By International Justice Mission (IJM) in partnership with the U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office) and the Philippine InterAgency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT)

Online Sexual Exploitation of Children (OSEC) is a complex hidden crime that is particularly challenging for the global community to measure and address. The lack of global OSEC data, the inconsistency in data collection, sharing and analysis across agencies, and the complexity of internet-facilitated crimes has made it almost impossible to accurately study and understand this crime. Yet, accurate information about its nature and scale is critical for informing and measuring the impact of stakeholder interventions to protect vulnerable children from ongoing exploitation and more effectively prevent this crime. To both set a baseline of the existing global data and catalyze future research efforts, International Justice Mission (IJM) brought together leading agencies from across multiple disciplines as well as research experts to collaboratively take on this challenge: examine existing data sources and research methodologies in order to provide meaningful information about this crime that would be valuable for understanding its scale as well as informing interventions to combat it. This report presents the results of a 2019 study into the nature and scale of OSEC in the Philippines. This study was led by IJM, in partnership with the Philippine Government and a variety of stakeholders, under the U.S.-Philippine Child Protection Compact (CPC) Partnership between the U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons and the Government of the Philippines. IJM is grateful for the extraordinary participation of the 15 partners representing governments, law enforcement, researchers, and non-governmental organizations, who generously shared their data and case histories, consulted on study methodology, and shared their expertise in the implementation and review of this study. This collaboration sets a strong foundation for future efforts to more effectively study and combat this global and local crime. For the purposes of this study, OSEC is defined as the production, for the purpose of online publication or transmission, of visual depictions (e.g., photos, videos, live streaming) of the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor for a third party who is not in the physical presence of the victim, in exchange for compensation.

Washington DC: International Justice Mission, 2020. 164p.

By The Youth Justice Board (UK)

Key findings The Serious Incident Annual Report provides a comprehensive overview of 438 serious incidents notified to the Youth Justice Board (YJB) in 2023-24 and the 546 children involved, highlighting key themes and recommendations. Whilst serious incident reporting has been mandatory for youth justice services (YJSs) since April 2022, this is the first year of published findings. A summary of the key findings is below. Whilst there are limitations to this data (please see section 2.1 Data Limitations), this report underscores the importance of addressing exploitation, knife crime, and the vulnerabilities of children with special educational needs or who are neurodivergent. It also highlights the need for timely, effective interventions which address underlying causes, and support to prevent children from being involved in serious incidents. To learn more about the notification process itself, please see the Serious incidents notification: standard operating procedures for YJSs - GOV.UK Criminal exploitation • 41% of all children notified were said to be gang affiliated, criminally exploited, or involved with the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) process1; 42% of all boys and 29% of all girls. • 20% of all children notified had exploitation concerns identified relating to the charge, of these; 58% an NRM referral was due to be made and 42% had a previous NRM referral but were awaiting a decision. Offence types • 55% of all notifications were for Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH), 16% for Rape, 13% for Murder/Manslaughter, 9% Attempted Murder and 3% Terrorism offences. • 56% of incidents notified were knife/blade enabled. • 92% of Attempted Murder notifications indicated there was knife or blade involvement, 84% of Murder/Manslaughter, and 62% of Grievous Bodily Harm incidents. • Rape charges increased from 8-13% of overall notifications when compared to the previous year. Contact with services • 36% of all children charged were under the supervision of a youth justice service at the time of the incident. • 24% were not known to YJSs, nor were they engaged in support from any other local authority service at the time of the incident. • 49% of children notified had no previous cautions and convictions, increasing to 92% for children charged with terrorism offences. • 71% of children notified for murder were not supervised by a youth justice service at the time of the incident, but were known to other agencies, social care, education, health. • 63% had some kind of previous contact with a local authority or Children and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS), of these 24% were engaged with both the youth justice service and one or more other services at the time of the incident. Safeguarding and vulnerabilities • Of the 63% who had some kind of previous contact with a local authority or CAMHS service; o 29% were identified as Children in Need or in Wales, Children with care and support needs o 19% were subject of a Child Protection Plan o 27% were in the care of the local authority as a looked after child, with 48% of these reported to have gang involvement and/or exploitation concerns. • 23% of children reported had identified Special Educational Needs, in Wales Additional Learning Needs/Neurodiversity. Of these; • 19% had an Education Health Care Plan (EHCP) or in Wales Individual Development Plans • 48% were diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) or Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) • 53% reported risks associated with exploitation. • 43% of children notified due to their death whilst under the supervision of the youth justice service were victims of murder and 19% died by suicide. Demographics and over-representation • 96% of the children notified were boys • 68% of the children notified were 16-17 years old; 99% of these were boys. • 48% of all children notified were from ethnic minority backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (27%) • 17% of children reported were from Black backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (6%) • 17% of children reported were from Mixed backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (6%) Timeliness of investigations and decision making • Rape offences took the longest from offence to charge, averaging 380 days, followed by terrorism offences at 230 days. • 32% of all incidents took longer than 180 days from offence to charge. • 17% of children notified were reported as being on bail for another matter at the time of the incident.

