and the low level of risk) enjoyed by those engaged in the trade.3 The online illegal wildlife trade is characterized by several key trends. First, traffickers exploit a diverse array of online platforms, spanning social media, marketplaces, messaging apps and encrypted channels to market and distribute illegal wildlife products. Second, online IWT is characterized by global reach, transcending geographical boundaries and regulatory jurisdictions, thereby making enforcement of wildlife protection laws a complex undertaking. Finally, the phenomenon has led to the fragmentation of traditional supply chains, with small-scale traders and individual sellers operating alongside larger criminal syndicates. Having a larger number of potential targets makes it difficult for law enforcement to efficiently prioritize and dismantle trafficking networks.5 Defining online illegal wildlife trade Recent publications have shed light on the alarming surge in IWT occurring on the internet.6 A significant hindrance in combating this crime is the dearth of data regarding the scale of the market, its dynamics, modus operandi and resultant consequences, especially on a global scale. To address this issue, ECO-SOLVE is developing a Global Monitoring System to monitor online IWT systematically and to gather global data to feed into law enforcement action and to inform policymaking. By identifying areas of high pressure on endangered species and ecosystems, surveillance activities can enable targeted interventions to prosecute traffickers and wider criminal networks

involved in this trade. Consistent monitoring may help to detect emerging trends and shifts in IWT, allowing for timely responses to new threats and challenges. This is the first in a series of Global Trend Reports, which will be published during the three year ECO-SOLVE project. Two or three of these reports will be published every year, to highlight important trends in online IWT and to contextualize these trends. Drawing on findings generated by the Global Monitoring System – a network of AI enabled ‘data hubs’ in key countries, which monitor online IWT – each Global Trend Report will showcase the latest trends in statistical data, specifically the number of adverts found, the numbers and types of species advertised and the number of platforms that host these adverts. Diving deeper into individual topics, these reports will offer regional breakdowns and include sections that contextualize and analyze findings, while also investigating changes in regulations and their effects on online IWT as well as trends in law enforcement. The reports will also discuss case studies of online IWT. This first report will set the stage for reports to come. It will review past trends in efforts to monitor the online IWT, trends in regulation and other government policies towards IWT, and the evolving role of civil society and law enforcement in responding to the phenomenon.   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 26p.

By  Council for Court Excellence and Office of the D.C. Auditor

While much attention is being paid to youth crime rates in D.C., little is known about the circumstances of justice-involved young people. This report finds that one characteristic many share is involvement in the child welfare system due to parental abuse and neglect. This report examines how effectively the District – and in particular the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) and the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) -- serve young people who have had involvement in both child welfare and youth justice systems, that is, crossover youth. 

The fundamental finding of the audit is that the District lacks a unified approach to addressing the needs of these vulnerable young people. D.C. leaders are unable to accurately identify the number and traits of crossover youth in our community, to coordinate the services being offered or supervision being provided, to target specialized programming for these youth, or provide appropriate resources for their families and caregivers.

The new report includes the following key findings:  

• There is no single unified source of public data related to crossover youth in the District, making it difficult to understand the number and needs of this vulnerable population. 

• CFSA and DYRS undercount the number of crossover youth in their care because they only count dual-jacketed youth, rather than youth involved in both agencies at any point in their lives. CFSA and DYRS identified only 8 crossover youth in FY 2023, while CCE analysis of court records indicated 93 youth at the end of FY2022 were involved with the delinquency system and had current or past child welfare involvement. 

• Crossover youth are essentially invisible to CFSA and DYRS; neither clearly recognizes this population in their current operating documents, systems, policies, or practices, and their rights as justice-involved youth are not clearly identified in the Bill of Rights for Children in Foster Care. This impedes the agencies’ ability to address the special needs and manage cases of these young people, and can leave youth in New Beginnings and other facilities unaware of their rights.

• CFSA and DYRS do not sufficiently collaborate or communicate regarding crossover youth.   

Some of the report’s recommendations include:  

• D.C. Council should ensure the Office of the Ombudsperson for Children (OFC) has sufficient authority and funding to analyze and report on crossover youth annually. 

• CFSA and DYRS should reestablish the “Crossover Youth Steering Committee” to identify, manage and serve crossover youth in their care.

• CFSA and DYRS should identify and track crossover youth in their case management systems.

