By Jennifer Cearns and Charles Beach

Contraband Cultures presents narratives, representations, practices and imaginaries of smuggling and extra-legal or informal circulation practices, across and between the Latin American region (including the Caribbean) and its diasporas. Countering a fetishizing and hegemonic imaginary (typically stemming from the Global North) of smuggling activity in Latin America as chaotic, lawless, violent and somehow ‘exotic’, this book reframes such activities through the lenses of kinship, political movements, economic exchange and resistance to capitalist state hegemony. The volume comprises a broad range of chapters from scholars across the social sciences and humanities, using various methodological techniques, theoretical traditions and analytic approaches to explore the efficacy and valence of ‘smuggling’ or ‘contraband’ as a lens onto modes of personhood, materiality, statehood and political (dis)connection across Latin America. This material is presented through a combination of historic documentation and contemporary ethnographic research across the region to highlight the genesis and development of these cultural practices whilst grounding them in the capitalist and colonial refashioning of the entire region from the sixteenth century to the present day.

London: UCL Press, 2024. 294p.

By The  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

Gender-based violence against women and girls and its most extreme manifestation —femicides, feminicides, or gender-related killings of women and girls—1 are a dramatic illustration of the persistent structural challenges of gender inequality that affect women and girls in Latin America and the Caribbean. Bulletin No. 3 on feminicide violence presents the official statistics submitted by the region’s countries to the Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean on cases of femicides, feminicides and gender-related killings of women reported in 2023. This bulletin is part of the UNiTE by 2030 to End Violence against Women campaign of the Secretary General of the United Nations, aimed at preventing and eliminating gender-based violence against women and girls worldwide. The campaign calls on governments, civil society organizations, women’s organizations, youth, the private sector, the media, and the entire United Nations system to join forces and tackle the global pandemic of violence against women and girls. The publication of this third bulletin coincides with the commemoration of two key milestones in the process of garnering commitments from States to guarantee the human rights of women and girls and the right to a life free of violence: the thirtieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, and the thirtieth anniversary of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará), the first human rights treaty to establish the right of women to a life free of violence in both the public and private sphere, and to identify gender-based violence against women as a violation of human rights. The standards and commitments established in these instruments are also reflected in the Regional Gender Agenda, which consolidates agreements signed by governments at different sessions of the Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1977 (see diagram 1). Another key instrument in the region is the Montevideo Consensus, adopted at the first meeting of the Regional Conference on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Consensus is a robust road map to promote the safeguarding of sexual and reproductive rights, gender equality and a rights-based approach (ECLAC, 2013).   

Bulletin No, 3 Santiago de Chile; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) , 2024. 20p.

By Cirenia Chávez, Victor Cebotari, María José Benítez, Dominic Richardson, Chii Fen Hiu and Juliana Zapata

The prevalence of school-related violence and bullying is a global issue that impacts educational outcomes negatively. Furthermore, bullying can have emotional and physical effects on the children experiencing it, both in the short- and long term. Although the evidence regarding bullying from low- and middle-income countries is less extensive in comparison to evidence on the effects of bullying from high-income countries, some findings from the Latin American and Caribbean regions show similar results connecting lower reading scores with a high prevalence of bullying victimization. This working paper uses data from UNESCO’s Third Regional Comparative and Explanatory Study to determine the correlation between bullying and learning outcomes in 15 countries of the LAC region. It also looks at ways to mitigate the impacts of violence.

Innocenti Working Paper WP-2021-02 New York: UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund, 202. 68p.