London: YJB, 2025. 38p.

By Sara T. Thompson

Banditry is a current problem in Nigeria. Historically, banditry has been a problem around the world. A review of the trends of banditry can help to identify and understand patterns that are present related to such criminal activity. To further understand and analyze this problem, this paper outlines the methodology for the systematic collection and creation of one major dataset that provides detailed information about bandit attacks in Nigeria. A review of around 1200 publications from peer-reviewed journals, news articles, and other relevant publications containing information about bandit attacks in Nigeria resulted in a dataset containing a sample of almost 1000 bandit attacks over the course of a decade in Nigeria. Upon analysis of this dataset, there are spatial concentrations related to where bandit attacks occurred as well as the identifcation of common types of bandit attacks. This paper concludes with recommendations for future research.

Security Journal, 2025, 17p.

By Anna Stenkamp, Joanna Weill, and Michael Rempel

This report examines how New York’s 2020 discovery reform law has been implemented across New York City, the four downstate suburban counties (Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, and Rockland), and the 53 remaining “upstate” counties. The law was designed to increase fairness in the criminal legal process by requiring prosecutors to exercise early sharing of evidence to the defense. Prosecutors must file a Certificate of Compliance (COC) within 20 or 35 days of arraignment (depending on whether a person is held pretrial or released), with a possible 30-day extension. This report evaluates whether the law has contributed to more case dismissals and whether case processing times have changed. In a first-ever analysis, this report also examines prosecutors’ compliance with the reform’s legal timelines for sharing evidence.

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice at John Jay College, 2025. 37p.

By Michael Picard and Colby Goodman

As armed conflicts surge and organised crime activity rises, a new report from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) and Transparency International US (TI-US) reveals how corruption is quietly but consistently enabling weapons to fall into the wrong hands.

Under the Radar: Corruption’s Role in Fueling Arms Diversion investigates over 400 cases of diversion across 70 countries and shows how corruption, including bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of authority, serves as a key enabler of illicit arms flows.

The report’s release comes at a time of intensifying global concern over weapons diversion. It shows how corruption-fuelled diversion has empowered organised crime, fuelled armed conflict and violence, weakened military effectiveness, and undermined governance and security around the world.

“Despite greater recognition of corruption’s corrosive effect on arms control policies, corruption has often been sidelined in efforts to assess risks of arms diversion like a detective ignoring key clues in a recurring crime,” said Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher at TI US and TI-DS and one of the report’s authors. “Some states’ actions in recent years to add corruption risk assessments are a critical first step to better tackling this global scourge.”

The report provides critical information and tools for states to help identify and mitigate corruption-fuelled arms diversion as they develop new national arms control policies and engage in ongoing discussions within the United Nations on curbing arms diversion.

“The vast amounts of weapons diverted to terrorist groups in the past war on terror is a stark reminder of what happens when governments lose sight of corruption risks in the name of national security,” said Dr. Francesca Grandi, Head of Advocacy at Transparency International Defence & Security. “As demand for arms imports grows amid increasing global insecurity, this report offers practical and effective tools for arms exporting countries to strengthen integrity in their export control systems. It should also help spark more serious conversations globally, at the United Nations and in other fora, about sharing corruption-related information to prevent arms diversion.”

Some of the reports key findings include:

• The theft or embezzlement of state-owned weapons for private gain is the most common type of corruption-fuelled diversion, accounting for over 350 cases. Bribery and abuse of authority remain a serious concern for diversion.

• Corruption facilitates diversion at each stage of a weapon’s lifecycle, including production, international transfers, active use and storage, and disposal. The active use and storage stage had the most corruption-fuelled diversion cases followed by the disposal, international transfer, and production stages.

