By Iffat Idris

Conflict in eastern Ukraine has been underway since 2014: the February 2014 ouster of pro-Russia President Yanukovych was followed in March by Russian annexation of Crimea, and its support for insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) – the latter is ongoing. This paper is a rapid literature review of the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. While Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was rooted both in Moscow’s historic claims to the peninsula, as well as moves by Kiev to move closer to the European Union, the ongoing insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) stems from structural factors such as industrial decline. Russian support for the Donbas insurgents, alongside its failure to recognise the republics that they announced (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic), suggests that Moscow’s real goal is to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and prevent its integration into Western structures. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the economy of Crimea and Donbas. Russia has tried to demonstrate the benefits to Crimea of annexation by pumping vast resources into the region, but this resource injection has been unable to overcome the effects of wide-ranging Western sanctions. Donbas’ economy has been even more badly affected by ongoing conflict, with thousands displaced and an economic blockade imposed by Kiev greatly limiting trade. Here too, Moscow has had to step in with subsidies and humanitarian assistance. The paper also looks at the involvement of organised criminal groups (OCGs) in the conflict, and the impact of the conflict on organised crime in the region. With regard to the former it finds that OCGs played a big role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, fighting alongside Russian forces (without their insignia) and other volunteers. This highlights the complementary and symbiotic nature of the connection between criminal groups and the Russian state. OCGs in the Donbas region had strong links with the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, ousted in 2014 – hence it is no surprise that these groups were heavily involved in the Donbas insurgency. With regard to how organised crime has been affected by conflict, the paper finds that corruption was a massive problem in Ukraine long before the conflict in the east. Moreover, it involved all levels of the government system and was strongly linked to organised crime. OCGs were especially prevalent in Crimea, while Donbas was even more notorious for criminality. Post-Crimea’s annexation, links between OCGs in Crimea and in Russia became even stronger. Ironically, due to the vast influx of Russian development funds, Crimea represented an opportunity for embezzlement and corruption for Russian and Crimean OCGs. Closer ties were even forged between Russian OCGs and those in Ukraine. Since the conflict in Donbas began – and given the economic blockade, and falling Russian funding support - the region has become heavily dependent on organised crime. The paper also finds that oligarchs, with close ties to organised crime, have benefited hugely from Crimea becoming part of Russia, e.g. seizing property belonging to pro Ukraine business elites. Ties with political elites are equally strong: gangs gain protection from political patronage, in turn giving kickbacks to politicians. One final aspect explored in the paper is transnational crime. It finds that this has risen since the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, including a rise in smuggling of illicit goods into Europe, and a rise in organised crime in Ukraine. Sevastopol could potentially take over as a smuggling hub from Odesa, while Crimea and Ukraine could become a global money laundering centre. Criminality in Russia has also increased, seen in rises in drug and arms trafficking and criminal cases. The drop in cross-border cooperation to combat crime has contributed to greater criminality. The paper concludes that corruption, crime and conflict are heavily intermeshed in eastern Ukraine, with each reinforcing the other in what appears to be a downward spiral of escalation.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 2. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 26p/

By Vaclav Prusa   

In 2023, President Mnangagwa secured a second term amid allegations of election irregularities and corruption in Zimbabwe. Despite anti-corruption efforts, challenges include political interference and resource constraints, hindering transparency. Though there have been efforts to address corruption in the natural resources sector, progress in prosecuting politically exposed persons and recovering stolen assets has been uneven. Likewise, hopes for reform since Mnangagwa's 2017 presidency have been tempered by enduring corruption, economic challenges, and human rights abuses. And illicit financial flows, notably linked to corruption in mining, timber, and wildlife, pose a significant international threat as they have drained billions of dollars from the country. Though civil society and independent media play crucial roles in exposing corruption, initiatives such as The Patriot Act, introduced in 2023, raises concerns about suppressing dissent and investigative journalism.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway ; Berlin: Transparency international, 2023. 26p.

By Caitlin Maslen   

Green energy (and/or renewable energy) requires large areas of land to operate, often more so than energy generated from fossil fuels. The acquisition of land comes with accompanying corruption risks which can lead to challenges such as land grabbing and illegal displacement of communities. To help mitigate corruption risks and their consequences, strong regulatory oversight and rigorous licensing requirements are needed, as well as transparency and community-based approaches to ownership of green energy projects.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway ; Berlin: Transparency international, 2023. 21p.

Sergi, Anna and Vannucci, Alberto

This paper wishes to explore some characteristics of the relevant interconnections between mafias/ mafiosi and masonic lodges/masons in the Italian context. The paper sets out to study these interconnections from a social science perspective rooted in sociological and neo-institutional studies of organised crime and mafias, but also in criminological approaches to social constructionism, in the form of symbols and narratives. We will present a case study to reflect on the roles that (deviant) masons can assume in contexts where both mafias’ and personal, political, or economic interests are at play. The case study shows how masonic alliances can augment networking and enforcing capabilities: we call this process masonic deviance amplification. Additionally, the case study confirms the constitutive power that narratives around the masonic world hold today in the Italian context.

