By Tatiana Zárate-Barrera

This paper estimates the non-monotonic effects of air pollution on criminal activity in a developing country setting and provides empirical evidence on the potential behavioral responses mediating this relationship. To do so, I combine daily administrative data on crime, air pollution, and sentiment polarity from millions of social media posts in Mexico City between January 2017 and March 2020. The identification strategy relies on highly dimensional fixed-effect models, non-parametric estimations of dose-response functions, and an instrumental variable approach that employs wind speed and wind direction as instruments for air pollution. My results suggest a causal and inverted U-shape relationship between air pollution and crime. Specifically, there is an inflection point after which marginal increases in air pollution negatively affect criminal activity. Exploring the mechanisms behind this relationship, I find that air pollution has the power to shape people’s emotional states and mobility patterns. These results provide important insights for developing countries where pollution levels are dangerously high, and crime is still one of the most pressing issues. In particular, under certain circumstances, environmental regulation tailored to reduce air pollution must consider the presence of behavioral responses and these non-linear interactions with criminal activity in their design. 

Unpublished paper, 2021. 48p.

By Mary Allen and Cristine Rotenberg

In December, 2014, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA) changed the laws related to the sex trade, shifting the focus of criminalization from those who sell their own sexual services onto those who purchase sexual services and those who benefit financially from others’ sexual services. This article examines changes in sex-trade-related crime reported by police before and after the change in legislation.Between 2010 and 2019, there was a 55% decline in sex-trade-related crime driven by a 95% decline in incidents of stopping or impeding traffic, or communicating for the purpose of offering, providing or obtaining sexual services. Most of this decline occurred prior to the adoption of the PCEPA in 2014.Fewer women were accused or charged in incidents of stopping or communicating offences after the introduction of the PCEPA. The number of men accused in incidents relating to stopping or communicating offences also dropped considerably between 2010 and 2014. Charging rates also declined for men accused in this type of incident, but not to the same extent.With the drop in charges for stopping or communicating offences, there was a large decline in the number of court cases involving these offences. Fewer women were tried in court for stopping or communicating offences in the five-year period after the new legislation than the five-year period preceding the change (-97%). In addition, far fewer women were found guilty, and, of those, none were sentenced to custody.The PCEPA placed a new focus on activities related to the purchasing of sexual services. Between 2015 and 2017, incidents of the new offence of obtaining sexual services from an adult increased sharply before declining for two consecutive years. Individuals accused in these incidents were mostly men.After the drop in the number of men accused in incidents of stopping or communicating offences prior to the PCEPA, the number of men accused increased once the new legislation was in place (obtaining sexual services from an adult). There was also an increase in men accused in incidents of obtaining sexual services from a minor. Most of the men accused of purchasing sexual services were charged. In the courts, over four in five men tried for obtaining services from a minor were found guilty, and this was the case for about one in seven cases of obtaining sexual services from an adult.The number of police-reported incidents related to profiting from the sexual services of others increased after the change in legislation, as procuring and receiving material benefit incidents reached a high point in 2019, almost double what was reported in 2010.Both before and after the change in legislation, men were more often accused in incidents related to procuring or receiving material benefit than women, even more so after the PCEPA (67% of accused were men prior to the PCEPA and 82% after). This shift was the result of the drop in women accused in these incidents, coupled with a substantial increase in the number of men accused. In the courts, among cases involving a charge related to profiting from sexual services, men were more likely than women to be convicted in the five-year period before and after the PCEPA. Most of those convicted in these cases were sentenced to custody. Though an infrequent offence in terms of the number of cases processed, advertising sexual services offences also saw high conviction rates.After the PCEPA, fewer sex-trade-related offences occurred on the street or in an open area and proportionally more took place in a home or a commercial dwelling unit such as a hotel. This was driven by a considerable decline in offences that are public by definition (i.e., stopping or impeding traffic or communicating offences). The increase in incidents occurring in a home or a commercial dwelling unit is mostly explained by the large increase in incidents of procuring or receiving material benefit as well as the creation of the new offence related to obtaining sexual services from an adult.

Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2021. 29p.

