By Lester Ramirez Irias

This report seeks to understand how communities in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras build and sustain their resilience to extortion, especially in light of state-led anti-extortion measures under emergency regimes in El Salvador and Honduras. It examines how community resilience manifests in environments plagued by violence and organized crime, particularly where gangs operate alongside public security forces under emergency regimes or mano dura (‘iron fist’) policies. Through six case studies, the report explores the varying contexts of community resilience, the factors contributing to its development and long-term sustainability, and the communities' capacity to absorb the impacts of criminal governance, adapt, and transform their environments. The findings reveal a shifting risk landscape for communities. Under emergency regimes, while the incidence of extortion and homicides has decreased, there has been an increase in restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms. These restrictions complicate community resilience, as the state – expected to provide public security and protect human rights – has become an enabler of impunity. The case studies highlight different forms of resilience, driven by diverse actors such as women victims of extortion, private sector organizations, and foundations promoting sports and community development. While not fully representative of each country, these case studies offer valuable insights into community resilience in high-violence and emergency contexts. Main findings § Emergency regimes have negatively impacted community resilience in El Salvador and Honduras. Each country has unique characteristics in how emergency regimes or ‘iron fist’ measures are implemented, driven by their respective governments. In El Salvador, community resilience is undermined by an emergency regime that has become entrenched as state policy, weakening communities' ability to resist and recover from threats. In Honduras, community resilience faces a dual challenge: criminal networks that once profited from extortion now operate legitimate businesses within communities, making it difficult to identify and manage threats. § Private sector-led initiatives are proving effective. Activities organized by the private sector, such as those by sugar associations in El Salvador and traders in Guatemala, have been effective in building and maintaining community resilience. The private sector’s ability to provide financial resources, along with its organization, leadership and influence over governments, has been crucial in reducing the risks posed by organized crime and transforming environments. However, as seen in the Honduras case study below, mistrust, fragmented initiatives and a highly uncertain context have hindered sustained collaboration between organized entrepreneurs and the police. § Organized sports contribute positively to community resilience. Participation in organized sports has been a key strategy for building resilience in the communities of La Bethania in Guatemala and Chamelecón in Honduras. Sports foster social cohesion by involving not only young people but also parents, coaches and other adults who serve as positive role models. It also offers young people a safe space and instils life values that extend beyond the playing field. § Corruption within the state significantly hampers resilience efforts. Corruption has a detrimental impact on the sustainability and effectiveness of community resilience initiatives. In El Salvador, for example, as extortion by gangs has decreased, police corruption has emerged as a new form of extortion. Unchecked corruption erodes public trust in institutions, allows organized crime to infiltrate state structures and excludes vulnerable groups such as women. § Sexual extortion and impunity obstruct the development of resilience. Under emergency regimes, sexual violence by state actors often receives institutional backing, with arbitrary detention threats becoming commonplace. Victims face severe psychological and social consequences, including stigma and revictimization. The normalization of sexual violence within communities exacerbates these issues, leaving women feeling unprotected and isolated. Mistrust of authorities and fear of reprisals further hinder the community’s ability to organize and respond collectively to such abuses.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 25p.

By Laura R. Blume

Why do drug traffickers sometimes decide to use violence, but other times demonstrate restraint? Building on recent work on the politics of drug violence, this article explores how Central American drug trafficking organizations’ strategies impact their use of violence. I argue that three inter-related political factors—corruption, electoral competition, and the politicization of the security apparatus—collectively determine the type of relationship between traffickers and the state that will emerge. That relationship, in turn, determines the primary strategy used by traffickers in that country. Drawing on over two years of comparative ethnographic fieldwork in key transshipment points along the Caribbean coast of Central America, I show how co-optation strategies in Honduras have resulted in high levels of violence, evasion strategies in Costa Rica have produced moderate levels of violence, and collusion strategies in Nicaragua have generated the lowest levels of drug-related violence.

Comparative Political Studies,Volume 55, Issue 8, July 2022, Pages 1366-1402

By Paulo J Murillo-Sandoval1, Steven E Sesnie2, Manuel Eduardo Ordoñez Armas3, Nicholas Magliocca4, Beth Tellman5, Jennifer A Devine6, Erik Nielsen7 and Kendra McSweeney8,*

