By Charlotte Howell, Martin Gill and Janice Goldstraw-White

The aim of the research was to explore the forms of joint working that take place between the security sector and the police, and the barriers that can prevent this work from progressing. The research is based on the views of security professionals from in-house security, security suppliers, other security experts and some individuals working for, or recently retired from the police.

The research sets out different forms of police and private security engagement:

• Crime reduction

• CCTV surveillance/co-operation

• Crime investigation and reporting

• Education and awareness raising

• Facilitating access to a site for police training exercises

• Joint patrolling

• Private security adopting specific policing powers

• Funding police time

• Emergency response

• Public events

• Assisting vulnerable individuals/victims of crime

• Critical infrastructure

Further, the research identifies 6 key opportunities for improving engagement and overcoming barriers:

Understand what the private security sector does now

There is a need to change the flawed assumption that public protection is possible without the private security sector. The spaces protected by private security are places where the public work, live and spend leisure time, largely with minimal police input. Private security also assumes responsibility for protecting critical national infrastructure. There was a view that a better understanding of what private security does, would facilitate greater collaboration.

Stress the similarities

While the police and private security may have different philosophies, the similarities are striking and need to be brought to the fore. Both are committed to reducing crime, gathering intelligence and being visible. Protecting people and places is complex, it is a skilled task which both mostly do well. Both have come under fire at times for poor performance.

Be clear how private security benefits

Our survey of security professionals showed that the vast majority believe collaboration has huge potential and results in better protection of the public and of organisations, and in an increased capacity to respond to crime. Other benefits include that clients view police engagement positively, it increases the knowledge and skills of private security and improves morale; and a good rapport with the police can lead to more activity on site (such as training, presentations, patrols) which is seen as a positive in some contexts.

Be clear how the police (and public) benefits

The private security sector offers resources, expertise, and data/intelligence; it protects people, places, and infrastructure; and it mostly operates in domains the police cannot realistically cover without extensive additional support. All private security work helps policing. There is an opportunity to better tap into this work to enhance efforts to protect the public. All parties benefit from effective collaborative working.

Joint working does not have to be onerous

There are different ways of working together. More formal collaborations can be important but are not always necessary; there is enormous opportunity at the informal levels. Private security acts not only as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police but as a voice too in sharing key messages about safety and security. Often joint working is not about the police transferring responsibility or granting police powers for security staff.

There is a need for strong leadership (on both sides)

Our survey of security professionals showed that three quarters thought there is a need for strong leadership on joint working, on both sides. Each is difficult to deal with; private security has no identifiable single voice while each police force acts autonomously. The statutory regulation of the security sector does not include police input, and police argue that it is difficult to know who we are dealing with. Concerns can only be solved or ameliorated with good leadership, which is also needed to solve a variety of other very solvable barriers such as: identifying appropriate partners operating at the right level; understanding mutual risks and rewards; providing continuity and consistency; avoiding unnecessary data sharing complications and leading on new ideas and ways of working.

Professor Martin Gill who led the research noted:

‘Our research indicates that security professionals saw significant value in collaborative working with the police, particularly to better protect the public as well as organisations. There were many examples of joint initiatives which were considered beneficial. However, it was also apparent that much potential was untapped; that there is a general lack of joint working and that partnerships often do not achieve their full potential because of common barriers. Further, security professionals consider themselves to be more enthusiastic about collaborative working than they perceive the police to be. The Policing Vision 2030 sets an objective to collaborate more to prevent crime, and this includes with businesses. What is needed now is strong leadership with a strategy to move collaboration forward.’

Tunbridge Wells, UK: Perpetuity Research, 2024. 91p.

By: Sameer Hinduja and Brandon Kooi

Information can be considered as an invaluable commodity for all business entities, and has brought about the development of various security architectures devoted to its protection. Corporations have tended to react to the exploitation of information security (InfoSec) vulnerabilities through the implementation of technological measures. Indeed, most security policies and procedures are highly technologically inclined, making use of hardware and software to protect and safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data. Unfortunately, these tactics have achieved limited success because of inattention to the opportunistic aspects of crime commission. Situational crime prevention can address the importance of these aspects by concentrating on the circumstances associated with a crime, and how the setting, conditions and context can be modified to preclude its manifestation. Its specific application to cyber and InfoSec in a corporate setting is advantageous in developing competent proactive strategies to reduce the presence and attractiveness of criminal possibilities for would-be offenders.

