By Caitlin McCulloch, Brian A. Jackson, Sameer M. Siddiqi, Jordan R. Reimer, Emily Allendorf

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has changed and expanded its efforts in violence prevention in the past five years. DHS asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) to examine the change in efforts by the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) and its predecessor organizations in preventing terrorism and other violence and explore options for CP3 moving forward.

In the United States, the full potential value of countering violent extremism (CVE) has never been realized because of key disconnects between the intent of CVE programs and the realities of their implementation. Although it might not have been the intent, efforts singled out and stigmatized American Muslim communities. The disconnect between stated intention and reality stimulated potent opposition to CVE as a concept. In response, the federal government decided to make significant changes in its approaches in this policy area. In late 2021, DHS asked HSOAC to examine and characterize the changes that had been made, providing an outside viewpoint on the extent of change and how those changes had responded to the concerns about CVE efforts. This report documents the researchers' approach, findings, and recommendations.

Key Findings

• There has been enormous growth in CP3, and it is currently working on developing and standardizing the institutions and processes that are required to support a larger organization. These efforts include extensive standardization efforts in training and evaluation of CP3's work. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) posed some problems, including making it difficult to create a cohesive whole with new personnel, but also presented some new opportunities, such as an increased ability to reach a diversity of stakeholders digitally.

• CP3 and the government more broadly have made major shifts in the rhetorical framing of their work, toward a public health–informed approach, a framing that aligns more closely with the intent of their programs. Although there is still discussion of the implications of a public health–informed approach, this shift was reflected in both interviews and official documentation.

• In line with this rhetorical shift is the expansion in the diversity of stakeholders, both in engagement and in grantees, including evidence of a shift away from criminal justice and security partners, although they remain important collaborators.

• External stakeholders remain skeptical, but there are some signs of increasing trust in relevant actors outside government.

Recommendations

• Continue efforts to build and sustain consistency in messages and activities. Many external stakeholders noted the importance of rebuilding trust and that sustainable and continuous actions and relationships were essential for fostering that trust.

• Continue to codify and standardize internal office procedures—with rapid growth comes a renewed need for new internal institutions to keep all personnel on the same page.

• More clearly define the elements of a public health–informed approach and how they will be applied to violence prevention for CP3 programs and outreach. There are many definitions present in practitioner circles and the academic literature; choosing one and fully exploring the implications of the definition will be key for aligning stated CP3 goals with programmatic action.

• Invest further in program evaluation. The research team recognizes that it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness in this area, but, without standardized evaluation, supporting the impact of CP3 programs will be difficult.

• Commit to transparency and external communication. Transparency in actions taken and evidence collected, as well as communication with skeptical audiences, will be key in showing change and growth in CP3 and its activities to external actors and in further building trust with external audiences.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) are easily accessible to large numbers of people and have limited security or protective measures in place, making them vulnerable to attack. Examples include sports arenas, shopping centers, schools, transportation systems, and houses of worship. Although attacks on them are relatively rare, they result in significant loss of life and contribute to an atmosphere of fear throughout society. Researchers performed a landscape assessment of the threat to and major vulnerabilities of ST-CPs, existing security measures and initiatives, and ways to improve allocation of security resources. The researchers then developed a road map for future investments and made recommendations for improving ST-CP security and response to attacks. These recommendations include research, development, test, and evaluation priorities to improve prevention and protection, such as seeking methods of deterring and dissuading would-be attackers, more evaluation of the effectiveness of security measures, and developing a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces. In addition, they recommended funding and policy priorities focused on public education and training, providing additional resources to cross-organizational security teams and managers, and increasing funding for access control systems.

Key Findings

• The most-common motivations for attacks are personal, followed by terrorism and extremism.

• Education and private buildings are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs.

• Attacks on ST-CPs with large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, have the highest average lethality.

• Layered security strategies, in which measures work together, improve the chance that an attack will be prevented, halted, or mitigated.

