By R. Evan Ellis

The security environment in Mexico is characterized by a dangerous fragmentation of and competition among criminal groups that pushed the nation’s homicide rate to a record high of 22.5 per 100,000 in 2017, a 27.5 percent increase over the prior year.1 The nation, whose security and prosperity strongly impacts the United States through geographic proximity and associated flows of people, money, and goods (both licit and illicit), is at a critical juncture in its fight against transnational organized crime. Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched the “war against the cartels” in December 2006 with the deployment of the Mexican army into the state of Michoacán, the nation’s security forces have taken down the leaders of multiple powerful criminal groups and debilitated their organizations.2 In the process, the Mexican military, police, and other security institutions have evolved their institutional structures, modified both their strategy and their doctrine, and strengthened their ability to combat transnational organized crime. Yet as with the experience of the United States in combatting terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mexico’s fight against the cartels, both despite and because of its successes, has created a more chaotic criminal landscape, with both a higher level of violence and a broader range of criminality.

Complicating Mexico’s security challenge is the disposition of the Trump administration to act aggressively against illegal immigration from Mexico (among other countries) into the United States, along with U.S. renegotiation and possible abandonment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. These actions increase stressors on Mexico, including the prospect of expanded deportations of immigrants to Mexico, the loss of remittance income, and impeded access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market. The Trump administration’s actions, magnified by rhetoric that many Mexicans perceive as an insult to their country and people, have combined with Mexican frustration over the persistence of violence and corruption to create the real prospect that leftist populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador could win the July 2018 presidential election, potentially taking Mexico on a course of more distant political relations and decreased security cooperation with the United States and expanded engagement with extra-hemispheric rivals of the United States such as Russia and China.

This article examines Mexico’s serious and evolving security challenges, and the key initiatives and critical issues confronting the nation’s security forces. It argues that the Mexican government has made important progress against a range of criminal groups and in innovating and strengthening its own capabilities to combat such entities and associated flows of illegal goods—capabilities that deserve to be recognized, further refined, and exploited in partnership with the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. It concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy makers regarding the importance of strong and respectful support for Mexico at the present critical juncture.

2028. 13p.

Women and Illicit Finance in Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine Orly Stern Olivia Allison

Addressing police and military involvement in serious organised crime (Research Paper 39)

By MARIANA OLAIZOLA ROSENBLAT AND LUKE BARNES

Political violence in the United States has increased in recent years and shows no signs of declining.1 This trend was underscored in September 2025 by the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. In the two weeks before and after Kirk’s killing, shooting incidents in Colorado, Minneapolis, and Dallas seized public attention.2 Executive Summary Amid growing concern about the relationship between online rhetoric and real-world violence, this report examines how violent extremist actors across the ideological spectrum use digital platforms to respond to, amplify, and exploit acts of political violence in the United States. Drawing on opensource intelligence (OSINT) gathered initially from March 24 to June 6, 2025, and then extended to include a period following Kirk’s assassination, this analysis reveals sophisticated cross-platform strategies employed by far-right, far-left, violent Islamist, and nihilistic violent extremist (NVE) actors. This report uses “violent extremist” to refer to individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals, as well as those who commit violence driven by generalized hatred rather than a coherent ideology. Key Findings • Violent extremist groups systematically exploit trigger events—high-profile incidents of violence—to recruit supporters, justify their ideologies, and call for retaliatory action. • These groups employ multi-platform strategies, using mainstream sites like X for visibility and recruitment while maintaining a presence on private or semi-private platforms for coordination and more extreme content. • Far-right groups capitalized on cases like the Austin Metcalf stabbing and the Iryna Zarutska killing to advance narratives of White victimhood and justify threats against perceived enemies. • Activities of both far-left and far-right networks revealed a troubling convergence around antisemitic targeting. • Violent Islamic groups are more aggressively monitored than domestic groups espousing similar levels of violence. • Violent Islamist groups, facing stricter moderation than domestic extremists, have migrated to decentralized platforms like Rocket.Chat while disseminating symbolic propaganda elsewhere. • Nihilistic Violent Extremist (NVE) communities glorify violence across ideological lines for shock value and digital notoriety, making their threats harder to predict based on political triggers. This report aims to bring clarity to a conversation clouded by vagueness and partisanship. It first maps the domestic threat landscape, offering timely examples of online violent discourse from across the ideological spectrum targeting US individuals or institutions, and sets out a clear definitional framework for types of speech that carry legal significance under US constitutional doctrine. It closes with practical recommendations for online service providers and policymakers.

New York: NYU Stern Center for Businsss, 2025. 36p.

The 2025 Africa Organised Crime Index, published on 17 November by the ENACT project, provides an overview and analysis of the past, present and future of organised crime across the continent. In its fourth and final iteration, the 2025 Index draws on the knowledge of over 160 experts. It combines eight years of qualitative and quantitative data to provide an assessment of how organized crime and resilience have evolved in Africa. It also examines ongoing challenges, including the impact of technology and geopolitical dynamics on organized crime. The ENACT project is implemented by a consortium of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), INTERPOL and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC).