By Hannah E. Meyers

In November 2014, California voters approved a criminal justice reform measure, Proposition 47 (“Prop 47”), with almost 60% support. Ten years later, California voters are now considering rolling back some of its soft-on-crime policies. Prop 47 identified six “petty” crimes—grand theft, larceny, personal drug use, forgery, and two types of check fraud—and reclassified them. It downgraded these crimes, including thefts with property values under $950 and illegal drug possession for personal use, from felonies to misdemeanors. This paper presents a data-based argument on how Prop 47 shifted dynamics in both offender behavior and prosecutorial decision-making that damaged public safety and public health. Representative data from Riverside, one of California’s largest counties, suggest that Prop 47 increased re-offending, including serious felony re-offending, detention times, failures to appear in court, warrants issued on offenders, case dismissals in conjunction with plea deals, and the persistence levels of drug and theft offenders. Additional data collected from both Riverside and San Bernardino law-enforcement agencies show a significant drop in sentencing and in arrests, due partly to the diminished incentive for businesses to promptly report thefts. These shifts have also resulted in fewer defendants participating in in-custody drug treatment programs or other mandatory, supervised services because the incentives for doing so (avoiding prosecution and significant sentences) have evaporated. And, as California business owners can attest, reducing the cost of repeatedly committing theft removes the incentive for offenders to change their behavior. This has fueled increases in organized retail theft and fencing rings. Prop 47 also strained the resources of counties, by increasing the number of defendants sentenced to serve in overcrowded jails rather than prison.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2024. 20p.

By Mark Shaw | Ian Tennant Ana Paula Oliviera | Daren Brookbanks

In 2000, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the Palermo Convention, was adopted in a milestone moment for fostering global cooperation to combat organized crime. With 192 state parties, the convention and its protocols have provided a crucial legal framework for addressing types of crime such as human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and firearms trafficking. However, as transnational criminal networks continue to expand, new challenges are emerging, and the global community must take decisive action to ensure the UNTOC reaches its full potential. Our latest report highlights key obstacles to effective implementation: inconsistencies in national legislation, a lack of centralized data, and delays and restrictions in the convention’s Independent Review Mechanism (IRM). While the UNTOC’s widespread ratification is an achievement, these gaps hinder its ability to deliver impactful results. Without timely evaluations and better international cooperation, the global response to organized crime remains fragmented and insufficient. We believe that strengthening the UNTOC requires more robust data collection, greater transparency, and deeper engagement with civil society. Our report recommends the creation of an independent research center to monitor organized crime trends and track the convention’s progress. Additionally, we call for increased political will and resources to accelerate the IRM, ensuring that the UNTOC becomes a more powerful tool in the fight against evolving criminal markets.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 48p.

By María Victoria Llorente & Jeremy McDermott,  Raúl Benítez Manaut,  Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón,  John Bailey 

Transnational criminal organizations trafficking drugs from Mexico to the United States have existed since the Prohibition era in the United States. But the violence associated with this trafficking—and related movements of other illicit goods as well as undocumented migrants—increased exponentially beginning in the mid-2000s, threatening Mexico’s national security. During the six-year administration of President Felipe Calderón (2006-12) estimates of those killed in drug-related violence reached 70,000, with an additional 20,000 “disappeared.” The upsurge in violence in many areas of the country reflected a combination of fighting between rival drug trafficking organizations seeking territorial control of criminal markets and dominance of lucrative trafficking corridors, as well as clashes between the traffickers and government security forces. By 2010, some Mexican cities registered homicide rates that were among the highest in the world and the public began to seriously doubt the government’s strategy and its ability to guarantee public safety. The scope of the violence and its frequently gruesome and shocking character, and the government’s seeming inability to bring it under control, brought forth memories of an earlier period in Latin America, when Colombia was besieged by the violence of the Medellín and Cali drug trafficking cartels. The Colombian crisis of the 1980s and ’90s involved multiple ways the state was losing ground to guerrilla and paramilitary groups in addition to drug traffickers. But like Mexico, the cost in human lives and government legitimacy was huge Over the course of more than a decade, Colombia’s security situation has improved dramatically. With significant international cooperation, the guerrillas have been weakened militarily and coca cultivation and cocaine production have been reduced. Most analysts agree that at least some of the security crisis in Mexico (as well as Central America) is due to ways that security advances and improvements in state capacity in Colombia forced traffickers to search for new smuggling routes and ways to market their illicit product. This is true even though, as several chapters in this publication indicate, organized criminal groups remain an important source of instability in Colombia, having mutated and fragmented in response to government pressure. Former paramilitary fighters, who demobilized in the early 2000s as a result of peace talks with the government, are important actors in the new manifestations of organized crime. Colombia is now a major player in South-South security cooperation, offering training to over 2,500 Mexican military and police officials between 2010 and 2012, as well as to over 5,000 members of the security forces from Central America and the Caribbean and over 2,000 from South America during the same time period.1 A former director of the Colombian National Police, General Óscar Naranjo, served as an adviser to the administration of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. The United States funds some of Colombia’s programs abroad and U.S. officials have expressed satisfaction and pride in Colombia’s success. In a May 2013 visit to Colombia, Vice President Biden paid “personal tribute” to President Santos and “the people of Colombia for the remarkable, remarkable progress you’ve made…” in dealing with the country’s security concerns. Biden went on to mention Colombia’s training of “thousands of law enforcement officers and security officers from over 40 countries since 2009.”  But precisely what aspects of Colombia’s strategy and tactics for fighting organized crime in its own territory offer useful lessons for Mexico? What might Colombia’s steps and missteps offer by way of example or counter example? What is unique about each case such that comparisons are misleading? What do current security challenges in Colombia suggest about the threat posed by organized crime more generally? To reflect on these questions, the Latin American Program commissioned a series of papers from international experts with a wealth of experience on issues of security, violence, and transnational criminal organizations. This publication includes two chapters analyzing the usefulness of comparing Colombia and Mexico’s experiences in combatting organized crime, as well as the potential for using Colombia’s successes as lessons for Mexico’s security strategy. Maria Victoria Llorente of Fundación Ideas para la Paz and Jeremy McDermott of Insight Crime argue that Colombia does not represent a ready template for Mexico’s fight against violence and organized crime, although its long experience may provide insight into Mexico’s future. The second paper, by Raúl Benítez Manaut, a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), contends that Colombia does offer positive lessons about how reform of the defense sector and professionalization of the police can yield measurable results for Mexico. Commentaries by Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, and John Bailey of Georgetown University, deepen and take issue with the analyses provided by Llorente and McDermott and Benítez. .     

,Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014. 128p. Scholars

By Garan Ho/mqvist 

Crime is an increasingly worrying social phenomenon in the developing world in general and in Latin America in particular. As shown in Figure 1~, the crime rate (measured by homicide lOO 000, as reported to the UN crime surveys by national police authorities) has virtually exploded since the mid-1980s in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe. Latin America stands out as an exceptional case. Annually in Latin America, approximately 140,000 people are murdered (Londono & Guerrero 1999:27). Using other sources does not change this picture. Figure 2 confirms the exceptional position of Latin America, where the source in mortality statistics is collected from national health authorities instead of the police. Indicators of crime other than homicide are less reliable for international comparison, but estimates point in the direction of Latin America being way above the average for any other region of the world (Bourguignon 1999, Table 1). It has been estimated that 28 million Latin American families are victims of theft or robbery every year (Londono & Guerrero 1999:3). Crime and violence are now viewed as a development issue of importance, which was probably not the case two decades ago. Development agencies such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have quite recently initiated ambitious research projects on crime and violence. Projects directed to the judicial system or police authorities have increased their share in the project portfolio of multilateral as well as bilateral development cooperation agencies. More importantly, crime is becoming a major concern in the daily lives of an increasing number of citizens in the developing world, manifesting itself in national political agendas, in higher crime-related expenditures, and, not the least, in human suffering. There are several reasons to regard crime as a social phenomenon with strong and complex ties to the development process in general. In Latin America, crime is a potential threat to what most people would regard as encouraging development trends, especially after ''the lost decade" of the 1980s, in terms of democratization and resumed growth. The following examples may illustrate how continuous progress in these areas is being made more difficult by the increasing crime levels: 

 Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Vol. XXX: 2 2000,pp. 23-53

By Ben Mostyn

This article presents archival data produced by Australian diplomats in the 1980s that report on the ‘drug problem’ in various host countries. The reports reveal growing concern in many countries at a rapid increase in drug use. The second half of the article focusses on diplomatic reports from the United Nations where discussions were beginning about creating a third convention against drug trafficking. These early drafts of the convention labelled drug trafficking a ‘crime against humanity’—a criminal charge that had not been prosecuted since the Nuremburg trials. The article applies elements of moral panic theory, neorealism, and the sociology of punishment. Combining these theories suggests that condemning drug traffickers in the 1980s allowed diplomats to create a global social solidarity that may have helped end the Cold War.

Critical Criminology, August 2024. Crit Crim (2024).