• Tips from the public have prevented attacks. Public education on what to report and how, and support for threat assessment teams, would make tips more effective.

• Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient but need to be trained on and maintained.

• Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective. Training can make responses even more effective.

• Response command, control, and communications need to be improved. Alternatives to traditional, push-to-talk voice radio communications are needed.

• Security measures need more effectiveness and efficiency evaluations. The security community has growing interest in artificial intelligence (AI); evaluations of security systems with AI will be needed as these systems deploy.

Recommendations

• Find ways to deter and dissuade would-be attackers.

• Develop indicators of and education about suspicious seeking of weapons.

• Develop protocols and education for wellness checks.

• Further evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of security measures.

• Develop a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces, such as shopping malls and restaurants.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Review mass-shooting events to determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on soft targets or crowded places.

• Find ways to reduce the mass psychological effects of attacks, including societal fear and secondary trauma.

• Focus on basics, such as provision and maintenance of access control equipment and public education campaigns on what to look for and how to report it.

• Strengthen the system-based, layered security framework.

• Ensure that funding and policy priorities reflect research findings.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams and managers.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational security teams and managers.

• Fund and distribute updates of site security guidance documents and training.

• Fund access control systems

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 24p.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Attacks on soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) represent a significant challenge. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires research and development to assess methods for reducing the propensity and loss of life from these types of attacks. In response, researchers from the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center conducted a comprehensive landscape assessment of the threat to ST-CPs and corresponding security measures. This assessment integrated literature reviews, attack plot analyses, grant data reviews, and security cost modeling to identify both needs for improvement and recommended research and investment priorities for addressing those needs.

The number of attack plots is broadly aligned with regional population counts. The most-common motivations for ST-CP attacks have been personal, followed by terrorist and extremist motivations. Education and private buildings (workplaces) are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs. Attacks on ST-CPs that have large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, had the highest average lethality.

To defend ST-CPs, a layered approach has security measures work together to improve the chance that an attack will be stopped or mitigated. Prevention measures stop attacks before they reach execution; however, the public needs to know what warning signs to look for and how to report them, and threat assessment teams need to assess tips and follow up appropriately. Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient. Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks; groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective.

Key Findings

The conditions that a would-be attacker must fulfill to successfully execute a high-fatality attack are collectively the attack chain; interrupting that chain can prevent or reduce casualties

• An attacker must carry out many steps to complete a high-fatality attack. The attacker must become fully committed, plan, acquire weapons and skills, and make other preparations without being detected and reported by others. Once on scene, the attacker must get through the site's security layers and engage a crowd without being stopped quickly.

• A system-based, or layered, approach helps security measures work together to improve the chances that an attack will be stopped or mitigated at any of these steps, guarding against single points of failure.

• Prevention measures are perhaps the most-important factors in interrupting the attack chain because they can and have halted many plots before they reached execution. Reports of warning signs have been key. However, the public must know what to look for and how, and authorities need threat assessment teams and training to assess tips and follow up appropriately.

• Access and entry-control systems, including locks, secured windows, and secured entry spaces, have been effective and efficient in protecting against attackers.

• Both bystanders and on-scene security have been effective in stopping attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective in ending attacks.

  Recommendations

• Seek methods for deterring and dissuading would-be attackers from becoming committed to plots.

• Develop indicators and training to detect suspicious seeking of weapons and ammunition.

• Develop enhancements to "see something, say something" campaigns.

• Develop and evaluate campaigns to reduce hoax threats of violence.

• Develop rules and processes for assessment, monitoring, and follow-up with reported threats, including processes for initial wellness checks.

• Evaluate the effectiveness of site security technologies in stopping simulated attacks.

• Study the social costs of security measures more.

• Develop a model strategy for open and nonsecure spaces, such as parks, parking lots, shopping malls, and restaurants.