“Eight years of data and four issues of the Africa Organised Crime Index provide a rich pool of information that gives us an unprecedented overview of illicit economies across the continent”, says Mark Shaw, Executive Director of GI-TOC. “Thanks to the ENACT research programme and our cooperation with the ISS, we have pioneered a methodology for measuring organized crime first in Africa, which has now been scaled up to a Global Organized Crime Index produced every two years”.

"This has been an innovative flagship project," says Eric Pelser, ENACT Programme Head at the ISS. "Our partnership with GI-TOC has produced in-depth analysis that goes beyond research – we've taken the recommendations emanating from the Africa Index to the highest levels of policy-making, ensuring that evidence drives action across the continent."

Key findings:

• There has been a steady growth in criminal markets and criminal actors in Africa since 2019. 
   

• In 2025, the most pervasive criminal markets in Africa are financial crimes, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes, the trade in counterfeit goods and arms trafficking. Since 2023, the two fastest-growing markets have been financial crimes and the trade in counterfeit goods, reflecting broader global patterns.
   

• Criminal markets in Africa today show considerable diversity across the continent. East Africa stands out for its high human trafficking, arms trafficking, and human smuggling scores, which drive the continental averages. In North Africa, financial crimes and cannabis trade are the most pervasive criminal markets, placing the region second and first (respectively) in the world for these illicit economies. Non-renewable resource crimes were found to exert significant influence in Central Africa, while the cocaine trade dominates West Africa’s illicit economy. In Southern Africa, wildlife trade was found to be among the most prevalent criminal markets.   
   

• State-embedded actors are the most prevalent type of criminal actor across the continent, with their influence in nearly half of African countries (48%) classified as “severe”. 
   

• Foreign criminal groups pose an increasingly significant threat to the continent. Their influence in West Africa was found to be “significant to severe” in all but one country in the region. This reflects the impact of transnational cocaine trafficking as well as private military companies engaged in illicit activities.
   

• Africa’s digital boom has provided new opportunities for criminal actors, both to expand and diversify traditionally non-digital markets and to grow new criminal markets, such as online financial fraud and ransomware. As in other regions of the world, cyber-dependent crime is increasing in many parts of Africa – particularly Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria, with four out of the five subregions witnessing a rise in this crime type.
   

• Criminality thrives in volatile environments. States and regions where conflicts, insurgency and violent extremism persist are magnets for organized crime. Many countries in Africa that have the highest criminality scores are wracked by conflict and instability: there is a relatively high (0.59) correlation between the Fragile States Index and criminality. This phenomenon needs to be factored into peacemaking and peacebuilding.
   

• Governance was found to have a strong impact on resilience to organized crime, with the data showing a strong (0.81) correlation between Africa’s resilience and the Democracy Index. While democratic countries are vulnerable to organized crime, they are also more resilient in their response to it. In contrast, authoritarian states tend to either embrace organized crime or suppress it with violent crackdowns.
   

• Geopolitics has a negative impact on illicit economies, drawing on the continent’s resources and role in the global landscape. For example, the withdrawal or expulsion of some foreign powers has created a vacuum for both licit and illicit actors to fill, generating instability and the growth of illicit activity in some cases.
   

• There has been a steady decline in resilience to organized crime in most African countries since 2019. Almost all countries in Africa (92.5%) are characterized as having low resilience to organized crime. Of these, 23 countries are affected by high criminality, creating a particularly vulnerable combination of high criminality and low resilience.
   

• Africa’s resilience ranks among the lowest in the world, indicating insufficient capacity to respond to the criminal threats the continent faces. One key resilience measure is that ‘non-state actors’ play a vital role by supporting vulnerable communities and holding authorities to account. Civil society organizations are often at the forefront of leading social protection efforts. However, since the 2021 Index, the ‘nonstate actors’ resilience indicator has declined the most

By Kathryn Westmore

Within a relatively short period of time, Chinese money laundering organisations (CMLOs) have become one of the pre-eminent global money laundering threats. Using centuries-old techniques, modern-day CMLOs have evolved into multi-billion-dollar operations, providing quick, cheap and efficient money laundering services to transnational organised crime groups (OCGs). In some countries, such as the US, CMLOs have come to dominate the market, and their activities are growing in the UK and Europe. This paper seeks to explore the reasons why CMLOs have become so successful and how their activities have developed. It identifies that the imposition of strict capital controls by China has created a demand from wealthy Chinese individuals for ways in which they can move money out of the country to access Western currencies. CMLOs are able, for a fee, to provide this from the funds that they launder on behalf of transnational crime groups. CMLOs also take advantage of large Chinese diaspora populations both as potential clients and as part of their operations; for example, through the recruitment of “money mules” to deposit criminal proceeds into bank accounts controlled by the CMLOs. These factors, combined with OCGs’ increasing demand for “professional” money laundering services and the involvement of Chinese groups in the fentanyl drug trade, have created the perfect conditions for CMLOs to flourish. This paper goes on to apply a “state threats” lens to the activities of CMLOs, building on the work of researcher and risk consultant Matthew Redhead,1 to inform readers how countries in the West could respond to the threat. Ultimately, the research concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that the activity of CMLOs is being directed by the Chinese state. While there is evidence that Chinese money laundering schemes can, and do, involve Chinese government officials and members of the Chinese Communist Party, that is very clearly not the same as saying that the schemes are state directed. This conclusion, therefore, prompts a follow-up question, which the paper explores, as to the prospect of collaboration between the West and China in tackling CMLO activity. 