• Many of the corruption-fuelled diversion cases resulted in devastating consequences for civilians. In more than 200 cases, military or security personnel reportedly colluded with illicit actors, such as insurgents or terrorists, in connection with arms diversion, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries.

To address this urgent issue, the report offers key analysis and recommendations for states engaged in arms exports and imports:

• Strengthen national policies by explicitly identifying corruption as a key risk for arms diversion and developing implementation guidelines that incorporate targeted risk assessment questions that measure key, often overlooked defence and security institutional controls.

• Improve international collaboration on corruption in arms transfers by sharing information on corruption risks in arms transfers within the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) framework and establishing working groups within the ATT and other multilateral for deeper discussions on the topic.

• Support research and foreign aid to curb corruption-fuelled arms diversion, including funding studies on related issues and efforts to strengthen the integrity of defence and security institutions.

London: Transparency International, 2025. 50p.

By Sierra Smucker, Jirka Taylor, Ivy Todd, Emily Hoch, Monique Martineau, Deven Clark, Meagan E. Cahill, Esther M. Friedman

s the number of older adults in the United States increases, there will be a corresponding increase in the need for services to prevent elder abuse and intervene in cases where it has already occurred. However, there are a limited number of evidence-based interventions to support victims of elder abuse. To encourage the rigorous evaluation of one intervention—Elder Abuse Shelters (EASs)—RAND researchers developed three research designs and assessed the preparedness of the well-established Weinberg Center's EAS in New York to undertake them. Researchers found that the Weinberg Center's EAS is well established, and the program model was organizationally and programmatically ready to be evaluated, though data collection practices should be strengthened before implementing the suggested evaluation designs. These evaluation designs could be generalized and implemented at EASs across the country as the number of shelters continues to grow.

Key Findings

The Weinberg Center's client numbers have fluctuated over time but are typically between 16 and 34 per year. Clients mostly identify as women, are ethnically and racially diverse, and are from the New York City area. Many clients have cognitive impairment and limited financial resources.

The COVID-19 pandemic corresponded with a decrease in the number of clients by decreasing potential clients' desire to stay in long-term care facilities and increasing turnover in referring agencies.

The Weinberg Center has a clear program logic model that connects inputs and outputs with measurable short- and long-term outcomes.

Organizationally and programmatically, the Center is ready to embark on an evaluation, with scores of 77 and 84 percent, respectively, in those areas of the evaluability assessment.

However, a low score for evaluation readiness of 43 percent, driven largely by currently insufficient data collection processes, indicates that the Center would need to strengthen its data collection capacity to complete a rigorous evaluation.

Three evaluation designs could help the Weinberg Center's EAS and other EAS models rigorously evaluate its impact: (1) a quasi-experimental design using non-random self-selection into the program, (2) a propensity score matching design that pairs clients with Adult Protective Services, and (3) a robust pre- and post-evaluation design.

When conducting an evaluation of an EAS, researchers must consider equity, data safety, and consent. The experience of elder abuse and the tools needed to help someone heal will differ across individuals depending on their background and cultural expectations.

Recommendation

Because the Weinberg Center is largely ready to embark on an evaluation, its leadership should review the proposed designs and consult with partners and potential evaluation teams as needed to decide how to proceed. Federal and state partners interested in protecting victims of elder abuse should consider funding one of these evaluation designs to determine whether EASs should be supported and encouraged to proliferate as the population ages.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023, 77p.

By Emily Grant, Lena Dechert

Wyoming is home to a little over 16,000 Indigenous residents, who make up nearly 3% of the state's population. However, Indigenous people in Wyoming continue to experience disproportionately high rates of homicide and disappearances compared to White residents. This means they go missing and are killed more often than their population size alone would predict. The Wyoming Missing and Murdered Indigenous Persons (MMIP) Task Force is dedicated to tracking and sharing data on these cases. This fifth-annual publication includes the latest available information on Indigenous homicide victims and missing persons in Wyoming, along with updates on efforts to improve law enforcement protocols for missing person cases.

Laramie: Wyoming Survey & Analysis Center, University of Wyomingm 2025. 7p.

