By Samantha Richter

A new report from the Wilson Center for Science and Justice at Duke Law draws on more than a dozen in-depth interviews with formerly incarcerated individuals across North Carolina to uncover the real experiences of people returning from prison and where the system falls short.

Based on interviews conducted across urban and rural counties, this report, Bridging the Gap: Aligning Policy with Lived Experience to Strengthen Reentry in North Carolina examines the experience of people navigating the transition from incarceration to community life and makes recommendations to strengthen the process. Each year, approximately 18,000 people return to North Carolina communities from state prisons. While the state has joined the national initiative to improve reentry success through Reentry 2030, participants in this report described reentry as a critical and vulnerable period, where fragmented services and limited planning times can undermine support, creating a gap between available services and what people need to successfully rebuild their lives.

“What we heard consistently is that reentry isn’t a short-term process,” said report author Samantha Richter (A.B. ‘25). “People need support that is personalized, coordinated, and sustained—and they need systems that listen to their experiences and respond to what helps them succeed.”

Key Findings

Five major themes emerged from participant interviews:

1. Reentering community members need personalized, ongoing support: One-size-fits-all services often left participants feeling unsupported, while peer mentors with lived experience were described as especially effective.

2. Location shapes access and opportunity: Urban areas offered more resources, while limited flexibility around release locations sometimes forced individuals back into environments that undermined their stability.

3. System disconnects create difficulty in navigating resources: Even when resources existed, participants often struggled to access them due to confusion, poor communication, or lack of coordination between agencies

4. Timely, attentive, and thorough pre-release planning is critical for success: Participants consistently emphasized that meaningful preparation requires more than the standard 30-day planning window

5. Reentry services must support long-term stability: Participants repeatedly stressed that reentry challenges did not end in the first few weeks, and sustained support was necessary to build long-term stability.

Policy Recommendations

Grounded in participant experiences, the report outlines six priorities for policymakers and practitioners:

1. Increase flexibility in release location

2. Begin pre-release planning earlier and expand its scope

3. Strengthen employment readiness and employer connections

4. Expand targeted housing supports

5. Improve continuity between prison and community-based services

6. Invest in peer support programs led by people with lived experience

By the staff of Democratic Sen. Jon Ossoff and Republican Rep. Jen Kiggans

U.S. Senator Jon Ossoff of Georgia and Representative Jen Kiggans of Virginia have launched a bipartisan investigation into the incarceration of children with mental health conditions in juvenile detention facilities (“facilities”)—centers designed to detain children charged with or sentenced for delinquent offenses—across the United States. As part of this investigation, beginning in May 2024, Sen. Ossoff and Rep. Kiggans surveyed facilities about what circumstances lead to the prolonged detention of children with mental health conditions and children who have not been charged with offenses. In survey responses, 75 facilities across 25 states reported incarcerating children who could be eligible for release to mental health care programs outside the facility but remained incarcerated because the care they needed was not yet available. More than half of these facilities reported incarcerating children in these circumstances for at least one month, and some reported incarcerating children in these circumstances for up to a year. Facilities reported incarcerating children who are on the autism spectrum, who have general neurodevelopmental issues, or who engage in severe self-harm, who could be eligible for release to an external program or health facility. One facility in North Dakota reported that children “with neurodevelopmental issues sometimes are held the longest, while waiting on forensic evaluations of competency.” Twenty responding facilities in 13 states reported incarcerating children either with no charges or with charges that would not ordinarily lead to placement in juvenile detention. Many of these facilities reported incarcerating these children because they needed mental health services outside of the facility that were not yet available or needed mental health care available at the facility and not outside. One facility reported that, in the year before the survey was administered, it held as many as 29 children without charges or with charges that would not ordinarily lead to detention due to a lack of available offsite mental health care. Another facility reported that, in the year before the survey was administered, it held 10 children in these circumstances solely so that they could access internal mental health services not available outside the facility. Another reported incarcerating children in these circumstances for more than a year due to lack of offsite mental health care. Six facilities reported incarcerating children beyond their expected release dates after their charges were dropped or sentences completed, due to lack of available offsite mental health care. One facility reported that it had held roughly 50 children under these circumstances in the year before the survey was administered alone.According to experts in pediatric care, incarcerated children have high rates of physical, mental health and developmental needs that may be undiagnosed or under-addressed in custodial facilities. Incarcerated children also face limited access to evidence-based medical care and a lack of educational opportunities. Other experts warn that incarcerating children can cause adverse lifelong medical and mental health outcomes including higher rates of depression, and suicidality.

By José Miguel Cruz and Gema Kloppe-Santamaría 

What are the factors behind citizen support for the use of extralegal violence in Latin America? The prevailing argument is that, in countries overwhelmed by skyrocketing levels of criminal violence, people endorse the use of extralegal violence as a way to cope with insecurity. Other scholars believe that support for extralegal violence is the result of state withdrawal and failure. Few empirical studies, however, have tested any of these arguments. In this article, using regional data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we examine different explanations regarding citizen support for the utilization of extralegal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. We developed a multi-item scale that gauges support for different forms of extralegal violence across the Americas, and we hypothesize that support for extralegal violence is higher not only in countries with extreme levels of violence but especially in countries in which people distrust the political system. Results indicate that support for extralegal violence is significantly higher in societies characterized by little support for the existing political system.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

In Haiti, 5 915 people were killed in 2025 (compared to 5 601 in 2024). The national homicide rate got to 49.8 per 100 000 people, and Port-au-Prince, which is home to about a quarter of the population, reached nearly 140 per 100 000 people, ranking it among the most violent cities in the world.