We assess how much of Central America is likely to be agriculturally suitable for cultivating coca (Erythroxylum spp), the main ingredient in cocaine. Since 2017, organized criminal groups (not smallholders) have been establishing coca plantations in Central America for cocaine production. This has broken South America's long monopoly on coca leaf production for the global cocaine trade and raised concerns about future expansion in the isthmus. Yet it is not clear how much of Central America has suitable biophysical characteristics for a crop domesticated in, and long associated with the Andean region. We combine geo-located data from coca cultivation locations in Colombia with reported coca sites in Central America to model the soil, climate, and topography of Central American landscapes that might be suitable for coca production under standard management practices. We find that 47% of northern Central America (Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize) has biophysical characteristics that appear highly suitable for coca-growing, while most of southern Central America does not. Biophysical factors, then, are unlikely to constrain coca's spread in northern Central America. Whether or not the crop is more widely planted will depend on complex and multi-scalar social, economic, and political factors. Among them is whether Central American countries and their allies will continue to prioritize militarized approaches to the drug trade through coca eradication and drug interdiction, which are likely to induce further expansion, not contain it. Novel approaches to the drug trade will be required to avert this outcome.

Environ. Res. Lett. 19 (2024) 104068  

By Nicholas R. Magliocca , Diana S. Summers , Kevin M. Curtin , Kendra McSweeney, Ashleigh N. Price

Cocaine traffickers, or ‘narco-traffickers’, successfully exploit the heterogeneous landscapes of Central America for transnational smuggling. Narco-traffickers successfully adapt to disruptions from counterdrug interdiction efforts by spatially adjusting smuggling routes to evade detection, and by doing so bring collateral damages, such as deforestation, corruption, and violence, to new areas. This study is novel for its integration of landscape suitability analysis with criminological theory to understand the locations of these spatial adaptations by narco-traffickers as intentional, logical, and predictable choices based on the socio-environmental characteristics of Central America’s landscapes. Multi-level, mixed effects negative binomial regression models predict the suitability of landscapes for cocaine trafficking across 17 departments (the unit of analysis) in Costa Rica, El Sal vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama from 2007 to 2018. Informed by long-term research in the region, independent variables included proximity to roads, country borders, international ports, indigenous territories, population density, and protected areas. The year of peak interdiction (measured by kg of cocaine seized) in each department was used to analyze spatial shifts in landscape suitability before and after maximum counterdrug interdiction pressure. We find that areas with lower population density and closer proximity to international borders became more suitable following peak interdiction—i.e, they are more likely to be sought out by traffickers seeking to avoid further disruptions from counter-narcotic efforts. Additionally, indigenous territories were disproportionately exploited as cocaine trafficking routes following significant interdiction activities by law enforcement. While interdiction may reduce the suitability of targeted locations, it can also unintentionally increase the attractiveness of other locations. Our study pushes criminological theory through its application to a unique space/time context, and it advances land system science by considering landscape suitability for logistical rather than productive uses. Policy implications are clear. Since interdiction resources are limited relative to the overall amount of trafficking activity, knowing which landscape features are viewed as  suitable by traffickers can in the short term guide interdiction deployment strategies, and in the longer term build strategies to mitigate associated harms from trafficking where they are most likely  

Landscape and Urban Planning Volume 221, May 2022, 104359

What’s new? Each year, hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Darién Gap, a strip of jungle between Central and South America, on their way to the U.S. With little state presence in the area, Colombia’s Gaitanista drug syndicate is overseeing human smuggling rackets while gangs in Panama perpetrate assaults on migrants. Why does it matter? Illicit profits are soaring as the flow of migrants swells, with much of the money going to organised crime. Efforts by Colombia and Pan ama to impede the movement of people or weaken the criminal groups’ hold have so far failed to curb murder, rape and other attacks on migrants. What should be done? The days when the Darién Gap was a meaningful bar rier to mass migration are over. Enhanced law enforcement, redoubled efforts to quell crises in the main countries of departure and reinforced humanitarian assistance in the Darién could form part of regional efforts to manage irregular migration and protect the vulnerable.

Bogota; New York: Latin America Report N°102 | 3 November 2023

International Crisis Group, 2023. 46p.

By Julia Yansura

Proceeds from extortion in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador amount to more than US$1.1 billion annually according to a new study by Global Financial Integrity (GFI). The report, which examined data for individuals and businesses, also reveals that an estimated 330,000 people in the Northern Triangle region of Central America fall victim to extortion each year. Extortion against individuals is estimated at US$40 million – $57 million a year in Guatemala, US$190 million – $245 million a year in El Salvador, and $30 million – $50 million a year in Honduras. Data on extortion paid by businesses is not comparable across countries due to significant gaps in data availability. The report, titled Extortion in the Northern Triangle of Central America: Following the Money, assesses the value of this activity and seeks to better understand how the proceeds of extortion are used and laundered. It also considers whether anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) strategies are being effectively utilized to combat extortion.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2022. 39p.