The Secret Nexus. A case study of deviant masons, mafia, and corruption in Italy. The British Journal of Criminology, 63 (5). (2022) pp. 1165-1183.

By Andres Martinez-Fernandez

Key Points

• Corruption is an urgent challenge in Mexico that undermines political stability, economic development, the rule of law, efforts to combat organized crime, and the effectiveness of public services.

• Corruption in Mexico’s security forces is a key contributor to the sharp rise of organized criminal violence and severely handicaps US-Mexico security cooperation against drug cartels.

• President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s emphasis on combating money laundering and his empowerment of Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit are positive developments for the government’s anti-corruption efforts. However, an increasingly hostile stance to US-Mexico security cooperation, the politicization of investigations, neglect of independent institutions, and inattention to cartel corruption are all concerning.

• The US should use a combination of diplomatic engagement, expanded cooperation against money laundering, and unilateral enforcement actions to restore trust and the effectiveness of bilateral security and anti-corruption cooperation while pushing Mexico to address its anti-corruption blind spots.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2021. 32p.

Edited By Melchior Powell, Dina Wafa, Tim A. Mau

This book provides an important survey of the causes and current state of corruption across a range of nations and regions. Delving into the diverse ways in which corruption is being combatted, the book explores and describes efforts to inculcate principles of ethical conduct in citizens, private sector actors and public sector personnel and institutions. Corruption is a global condition that effects every type of government, at every level, and has bewitched scholars of governance from ancient times to the present day. The book brings together chapters on a range of state and regional corruption experiences, framing them in terms of efforts to enhance ethical conduct and achieve integrity in government practices and operations. In addition, the book addresses and analyses the theoretical and practical bases of ethics that form the background and historical precepts of efforts to create integrity in government practices, and finally assesses recent international efforts to address corruption on an international scale. This book will be perfect for researchers and upper level students of public administration, comparative government, international development, criminal justice, and corruption.

London: Routledge; New York: 2020. 352p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Despite minimal domestic production, gold has figured prominently in Kenya’s recent history. Many Kenyans can still vividly recall the ‘Goldenberg’ scandal of the 1990s, a gold export and foreign exchange fraud scheme that drained government coffers of a sum exceeding ten percent of Kenya’s GDP at the time.The late 1990s also saw the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in then Zaïre, followed by a devastating half-decade-long regional conflict that resulted in the loss of five million lives, mainly from war-related hunger and disease. Facing external invasion and an internal revolt, Zaïre’s successor state, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), lost control of most of the resource-rich territory in the east of the country. Since then, the smuggling of artisanally mined minerals, including gold, have fuelled an ongoing conflict that in 2022 reached an intensity not seen for a decade. Insurgent groups, pro-government militias and criminal networks all continue to benefit from the tonnes of gold smuggled out of eastern DRC each year. Kenya has long been one of the principal regional transit hubs – along with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania – for the smuggling of this conflict gold.Almost as lucrative as the smuggling of genuine gold through Kenya are the myriad scams that seek to peddle counterfeit or non-existent quantities of the precious metal to unsuspecting buyers. The targets of these scams are often foreigners travelling to Africa in search of hit-and-run riches. Gold swindles have on occasion escalated into embarrassing diplomatic rows, most notably in 2020 when both the president of Kenya and the main opposition leader were summoned to a meeting by the emir of Dubai over an Emirati company that had been victimized by Kenyan fraudsters. Dubai is by far the most popular destination for smuggled East African gold, due to its status as a tax haven as well as a key aviation hub.The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) conducted extensive interviews with a Kenyan national whose initial career in aviation logistics – specifically the charting of private jets – gradually pulled him into the gold trafficking underworld.During these interviews, this insider provided the GI-TOC with a series of unique insights based on a decade of experience in the East African illicit gold trade. These insights will be presented through several accounts of operations in which our source was involved, ranging from fictitious customs seizures to an attempt by an Israeli businessman to commandeer an aircraft, a German with ‘gold fever’, a month-long airport standoff in the UAE and a visit to an artisanal smelting facility located in the heart of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. Taken together, our source’s revelations paint a picture of an illicit economy characterized more by con artistry and double-dealing than genuine commodity trading.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 31p.