• CFSA and DRYS staff should be trained on the unique needs of crossover youth. Additionally, parents and foster parents should receive training and resources to help identify and meet the needs of youth who are, or are at risk of becoming, crossover youth. 

Washington, DC: Council for Court Excellence and Office of the D.C. Auditor, 2024. 125p.

By  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is proud to present this introductory analysis of darknet-enabled threats against Southeast Asian countries, which has been made possible through strong partnerships with global and regional law enforcement and justice authorities, together with private industry and academia. The report was produced thanks to kind voluntary funding from the Government of Japan. This report assesses the Darkweb from user, criminal and law enforcement perspectives with a particular focus on cybercriminality targeted at Southeast Asian countries. Darknets (i.e. networks on the Darkweb) provide the ideal environment for a wide range of criminal activities. Just as new threats appear on the Clearnet (i.e. the regular Internet), darknets can facilitate similar attacks that provide perpetrators with a greater degree of anonymity. This anonymity makes investigation and prevention more challenging, but still possible. There has been a consistent increase in darknet and Darkweb usage, both for legitimate and illegitimate reasons, whilst the COVID-19 pandemic also appears to have given rise to darknet cybercrime, including by criminals with no previous cyber experience. Despite this, there is an overall paucity of darknet criminality data specific to Southeast Asia. There is little prioritisation of darknet criminality in the region, either in policy or practice. This creates risk from the criminality itself, which is compounded by the limited political, policy and law enforcement response. There is an absolute need for a ministerial lead on cyber affairs, in each country, to ensure that law enforcers receive necessary political support to undertake the most challenging operations. Many criminal activities conducted over darknets are predictable and preventable. UNODC and its partners work hard to address these challenges by supporting and encouraging policy development, research, training and capacity building support in Southeast Asia. Awareness is fundamental for addressing cybercrime. Given, however, the challenges posed by darknets, stakeholders must increase their commitment and cooperation to developing policy, sharing intelligence and enhancing international cooperation to counter darknet crime nationally, regionally and internationally. This UNODC analysis will inform policymakers in Southeast Asia, including through the annual Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), as well as supporting law enforcement and judicial cooperation, and providing opportunities for darknet-focused crime prevention. 

  2020. 64p.

By Priyanka Goonetilleke, Alex Knorre, Artem Kuriksha

We present a comprehensive description of Hydra, the largest darknet marketplace in the world until its shutdown in April 2022. We document the main features of Hydra such as dead-drop delivery, feedback and reputation system, escrow, and dispute resolution. Using data scraped from the platform, we quantitatively examine the scale and the structure of the marketplace. We find that it has been highly competitive, geographically covering at least 69% of the Russian population and trading a wide variety of drugs, while also allowing the wholesale trade of drugs and precursors. The dead-drop delivery system used on Hydra was expensive, as the courier costs comprised a substantial proportion of the sale price of drugs on Hydra. We contribute to the research on drug cryptomarkets by studying an unprecedentedly large non-Western marketplace that existed substantially longer than any other known darknet market.

Policy Implications

The phenomenon of Hydra shows that shut-down policies applied to darknet marketplaces have a large effect and implicitly shape the whole drug market. Without these policies, a pervasive digitalization of the drug trade can occur. The major cost of allowing marketplaces to grow is the probable increase in the consumption of illegal drugs due to convenience for consumers and facilitated cooperation between suppliers. This cost must be weighed against the potential benefits, including a higher quality of drugs, a decrease in potential violence, and the incentives for a large marketplace to self-regulate. The case of Hydra also suggests the relevance of financial regulation to limit the growth of darknet marketplaces.