By Carla Álvarez

Ecuador is experiencing an unusual growth in violence and criminality. In addition to being among the 10 countries with the greatest incidence of criminality in the world,1 it currently has the highest rate of violent deaths in Latin America, 47.25 for every 100 000 residents,2 eight times higher than in 2016, the year Ecuador recorded its lowest rate since 1980.3 In less than a decade, it has gone from being the second safest country in South America (after Chile)4 to becoming the most violent. Firearms play a central role in this security crisis. According to the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index,5 arms trafficking is one of the largest-growing criminal markets in the country. Firearms have become an instrument for strengthening the capacity of criminal organizations dedicated to drug trafficking and illegal mining, as well as a way to assert territorial control. In 2023, firearms were involved in nine out of every 10 violent deaths in the country.6 As shown in Figures 1 and 2, since 2020 the number of homicides has virtually doubled year after year, as well as the recurrence of the use of firearms. These figures exceed the regional and worldwide averages of violence committed with these devices.7 In addition, while young men have accounted for the majority of the violent deaths recorded, the assassinations of women have also grown significantly in recent years. In the case of the femicides recorded in 2023, a total of 321 violent deaths of women were gender-related, 37% of which were committed using firearms.8 The centrality of firearms in the dynamics of violence in Ecuador is the result of the loosening of internal regulations that permit the import, manufacture, commerce and carrying of weapons. Despite the growth in armed violence, on 1 April 2023 the Ecuadorian government relaxed several measures that expanded the legal market for firearms. These decisions were adopted despite the institutional inability of the state to exercise effective control over the permits to carry and possess weapons;9 the growing corruption in security-related institutions;10 and the harsh criticism by some sectors of civil society of the government for having fostered the adoption of measures on self-protection and the privatization of security instead of promoting a public security policy.

This change has facilitated the proliferation of arms amid a process of expansion of criminal activities in the country, which has in turn led to the growth of an active and concerning market for arms. Without a doubt, the increase in violence is related to the increase in arms trafficking, which, in addition to being lucrative, facilitates other crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, illegal mining, contract killings and kidnappings.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2024. 31p.

By  Rafael Duarte Villa, Camila de Macedo Braga1 and Marcos Alan S. V. Ferreira

In several Latin American countries, social violence has risen to warlike levels. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the extent of social violence and the new (informal) forms of governance generated by the so-called violent nonstate actors (VNSAs). Where a state’s forces fail to provide for the physical protection and social security of its citizens, some areas are governed by a mix of formal (vertical) and informal (horizontal) forms of governance, mixing state and nonstate actors. In these socially bounded spaces, nonstate actors produce and distribute public goods similarly as the state does. In this article, we explore how hybrid governance has appeared in the South American region, considering the operation of two regional VNSAs, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in Brazil and the Bandas Criminales (BACRIM) in Colombia. We show that such VNSAs are significant agents for security governance, as they challenge preconceived notions of state authority (legitimacy)  

2021, Latin American Research Review

By Spencer Chainey Nathalie Alvarado Rodrigo Serrano–Berthet

Hot spots policing (HSP) is an effective approach for decreasing crime. This guide is designed to help police agencies better understand and make practical use of this policing strategy. The guide explains how HSP works in helping to decrease crime, and describes the processes involved in implementing a successful program in Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC). It also offers practical advice on how to address many of the challenges involved in implementing HSP, how to evaluate its impact, and how to complement it with other policing approaches to help sustain decreases in crime. Included throughout the publication are case studies from the region that help illustrate how HSP is applied. The guide also answers questions that are often asked about HSP, such as issues associated with the displacement of crime.

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank - IDB 2024. 149p.

By Simone Cecchini and Jorge Martínez Pizarro

In Latin America and the Caribbean, where every country is a country of origin, destination, return or transit, international migration is becoming ever more complex and intensive. Migratory flows are increasingly characterized by irregularity; and migrants represent one of the most vulnerable population groups, as victims of stigmatization, discrimination, xenophobia and racism. However, migrants contribute to sustainable development through work, entrepreneurship, remittances and tax payments, in addition to their culture. To enhance these contributions, public policies and migration governance are needed at the multilateral, national and local levels, based on the interaction between migration and development and fulfilment of the countries’ human rights obligations.