By Emily Grant, Lena Dechert, Laurel Wimbish, Andria Blackwood

HOMICIDE 105 Indigenous people (34 females, 71 males) were victims of homicide between 2000 and 2020. Indigenous homicide victims were 21% of the total homicide victims in Wyoming between 2000 and 2020. Between 2010 and 2019, the homicide rate per 100,000 for Indigenous people was 26.8, eight times higher than the homicide rate for White people. The homicide rate for Indigenous females was 15.3 per 100,000, 6.4 times higher than the homicide rate for White females. MISSING Between 2011 and September 2020, 710 Indigenous persons were reported missing. Some Indigenous people were reported missing more than once during the time period, resulting in a total of 1,254 missing person records for Indigenous people. Eighty-five percent were juvenile, and 57% were female. They were reported missing from 22 counties in Wyoming. Ten percent of missing Indigenous people are found within the same day they are reported missing, 50% are found within one week. One-fifth of the Indigenous people reported missing were missing for 30 or more days, which is a higher percentage than White people missing for 30 or more days (11%). Currently, 10 Indigenous people are listed as missing (3 females and 7 males). MEDIA COVERAGE Only 30% of Indigenous homicide victims had newspaper media coverage, as compared to 51% of White homicide victims. Indigenous female homicide victims had the least amount of newspaper media coverage (18%). MEDIA PORTRAYAL The newspaper articles for Indigenous homicide victims were more likely to contain violent language, portray the victim in a negative light, a nd provide less information as compared to articles about White homicide victim COMMUNITY BARRIERS Lack of trust in law enforcement and the judicial system, no single point of contact during an investigation, and lack of information during the investigation and after the final outcome were seen as barriers in the community related to the reporting and response to MMIP. RECOMMENDATIONS Develop consistent protocols and data systems for MMIPs to inform both law enforcement and families. Pay particular attention to documenting tribal affiliation in official records, coroner reports, and vital records. Create an Indigenous advocacy position/response team to help families navigate the reporting and investigation process. The advocate can serve as a communication point person, helping to reduce the emotional burden for families of repeating incident details to multiple agencies. Raise community awareness about the prevalence of MMIP, contributing risk and protective factors, and available resources. Distribute a list of community resources and efforts

Laramie: Wyoming Survey & Analysis Center University of Wyoming , 2021. 51p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is proud to release a practical resource designed to empower law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and stakeholders in tackling cryptocurrency-related crimes. The guide "Decoding Crypto Crime: A Guide for Law Enforcement" simplifies complex concepts like blockchain technology and virtual assets, offering best practices for investigating common crypto crimes such as investment scams, extortion, and phishing.

It provides actionable steps for collecting critical evidence, interacting with Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), and utilizing blockchain analytics tools. Recognizing the challenges victims face, the guide also offers support strategies and emphasizes the importance of cross-jurisdictional collaboration. While not exhaustive, this guide serves as a foundational tool to bridge the knowledge gap and enhance law enforcement’s ability to navigate the rapidly evolving world of crypto crime. Download the guide today to strengthen your capacity to combat digital financial crime and ensure a safer digital landscape.

Prague: OSCE, 2025. 64p.

By The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)

Introduction The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) has developed 13 indicators on intimate partner violence and domestic violence to guide the data collection efforts of the police and the justice sector. EIGE’s indicators support EU Member States to measure intimate partner violence and domestic violence and to assess the progress made to combat and monitor these forms of violence. Ultimately, the indicators enhance the comparability of national administrative data on intimate partner and domestic violence in alignment with the minimum requirements of Directive (EU) 2024/1385 on combating violence against women and domestic violence; Directive 2012/29/EU on establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime; and the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention). Between 2018 and 2020, EIGE used the 13 indicators to measure intimate partner violence across the EU. Between 2021 and 2022, EIGE revised and simplified the 13 indicators, the data collection tool used to populate the indicators and the data collection methodology. Between 2023 and 2024, EIGE conducted a new EU-wide data collection exercise to measure intimate partner violence and domestic violence using the updated indicators, data collection tool and methodology. This document describes the methodological approach for the 2023–2024 data collection exercise. The structure of this report is as follows. • The following section provides an overview of EIGE’s data collection exercise, indicators and data collection tool and provides general methodological details. • The remaining sections provide indicator-specific details on the methodological approach used to collect data on EIGE’s 13 indicators on intimate partner violence and domestic violence. • The annexes present mapping tables with further information on the availability and comparability of the data collected, and the sources of the data.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025, 152p.