SOC ACE Research Paper 36. University of Birmingham. 2025. 34p.

By Lucia Bird | Jason Eligh,  Kingsley Madueke | Mouhamadou Kane

The proliferation of synthetic drugs across West Africa potentially represents one of the most urgent and complex public health and security challenges facing the region. In recent years, the illicit drug landscape has been fundamentally reshaped, moving away from traditional plant-based substances controlled by hierarchical criminal networks towards a fragmented, decentralized market for man-made psychoactive compounds. The harms driven by the synthetic drug market – overdoses, chronic health conditions, severe mental health conditions, community fragmentation – are escalating. Consumption, and consequences, are concentrated in the youth: in the worst-affected countries this poses a serious threat to future stability and economic development. The effects of synthetic drugs in parts of West Africa have become so severe that since 2024 two countries have declared states of emergency – an unprecedented response previously reserved for deadly epidemics and pandemics.1 This report examines the emergence and rapid expansion of this synthetic drug economy in West Africa, detailing how factors such as low barriers to entry, the convenience and anonymity afforded by the proliferation of online platforms and technology, and the minimal capital required for production have enabled a diverse array of new criminal actors to enter the trade. The subsequent influx of substances such as synthetic cannabinoids, nitazenes and other novel compounds of unknown composition, and the expansion of pre-existing synthetic drug markets such as methamphetamine, present a multifaceted threat that is rapidly outpacing the response capacity of regional governments. The breadth and depth of synthetic substance presence globally has grown enormously over the past decade. Increasingly, synthetic substances are being detected in local illicit drug markets that have no prior record of their presence, often being identified as contaminants of, or unknown substitutes for, other more traditional substances. Expanding use of synthetic opioids, particularly tramadol, tramadol derivatives (most prominently tapentadol) and nitazenes in West Africa, is a particularly alarming trend within this growing illicit drug marketplace. These substances, some vital to public health institutions for pain relief and palliative care purposes, have been responsible for a significant increase in drug-related morbidity and mortality worldwide. Their potency and availability pose unprecedented challenges to public health systems and law enforcement agencies alike.

The sheer diversity of substances being synthesized, the inability of existing surveillance systems to effectively identify many of them, and the challenge of interdicting and mitigating their harms significantly impairs the ability of health and security services to respond. Further, the intersection of synthetic drug markets with other illicit activities further complicates efforts to address these challenges effectively. Organized criminal networks leverage the profits generated from synthetic drug production, trafficking and distribution to fund their criminal operations and purchase protection, driving corruption. The report explores the mechanisms driving this rapid expansion in synthetic drug markets in West Africa, analyzing the critical roles of digital technology and globalized supply chains. It looks at how internet penetration across the region has facilitated growth in the online purchase of precursor chemicals and finished products, often from suppliers in Asia and Europe, which are smuggled into the region through difficult-to-monitor channels such as postal and courier services. The report discusses the profound economic incentives that make the synthetic drug trade so attractive, functioning as a ‘bridge’ market that allows new entrants to accumulate capital rapidly. By examining case studies and discussing market trends, the report illustrates how these dynamics have allowed synthetic drugs to capture a growing share of the retail market with alarming speed, potentially leading to devastating social and public health consequences.

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2026. 47p.