By Irene María Álvarez-Rodríguez Translated by Victoria Furio

The consolidation of armed civilian collectives in the Mexican state of Michoacán arose in a setting in which the illegal regional economy no longer focused on drug smuggling but had turned to a variety of criminal activities and in which the perspective of a moral economy had been restored. This restructuring of the criminal economy was a strong factor in the emergence of the armed collectives.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 236, Vol. 48 No. 1, January 2021, 231–244

By Yanwen Wang, Jacquelyn Gilbreath , Lynne Mock

While drug crime-related criminal legal system and victim costs reached $113 billion across the United States in 2007, just $14.6 billion was spent on treating substance use disorder (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2014). Due, in part, to drug crimes, many U.S. citizens are under correctional supervision, with 1 in 66 adults being on probation or parole in 2020 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2021). In Illinois, 67,587 individuals were on probation in 2020 (Administrative Offices of the Illinois Courts, 2021) and 26,426 were on parole (Illinois Department of Corrections, 2020). The supervision population rate of substance use is estimated to be two to three times higher than that of the general population, with nearly half of the people under community supervision having a substance use disorder (PEW Charitable Trusts, 2018). The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority’s Adult Redeploy Illinois (ARI) program was established by the Crime Reduction Act of 2009 to provide financial incentives to local jurisdictions for programs that divert justice-involved individuals from state prisons by providing community-based supervision and individualized services. While researchers have evaluated ARI, models used in some jurisdictions (DeLong & Reichert, 2016; Kroner, et al., 2021; Mock et al., 2017; Reichert et al., 2016), research on ARI client outcomes related to the impact of drug testing is limited. The research goals for this study included: • Quantitatively examining all local ARI program drug test data, including tested drugs, drug test frequencies, and drug test results. • Systematically examining how ARI drug testing contributes to the possibility of revocation including other factors such as age, sex, and race. • Proposing recommendations for better program practice to reduce the rate of revocation. This study sought to answer the following research questions: 1. How is drug testing being practiced and observed in ARI in terms of its frequency, pass rates, and tested drugs? 2. Does drug testing have a significant impact on ARI participant outcomes when controlling for demographic variables? The study included 53,159 records of 1,055 individuals collected from October 3, 2011, to June 20, 2019. The median number of drug tests per individual was 19, and the median of the average days between drug tests was 10 days. The most frequently tested drugs also had the highest positive results: heroin (32%), marijuana/THC (30%), cocaine/crack (14%), alcohol (10%), and other opiates (8%). Logistic regression analyses were used to determine what demographic, drug testing, and criminal justice variables predicted program outcomes of completion or revocation. Among the demographic variables, only age predicted program outcomes. Neither sex nor race emerged as significant program outcome predictors. Drug test positivity rates predicted revocation, as well as drug test frequency (number of times an individual was tested) and average number of days between the drug tests. i Overall, the average drug positivity rate was 29% and most tests were passed with no drug found. Most successful clients who were older women at medium to medium-high recidivism risk and whom tested monthly with lower test positivity rates. Those most likely to experience program revocation were younger men who tested several times per month with higher test positivity rates during their program tenure. Graphing the programs by test positivity, number of tests, and frequency of tests suggests that individuals enrolled in some programs had higher test positivity rates (>50%) and were subject to less frequent drug tests than other programs. This study focuses on drug test outcomes, however, it also would be worth exploring data on drug testing rewards, sanctions, and requirements for program completion and their impacts on program outcomes.   

Chicago:  Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority., 2022. 33p 

By Amir Rotami

In this policy brief, based on published and forthcoming studies, author Amir Rostami outlines the changing nature of crime in Sweden, with a focus on organised crime, specifically lethal violence and fraud. What are the lessons learned from the Swedish crime paradox, namely the rise in organised crime, but not an equivalent rise in general crime, and what needs to be implemented to counter organised crime? The reaction to the question can be divided into two components: local and global/

European Liberal Forum Policy Paper . Brussels: European Liberal Forum, 2021. 19p.

By Matt Hopkins, Rachel Keighley, Teela Sanders

  Thinking about organised crime as an ecosystem is not only novel but also offers much potential to add to the theoretical and policy-based literature in this area. While organised crime is often analysed as relationships between criminal groups and consumers of illicit goods/services, little work has analysed specific forms of organised crime activities as ecosystems where different constituent parts are dependent upon each other for the crime activity to occur. This paper analyses the organisation of sexual exploitation by entrepreneurial organised crime groups sell ing sex in the United Kingdom. Based upon 30 interviews with 23 law enforcement forces in England and Wales and five interviews with Adult Service Website Opera tors; it identifies how an ecosystem is built that ensures (a) profit generation and (b) avoidance of legal prosecution. Our analysis not only illustrates how a market ‘sup ply’ and ‘demand’ ecosystem is generated through mutually convenient ‘organiser’, ‘marketer’ and ‘buyer’ relationships, but also how the roles of these actors ensure sexual exploitation continues. Keywords Organised crime · 

Trends in Organized Crime, trends in Organized Crime. 2024, 20pg