• Improve command and control, leadership, and coordination during attack responses.

• Study alternatives to traditional voice radio communications during attack responses.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on ST-CPs.

• Seek ways to reduce the mass psychological impacts of attacks.

• Support detailed tracking of grant spending related to ST-CP security.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how and on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams, security teams, and managers, and provide training on how to report on and how to respond during an incident.

• Fund access control systems.

• Fund medical supplies and training to match updated medical standards.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 168p.

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to Correlation – European Harm Reduction Network (C-EHRN)

Drug consumption rooms (DCRs) are fixed or mobile spaces in which people who use drugs are provided with sterile drug use equipment and can use illicit drugs under the supervision of trained staff. They exist in several European countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico and the USA, and are usually located in areas where there is an open drug scene and injecting in public places is common. Their primary goal is to reduce morbidity and mortality by providing a safer environment for drug use and training clients in safer forms of drug use. Other explicit objectives may be providing a conduit to other care services and reducing public nuisance. A main aim of this report is to inform discussions on DCRs by examining the available evidence, as well as reviewing the various models being adopted and their characteristics. Two operational models are typically used in Europe: (1) integrated DCRs, operating within low-threshold facilities, where the supervision of drug use is just one of several services offered; and (2) specialised DCRs, which provide a narrower range of services directly related to supervised consumption. Services typically available within DCRs include: provision of a supervised environment for drug use; clean drug use equipment, including sterile syringes; and rapid interventions if overdose occurs. In addition, DCRs may offer counselling services; primary medical care; training for clients in safer forms of drug use, overdose awareness and the use of naloxone; and referral to social, healthcare and treatment services. Access to consumption facilities may be restricted to registered service users, and often certain conditions have to be met, for example minimum age and local residency. Typically, drugs used in these facilities must be obtained prior to entry. Drug dealing and drug sharing are not allowed within the facilities (staff may be required to call in the police if necessary), and staff can advise but do not directly assist clients in administering their drugs. As frontline, low-threshold services, drug consumption rooms are often among the first places where insights can be gained into new drug use patterns, and, thus, they also can have a role to play in the early identification of new and emerging trends among high-risk populations using their services. The operation and functioning of DCRs has adapted to changes in the profiles and needs of their target groups, and to new patterns of use, as well as to new types of drugs emerging on the market. DCRs may also therefore be well placed to identify and inform strategies to mitigate harms related to developments in the illicit drug market that present new health challenges.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 52p.

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By Andrew von Hirsch, David Garland and Alison Wakefield

Situational crime prevention has drawn increasing interest in recent years,yet the debate has looked mainly at whether it 'works' to prevent crime. This volume addresses the ethics of situational crime prevention and also examines the place of situational crime prevention within criminology. The contributors are twelve distinguished criminologists who together advance our understanding of the ethical and societal questions underlying crime prevention.

Hart Publishing, Nov 18, 2000, 230 pages

By Toner, Helen; Ji, Jessica; Bansemer, John; Lim, Lucy; Painter, Chris; Corley, Courtney D.; Whittlestone, Jess; Botvinick, Matt; Rodriguez, Mikel; Shankar Siva Kumar, Ram

From the document: "AI is experiencing a moment of profound change, capturing unprecedented public attention and becoming increasingly sophisticated. As AI becomes more powerful, and in some cases more general in its capabilities, it may become capable of posing novel risks in domains such as bioweapons development, cybersecurity, and beyond. Two features of the current AI landscape are especially challenging from a policy perspective: the rapid pace at which research is advancing, and the recent development of more general-purpose AI systems, which--unlike most AI systems, which are narrowly focused on a single task--can be adapted to many different use cases. These two elements add new layers of difficulty to existing AI ethics and safety problems. In July 2023, Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) and Google DeepMind hosted a virtual roundtable to discuss the implications and governance of the advancing AI research frontier, particularly with regard to general-purpose AI models. The objective of the roundtable was to help bridge the gap between the state of the current conversation and the reality of AI technology at the research frontier, which has potentially widespread implications for both national security and society at large."