 By the United Nations: International Narcotics Control Board

Supported efforts to secure borders, strengthen trusted private sector partners and disrupt trafficking in dangerous new psychoactive substances, synthetic opioids and related chemicals by: • Exchanging, as of 2025, over 125,000 government intelligence pieces on seizures in real time, involving over 3 million trafficking signals through the IONICS suite of tools, in line with mandates in article 35, subparagraph (g), of the 1961 Convention as amended • Facilitating the action of 95 national law and regulatory enforcement agencies and six international partner organizations in Operation Zeneth, in which over 1.5 million lethal doses of nitazenes were detected and seized in 2024 • Coordinating the agencies of Kenya and Uganda in Operation African Star II, which detected 48,000 falsified, unauthorized or illicitly manufactured pharmaceutical products entering East Africa, with detection through United States law enforcement agencies, the Pulse platform of the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, the IONICS suite of tools and the Scanning of Novel Opioids on Online Platforms (SNOOP) systems and related technologies • Providing early-warning alerts to Governments, for enforcement actions, on ketamine trafficking, MDMB-INACA and related chemicals, vaping products containing new psychoactive substances, new psychoactive substances, performance-enhancing substances and 7-hydroxymitragynine • Delivering 115 INCB GRIDS Programme expert meetings and training events increasing enforcement capabilities and access to state-of-the-art tools and technologies to over 880 agencies, thereby securing borders and strengthening the resilience of communities and businesses at risk of being targeted by drug traffickers • Coordinating operational responses through its regional technical officers posted in Abuja, Almaty (Kazakhstan), Bangkok, Cairo, Mexico City and New Delhi, and at the GRIDS Cyber-Communications Centre in Vienna.........Strengthened the knowledge and capacity of national authorities1 to implement the drug control conventions by: • Delivering training on the drug control conventions to more than 1,500 officials from 160 countries in all regions by means of five e-modules and online and in-person training • Engaging Governments, international and regional organizations, and civil society actors in an ongoing dialogue on treaty implementation in the areas of the availability of controlled substances for licit purposes, supply reduction and demand reduction • Providing countries with the knowledge and capacity to implement the international drug control conventions, including through the findings and recommendations contained in the Board’s annual report and report on precursors for 2024, which were launched globally by its members, as well as its technical publications on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances • Participating in the regular session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, including in thematic discussions and in a special event to commemorate the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and launch the UNODC World Drug Report 2025, as well as in side events and an informal dialogue with the Vienna NGO Committee on Drugs held on the margins of the session, and in intersessional meetings

Vienna: UNODC, 2026. 166p.

By Jemar R. Bather, Diana Silver, Brendan P. Gill, Adrian Harris, Jin Yung Bae, Nina S. Parikh & Melody S. Goodman 

Background

Social vulnerability may play a role in social media-involved crime, but few studies have investigated this issue. We investigated associations between social vulnerability and social media-involved violent crimes.

Methods

We analyzed 22,801 violent crimes occurring between 2018 and 2023 in Prince George’s County, Maryland. Social media involvement was obtained from crime reports at the Prince George’s County Police Department. Social media application types included social networking, advertising/selling, ridesharing, dating, image/video hosting, mobile payment, instant messaging/Voice over Internet Protocol, and other. We used the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Social Vulnerability Index to assess socioeconomic status (SES), household characteristics, racial and ethnic minority status, housing type and transportation, and overall vulnerability. Modified Poisson models estimated adjusted prevalence ratios (aPRs) among the overall sample and stratified by crime type (assault and homicide, robbery, and sexual offense). Covariates included year and crime type.

Results

Relative to high tertile areas, we observed a higher prevalence of social media-involved violent crimes in areas with low SES vulnerability (aPR: 1.82, 95% CI: 1.37-2.43), low housing type and transportation vulnerability (aPR: 1.53, 95% CI: 1.17-2.02), and low overall vulnerability (aPR: 1.63, 95% CI: 1.23-2.17). Low SES vulnerability areas were significantly associated with higher prevalences of social media-involved assaults and homicides (aPR: 1.64, 95% CI: 1.02-2.62), robberies (aPR: 2.00, 95% CI: 1.28-3.12), and sexual offenses (aPR: 2.07, 95% CI: 1.02-4.19) compared to high SES vulnerability areas. Low housing type and transportation vulnerability (vs. high) was significantly associated with a higher prevalence of social media-involved robberies (aPR: 1.54, 95% CI:1.01-2.37). Modified Poisson models also indicated that low overall vulnerability areas had higher prevalences of social media-involved robberies (aPR: 1.71, 95% CI: 1.10-2.67) and sexual offenses (aPR: 2.14, 95% CI: 1.05-4.39) than high overall vulnerability areas.

Conclusions

We quantified the prevalence of social media-involved violent crimes across social vulnerability levels. These insights underscore the need for collecting incident-based social media involvement in crime reports among law enforcement agencies across the United States and internationally. Comprehensive data collection at the national and international levels provides the capacity to elucidate the relationships between neighborhoods, social media, and population health.

Inj. Epidemiol. 11, 54 (2024

By U.S. Congressional Research Service

For over a decade, the synthetic opioid fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances have been key drivers of the U.S. opioid crisis. Countering the illicit trafficking of fentanyl and the precursor chemicals ("precursors") used to make it has been a U.S. priority. In 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) first identified the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) as the main source of U.S.-bound fentanyl and fentanyl precursors. Since the PRC imposed domestic controls on fentanyl-related substances in 2019, which curtailed almost all direct shipments of fentanyl from China to the United States, many U.S. policymakers have shifted focus. Their chief concern today is the role of China—the global leader in chemical sales—as the primary source of precursors used by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to synthesize fentanyl and its analogues in third countries (chiefly Mexico). Congress has sought to address China's shifting role in the illicit drug trade, including through provisions in the BUST Fentanyl Act in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2026.