By G. Herbert

This review provides a summary of the evidence on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) between China and developing countries in Africa and Asia. Specifically, it looks at the evidence on how IFFs to and from China impact on developing countries, as well as on the drivers of IFFs and of how flows are facilitated. The review draws upon a combination of academic and grey literature sources, though it is not exhaustive and only draws upon English language sources. IFFs involving China have attracted particular attention, due to estimates suggesting it is responsible for the largest IFFs by value globally. However, little has been published to date specifically on IFFs between China and developing countries. This paper attempts to help address this gap. Section 2 provides some background information on the debates and uncertainties around IFFs, including conceptual issues, difficulties in measuring these flows, and their potential impacts, as well as attempts to quantify China’s overall IFFs. Section 3 focuses on trade-related IFFs between China and developing countries in Asia and Africa. Discrepancies indicative of potential IFFs are identified using trade data from 2018 and an attempt is made to determine the scale of the revenue consequences of trade is-invoicing for China’s developing country partners. Section 4 considers IFFs-related to corrupt business practices, focusing largely on Chinese investment in Africa. Section 5 moves on to consider IFFs that relate to the trade in illegal products, including illegal narcotics, human trafficking, the illegal arms trade, the illegal wildlife trade, the illegal organ trade, and the trade-in counterfeit products. Finally, Section 6 discusses enabling environment factors relevant to IFFs between China and developing countries.

K4D Helpdesk Report.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 2020. 37p.

By Michael Levi

Money laundering has ascended the enforcement and criminological agenda in the course of this century, and has been accompanied by an increased focus on legal professionals as ‘enablers’ of crime. This article explores the dynamics of this enforcement, media and political agenda, and how the legal profession has responded in the UK and elsewhere, within the context of ignoring the difficulties of judging the effectiveness of anti money laundering. It concludes that legal responses are a function of their lobbying power, the determination of governments to clamp down on the toxic impacts of legal structures, and different legal cultures. However, it remains unclear what the effects on the levels and organization of serious crimes for gain are of controls on the professions.

Trends in Organized Crime volume 24, pages96–110 (2021)

by Richard Chelin

Synthetic drugs have created a public-health crisis and changed drug market dynamics in the country. Synthetic drugs, more specifically, new psychoactive substances (NPSs), were first detected in Mauritius in 2013 and since then have had a significant negative impact, overtaking heroin as the most popular drug among young people. The government has developed various policies to address the issue, the most recent being the National Drug Control Masterplan, which promotes collaboration among law enforcement agencies. However, the success of the strategy will depend on its effective implementation.

ENACT-Africa, 2020. 20p.

By Marcena Hunter

Exploitation and criminal capture of the ASGM sector is multifaceted and complex.

The development potential of the African artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector is undermined by criminal consortia across the continent who exploit it for economic and political ends at the expense of vulnerable populations. Yet, much of the discourse around ASGM in Africa has not directly addressed criminality, instead being framed within development or conflict frameworks. In an effort to fill this gap, this report seeks to unpack how criminal consortia manipulate ASGM and associated gold flows to secure illicit rents and capture the sector. The findings highlight the need for nuance, especially regarding the role of informal and traditional actors in the sector. Through a more holistic understanding of the challenge, policymakers will better be able to identify and combat criminal consortia in ASGM.

ENACT - Africa, 2019. 44p.

By Eric Scheye

Using country specific formulae in three categories – water and electrical utilities, tax administration and land management – this paper presents an empirical methodology to measure state actors' political will to reduce organised crime.

A lack of political will is often used as an excuse by policymakers, donors and development practitioners to explain failures in policies and programmes. While this is true for most development programming, it is particularly salient with regard to anti-corruption, the rule of law, and efforts to combat organised crime. Indeed, political will is vital if governments are to reduce the deleterious activities of organised crime; without it, crime proliferates. Using country specific formulae in three categories, water and electrical utilities, tax administration and land management, this paper presents an empirical methodology to measure the political will possessed by state actors to reduce organised crime.

ENACT-Africa, 2020. 20p.

By Mark Shaw

Foreign criminals are a significant presence in Africa. Four typologies of foreign criminal actors are identified, allowing an exploration into why some actors develop more successful criminal enterprises than others. Success appears to be the result of a slow embedment in the local criminal economy, avoiding displays of wealth and the targeted corruption of officials. It also depends on the expansion of ethnic networks where high levels of trust or coercion of members prevent law enforcement penetration. Eroding these successful criminal operations requires an ability to disrupt recruitment into the networks and ultimately their more effective integration into legitimate economic activities.

ENACT-Africa, 2028. 24p.

By Raouf Farrah

The civil society of the Libyan northwest city of Zuwara has led several efforts over the last years to tackle criminal governance with notable successes and failures. In 2014-2015, Zuwara’s CSOs took an impressive stand against human smuggling, providing assistance to migrants, raising awareness of the impact and dangers of smuggling, and leveraging elites to strengthen local taboos against human smuggling. Although community efforts continue to fight against criminal governance through awareness-raising and education campaigns via media, religious discourse and university campuses, the 2014-2015 momentum has been lost. Zuwara’s civil society has the means to reignite its stance against criminal governance. To do so, it needs more political recognition, more assistance from international stakeholders and better cooperation between local stakeholders with clearer boundaries between law enforcement and CSOs.