Georgetown University. Walsh School Of Foreign Service. Center For Security And Emerging Technology . 2023. 23p.

By Karen Bullock, Aiden Sidebottom, Rachel Armitage , Matthew P.J. Ashby, Caitlin Clemmow, Stuart Kirby, Gloria Laycock and Nick Tilley

This article analyses and critically reflects on the position of problem-oriented policing within England and Wales. Problem-oriented policing is a framework for improving police effectiveness. Its adoption has consistently been shown to be associated with sizable reductions in a wide range of crimes and public safety issues. However, many studies also find that problem-oriented policing is difficult to embed and sustain within police organisations. This article draws on the experiences and perspectives of 86 informed stakeholders to critically examine the position and practice of problem-oriented policing 40 years after its original formulation by Herman Goldstein in 1979. We argue that despite evidence of renewed interest in problem-oriented policing, the approach is not habitually conducted within police organisations in England and Wales. Where it is conducted, the practice of problem-oriented policing is found to lack discipline, the processes tend not to be faithfully followed, and there are weaknesses at all stages of the process. Implications of the findings for future research and police practice are discussed.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(4): 2021

By Karen Bullock, Aiden Sidebottom, Rachel Armitage, Matthew P.J. Ashby, Caitlin Clemmow, Stuart Kirby, Gloria Laycock & Nick Tilley

Evidence shows that the application of problem-oriented policing can be effective in reducing a wide range of crime and public safety issues, but that the approach is challenging to implement and sustain. This article examines police perceptions and experiences regarding organisational barriers to and facilitators of the implementation and delivery of problem-oriented policing. Drawing on surveys of (n = 4141) and interviews with (n = 86) police personnel from 19 police forces in England and Wales, we identify five key barriers and facilitators to problem-oriented policing: leadership and governance, capacity, organisational structures and infrastructure, partnership working and organisational culture. These factors provide important indicators for what police organisations need to do, or need to avoid, if they are to successfully embed and deliver problem-oriented policing. The article generates critical information about the processes that drive change in police organisations and offers recommendations for police managers who may wish to implement or develop problem-oriented policing. The paper also proposes a research agenda aimed at addressing evidence gaps in our understanding of the implementation and sustenance of problem-oriented policing.

Policing and Society, 32:9, 1087-1102, 2021.

By Ronald V. Clarke

Crime is not spread evenly across all places, people or times and, to be effective, preventive measures must be directed to where crime is most concentrated. Focusing on ‘hot spots’ – those places with a high rate of reported crimes or calls for police assistance – has proved useful in directing police patrols and crime reduction measures. Similarly, giving priority to ‘repeat victims’ of crime has proved to be an effective use of preventive resources. This publication argues that comparable benefits for prevention would result from focusing policy and research attention on ‘hot products’, those items that are most likely to be taken by thieves. These include not just manufactured goods, but also food, animals and works of art. The ultimate hot product is cash which helps determine the distribution of many kinds of theft, including commercial robberies, muggings, burglaries and thefts from ticket machines and public phone boxes. A better understanding of which products are ‘hot’, and why, would help businesses protect themselves from theft and would help the police in advising them how to do this. It would help governments in seeking to persuade business and industry to protect their property or to think about ways of avoiding the crime waves sometimes generated by new products and illegal use of certain drugs. It would help consumers avoid purchasing items (such as particular models of car) that put them at risk of theft and may lead them to demand greater built-in security. Finally, improved understanding of hot products would assist police in thinking about ways to intervene effectively in markets for stolen goods. This publication is the first to review comprehensively what is known about hot products and what further research is needed to assist policy.

London: Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, 1999. 59p.