By The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

This report presents the findings of research conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on existing child protection systems across all EU Member States. The 27 national reports, commissioned from Franet, the agency’s multidisciplinary research network, are available online on the agency’s website. These reports offer a wealth of additional data beyond what is included here. In April 2024, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child. It calls on authorities at all levels of government, civil society and other stakeholders to cooperate to protect children from violence by means of better-integrated systems. Its aim is to enforce a ‘culture of zero-tolerance for violence against children’ (recital 7) while also emphasising ‘Child protection as a global priority of the Union’ (p. 21). In developing the Recommendation, the Commission consulted children by means of the EU Children’s Participation Platform, and more than 1 000 children provided their views. Based on these data and the Commission Recommendation, this report suggests practical me

Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights ,2025. 118p.

By Marwa Alnasaa, Nikolay Gueorguiev, Jiro Honda, Eslem Imamoglu, Paolo Mauro, Keyra Primus, and Dmitriy Rozhkov 

  The emergence of crypto-assets (private digital assets that depend primarily on cryptography and distributed ledger technology for record keeping) has unleashed a plethora of financial innovation that will likely revolutionize the form of money and the ways it is used. These developments create opportunities as well as risks. As noted, for example, by a group of G-20 policymakers, “…technological innovation, including that underlying crypto-assets, has the potential to improve the efficiency and inclusiveness of the financial system and the economy more broadly,” but “crypto-assets […] raise issues with respect to consumer and investor protection, market integrity, tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing.” The pseudonymity of crypto-assets (whereby transactions require only digital identities) makes them a potential vehicle for illicit flows, including flows of proceeds from corruption. This pseudonymity is not an intrinsic feature of the underlying technology, but rather a choice made in the design and practice of most currently existing crypto-assets. Whereas cash provides full anonymity and large denomination bills have long been considered an aid for crime and tax evasion (Rogoff 2017, Chodorow-Reich et al. 2020), crypto-assets in their current form make it possible to move even larger amounts speedily and with greater ease, including across national borders (Graf von Luckner et al., 2021). As crypto-assets rapidly gain macroeconomic relevance (International Monetary Fund 2021) and policymakers consider the optimal degree of regulation, it is urgent to bring empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether crypto-assets facilitate corruption. Likewise, it is helpful to explore the extent to which crypto-assets are used to circumvent capital controls, for countries where these are in place, and whether crypto-assets are more likely to gain traction in countries where the local currency has historically not been a secure store of value. There are also potential benefits of the technologies that crypto-assets are based on. In particular, prudently designed central bank digital currencies could offer additional resilience, safety and availability with lower costs. These technologies could also be used to improve transparency and record-keeping for procurement or other payments related to government projects, thereby increasing accountability, and reducing the scope for corruption. Likewise, property and registry systems could be enhanced, reducing red tape, and streamlining processes. However, these initiatives are currently less advanced or widespread than crypto-assets. Empirical investigation of the factors underlying the growing usage of crypto-assets is in its infancy, owing to data limitations. In this paper, we present a simple cross-country analysis drawing on recently released survey-based data. We explore the correlation of crypto-asset usage with indicators of corruption, capital  controls, a history of high inflation, and other factors. We find that crypto-asset usage is significantly and positively associated with corruption and capital controls. Whereas the small sample size and uncertain quality of the data on crypto-assets implies that our results must be interpreted with caution, it is also worth recalling that measurement error tends to reduce the likelihood of finding a significant empirical association; significant results with low-quality data are thus worth paying attention to. With these caveats in mind and considering the urgency of acting before it is too late, rather than waiting for conclusive evidence, we believe that, on balance, our results add to the case for regulating crypto-assets, including know-your-customer approaches, as opposed to taking a laissez-faire stance. 

Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2022. 19p.