By the U.K. Ministry of Justice and Department of Health & Social Care

1 In April 2025, approximately 40,000 people in prisons in England and Wales (50%) had an identified drug problem. Misuse of illicit drugs by people in prison creates or exacerbates risks to their health, well-being and personal safety. Between December 2022 and December 2024, the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman investigated 833 deaths, of which 136 (16%) were drug-related. Conveyance, supply and use of illicit drugs also increase risks to the safety and stability of the prison regime. Availability of drugs inside prisons creates an illicit economy that can fuel debt, which can lead to assault, extortion or self-harm. Prisoners who are using illicit drugs often reoffend after leaving prison. 2 Effective interventions require HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and health service providers, commissioned for prisons in England by NHS England (NHSE), to work closely together. • HMPPS is primarily responsible for action to detect illicit drugs and prevent their conveyance into prisons, and it also seeks to reduce demand for drugs through initiatives to encourage positive behaviour changes. • Health service providers deliver drug treatment and recovery services inside prisons. • The overall prison environment can support prisoners by providing a rehabilitative culture; education and other purposeful activities; building relationships; delivering a safe regime; and facilitating access to health interventions, including addressing mental health needs. Focus of our report 3 This report focuses on how the prison and health services are using public funds to tackle drug harms in prisons. It examines: • how well the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), HMPPS, Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC), NHSE and wider government understand the scale and nature of drug harms in prisons (Part One); • the funding available for HMPPS and NHSE to tackle drug harms in prisons, and how resources are prioritised (Part Two); and • how effectively resources have been used and how well the prison and health services work together (Part Three).4 The report focuses only on illicit drug harms in prisons. We do not cover national and international work by the police and others to counter criminal activity supplying drugs to prisons, nor do we review interventions for people on community orders or the continuity of drug treatment services for prison leavers. ‘Substance misuse’ is a broader term often used in healthcare, which includes misuse of alcohol and diversion of prescription medicines, as well as illicit drugs. We touch on these broader issues where relevant, but they are not the focus of our report. While HMPPS is responsible for prisons in England and Wales, healthcare in Wales is a devolved function provided by NHS Wales, and therefore falls outside the scope of this report

By Cole Jurecka; Joella Adams; Pranav Padmanabhan; Jason Glanz; Paul Christine; Xiaoyu Guan; Danielle Kline; Ingrid Binswanger; Joshua Barocas

In 2022, Colorado passed legislation making possession of small amounts of fentanyl, a high-potency synthetic opioid, a felony. Whether the Colorado law affected opioid overdose fatalities and whether those effects differed by racial and ethnic subgroups is unknown. OBJECTIVE To estimate the association between the change in criminal penalties for fentanyl possession with opioid-related overdose deaths (OODs) in Colorado. DESIGN, SETTING, AND POPULATION Serial cross-sectional study comparing OODs among adults (18 years) who died of an overdose and population estimates before and after Colorado House Bill (HB) 22-1326 was enacted in July 2022 (January 2018-November 2023) using autoregressive integrated moving averages (ARIMA) model time series forecasting. Monthly OOD rates per 100 000 residents were calculated using state population estimates from the American Community Survey 5-Year Data and the Colorado Department of Local Affairs State Demography Office. Overdose death rates were calculated separately by racial and ethnic group (Hispanic, non-Hispanic Black, and non-Hispanic White). Data were analyzed from January 2018 to 2023. EXPOSURE Enactment of HB 22-1326 changed the legal penalty for possession of any drug weighing 1 g to 4 g that contained any amount of fentanyl from a misdemeanor to a level-4 drug felony punishable by up to 180 days in jail and up to 2 years of probation. MAIN OUTCOME The difference between expected and observed OOD rates following the enactment of increased criminal penalties. RESULTS A total of 7099 OODs were analyzed (1798 Hispanic [25.3%], 451 Non-Hispanic Black [6.4%], and 4170 Non-Hispanic White [58.7%], 680 other [9.5%] and not included in the race and ethnicity categories). OODs increased across the study period in Colorado from 20.46 per 100 000 adults in January 2018 to 37.78 per 100 000 adults in November 2023. Among different racial and ethnic groups, the non-Hispanic Black population had the highest increase in OODs (9.3 per 100 000 in 2018 to 56.9 per 100 000 in 2023) followed by the Hispanic population. There was no difference between the observed and expect overdose deaths for the overall population following the enactment of HB 22-1326. However, there were significant increases in 4 of 13 months after policy implementation among the non-Hispanic Black population CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The results of this serial cross-sectional study suggest that increased criminal penalties for fentanyl possession did not change preexisting trends of OODs in Colorado and may have been associated with an increase in opioid overdoses in the Black population.

By Kim Barnett, Noor Butt, Rosie Allen, Pauline Goodlad, Anne Krayer, Adam O'Neill, et al.