By Luke Bennett

This paper was drafted in Summer 2008. It features ideas and events that could not fit into my published paper 'Assets under attack: metal theft, the built environment and the dark side of the global recycling market' Environmental Law and Management 20, 176-183 (2008). At the time I intended to develop the draft into a companion piece to that paper, but other projects distracted my attention. Accordingly this draft paper is a little dated in its focus upon pre 2008 examples, however its conjectures on the nature and motives of metal thieves may still be worthy of some attention. I therefore offer this paper to public view on an 'as is' basis. If anyone finds my comments of interest then I would be glad to receive any comments and might thus be spurred to update the treatment and examples featured in the present draft.

Unpublished paper, 2008. 19p.

By James A. Cook

This thesis is a comparative case study comparing and contrasting the efforts of three countries (United Kingdom, France, Italy) in their fight to reduce copper wire theft incidents within their nations. The ultimate goal of the research is to highlight the significant threat posed to critical infrastructure from copper thieves and to offer best practice recommendations to policymakers within the United States in response, based on the experiences of the three targeted nations. An analysis of the data reveals that the United Kingdom has had the most success in the reduction of reported copper wire theft incidents primarily due to its multi-faceted approach to the problem, which includes heavy regulation of the scrap recycling industry, centralized law enforcement operations, and enhanced criminal statutes.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 133p.

By Remone Govender

Cable theft could be currently considered as a significant problem, globally. The Eskom statistical figures indicate that cable theft creates a massive problem for service delivery and places a vast amount of pressure on its financial resources. Cable theft is highlighted on various different platforms within Eskom’s business operating units and while efforts for increased security and protection measures are in place, these measures appear to be inadequate to prevent it. This study investigated the extent of cable theft at Eskom and examined what actions Eskom and private security personnel should undertake to prevent it. This study further determined what action steps need be taken by Eskom’s internal security management team, and those responsible for the capturing of all relevant information related to it, in order to prevent any form of cable theft. This research has made four key contributions to the subject: (i) A new Eskom security structure was proposed, (ii) a newly designed Eskom training curriculum framework was designed for all private security personnel working at Eskom facilities, (iii) proposed changes to Eskom’s CURA system were made, and (iv) proposed changes were suggested for Eskom’s internal ENECC cable theft reporting system.

Kwadlangezwa, South Africa: University of Zululand, 2017. 355p.

By Kevin W Whiteacre; Lindsay Medler; Dan Rhotonand Raeann Howes

Highlights of summary findings include: (1) from January to March of 2008, there were 768 metal thefts reported in Indianapolis; (2) copper was the most stolen metal, with copper pipes and plumbing accounting for more than 17 percent of all items and copper wires accounting for 8 percent; (3) on average, one catalytic converter was stolen every day during the reporting period; (4) 25 percent or 169 of the crime reports contained estimates of the values for the stolen items for those 169 cases, the average value of the stolen items was $4,314; (5) extrapolating those values to the other 75 percent of cases suggests the value of stolen metals thefts averaged just under $1 million per month; and (6) the Northeast District had the most residential metals theft, while the Southeast and Southwest Districts had the most commercial and vehicle related metals thefts. Metal theft describes the theft of items for the value of their constituent metals. It is generally agreed that metals theft has risen because of steep increases in the prices of metals. Law enforcement agencies across the country report growing concerns over metals thefts. The Indianapolis Metals Theft Project seeks to gather and analyze a wide variety of data to provide a clearer understanding of the incidence, types, costs, and impacts of metals thefts in Indianapolis. This is the first report on a pilot study to establish protocol for collecting, coding, and analyzing metals theft data from crime reports. It provides descriptive data on metals thefts from January through March of 2008.

Indianapolis: University of Indianapolis Community Research Center, 2008. 16p.