By Marcena Hunter and Lynda Lawson

Known for their beauty, coloured gemstones have been used in jewellery, to adorn clothing and in religious ceremonies for centuries. Fuelled by demand from jewellers and investors, the coloured gemstone sector is an international trade linking supply countries in Africa and traders in Thailand and elsewhere in Asia. Today, there are more than 50 source countries and over a hundred gemstone varieties. In 2015, a conservative estimate of the global annual market for rough coloured gemstones – the term used to describe uncut, unpolished stones – valued the sector at between US$17 billion and US$23 billion. Africa is a prominent supplier of gemstones, which are shipped across the Indian Ocean to Asia for beneficiation. Rough coloured gemstones are mined throughout Africa, largely by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) operators. Small-scaling mining will continue to be a vital source of gemstones for the international market because many gem deposits are small, which means they are short-lived and therefore not appropriate for large-scale mining operations. From Africa, the rough stones are shipped mainly to Thailand, India and Sri Lanka, which are home to long-established, traditional processing centres, and are the main global hubs for cutting and polishing stones for the global retail market. China is also expanding its market share of this industry through increasing use of machine cutting (a process traditionally done manually). Dubbed the ‘ruby trading kingdom’, Thailand is one of the world’s major processing centres for coloured gemstones. The country has been the world’s leading exporter of precious coloured gemstones for the last eight years consecutively,5 with overall exports in 2017 valued at US$1.9 billion. Thailand plays an especially prominent role in ruby and sapphire supply chains. The Thai gemstone industry is known to be heavily dependent on African rough coloured gemstones (see the map); however, official trade records fail to reflect the immense scale of the trade. This is because of the clandestine nature of flows, which are of both an informal and illegal nature. Most African coloured gemstones are moved undeclared through informal channels or are under-declared in official channels. African rough-gemstone traders play a significant role in these supply chains, and have been able to exploit their knowledge of the gemstone industry, as well as their close social and ethnic networks, to buy and export stones from Africa to Asia with ease. In Thailand it is openly acknowledged that the country’s import figures for coloured gemstones from Africa are underreported. For example, according to participants in this research, Madagascar has been an important source of sapphires and other gemstones supplying the Thai industry for over 20 years. After the discovery of brilliant-blue sapphires in the 1990s, numerous gem rushes ensued and Madagascar became the centre of the sapphire universe, but has only recently started to be included as a source country in official Thai trade records. The informal nature of the coloured-gemstone trade, combined with the inherent difficulty in valuing rough stones at the site of extraction, provides ample opportunity for criminal and corrupt actors to exploit and profit from it. This includes large-scale smuggling of stones, resulting in significant underreporting of export and trade figures. Based on Thai trade figures and estimates of authorities and stakeholders, there is a strong likelihood that hundreds of millions of dollars of coloured gemstones are smuggled annually from Africa to Thailand. According to authorities and those engaged in the trade, coloured gemstones may also be being used in money-laundering schemes.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) 2020. 56p.

By Lester Ramirez Irias

This report seeks to understand how communities in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras build and sustain their resilience to extortion, especially in light of state-led anti-extortion measures under emergency regimes in El Salvador and Honduras. It examines how community resilience manifests in environments plagued by violence and organized crime, particularly where gangs operate alongside public security forces under emergency regimes or mano dura (‘iron fist’) policies. Through six case studies, the report explores the varying contexts of community resilience, the factors contributing to its development and long-term sustainability, and the communities' capacity to absorb the impacts of criminal governance, adapt, and transform their environments. The findings reveal a shifting risk landscape for communities. Under emergency regimes, while the incidence of extortion and homicides has decreased, there has been an increase in restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms. These restrictions complicate community resilience, as the state – expected to provide public security and protect human rights – has become an enabler of impunity. The case studies highlight different forms of resilience, driven by diverse actors such as women victims of extortion, private sector organizations, and foundations promoting sports and community development. While not fully representative of each country, these case studies offer valuable insights into community resilience in high-violence and emergency contexts. Main findings § Emergency regimes have negatively impacted community resilience in El Salvador and Honduras. Each country has unique characteristics in how emergency regimes or ‘iron fist’ measures are implemented, driven by their respective governments. In El Salvador, community resilience is undermined by an emergency regime that has become entrenched as state policy, weakening communities' ability to resist and recover from threats. In Honduras, community resilience faces a dual challenge: criminal networks that once profited from extortion now operate legitimate businesses within communities, making it difficult to identify and manage threats. § Private sector-led initiatives are proving effective. Activities organized by the private sector, such as those by sugar associations in El Salvador and traders in Guatemala, have been effective in building and maintaining community resilience. The private sector’s ability to provide financial resources, along with its organization, leadership and influence over governments, has been crucial in reducing the risks posed by organized crime and transforming environments. However, as seen in the Honduras case study below, mistrust, fragmented initiatives and a highly uncertain context have hindered sustained collaboration between organized entrepreneurs and the police. § Organized sports contribute positively to community resilience. Participation in organized sports has been a key strategy for building resilience in the communities of La Bethania in Guatemala and Chamelecón in Honduras. Sports foster social cohesion by involving not only young people but also parents, coaches and other adults who serve as positive role models. It also offers young people a safe space and instils life values that extend beyond the playing field. § Corruption within the state significantly hampers resilience efforts. Corruption has a detrimental impact on the sustainability and effectiveness of community resilience initiatives. In El Salvador, for example, as extortion by gangs has decreased, police corruption has emerged as a new form of extortion. Unchecked corruption erodes public trust in institutions, allows organized crime to infiltrate state structures and excludes vulnerable groups such as women. § Sexual extortion and impunity obstruct the development of resilience. Under emergency regimes, sexual violence by state actors often receives institutional backing, with arbitrary detention threats becoming commonplace. Victims face severe psychological and social consequences, including stigma and revictimization. The normalization of sexual violence within communities exacerbates these issues, leaving women feeling unprotected and isolated. Mistrust of authorities and fear of reprisals further hinder the community’s ability to organize and respond collectively to such abuses.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 25p.