Background: With a rising prison population, a substantial portion of whom are identified as substance misusers, it is important to understand the availability of treatment pathways, their successes and areas for improvement. Given the likelyimportance of national factors in criminal justice and substance use service provision, we chose to focus on one country.Aim: To review substance misuse treatment and outcomes for such treatments as implemented in British prisons for men.Methods: We conducted a mixed‐methods systematic review, searching Ovid MEDLINE, Ovid Embase, APA PsycINFO,CINAHL Plus, Sociology Collection, Web of Science Core Collection and Social Science Premium Collection between 1 January2000 and 5 June 2024. Included were empirical, peer‐reviewed studies of processes and outcomes of UK male prison‐basedsubstance misuse programmes. Primary outcomes included changes in substance use, withdrawal symptoms and experiencesof interventions, whereas secondary outcomes encompassed quality of life, locus of control and mental health. Because of studydesign heterogeneity, meta‐analysis was not possible. Analysis followed JBI methodology with a convergent synthesis.Results: Fourteen studies were included: 8 qualitative, 5 quantitative studies of which 3 were randomised control trials (RCTs)and 1 mixed‐methods study, with a combined sample of 4037 participants engaged in opioid substitute treatment (OST) and/orpsychosocial interventions. Four key themes emerged: the power of purposeful activity, strengthening support systems, bridgingpatient needs with treatment plans and, for those in opiate programmes, experiences and engagement with opioid substitutiontreatments.Conclusions: Participants articulated diverse treatment needs, highlighting the necessity of individualised and tailoredreduction or maintenance plans. Treatment requires a comprehensive approach with the aim of facilitating effective socialintegration.

By Caroline Shubel , Mary Ava Nunnery , Grace Marley, Bayla Ostrach , Delesha M. Carpenter

Background: Methadone, an evidence-based medication for opioid use disorder (MOUD), is available through prescription at community pharmacies in countries like Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, but not in the United States (U.S.). The objective of this scoping review was to summarize barriers and facilitators related to dispensing methadone in community pharmacies to inform future implementation efforts in the U.S. Methods: A scoping review was conducted using PubMed, Embase, SCOPUS, and CINAHL. Original research articles related to barriers and/or facilitators around community pharmacy-based methadone dispensing were included. No search limits (year of publication, geographic boundaries) were applied to the search strategy. Two independent researchers screened all articles for eligibility, extracted data, and met to reach consensus. Data were extracted on 12 items, with a particular focus on barriers and facilitators to dispensing methadone in community pharmacies. Results: Forty-one articles were included in the review. The most common barriers to methadone dispensing were workload (n = 14), safety concerns for staff and property (n = 13), concern about patient behavior and interactions (n = 12), financial hardship (for pharmacists and patients) (n = 11), and stigma and discrimination towards patients (n = 11). The most common facilitators were pharmacist training and education (n = 14), positive pharmacist-patient relationships (n = 14), and privacy (n = 10). Conclusions: The findings from this review can be used to address barriers and incorporate known facilitators into future protocols or practice of pharmacy-based methadone dispensing. Further research is needed to identify U.S. and state-specific anticipated needs for pharmacy-based methadone dispensing

:Drug Alcohol Depend Rep. 2026 Jan 29;18:100413. doi: 10.1016/j.dadr.2026.100413. PMID: 41695144; PMCID: PMC12906019

By Andrew P. Bontemps, Elizabeth S. Hawes, Bailey E. Pridgen, William P. Wagner, Dominique Black, Karen L. Cropsey

Background:Cannabis use has increased in the United States as legalization has spread. While Δ-9 THC remains the most-used federally illegal substance, use of other psychoactive hemp-derived products (Δ-8 THC, Δ-10 THC, HHC, THC-O) has grown. The current study investigated patterns of cannabis use and perceptions of harm and benefit of cannabis across states with differing cannabis laws.

Method

Participants (N=639) were adults endorsing past-90-day cannabis use who lived in one of 15 states selected based on cannabis laws (recreational use, medical use, illegal). Participants completed self-report questionnaires endorsing types of cannabis used, methods of consuming and acquiring cannabis, and ranking of potential harm and benefit of consumption methods.

Results

The majority (N=573; 89.7% of participants) endorsed past-30-day use of Δ-9 THC, regardless of legal status. There was significantly greater use of alternate cannabis forms in states where Δ-9 THC remains illegal (past-90-day: χ2(2)=16.78, p<.001; past-30-day: χ2(2)=9.50, p=.009). Individuals from states with legal recreational cannabis most frequently purchased cannabis legally (52.0%), but high levels of non-legal purchase existed regardless of legal status (47.5%). Participants reported primarily consuming Δ-9 THC through smoking (86.1%), CBD through ingestion (50.5%), and alternative cannabis types through vaping (43.8-57.7%). Average harm rankings were lower for smoking if it was the primary method of consumption.

Conclusions

Individuals purchased and consumed cannabis regardless of legal status and legal status was not significantly associated with harm or benefit rating, controlling for demographic and use data. Individuals appear more likely to purchase through legal means, if available.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports

Available online 14 March 2026, 100431

Bt Hope M. Smiley-McDonald,  Esther O. Chung , Lynn D. Wenger, Danielle Good , Gillian Leichtling c, Barrot H. Lambdin , Alex H. Kral 

Background

In 2020, the U.S. state of Oregon passed Measure 110 (M110), which aimed to address substance use disorder as a public health issue and reduce disparities in the criminal legal system by decriminalizing personal drug possession and increasing services. The impact of partial drug decriminalization on individuals under community supervision—whose release conditions often prohibit drug use and who M110 excluded—is understudied.