By Shane D Johnson, Lucía Summers and Ken Pease

Previous research by the writers and others demonstrated clustering of domestic burglary in space and time. This enabled the development of a predictive mapping instrument (PROMAP) which substantially outperforms traditional crime mapping in anticipating burglaries. This report seeks to determine whether the clustering which underpins PROMAP is also evident in relation to vehicle crime, specifically Theft from Motor Vehicle (TFMV) and Theft of Motor Vehicle (TOMV). Data of recorded vehicle crime over a one year period from Derbyshire and Dorset were examined to test that proposition. Analyses demonstrated that • TFMV clusters closely in space and time in both police force areas. When such an offence occurs at one location another is likely to occur nearby and soon after. To use the vocabulary of an epidemiologist, like burglary the risk of this type of vehicle crime is highly communicable. • TOMV clusters somewhat, but not in the same way or with the same closeness as TFMV. The pattern is similar in both force areas. • The spatio-temporal signatures of the two types of vehicle crime, as noted above, differ.This suggests different targeting or foraging strategies are employed for these two types of crime. The difference is consistent with common sense, since there is more post-offence activity implied in theft of a car (onward selling, changed identity, enjoying performance for a non-trivial period) than for theft from a motor vehicle, where the primary constraint on further offending is the offender’s carrying capacity. • There are data limitations which have implications for the ease with which a PROMAP variant dealing with vehicle crime could be deployed operationally. These include shortcomings in the current recording of locations of vehicle crime, and the special problems in mapping crime in car parks, Notwithstanding current data limitations, the patterning of vehicle crime in time and space is such as to encourage the view that prospective mapping could, with proper implementation, prove operationally useful in crime reduction and offender detection

London: UCL, Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, 2006. 52p.

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By Francisco Klauser

The paper draws upon empirical insights provided by a two-year research project relating to security governance at the European Football Championships 2008 in Switzerland and Austria (Euro 2008). The objective is to study the role and modalities of border and access control in the context of sport mega-event security on various national and urban scales. This investigation seeks to demonstrate that security and surveillance at sport mega-events are shaped, fundamentally, by efforts towards the increased flexibility, variability and mobility (in both space and time) of carefully orchestrated access, passage and border controls. At stake in this “mobile border assemblage” are a large variety of phenomena, places and scales: from classic border controls at the national boundaries to a wide range of inter- and intra-urban enclosures and passage points (Graham, 2010) aimed at monitoring, restricting, filtering and also managing and facilitating different forms and modalities of circulation (of people and objects). This paper explores the reasons, logics and characteristics of this phenomenon..

Neuchâtel, Switzerland: University of Neuchâtel, 2011. 26p.

By Kin Y. Ma

Over the past two decades, gang-related violence and control has plagued the Northern Triangle: the Central American (NTCA) countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. This gang-related behavior has propelled the countries to exhibit some of the highest homicide rates per capita globally, contributing to state fragility and mass emigration – most notably to the United States and Mexico. Mitigating such gang influence can be taxonomized into two areas: anti-gang activities focusing on recruitment prevention efforts, and counter-gang operations centered around disrupting, dismantling, or denying gang activities via law enforcement efforts. Scholars and subject-matter experts on gang influence both overwhelmingly agree and exhort that reducing gang membership remains a key factor in lessening a gang’s impact in a given area, as well as potentially yielding a more effective outcome than solely relying on the disruption provided by counter-gang operations. In view of this consensus, the scope of this study focuses specifically on gangprevention efforts in the economic, community outreach, and law enforcement sectors over the past two decades, while concurrently examining US-involved programs and their impact from a qualitative perspective. Most prior academic work on the topic consists of an overarching view of the totality of the programs. As such, this study either increases, updates, or combines the research conducted by the US government, academic community, field researchers, as well as the author’s original research conducted in either the NTCA or with officials inside the respective countries. As a result, this study confirms and furthers reasoning for the existing consensus, and moreover, coalesces the wide-ranging research existing in academia, US diplomatic efforts, and Guatemalan government efforts, as well as delving into program specifics existing in academia, US diplomatic efforts, and Guatemalan government efforts, as well as delving into program specifics

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2021. 114p.