Gangs continued to expand their influence in Haiti, both through territorial control and by consolidating their role as political brokers. This latter dimension remains largely absent from national and international crisis response strategies.By failing to account for the political economy of violence, particularly the importance of addressing politico-criminal relationships, current policies risk perpetuating rather than loosening the links between armed groups and the political system, especially if the 2026 elections proceed without a more comprehensive response adapted to the complexity of the crisis.Haiti’s gangs are neither insurgents nor revolutionaries; they are embedded within circuits of political and economic power. The crisis is sustained by illicit financial flows, arms and drug trafficking, and patronage networks that protect and instrumentalize armed groups.Arrests and targeted operations may weaken certain groups, but as long as the structures that sustain criminal governance remain intact, the system will reconstitute itself. Without measures to dismantle the networks intertwining political competition and criminal governance, electoral processes risk reinforcing rather than transforming the system they are intended to renew.Haiti requires a strategy to combat organized crime that integrates public security, justice and community reconstruction. Any approach focused exclusively on force will fail if it does not address the political and economic foundations that allow violence to persist.To be effective, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) must be paired with judicial tools capable of targeting gang support networks, particularly financial ones, and not only armed actors. This includes pursuing criminal leaders as well as their political and financial sponsors. Only by addressing the broader ecosystem of collusion can Haiti move away from a political order that is shaped by entrenched politico-criminal relationships.A long-term crisis resolution strategy must integrate justice, economic policy, security and political reform. The central question is not whether to negotiate with criminal groups, but how to articulate justice, demobilization and reintegration in a way that prevents the reproduction of violence.

By José Miguel Cruz and Gema Kloppe-Santamaría

 What are the factors behind citizen support for the use of extralegal violence in Latin America? The prevailing argument is that, in countries overwhelmed by skyrocketing levels of criminal violence, people endorse the use of extralegal violence as a way to cope with insecurity. Other scholars believe that support for extralegal violence is the result of state withdrawal and failure. Few empirical studies, however, have tested any of these arguments. In this article, using regional data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we examine different explanations regarding citizen support for the utilization of extralegal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. We developed a multi-item scale that gauges support for different forms of extralegal violence across the Americas, and we hypothesize that support for extralegal violence is higher not only in countries with extreme levels of violence but especially in countries in which people distrust the political system. Results indicate that support for extralegal violence is significantly higher in societies characterized by little support for the existing political system.

By Devon Ziminski , Julia P Schleimer and  Meron Girma 

Community violence interventions (CVI) encompass a range of strategies aimed at reducing community firearm violence among those most affected. While CVI is an umbrella term, specific CVI approaches across the United States differ markedly in their underlying theoretical frameworks, specific program activities, and populations served. These different CVI approaches have not been well defined or uniformly understood. Given unprecedented financial support for CVI from local, state, and federal sources in recent years, increased research attention to understanding the implementation and impacts of these programs, and growing efforts by policymakers, practitioners, and community leaders to enact CVI programs, it is important to understand how CVI is defined and characterized in applied discourse (eg, among CVI practitioners, funders, and scholars). This grey literature review aimed to synthesize how CVI practitioners, funders, and scholars commonly characterize CVI approaches and how those approaches relate to previously identified CVI theoretical frameworks. Following processes similar to a scoping review, we conducted a grey literature search to locate and synthesize information from webpages (eg, from community groups and academic organizations) and (non-peer reviewed) reports from web sources discussing CVI approaches. We identified nine main CVI approaches commonly mentioned in applied CVI discourse: 1. Violence interruption/street outreach; 2. Group violence interventions (GVI)/focused deterrence/group violence reduction strategy (GVRS); 3. Hospital-based violence intervention programs (HVIP); 4. Built environment/place-based/Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED); 5. Behavioral science interventions/cognitive behavioral interventions; 6. Victim/trauma/survivor programs/resources; 7. Mentoring/fellowship programs; 8. School-based/related youth interventions; and 9. Diversion/deflection programs. These approaches operated at multiple intervention levels and drew on various theoretical frameworks. Findings from this scoping review provide a timely summary of how CVI is characterized in applied discourse, which can support the field in operating from a shared understanding of what constitutes CVI and, in turn, inform CVI research, practice, and policy-making.

Community gun violence in US cities is both rare and highly concentrated. Decades of research and practice show that shootings cluster within a very small number of people, places, and social networks. Effective violence reduction therefore requires identifying and engaging the individuals at very high risk of being involved in gun violence in the immediate future (i.e., very high-risk individuals, or VHRI).

This new brief is designed to support jurisdictions working to implement community violence intervention approaches by improving their ability to identify VHRI. The brief provides 1) a concise synthesis of the research evidence on risk for involvement in community gun violence, and 2) guidance on how to implement structured processes to identify the people driving violence within their communities.