By Ana Castro

The "Strengthening Resilience Against Extortion: A Community-Led Approach in Central America" project, implemented from January to July 2024, aimed to enhance community resilience against extortion in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. This initiative, led by GI-TOC and its partners, focused on empowering local communities through research, capacity-building activities, and active dialogues, fostering collaboration among civil society, academia, and law enforcement. The project delivered several key outcomes:  Policy Brief: A comprehensive assessment of community responses to extortion under the State of Exception in the target countries. This brief provided detailed analysis and recommendations, addressing the effectiveness of community resilience over time.  Updated Manual: The existing manual on community responses against extortion was enhanced with a new chapter on Victim Support. This updated resource was used extensively in nine capacity-building workshops conducted across the three countries.  Capacity-Building Workshops: Nine workshops were held, three in each country, training a total of 233 participants (157 females, 76 males). These workshops aimed to deepen the understanding of community responses to extortion and strengthen local capacities.  Resilience Dialogues: Four virtual and one in-person meeting facilitated active dialogue among stakeholders. These dialogues led to the development of three anti-extortion mechanisms: an interinstitutional roundtable on gender approaches, recommendations for preventing extortion risks, and an advocacy plan for telecommunication protection laws. Throughout the project, several challenges were encountered, including fear and resistance from community members, lack of updated comparative statistics, and alleged corruption within law enforcement. These obstacles highlighted the need for building trust, ensuring confidentiality, and providing mental health support. The lessons learned emphasized the importance of comprehensive security approaches, applying gender and intersectional analyses, and fostering collaboration between civil society and government. To sustain and enhance these efforts, future support should focus on strengthening community structures, advocating for balanced policies that protect human rights, establishing mental health support programs, and promoting comprehensive security measures that go beyond military interventions. Additionally, continuous training in digital security, mental health first aid, and legal rights is essential for empowering communities against evolving threats. Public-private partnerships and international awareness campaigns are also crucial for addressing the root causes of extortion and violence in the region. By implementing these recommendations, communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras can build more resilient and secure environments, effectively combatting the pervasive issue of extortion.  

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 21p.

Edited by Shann Hulme, Emma Disley and Emma Louise Blondes  

The economic and social harms from serious and organised crime (SOC) are multifaceted and wide-reaching, and span the individual, community and societal level. Appropriate targeting of resources to tackle SOC relies upon accurate information about the extent and nature of the phenomenon. However, the hidden nature of SOC means that measuring its size and scale is inherently challenging. The European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs, called for a study ‘Mapping the risk of serious and organised crime infiltrating legitimate businesses’ to improve the evidence-base in relation to SOC in the EU.

Brussels: European Commission, 2021. 166p.

UNODC released an Issues Paper on Organized Crime and Gender in May 2022 which focused on gender mainstreaming in the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. One of the key takeaways from the paper is that gender mainstreaming is not a parallel effort or a “women’s issue” separate from the implementation of the Organized Crime Convention but that it is an integral part of full implementation of the Convention. By not mainstreaming gender into legislation, policies and practices to combat organized crime, this can jeopardize the effective implementation of the convention and be counterproductive to preventing and combating organized crime.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022. 64p.

By Europol

These recommendations follow the 6th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies on 1–2 September 2022. The conference was hosted by Europol at its headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands, together with the Basel Institute on Governance through the Joint Working Group on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies.