Geneva: e Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and Migrant Network., 2021. 29p.

By Julia Stanyard | Thierry Vircoulon | Julian Rademeyer

The Wagner Group has rapidly become the most influential form of Russian engagement in Africa today. Principally a private military company – the group is a supplier of mercenary troops – it also comprises a network of political influence operations and economic entities such as mining companies. Controlled by a historically close ally of Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner has a seemingly mutually beneficial relationship with the Russian state. The group has been accused of using whatever means necessary, including criminal activity, to achieve its aims: from indiscriminate use of violence against civilians in its military engagements, to disinformation campaigns and election-rigging to industrialscale smuggling of natural resources, like gold and diamonds. The group operates in the grey zone, spanning both legal and illegal economies. In late January 2023, the US government designated Wagner as a ‘transnational criminal organization’, allowing for wider sanctions against Wagner and its enablers. The Wagner Group is unique as an organization in the breadth, scale and boldness of its activities. However, as this report aims to show, Wagner did not emerge in a vacuum. …

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 92p.

By Uglješa Ugi Zvekić, Sunčana Roksandić and Bojan Dobovšek,

This report uses the term ‘organized corruption’ to explain how corruption is embedded in the political economy of many countries in the region. Organized corruption is a ‘a symbiosis of organized crime, criminal methods and high-level corruption, which creates a crooked ecosystem that enriches and protects those with access to power’. Organized corruption is not only about systemic illicit financial gains and undue influence in decision-making, but also the systemic buying and influencing of social support to gain or maintain political and economic power.

Organized corruption is particularly evident in the political context of transitions towards democracy, when key parts of the economy are in the public domain, as is the case in the Western Balkans. In this context, control of politics and control of the economy are interlinked. Being in power means controlling the strings of the public purse. Political parties utilize political power to acquire economic influence through the control of public finances and public officials. Political victory enables the use of state funds and enterprises for patronage and to gain financial, political and social benefits. In such an environment, elections are often a winner-take-all contest, not only for the political parties but also for those who benefit from patronage. It therefore follows that those who profit from power have an interest in financing political parties and elections.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), 2023. 72p.

By Anastasia Austin and Douwe den Held

The Dominican Republic prides itself on its openness to the world. As one of the first countries to open up during the COVID-19 pandemic, it seeks to be ever welcoming to tourism and business. But criminals may feel welcome as well. In this three-part series, InSight Crime dives into the infrastructure, the trafficking networks, and the corruption facilitating organized crime in the Dominican Republic.

Washington, Insight Crime, 2022. 26p.

By Venezuela Investigative Unit

Is Venezuela now a hybrid state, where the line between governance and criminality has blurred, or even disappeared altogether? The start of this evolution can be traced back 20 years to then-President Hugo Chávez and his willingness to use all means necessary to cling to power. Since then, the country has seen the emergence of new generations of hybrid armed groups, which systematically coordinate and cooperate with elements of the state. In some parts of Venezuela, authorities now co-govern with these groups, working hand in hand to maintain social control over the population and to counter political, social, and economic threats.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2023. 41p

By Meenakshi Fernandes and Lenka Jančová  

  Corruption, which can be defined as the 'abuse of entrusted power for private gain', poses a significant threat in the European Union. Corrupt practices can lead to a misuse of public funds and can contribute towards an erosion of democracy and the rule of law. The European Union can do more to tackle corruption and curb its negative impacts on society. This report draws on a quantitative analysis of corruption in the EU with a focus on three aspects: i) democracy and the rule of law; ii) public trust in institutions; and iii) public procurement. Further EU action to tackle corruption could strengthen trust in public institutions and enhance regulatory certainty. In quantitative terms, the social and economic gains could reach up to €58.5 billion per year.  

 Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023.  78p.

By Ilia Gaglio, Jacopo Guzzon, Katarina Bartz, Luca Marcolin, Rrap Kryeziu, Emma Disley, Jirka Taylor, Shann Hulme

The present study to strengthen the fight against corruption in the EU aims at providing recommendations for possible EU measures in the area of corruption prevention and repression and to assess and compare the impacts of the identified policy options. The core problems, drivers and issues of the EU anti-corruption acquis, the need for and added value of EU action and the relevant policy objectives were identified through detailed desk research and numerous consultation activities. Overall, the assessment pointed to legislative and operational barriers that hinder both the prevention and the fight against corruption in the EU. Main barriers include significant differences in terms of legislative and administrative arrangements in place at the national level to fight against corruption, as well as a lack of adequate data collection and monitoring of corruption data and trends that prevents sufficient prevention of corruption in the EU. …

Publications Office of the European Union, 2022. 193p.