Criminology and Public Policy, Volume22, Issue4

Special Issue: Cybercrime and Cybersecurity

November 2023

Pages 735-777

By Adam Clark

Cybersecurity is the practice of protecting IT systems, devices, and the data they hold from unauthorised access and interference (known as cyber attacks). This briefing focuses on policy and legislative efforts to improve the UK’s cybersecurity. It does not discuss cyber in the context of military operations. Cybersecurity policy is a reserved matter, as are many related policy areas such as national security, product safety and consumer protection. In devolved matters, such as education, the devolved administrations have their own strategies for implementing the UK Government’s overarching cyber policy. Who carries out cyber attacks? The cyber threat to the UK comes from a range of actors, including state and state-sponsored groups, financially motivated criminal organisations, and ‘hacktivists’ with political aims. The boundaries between these groups can be unclear. For examples, cyber criminal groups can operate with the implicit backing of states, choose targets for political reasons, or sell their cyber attack services to others (known as ‘as-a-service’ business models). How are cyber attacks carried out? Cyber attacks typically involve malicious software (known as ‘malware’) being executed on the target’s system. Malware is an umbrella term for various types of software designed to damage, disable, and extract data from computer systems. Cyber attackers deliver malware to the target’s IT system by exploiting technical vulnerabilities and human error, then run the malware to achieve their aim (such as stealing or encrypting data). An estimated 95% of cyber attacks succeed because of human error. This includes ‘active’ errors such as opening malicious email attachments and ‘passive’ errors such as using weak passwords. 

Research Briefing.

London: House of Commons Library, 2024. 68p.

By Miranda Bruce, Jonathan Lusthaus, Ridhi Kashyap, Nigel Phair, Federico Varese

Cybercrime is a major challenge facing the world, with estimated costs ranging from the hundreds of millions to the trillions. Despite the threat it poses, cybercrime is somewhat an invisible phenomenon. In carrying out their virtual attacks, offenders often mask their physical locations by hiding behind online nicknames and technical protections. This means technical data are not well suited to establishing the true location of offenders and scholarly knowledge of cybercrime geography is limited. This paper proposes a solution: an expert survey. From March to October 2021 we invited leading experts in cybercrime intelligence/investigations from across the world to participate in an anonymized online survey on the geographical location of cybercrime offenders. The survey asked participants to consider five major categories of cybercrime, nominate the countries that they consider to be the most significant sources of each of these types of cybercrimes, and then rank each nominated country according to the impact, professionalism, and technical skill of its offenders. The outcome of the survey is the World Cybercrime Index, a global metric of cyber-criminality organised around five types of cybercrime. The results indicate that a relatively small number of countries house the greatest cybercriminal threats. These findings partially remove the veil of anonymity around cybercriminal offenders, may aid law enforcement and policymakers in fighting this threat, and contribute to the study of cybercrime as a local phenomenon.

PLOS ONE,  April 10, 2024

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0297312

By The Australian National Audit Office

Australian Government entities are attractive, high-value targets for a range of malicious cybercriminals because they hold the personal and financial information of Australians. In 2022–23, approximately 31 per cent of cyber security incidents reported to the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) were from non-corporate Commonwealth entities. Over 40 per cent of these cyber security incidents were coordinated, low-level malicious cyberattacks directed specifically at the Australian government, government shared services, or regulated critical infrastructure. Ransomware was the most destructive cybercrime threat in 2022–23, and continues to pose considerable risk to Australian government entities, businesses and individuals.

Previous audits conducted by the ANAO identified low levels of cyber resilience in entities. Low levels of cyber resilience continue to make entities susceptible to cyberattack and reduce business continuity and recovery prospects following a cyber security incident. An entity’s preparedness to respond to and recover from a cyberattack is a key part of cyber resilience. This audit was conducted to provide assurance to Parliament about the effectiveness of the selected entities’ implementation of arrangements for managing cyber security incidents.

In preparing audit reports to the Parliament on cyber security in Australian Government entities, the interests of accountability and transparency must be balanced with the need to manage cyber security risks. The ASD has advised the ANAO that adversaries use publicly available information about cyber vulnerabilities to more effectively target their malicious activities.

The extent to which this report details the cyber security vulnerabilities of individual entities was a matter of careful consideration during the course of this audit. To assist in appropriately balancing the interests of accountability and potential risk exposure through transparent audit reporting, the ANAO engaged with ASD to better understand the evolving nature and extent of risk exposure that may arise through the disclosure of technical information in the audit report. This report therefore focusses on matters material to the audit findings against the objective and criteria and contains less detailed technical information than previous audits.

Key findings:

• The implementation of arrangements by AUSTRAC and Services Australia to manage cyber security incidents has been partly effective. Neither entity is well placed to ensure business continuity or disaster recovery in the event of a significant or reportable cyber security incident.

• AUSTRAC has partly effective cyber security incident management procedures for investigating, monitoring and responding to cyber security incidents. It has established management structures and a framework of procedures to support these processes. It has not detailed the responsibilities for its Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), its approach to continuous monitoring and improvement reporting, or defined timeframes for reporting to stakeholders.