CEPAL Review No. 141 • December 2023

By the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The Americas have the highest regional homicide rate in the world, and high rates of homicidal violence related to organized crime. This research brief, excerpted from the UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2023, notes several recurrent patterns with respect to factors shaping criminal homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean: › Homicides related to organized crime and gangs are significantly more volatile than homicides perpetrated by intimate partners or other family members. › Subregions, countries and cities with a high homicide rate tend to be associated with a larger proportion of firearm-related homicide. › Settings with a high homicide rate also typically report a large proportion of homicides involving male victims. › High homicide rates are also usually associated with a proportionately higher number of homicides related to organized crime. Where there is a higher density of criminal organizations, there is a higher risk of homicidal violence. › Drug markets alone do not predict homicide but they are frequently associated with lethal violence, especially in the context of multiple competing criminal factions. Amid mounting public concern with violent crime and low trust in police, some Latin American and Caribbean governments are enacting “states of emergency” in response to organized crime and violent gangs. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has expressed concern about the human rights impacts of states of emergency introduced to address organized crime and violence1, while the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace policy brief 2 notes that over-securitized responses can be counterproductive and can reinforce the very dynamics they seek to overcome, as their far-reaching consequences – blowback from local populations, human rights violations and abuses, exacerbation of gender inequalities and distortion of local economies – can be powerful drivers for recruitment into terrorist or armed groups.  

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 42p.

What’s new? Each year, hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Darién Gap, a strip of jungle between Central and South America, on their way to the U.S. With little state presence in the area, Colombia’s Gaitanista drug syndicate is overseeing human smuggling rackets while gangs in Panama perpetrate assaults on migrants. Why does it matter? Illicit profits are soaring as the flow of migrants swells, with much of the money going to organised crime. Efforts by Colombia and Pan ama to impede the movement of people or weaken the criminal groups’ hold have so far failed to curb murder, rape and other attacks on migrants. What should be done? The days when the Darién Gap was a meaningful bar rier to mass migration are over. Enhanced law enforcement, redoubled efforts to quell crises in the main countries of departure and reinforced humanitarian assistance in the Darién could form part of regional efforts to manage irregular migration and protect the vulnerable.

Bogota; New York: Latin America Report N°102 | 3 November 2023

International Crisis Group, 2023. 46p.

By Reynell Badill and Víctor M. Mijares

Why do criminal groups decide to adopt political discourses? We argue that an armed group's discursive politicisation (the public declaration of political motivations) is more likely when the state declares the organisation to be an existential threat, militarises the fight against it (securitisation), and when the leaders of the armed group have had political training. This discourse aims to reduce the state's military actions against them and gain civilian support. This argument is demonstrated through a qualitative comparative analysis of six Latin American cases: Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia and Los Rastrojos (Colombia), Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú (Peru), Primeiro Comando da Capital (Brazil), Tren de Aragua (Venezuela), and Cartel de Sinaloa (Mexico). Three of them adopted a political discourse, and the others did not. We provide an analytical framework for criminal actors who do not necessarily fit into insurgent, paramilitary or simple criminal group typology.

October 2021Global Crime 22(4):312-335

By Patrick Naef

This article provides a picture of the political economy of tourism and violence in Medellín. It analyses the way criminal actors and tourism entrepreneurs share a territory, by shedding light on the extortion of tour guides, street performers and business owners in some of its barrios populares (poor neighbourhoods). The main objective is to demonstrate how intimate relationships – between and among kin, friends, long-term acquaintances – impact what is considered the criminal governance of tourism. This contribution shows that extortion in Medellín meets only limited resistance from tourism entrepreneurs. It also emphasises how criminals, tourism actors and tourists themselves contribute to the creation of fragile secured spaces in the developing tourist-scapes of Colombia's second city.