Security Journal advance online publication, 17 June 2013; doi:10.1057/sj.2013.25

By Ben Grunwald, John Rappaport and Michael Berg

Private security officers outnumber police by a wide margin, and the gap may be growing. As cities have claimed to defund the police, many have quietly expanded their use of private security, reallocating spending from the public to the private sector. It is difficult to know what to make of these trends, largely because we know so little about what private security looks like on the ground. On one prevalent view of the facts, a shift from public to private security would mean little more than a change of uniform, as the two labor markets are deeply intertwined. Indeed, academics, the media, popular culture, and the police themselves all tell us that private security is some amalgam of a police retirement community and a dumping ground for disgraced former cops. But if, instead, private officers differ systematically from the public police—and crossover between the sectors is limited—then substitution from policing to private security could drastically change who is providing security services.

We bring novel data to bear on these questions, presenting the largest empirical study of private security to date. We introduce an administrative dataset covering nearly 300,000 licensed private security officers in the State of Florida. By linking this dataset to similarly comprehensive information about public law enforcement, we have, for the first time, a nearly complete picture of the entire security labor market in one state. We report two principal findings. First, the public and private security markets are predominantly characterized by occupational segregation, not integration. The individuals who compose the private security sector differ markedly from the public police; they are, for example, significantly less likely to be white men. We also find that few private officers, roughly 2%, have previously worked in public policing, and even fewer will go on to policing in the future. Second, while former police make up a small share of all private security, roughly a quarter of cops who do cross over have been fired from a policing job. In fact, fired police officers are nearly as likely to land in private security as to find another policing job, and a full quarter end up in one or the other. We explore the implications of these findings, including intersections with police abolition and the future of policing, at the paper’s close.

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming . U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 850. University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 1004. Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2024-24

By Caitlin Chin

Ten years ago, when whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed that U.S. government agencies had intercepted bulk telephone and internet communications from numerous individuals around the world, President Barack Obama acknowledged a long-standing yet unsettled dilemma: “You can’t have 100 percent security and also then have 100 percent privacy and zero inconvenience. There are trade-offs involved.” Snowden’s disclosures reignited robust debates over the appropriate balance between an individual’s right to privacy and the state’s interest in protecting economic and national security—in particular, where to place limitations on the U.S. government’s ability to compel access to signals intelligence held by private companies. These debates continue today, but the internet landscape—and subsequently, the relationship between the U.S. government and private sector—has evolved substantially since 2013. U.S. government agencies still routinely mandate private companies like Verizon and Google hand over customers’ personal information and issue non-disclosure orders to prevent these companies from informing individuals about such access. But the volume and technical complexity of the data ecosystem have exploded over the past decade, spurred by the rising ubiquity of algorithmic profiling in the U.S. private sector. As a result, U.S. government agencies have increasingly turned to “voluntary” mechanisms to access data from private companies, such as purchasing smartphone geolocation history from third-party data brokers and deriving insights from publicly available social media posts, without the formal use of a warrant, subpoena, or court order. In June 2023, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) declassified a report from January 2022—one of the first public efforts to examine the “large amount” of commercially available information that federal national security agencies purchase. In this report, ODNI recognizes that sensitive personal information both “clearly provides intelligence value” but also increases the risk of harmful outcomes like blackmail or harassment. Despite the potential for abuse, the declassified report reveals that some intelligence community elements have not established proper privacy and civil liberties guardrails for commercially acquired information and that even ODNI lacks awareness of the full scope of data brokerage contracts across its 18 units. Critically, the report recognizes that modern advancements in data collection have outpaced existing legal safeguards: “Today’s CAI [commercially available information] is more revealing, available on more people (in bulk), less possible to avoid, and less well understood than traditional PAI [publicly available information].” The ODNI report demonstrates how the traditional view of the privacy-security trade-off is becoming increasingly nuanced, especially as gaps in outdated federal law around data collection and transfers expand the number of actors and risk vectors involved. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan recently noted that there are also geopolitical implications to consider: “Our strategic competitors see big data as a strategic asset.” When Congress banned the popular mobile app TikTok on government devices in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), it cited fears that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could use the video-hosting app to spy on Americans. However, the NDAA did not address how numerous other smartphone apps, beyond TikTok, share personal information with data brokers—which, in turn, could transfer it to adversarial entities. In 2013, over 250,000 website privacy policies acknowledged sharing data with other companies; since then, this number inevitably has increased. In a digitized society, unchecked data collection has become a vulnerability for U.S. national security—not merely, as some once viewed, a strength. The reinvigorated focus on TikTok’s data collection practices creates a certain paradox. While politicians have expressed concerns about Chinese government surveillance through mobile apps, U.S. government agencies have purchased access to smartphone geolocation data and social media images related to millions of Americans from data brokers without a warrant. The U.S. government has simultaneously treated TikTok as a national security risk and a handy source of information, reportedly issuing the app over 1,500 legal requests for data in 2021 alone. It is also important to note that national security is not the only value that can come into tension with information privacy, as unfettered data collection carries broader implications for civil rights, algorithmic fairness, free expression, and international commerce, affecting individuals both within and outside the United States.

Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2023. 60p.

USED BOOK. MAY CONTAIN MARK-UP

Edited by Ori Swed and Thomas Crosbie

FROM THE PREFACE: “This book started as a known unknown. We knew and admired the rich body of work being produced by political scientists, international relations scholars, legal scholars and historians (as well as a handful of sociologists) on the emerging private military and security industry. We knew about and were concerned with the political consequences of this development, with its nasty barbs of undermining legitimacy, stability and professionalism in the conduct of war and security operations. And we knew that we didn't know what this meant from a sociological perspective. With time, this known unknown transformed before our eyes into an unknown known. In other words, we realized that many of our fellow sociologists were as concerned as we were with establishing and promoting a sociological perspective on the privatization of security. The problem changed from one of disciplinary neglect to one of disciplinary resistance. In The Sociology of Privatized Security, we present a collection of nine chapters written by more than a dozen sociologists on a topic that is widely discussed in the public sphere but almost absent from the discipline. The book came about for that very reason: we want to bring this important topic into disciplinary discussion, to push our collcagues to take seriously the global trend toward privatizing security and military affairs as something that really matters to contemporary societies and to social life…”

NY. Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. 292p.

By Mark Button

Over the past few years there has been exponential growth in the private security industry as concerns about safety and risk have become increasing preoccupations in the western world. At the same time there has been a huge change in the balance and structure of policing in the direction of fragmentation and pluralisation. This book meets the need for a concise and up-to-date account of private policing, situating it within the context of the debates on policing more generally and the changing relationship between public and private policing. Private Policing examines the origins of private policing, the growing literature that has sought to explain its growth, and ways in which it has been defined and classified. These include the commercial security industry, policing functions exercised by the armed forces, local authorities, state departments and by voluntary policing bodies. The increasingly important issue of patrol by private policing bodies provides the focus for an important case study, exploring the implications of the exercise of patrol powers and functions by neighbourhood wardens, patrolling security officers and others.

Cullompton, Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2002. 176p.

Edited by David A. Shirk, Duncan Wood, and Eric L. Olson

Mexico has suffered a severe security crisis over the last decade. As in several other Latin American countries, elevated levels of crime and violence—and especially the proliferation of violent organized crime groups—have presented a serious threat to the Mexican state and to ordinary citizens. During the presidency of Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), the Mexican government attempted to address these problems primarily through law enforcement and military operations to combat organized crime and reforms to enhance the institutional integrity and efficacy of police and judicial sectors. Calderón’s successor, President Enrique Peña Nieto (whose six-year term began in 2012) spent much of his first year in office attempting to shift the narrative within and about Mexico from security issues to other matters, including political, economic, and social reforms to help move the country forward. However, while placing less emphasis on such matters, Peña Nieto also largely continued Calderón’s approach to security by targeting major organized crime figures, deploying federal forces to address urgent local security crises, and pushing ahead with efforts to implement Mexico’s new criminal justice system. Still, for many Mexicans, there have been few improvements in their dayto-day sense of security, their confidence in law enforcement authorities, or their ability to attain access to justice. Indeed, crime and violence remains such a serious concern in certain parts of the country that ordinary citizens have taken to extraordinary measures—hiring private security guards and embracing vigilantism—to protect themselves. In recent years, the emergence of self-professed citizen self-defense groups has introduced a new dimension to Mexico’s security situation. Such developments raise concerns about the course of Mexico’s security situation over the longer term. On the one hand, there are serious questions about the capacity of the Mexican government to fulfill its responsibility to provide for basic citizen security. While not a failed state, Mexico has proved highly vulnerable to penetration and corruption by powerful organized crime groups, and the government’s ability to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force has been challenged by both political insurgents and violent criminal organizations.

Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; San Diego University of San Diego Justice in Mexico Project, 2014. 294p.

Edited by Sabelo Gumedze

This monograph on private security in Africa is the part-result of a two-year research project on the Regulation of the Private Security Sector in Africa. This report is based on three country case South Africa. In these countries private security companies are involved in a number of security-related operations. This research project was inspired by the need for Africa to engage in the debate around the manifestation of the private security sector on the continent, and to support its effective regulation through the establishment of a consistent and logical regulatory framework for national, sub-regional and regional legislation and protocols. Little research has been undertaken to inform a thorough understanding of the private security industry in Africa. To this end, the country reports provide insightful findings and are aimed at influencing policy making at national, sub-regional and regional level.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2008. 124p.

Edited by Millan, Matteo and Alessandro Saluppo

This book provides a comparative and transnational examination of the complex and multifaceted experiences of anti-labour mobilisation, from the bitter social conflicts of the pre-war period, through the epochal tremors of war and revolution, and the violent spasms of the 1920s and 1930s. It retraces the formation of an extensive market for corporate policing, privately contracted security and yellow unionism, as well as processes of professionalisation in strikebreaking activities, labour espionage and surveillance. It reconstructs the diverse spectrum of right-wing patriotic leagues and vigilante corps which, in support or in competition with law enforcement agencies, sought to counter the dual dangers of industrial militancy and revolutionary situations. Although considerable research has been done on the rise of socialist parties and trade unions the repressive policies of their opponents have been generally left unexamined. This book fills this gap by reconstructing the methods and strategies used by state authorities and employers to counter outbreaks of labour militancy on a global scale. It adopts a long-term chronology that sheds light on the shocks and strains that marked industrial societies during their turbulent transition into mass politics from the bitter social conflicts of the pre-war period, through the epochal tremors of war and revolution, and the violent spasms of the 1920s and 1930s. Offering a new angle of vision to examine the violent transition to mass politics in industrial societies, this is of great interest to scholars of policing, unionism and striking in the modern era.

Abingdon, Oxon. UK; New York: Routledge, 2021. 299p.

Edited by Atsushi Yasutomi, Rosalie Arcala Hall and Saya Kiba

An exploration of the roles that pro- and anti-government militias, private armed groups, vigilantes, and gangs play in local communities in the new democracies of Southeast Asia. Scholars have typically characterized irregular forces as spoilers and infiltrators in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. The contributors to this book challenge this conventional understanding of irregular forces in Southeast Asia, demonstrating that they often attract solid support from civilians and can be major contributors to the building of local security — a process by which local residents, in the absence of an effective police force, develop, partner or are at least included in the management of community crimes and other violence. They analyze irregular forces’ dealings with political actors at the community level, explaining why and how forces are incorporated in and collaborate with legitimate institutions without using violence against them. Offering a new approach to dealing with irregular forces in Southeast Asia, contributors explore new theoretical frameworks that are better suited for evaluating irregular forces’ relationship to different security providers and the political environments in the region. Specifically, they examine case studies from Indonesia, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Thailand. A valuable resource for researchers, students and practitioners in the areas of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and security governance, especially those with a focus on Southeast Asia. This book will also be of great interest to scholars of the sociology and anthropology of the region.

Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2022. 215p.

By Max G. Manwaring.

This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states—and what the Mexican government calls “Zones of Impunity.” All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors..

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2009. 53p.

By Mahesh K. Nalla and Graeme R. Newman.

Way ahead of its time, in this classic text the authors convincingly introduce social science theory and methods to the field of private security. While they deal with the various approaches to private security including management styles and adaptations of regular policing styles, the significant innovation is the introduction of situational crime prevention -- at the time virtually unknown in the private policing field -- as a major tool of private security. Situational crime prevention today is widely used to solve a broad range of crime problems from car theft to terrorism, so remains even more relevant to private security than ever before. If you work in the private security or private policing field, indeed even regular public policing, this is a must read.