• Services Australia is partly effective in its design of cyber security incident management procedures. It has established a framework of procedures and an incident response plan. It has not documented an approach to threat and vulnerability assessments. Services Australia does

•  not have a policy covering the management of cyber security incidents.

  Auditor-General Report No. 38 2023–24

Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 2024. 103p.

By Sean Hill

Nonwhite communities experience higher rates of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration than white communities for drug offenses, and these disparities have persisted even in the wake of decriminalization and legalization. Although a diverse array of political stakeholders increasingly agree that drug policies should be reformed, they are nearly unanimous in their opposition to abolition. While select drug crimes may be worthy of reduced punishment or conversion into civil offenses, these stakeholders contend that the abolition of criminal institutions will inevitably jeopardize public safety. This Article challenges the widespread presumption that drug law and policy correlates with the protection of the public. Drug crimes are, instead, an essential vehicle for the subordination of nonwhite people and for the misallocation of resources across racial groups. Part I of the article contests the presumed correlation between illicit drugs and violence and illuminates how drug criminalization erodes individual and collective safety. Part II addresses how drug policy sustains white and American hegemony, respectively, by legitimating racist ideologies and by justifying force against marginalized people both in and outside of the country's borders. Finally, Part III explains how abolition represents a viable path away from the harms of prohibitionist policies.

Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Forthcoming

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 852

By  Kars de Bruijne Clara Gehrling 

t is generally accepted that violent extremism is a problem in northern Benin. Currently, attention is overwhelmingly devoted to northern Alibori and western Atacora and this problem is viewed as a ‘spillover’ from the Sahel.
But this is only part of the story.

This report points to a number of disturbing signals which, in combination, point to a problem of violent extremism along Benin’s border with Nigeria.

1.

Suffocating canaries in coal mines indicate dangerous levels of carbon monoxide. A variety of strange signals in Northern Benin along the border with Nigeria are like these canaries: they point at dangerous liaisons between violent extremist groups. Closer relationships with bandit groups seem to facilitate this. This report makes the following observations:

−

Banditry is re-emerging in JNIM’s zones of operation in Benin. Those bandits seem to have Nigerian connections.

−

Violent extremists are present in Kainji Lake National Park (Nigeria) just across the border from the Borgou Department. Evidence suggests this involves Sahelian extremists (likely JNIM). Another group would be Darul Salam – a group linked to Boko Haram, if not fully affiliated – with an open attitude towards bandits.

−

There has been a strong increase in the movement of unidentified armed actors along the Borgou border with Niger State and in banditry-related incidents since March 2023. The evidence suggests that there is a direct link with those operating in Kainji Lake National Park.

−

Since March 2023, unidentified armed groups have had a concealed presence in the Forêt de Trois Rivières between southern Alibori and the Borgou Department.

−

Bandits and unidentified armed groups are known to move towards Kebbi State from Sokoto. It is alleged that these include various Darul Salam fighters with links to the Sahel.

2.

There are deep connections between North West Nigeria and North East Benin due to longstanding social, ethnic and religious connections, particularly in the former ‘cross-border’ Borgu Empire:

−

The northern-most border area (North East Alibori and Kebbi State) sees intra-ethnic cross-border connections between the Hausa and the Nigerian Zamfara Fulbe respectively. A risk in this area are ethnic tensions between the Hausa and the Fulbe.

−

The area of the former Borgu Empire (Borgou Department and Niger State) has a distinct cross-border political entity. On both sides of the border, people tend to identify as one Bariba/Boo community with shared customary institutions. There are high farmer-herder tensions involving autochthonous Fulbe. There is also a fear of kidnapping by Zamfara Fulbe.

−

Another risk in the former Borgu Empire concerns the Dambanga hunting groups. These groups operate cross-border in defiance of a Benin government ban but are pitched against extremists in Kainji and have been used by the Nigerian military. This discrepancy can generate tensions between the two countries.

−

Two non-violent reformist movements – the Yan Izala movement and the Jama'at Tabligh – are present along the border. Their reach has grown strongly in the border area of Northern Benin during the last ten years.

3.