By Daniel Mejía, Ervyn Norza, Santiago Tobón, and Martín Vanegas-Arias

We study the effects of broken windows policing on crime using geo-located crime and arrest reports for 80 Colombian cities. Broadly defined, broken windows policing consists of intensifying arrests -sometimes for minor offenses- to deter potential criminals. To estimate causal effects, we build grids of 200 × 200 meters over the urban perimeter of all cities and produce event studies to look at the effects of shocks in police activity in the periods to follow. We use spikes in the number of arrests with no warrant -which are more likely associated with unplanned police presence- as a proxy for shocks in broken windows policing. As expected, we observe an increase in crimes during the shock period, as each arrest implies at least one crime report. In the following periods, crimes decrease both in the place of the arrests and the surroundings. With many treated grids and many places exposed to spillovers, these effects add up. On aggregate, the crime reduction offsets the observed increase during the shock period. Direct effects are more immediate and precise at low crime grids, but beneficial spillovers seem more relevant at crime hot spots. The effects of broken windows policing circumscribe to cities with low or moderate organized crime, consistent with criminal organizations planning their activities more systematically than disorganized criminals.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2022. 34p.

By Mateo Dulce Rubio

I use residential burglary data from Bogota, Colombia, to fit an agent-based model following truncated L´evy flights (Pan et al., 2018) elucidating criminal rational behavior and validating repeat/near-repeat victimization and broken windows effects. The estimated parameters suggest that if an average house or its neighbors have never been attacked, and it is suddenly burglarized, the probability of a new attack the next day increases, due to the crime event, in 79 percentage points. Moreover, the following day its neighbors will also face an increment in the probability of crime of 79 percentage points. This effect persists for a long time span. The model presents an area under the Cumulative Accuracy Profile (CAP) curve, of 0.8 performing similarly or better than state-of-the-art crime prediction models. Public policies seeking to reduce criminal activity and its negative consequences must take into account these mechanisms and the self-exciting nature of crime to effectively make criminal hotspots safer.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2019. 29p.

By Arbet Fetiu and Pablo Madriaza

For the purposes of this study, we adopted the following working definition of "radicalization leading to violence": [translation] "the process whereby an individual or group adopts a violent form of action, directly related to a politically, socially or religiously motivated extremist ideology that challenges the established political, social or cultural order" (Khosrokhavar, 2014, pp. 8-9). Although this definition guided our research, it was merely a working definition; a systematic review requires the inclusion of numerous viewpoints and specific definitions used by the different researchers.

International Centre for the Prevention of Crime. Montreal. Quebec. 2015. 147p.

By Laura Wolfgram, Cyndy Pollan, Kirstie Hostetter, Amy Martin, Tina Spencer, Scott Rodda, and Andrew Amey

This report explores in detail the recent past and emerging future of fare enforcement on transit systems. While the focus is on North American transit systems, the research also provides examples from some agencies abroad, primarily in Europe, Australia, and South America. The intent of this research is to discuss the many facets of fare evasion that must be considered to successfully measure and manage it. These include changing attitudes about fare enforcement and penalties for evading fare, how these impact the ability to manage fare evasion, and the role of new technologies and emergent enforcement alternatives in changing the purpose of and approach to managing fare evasion. The evolution of fare collection methods and technologies has required transit agencies to develop new ways to verify and enforce fare payment, increase their understanding as to why and where fare evasion occurs, take proactive approaches to increasing fare compliance, and respond to emerging community sensitivities and social issues related to discrimination and systemic bias, use of police, and needs of vulnerable populations. This research effort involved three core activities: a review of the existing literature (which included documents from and studies of U.S. and Canadian transit agencies, as well as agencies elsewhere in the world), phone surveys conducted with 18 North American transit agencies, and follow-up communications with those tran

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2022. 452p.