Methods

We used targeted sampling to recruit and survey people who use drugs (PWUD; N=468) in eight Oregon counties in 2023. We compared PWUD under community supervision to those who were not to assess opioid-related overdose, naloxone access, and law enforcement engagement.

Results

Compared to PWUD who were not under community supervision, those under supervision had higher prevalence of past year opioid-related overdose. There were no differences by naloxone access. Eighty-two percent (82%) of PWUD on community supervision were stopped by law enforcement in the past year. PWUD on community supervision were more likely than those not on community supervision to report in the past year being searched by law enforcement at least once (adjusted prevalence differences [APD]=0.33; 95% CI: 0.23, 0.43), spent time in jail at least once (APD=0.33; 95% CI: 0.23, 0.43), and to have concerns about getting into trouble if they called 911 for a drug-related health problem (APD=0.12; 95% CI: 0.00, 0.18).

Conclusion

Under M110, Oregon PWUD experienced more police engagement and overdoses. Findings have implications for less police presence at overdose scenes, greater access to naloxone and support services, and protections under future decriminalization laws.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports

Available online 15 March 2026, 100430

In Press, Journal Pre-proof

By Lisa N. Sacco, Joanna R. Lampe, Hassan Z. Sheikh

Marijuana is a psychoactive drug that generally consists of leaves and flowers of the cannabis sativa plant. It is a Schedule I controlled substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA; 21 U.S.C. §§801 et seq.), and thus is strictly regulated by federal authorities. In contrast, over the last several decades, most states and territories have deviated from a comprehensive prohibition of marijuana and have laws and policies allowing for some cultivation, sale, distribution, and possession of marijuana.

Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. According to data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), in 2024 an estimated 64.2 million individuals aged 12 or older used marijuana in the past year, and 44.3 million reported using it in the past month. The percentage of individuals 12 or older who reported past-month marijuana use gradually increased from 6.1% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024—a time frame during which a majority of states repealed state criminal prohibitions on marijuana and allowed for its recreational and/or medical use. The rate of past-month marijuana use among youth (ages 12-17) was 6.0% in 2024 and since 2008 has fluctuated from a low of 6.0% (in 2023 and 2024) to a high of 7.9% (in 2011), while adult (ages 18+) use steadily increased—from 6.3% in 2008 to 16.3% in 2024.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service; March 10, 2026.

By Matthew F. Garnett, Jodi A. Cisewski, Farida B. Ahmad

Objective:

This report identifies the specific drugs most frequently involved in drug overdose deaths in the United States from 2017 through 2023.

Methods:

Data from the 2017–2023 National Vital Statistics System mortality files were linked to literal text data from death certificates. Drug overdose deaths were identified using the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision underlying cause-of-death codes X40–X44, X60–X64, X85, and Y10–Y14. Specific drugs were identified by searching three literal text fields of the death certificate: the causes of death from Part I, significant conditions contributing to death from Part II, and the description of how the injury occurred. Contextual information was used to determine drug involvement in the death. Descriptive statistics were calculated for the most frequently mentioned drugs involved in drug overdose deaths. Deaths involving multiple drugs were counted in all relevant drug categories.

Results:

Among drug overdose deaths with mention of at least one specific drug, the most frequently mentioned drugs during 2017–2023 included: fentanyl, heroin, oxycodone, morphine, methadone, hydrocodone, alprazolam, diphenhydramine, cocaine, methamphetamine, amphetamine, gabapentin, and xylazine. Fentanyl ranked first across all years and was the most common concomitant drug found with other top drugs, ranging from 99.0% of xylazine-involved drug overdose deaths to 48.3% of oxycodone-involved drug overdose deaths. Cocaine and methamphetamine were also frequent concomitant drugs. Trends in age-adjusted rates across the 2017 to 2023 period varied by drug, but notably the rate for heroin-involved deaths sharply declined, while the rate for fentanyl-involved deaths increased and then stabilized between 2022 and 2023. In 2023, the most frequently mentioned drugs in unintentional drug overdose deaths were fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine, while the most frequently mentioned drugs for suicide-related drug overdoses were diphenhydramine, oxycodone, and bupropion.

Conclusions:

This report identifies patterns in the specific drugs most frequently involved in drug overdose deaths from 2017 through 2023.National Vital Statistics Reports; CDC National Center for Health Statistics; 2026.

By lBenedikt Fischer,  Didier Jutras-Aswad, Bernard Le Foll, Daniel T. Myra

Highlights

•

The province of British Columbia (Canada) temporarily implemented a decriminalization initiative for personal drug possession/use (2023–2024) in contexts of a toxic drug death crisis.

1. •

   The decriminalization initiative was a priori promoted as a “tool to end the overdose crisis” and widely expected to reduce adverse health outcomes from toxic drug use.

2. •

   Emerging evaluation data indicate that the drug decriminalization initiative was not associated with population-level changes in drug use-related mortality (e.g., overdose deaths) or morbidity (e.g., hospitalizations).