A well-developed cross-border trade system operates between the Nigerian and Beninese border. This system generates livelihoods for many people in the area. Livelihoods are at risk:

−

There is a variety of markets and crossings connecting North West Nigeria and Northern Benin. Unidentified armed groups and Darul Salam operate in these hubs.

−

People’s livelihoods are highly dependent on cross-border trade. Interviews revealed frustration and a strong sense of grievance towards both Nigerian and Beninese government policies that are perceived to put livelihoods under stress.

−

On the one hand, consistent problems reported are a ban on cereal exports and soybeans, and accompanying border restrictions. Both have a negative impact on livelihoods.

−

On the other hand, the end of fuel subsidies in Nigeria at the time of research for this report had a severe impact on people’s livelihoods (and on communities in general).

4.

The above three main observations suggest that a very problematic situation is emerging along the Nigerian-Benin border. Not only are there numerous indications of extremist activities and a link between bandits and extremists along the border but also there are clear social links that facilitate cross-border exchange and real livelihood needs that create vulnerabilities to recruitment. The governments of Benin and Nigeria urgently need to move into action. Three things could be done:

−

Coordinate and step up the military response by: revamping regional security cooperation within ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States); bilateral security cooperation for hot-pursuit, intelligence sharing and coordination; and a joint strategy for cross-border hunting groups.

−

Prioritise people’s livelihoods. This should involve cushioning livelihood effects of the ban on cereals (and cutting of fuel subsidies) to reduce vulnerability to recruitment.

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Be more flexible and agile to respond to rapidly changing context by closely monitoring border markets for sudden vulnerabilities, and demanding more flexible donor programming and funding so that programming can be really flexible.

The Hague: Clingendael, 2024. 80p.

By Laura Carlson  

American criminal jurisprudence relies on confidential informants: those individuals who agree to assist police in exchange for leniency. Facing little regulation by legislatures, law enforcement has raised an informant system premised on the exploitation of vulnerabilities and free from basic safeguards that would help to mitigate the moral, mental, and physical harm informants face in the field. While this is generally problematic, the issue becomes more pronounced when considering law enforcement’s use of juveniles to combat crimes perpetrated against and among children. A juvenile’s brain is developmentally distinct from an adult’s. During late adolescence, the brain goes through major maturation processes that significantly affect a juvenile’s ability to assess risk, make forward-thinking decisions, override emotions with logic, and resist social pressures. In other words, the juvenile brain is predisposed to act adverse to self-interests. Within the context of the modern informant system, juveniles engage with police on seriously disadvantaged ground; and because agreeing to assist police has proven to be a death sentence for some, the urgency with which this must be addressed cannot be overstated. America’s tolerance of police discretion with respect to the use of juvenile informants must end. Legislatures can facilitate change by implementing safeguards aimed at mitigating the risks posed by a juvenile’s physiological predispositions. Namely, legislatures should consider implementing mandatory cooling-off periods, a statutory right to counsel, mandatory parental and judicial consent, prescribed documentation and recordkeeping requirements, and enforced training regimens. Absent empirical data that youth at large are better protected by the abolition of the use of juvenile informants, legislatures looking to implement these suggestions or otherwise restrict the practice should be careful to balance proposed legislation with the needs of law enforcement. 

Arizona Law Review, 2023. 26p.

By Christina Billhartz

In 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Commission created its first federal sentencing guideline for child pornography offenses. As Congress grappled with dynamic technological advances that changed the child pornography landscape, the Commission continually revised and amended these guidelines, creating the last significant amendment in 2009. For the past 12 years, these guidelines have been considered by federal court judges tasked with sentencing child pornography offenders, yet little has been done to determine whether or not these guidelines actually diminish the amount of children victimized by child pornography. While acknowledging that child pornography victimizes and harms children in countless ways and must be criminalized to account for these egregious harms, this Note argues that the sentencing guidelines fail to deter the production, distribution, and consumption of child pornography, and fail to fulfill congressional goals of protecting children from victimization. Rather, the guidelines have resulted in the mass incarceration of child pornography offenders and a system that punishes viewers of child pornography more severely than it does child rapists. If the government truly wants to protect children from being victimized through child pornography, then the sentencing guidelines, as written, cannot stand, and they must be replaced by a system that allows child pornography offenders to access rehabilitative resources both inside and outside of the federal prison system.

Arizona Law Review, 2021. 32p.