Journal of Latin American Studies (2023), 55, 323–348

By Spencer Chainey and Robert Muggah

Despite numerous attempts to decrease homicides in the Latin American region, high homicide levels have persisted. Examining four cities in Rio de Janeiro, the research reveals the intense geographic concentration of homicides in each city, but illustrates differences in the extent of homicide concentration when using a variety of crime concentration measures. Single events involving multiple homicides and a homicide near repeat pattern are observed, with almost all these incidents taking place in areas of homicide concentration. The findings suggest that programmes targeted to areas of homicide concentration, including interventions that suppress the likelihood of future incidents, could decrease homicides.

The Police Journal, 95(2), 255-275. 2022.

by Stephanie Brewer and Ana Lucia Verduzco

Mexico’s federal government is increasingly militarizing civilian tasks within and outside the realm of public security. Previous presidents presented militarization as a temporary measure that would allow time to strengthen civilian institutions—though in practice, military deployment became the permanent model, largely at the expense of prioritizing other security and justice strategies and institutions. The current government, however, promotes a broad militarization of civilian tasks in the long term, including through the militarization of the National Guard. The power and roles of the armed forces are growing without effective civilian controls over their actions. While the levels of serious human rights violations attributed to the military have fallen following the end of former president Felipe Calderón’s term, such violations continue to occur. More broadly, Mexico continues to experience historic levels of violence, and the vast majority of crimes go unpunished. Without minimizing positive reforms and steps forward, access to justice remains a fundamental challenge. In this context, it is crucial to improve criminal investigations and strengthen the capacities and accountability of the country’s police institutions. The military’s growing list of civilian tasks is a trend that will not be easily reversed, but demilitarizing public security and consolidating civilian institutions is the necessary route to strengthen the rule of law. In the meantime, the government must install effective civilian controls over the armed forces.

Mexico: WOLA- Adovcacy for Human Rights in Mexico, 2023, 61p.

By Abigail Weitzman, Mónica Caudillo, and Eldad J. Levy

In this review, we argue that to understand patterns and causes of violence in contemporary Latin America, we must explicitly consider when violence takes on interpersonal qualities. We begin by reviewing prominent definitions and measurements of interpersonal violence. We then detail the proliferation of interlocking sources of regional insecurity, including gender-based violence, gangs, narcotrafficking, vigilantism, and political corruption. Throughout this description, we highlight when and how each source of insecurity can become interpersonal. Next, we outline mutually reinforcing macro and micro conditions underlying interpersonal violence in its many hybrid forms. To conclude, we call for more multifaceted conceptualizations of interpersonal violence that embrace the complexities of Latin American security situations and discuss the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead in this area.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 163 - 186

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Since 2007, negotiations with violent organised crime groups (hereafter, “criminal groups”) have been increasingly featured in government, church and NGO responses to violent criminality in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are enormously controversial, both politically and ethically. Many consider them unacceptable and counterproductive, as they may involve risks such as legitimising the criminal group or emboldening others to engage in criminal activities. The relative rarity with which such negotiations produce a deal and the great uncertainty as to their long-term outcomes are further sources of controversy. The sensitivity and risks are so large that some who have participated in the situations examined in this paper are wary of calling them “negotiations.” They may avoid the term even when they have bargained from a position of superiority or succeeded in striking a deal. In attempting to address the challenges criminal groups present, most countries understandably employ a tough-on-crime stance. Any other would be hard to justify to the public. Yet, where the activities of these groups have become especially pervasive and violent, there is often a lack of deterrence capacity, leading to public anger and desperation. Negotiation can thus sometimes become an option and may be pursued in conjunction with coercive tactics, institutional strengthening, legalisation measures and more. As a diplomat involved in the talks with criminal gangs in El Salvador and Honduras put it, by negotiating “we were not trying to get to heaven; we were just trying to avoid hell.” But if negotiation with criminal groups sometimes becomes necessary, which group characteristics and contextual factors must be taken into account? What end-goals are appropriate and realistic? What inducements, concessions and redlines must be contemplated? And how do such processes compare and contrast with negotiations conducted with politically-motivated insurgents? These are just some of the questions examined in this paper.   

Barcelona, Spain: The Institute for Integrated Transitions, 2021. 47p,