3. •

   Drug use decriminalization remains an essential step to align prohibition-based drug policy frameworks with public health and human rights principles, but must be approached realistically and designed sensibly.

4. •

   To tangibly address toxic drug use-related harms, expanded measures are required that are effectively capable of preventing and reducing PWUDs’ exposure to and use of toxic drugs
   International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 150, April 2026, 105181

By the U.K.Ministry of Justice, and the Office of Health Improvement and Disparities

Executive Summary This report presents follow-up analysis building on Pathways between probation and addiction treatment in England: report - GOV.UK focusing on people sentenced to community orders (COs) and suspended sentence orders (SSOs) with an Alcohol Treatment Requirement (ATR) or Drug Rehabilitation Requirement (DRR). It examines engagement with alcohol and drug treatment, how engagement relates to reconvictions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395926000332 outcomes, and their characteristics. The analysis covers all ATRs and DRRs issued between August 2018 and March 2023. The study linked probation case management records with the National Drug Treatment Monitoring System (NDTMS) using probabilistic data linkage. This was supplemented by Natural Language Processing (NLP) analysis of probation contact notes. This approach aimed to assess whether the absence of ATRs and DRRs in structured treatment data reflected a true lack of treatment or gaps in data linkage. A total of 45,943 ATR and DRR requirements were issued during the period. Of these, 22,636 were linked to structured treatment through data linkage. The NLP approach derived an engagement rate from the unlinked sample. This was then applied to all unlinked records, resulting in an estimated 18,712 requirements with evidence of treatment engagement. Key Findings 1. Up to 90%1 of ATRs and DRRs were estimated to involve some form of treatment engagement. This is based on 49% linked to structured treatment through probabilistic data linking and an additional 41% of unlinked records showing treatment engagement in probation contact notes. Engagement was estimated to be higher for ATRs (93%) than for DRRs (88%). 2. Reconviction was less common following ATRs and DRRs linked to structured treatment. Within 12 months of sentencing, 36% of those linked to structured treatment were reconvicted, compared with 44% of those not linked to structured treatment. 

3. Characteristics associated with being more likely to be linked to structured treatment included being: • aged over 50 • female • in settled accommodation, (least likely when associated with rough sleeping) • engaged by treatment services within: 

▪ 3 weeks of an ATR, ▪ 3–6 weeks of a DRR 4. Reconviction outcomes varied by treatment outcome: • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs were lowest when they remained in structured treatment at the end of the observation period (13% for ATR; 26% for DRR). • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs were highest when they dropped out of structured treatment (41% for ATR; 60% for DRR). • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs that were not identified in structured treatment were higher than completed or remained in structured treatment but lower than those that dropped out of structured treatment (37% for ATR; 51% for DRR). Conclusion The analysis shows clear associations between treatment engagement and both individual characteristics and justice system factors. Individuals with ATRs and DRRs who completed or remained in structured treatment had better reconviction outcomes than those who dropped out of or had no identified structured treatment. This highlights the value of sustained engagement. The report also demonstrates the value of AI based NLP methods to strengthen insight by identifying treatment activity not captured through data linkage alone.

London: U.K. Ministry of Justice and the Office of Health Improvement and Disparities, 2026. 47p.

By Laurie Caron, Frank Crispino and Cyril Muehlethaler

Tobacco smuggling remains a widespread illegal activity in Canada, associated with important social and economic impacts, and often linked to organized crime. This study explores the application of forensic profiling as an intelligence tool to support the analysis of contraband cigarette production and distribution. Physical and chemical manufacturing characteristics of seized contraband cigarette packs, provided by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), were observed and coded using macroscopic, microscopic, and spectroscopic techniques. Multivariate statistical analyses were then conducted to compare manufacturing characteristics between packs and identify potential links. The analyses highlighted links between cigarette packs and seizures based on shared manufacturing characteristics. The results and the identified groups were also compared with seizure data provided by the CBSA. The results demonstrate the relevance of forensic profiling to formulate hypotheses regarding shared production processes or supply networks. These hypotheses provide information that contributes to understanding tobacco smuggling and aim to examine how forensic intelligence can support law enforcement and measures to prevent and disrupt this criminal activity. A preliminary optimal procedure for applying forensic profiling in operational contexts targeting contraband tobacco was finally proposed. Despite limitations in the dataset creation that were beyond our control, this study represents a starting point for applying this scientific approach to tobacco smuggling

By The Laboratory and Scientific Services
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 

The scientific evaluation of substances for inclusion in international and most national legislations requires an assessment of a range of chemical, pharmacological, and toxicological properties of a substance. Also, for many of the NPS that have emerged, quality comparable scientific data on these properties are either scarce or do not exist. The aim of these UNODC guidelines is to support Member States in the generation of quality scientific data on key pharmacological properties used in the scientific evaluation of substances, specifically the determination of the abuse and dependence potential of NPS. Given the continued emergence of highly potent synthetic opioids in recent years, this guideline will focus on synthetic opioids and future volumes will contain information on other groups of NPS.

Vienna: UNODC< 2025. 58p.