The Recommendations are intended to highlight broad approaches and best practices. They are designed to help public and private actors stay one step ahead of those seeking to abuse crypto assets (also known as virtual assets) and services to make, hide and launder illicit money.

The main message is that as the use of crypto assets expands into practically every country and sector, so does its abuse to commit new forms of crime and launder criminal proceeds. Yet with the right tools, capacity and cooperation, the unique characteristics of blockchain-based technologies offer an unprecedented opportunity to investigate organised crime and money laundering networks and to recover stolen funds.

The five recommendations cover:

1. Breaking down silos between “traditional” and “crypto”

2. Regulating broadly and make full use of existing laws 

3. Taking advantage of the blockchain to disrupt organised crime 

4. Raising crypto literacy through capacity building and clear communication 

5. Increasing public-private cooperation

Europol and Basel Institute on Governance, 2022.  6p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Cybercrime poses serious threats and financial costs to individuals and businesses in the United States and worldwide. Reports of data breaches and ransomware attacks on governments and businesses have become common, as have incidents against individuals (e.g., identity theft, online stalking, and harassment). Concern over cybercrime has increased as the internet has become a ubiquitous part of modern life. However, comprehensive, consistent, and reliable data and metrics on cybercrime still do not exist - a consequence of a shortage of vital information resulting from the decentralized nature of relevant data collection at the national level.

Cybercrime Classification and Measurement addresses the absence credible cybercrime data and metrics. This report provides a taxonomy for the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of measuring different types of cybercrime, including both cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes faced by individuals and businesses, and considers the needs for its periodic revision. 

Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2025. 259p.

By Thorn in partnership with Burson Insights, Data & Intelligence

Since 2019, Thorn has focused on amplifying youth voices to better understand their digital lives, with particular attention to how they encounter and navigate technology-facilitated forms of sexual abuse and exploitation. Previous youth-centered research has explored topics such as child sexual abuse material (CSAM) — including that which is self-generated (“SG-CSAM”) — nonconsensual resharing, online grooming, and the barriers young people face in disclosing or reporting negative experiences. In recent years, young people have been encountering sexual interactions involving money and other items of value in their digital lives at an alarming rate, and may, at times, be advertising personal imagery. Technology has previously been recognized as a key enabler in the commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC) — facilitating unprecedented access to minors, enabling novel “advertising” models, introducing new forms of abuse (e.g., live-streamed child sexual exploitation), and strengthening illicit market networks for CSAM. However, the apparent commodification of sexual interactions involving minors, without clear third-party facilitator, points to an evolution within technology-facilitated forms of sexual exploitation.

Thorn explored this new development as part of its recent Emerging Threats to Young People survey, which examines emergent online risk areas to better understand how current technologies create and/ or exacerbate child safety vulnerabilities and to identify areas where solutions are needed. This report sheds light on some of the ways in which the intersection of technology and romantic or sexual relationships impacts young people and increases their risk for exploitative interactions. These risks include commodified and/or commercial exchanges for nude imagery and/or involvement in sexual acts. Other reports from the series address additional issues, including the emergence of deepfake nudes6 and the evolving nature of sextortion.7 Drawing on responses from a survey of 1,200 young people aged 13-20, this report examines their lived experiences with technology-facilitated sexual solicitations and involvement in commodified exchanges. Three key findings emerged from this research:. It’s common for young people to receive sexual solicitations8 online, often after only a brief period of connection between users. One in 3 (36%) young people reported they had received a solicitation to send sexual imagery of themselves from an online-only contact while they were under the age of 18. Most (79%) of these solicitations were received within a week or less of connecting with the other user.

For some young people, technology-facilitated sexual experiences have been commodified, with young people receiving both monetary and non-monetary (e.g., social opportunities) forms of compensation. One in 7 (15%) young people reported engaging in at least one form of transactional sexual experience while under the age of 18. And 33% of those who had indicated they received social opportunities, like invites to parties or more online followers, as part of their compensation. . Markets for the commercial sexual exploitation of children appear to be expanding, driven, in part, by emerging buyer dynamics that capitalize on vulnerabilities linked to technology-facilitated sexual exploration among young people. Among young people who had a commodified sexual experience as a minor, 25% indicated they never received a solicitation to sell their content, 59% indicated they exclusively knew their buyers online, and 42% indicated they had a buyer who was another minor.

El Segundo, CA: Thorn, 2025. 33p.